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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation seeks to establish that certain natural goods are 
systematically undervalued and neglected in the decision-making 
processes of private and public institutions. It is further argued 
that these natural goods Lend security to and enhance the quality of 
Life, hence their continued existence and functioning have consider-
able value for the survival and well-being of this and future genera-
tions. Decision-makers are therefore advised of the need to 
establish the.Level at which these natural goods will be maintained 
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The principal objective of this study is to develop a systematic, 
logical approach to assessing the trade-offs between economic goods and 
natural goods by exploring the nature of man and the relationship between 
man and his environment. Specifically, this dissertation examines the 
question: "Is there a rational basis for a policy which would seek to 
maintain in their present condition a significant number of natural and 
near-natural areas in developing countries''? To answer this question, 
certain economic, ecological, and philosophical concepts are analyzed 
from several different perspectives t6 ensure that subtle but important 
nuances are thoroughly explored; this may sometimes result in an 
impression of repetitiveness. 
The attempt to extend the horizons of economics to embrace wider philo-
sophical and ecological concerns is believed to be original in its 
general approach and it is hoped this will serve to stimulate greater 
interdisciplinary dialogue on the problem of developing better welfare 
criteria for making environmental decisions. 
In order to improve readability, direct references to sources and the use 
of quotation marks have been greatly reduced. These sources are 
identified by two numbers in brackets at the end of quoted or referenced 
material: the first number refers to the work cited (see the numerical 
listing of References), and the second refers to the page number of the 
work cited. 
The writer wishes to gratefully acknowledge the guidance and assistance 
of Professor Richard Fuggle and Professor John Grindley of the School of 
Environmental Studies, and Mrs Myra Mark. of the School of Economics, 
University of Cape Town. 
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DEFINITIONS OF THE KEY TERMS 
COMMON POOL RESOURCES: Public goods which can be depleted. 
CONSERVATION: Management of the biosphere to yield the greatest 
sustainable benefit to present generations while maintaining its po-
tential to meet the needs of future generations. 
CONSUMER COMM OD I TY: A man-made object which is intended to be used 
by an individual to satisfy his needs or wants. 
DECISION-MAKER: A legislative or administrative entity responsible 
for public welfare and common pool resources. 
DEVELOPED ENVIRONMENT: That part of the environment which has been 
designed or modified by man and is maintained by large auxiliary power 
flows from fossil or other concentrated fuels. 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY: Country with an average' annual per capita gross 
domestic product of less than R600 (in 1968 Rands). 
DEVELOPMENT: The modification of the biosphere and the application 
of human, financial, Living and non-Living re'sources to satisfy human 
wants. 
ECONOMIC GOOD: A commodity or service that can be ut i Li zed to 
satisfy human wants and that has exchange value. 
ECONOMIC GROWTH: The expansion over time in the output of goods 
and services. 
ECONOMIC WELFARE: That part of a society's well-being which is 
attributable to the consumption of economic goods~ 
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EXTERNAL I TY: The discrepancy between the costs (or benefits) in- ~ 
curred by the party responsible for some action and those incurred 
by society as a result of that action. 
GOAL: The result or achievement toward which effort is directed. 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT: A system of development based on the ex-
pansion of manufacturing and trade. 
INTERMEDIATE TECHNOLOGY: A means of modifying the physical en-
vironment on a small scale with simple tools and very little capital. 
NATURAL AMENITY: A natural good which has the quality of being 
pleasing. 
NATURAL AREAS: Areas virtually unmodified by man, in which natural· 
ecological processes are unimpaired. 
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT: That part of the environment which is of 
natural origin and operates without energetic or economic input from the 
power flows directly controlled by man. 
NATURAL GOOD: An object or service of nature which benef,its man and 
which may or may not have exchange value. 
NATURE: The natural world as it exists without man or his civilizat}on; 
the world surrounding man and existing independently of his activities. 
NEAR-NATURAL AREAS: Areas which have retained much of their 
natural appearance and functions, but which have been somewhat modified 
by man; areas where natural ecological processes have to some degree 
been pre-empted, displaced, or subsidized by man-directed processes, 
but which would quite readily revert back to natural conditions. 
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PARETO OPTIMUM: A social optimum in which it is not possible to 
make somebody better off without making somebody worse off. 
POL ICY: Any governing principle, plan, or course of action. 
PUBLIC GOOD: A good which, if available for anyone, is available 
for everyone. 
QUALITY OF LIFE: The state of well-being of an individual or society 
based on the extent to which basic needs are satisfied. 
SOCIAL WELFARE: The total well-being of society. 
STANDARD OF LIV I NG: A measure of welfare 'based on the consumption 
of economic goods. /" 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
"The. e.vofution. 06 a. £.and e..t.h.ic. .i-6 a.n. .in.te.Ue.c..tu.a.i.. 
M we.U M a.n. e.motion.a.i. pltoc.e.-6-6." C 94-263 > 
THE OBJECTIVE 
A policy of maintaining natural and near-natural areas must be based on 
rational principles and not simply an emotional commitment to nature if 
it is to have general and Lasting acceptance. A Logical approach to 
developing a policy pertaining to the natural environment would be to 
study the concepts of various disciplines which are concerned with man 
and his relationship to nature, and consider how these concepts might 
be synthesized. to construct a viewpoint with a sufficiently broad pers--.. 
pect i ve. Conservation has been defined as the meeting point of 
cultural, social and economic systems on the one hand and natural 
systems at the other; conservation·actions aim at the planned, harmonious 
interlocking of these two sets of systems and requires a knowledge of 
both. (21-190> Decisions affecting the natural environment should be 
based on an understanding of man's true physical and psychological needs, 
and the economic benefits of any project or policy should be weighed 
against potential ecological and psychological costs. 
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Psychology, economics, and ecology are disparate discipl.ines which are 
all supremely relevant to choices of future environments. Each deals 
with certain aspects of reality and ignores other aspects; none on 
its own can provide a sufficient set of ideas by which to live and to 
interpret the world. Neither economfcs nor ecology, for example, 
addresses the question: "What kind of world do we want"? Psychology, 
which deals with human needs and values, can provide guidance for 
establishing goals. Economic and ecological concepts can be used to 
assess alternative courses of action in terms of these goals. 
Ecology is concerned with elucidating principles governing the inter-
relationships between· living things and their environment, and 
economics is concerned with examining the effects of certain activities 
on human welfare. ·Since man's relationship to his environment is 
fundamental to his welfare, knowledge of ecological mechanisms and their 
effects must be considered essentia~_to the economic calculus. Until 
recently, economists largely ign~red this aspect of man's well-being, 
being concerned primarily with improving the efficiency and distribution 
of goods and services irrespective of the resulting impacts on environ-
mental quality. The growing .and pervasive problem of pollution led to 
the development of new concepts in economic theory (such as the concept 
of externalities) to bring these man-created environmental problems 
into the economic equation. Nevertheless, to date little attention 
has been paid to another, potentially more serious, set of environ-
mental problems which is far more insidious: the exhaustion of natural 
and near-natural systems due to man's increasingly disruptive 
activities, which are growing at an exponential rate together with 
population and technological expansion. 
This dissertation seeks to establish the psychological and ecological 
importance of maintaining natural and near-natural areas. The approach 
involves postulating a set of reasonable goals for society based on 
man's physical and psychological needs, and then examining the relative 
importance of what is called "economic welfare" and those "non-
monetizable" aspects of social well-being for which no market can be ' 
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created because they are not interchangeable and cannot be quantified. 
The thesis developed in this study is that the natural environment 
provides certain services and amenities which must be maintained if 
total human welfare is to be maximized. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Social, economic, and political pressures to accelerate industrial 
growth and development are resulting in irreversible modifications to 
natural and near-natural areas with uncertain consequences for the 
quality of Life and the future of mankind. These environmental changes 
may impose great social costs which will not be foreseen in time to 
avoid incurring them. If the true nature of these costs were known, 
they might be regarded as unacceptable. 
This problem is particularly acute in those developing countries which 
have rapidly growing populations and rising expectations, but which are 
already overcrowded and short of natural resources needed to meet 
demands. It is generally assumed that the first objective for a 
developing country should be to rapidly increase its output of goods 
and services in order to satisfy society's wants. This Laudable ob-
jective may, however, mask a most serious difficulty, and prove to be 
an economic tar baby: attempts to rapidly improve the standard of 
Living and eliminate poverty may meet with environmental and institutional 
resistance, and resources may become inextricably committed to an 
ultimately destructive pursuit. The challenge for developing countries 
is to solve their substantial health and welfare problems without 
falling into the disamenity and hazard trap that waits for future 
generations. 
The question is whether rapid and unconstrained industrial development 
constitutes the most sensible approach to solving the formidable 
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problems facing developing countries. This type of solution appears 
to have an inherent weakness which could ultimately undermine all the 
good it promises to do. The industrial system stimulates "wants" 
which only continued industrial growth can satisfy and thus insinuates 
its goals into a society's value system. The industrial system 
stimulates greed, envy, and avarice, (131-26) ·and this bodes ill for 
the future of mankind: resources are consumed and the productive base 
is eroded largely to satisfy unwarrantable wants, while the income gap 
between the rich and poor continues to widen. 
Faced with the pressing needs of the poor, environmental issues tend 
to have low priority in developing countries, and some maintain that 
the problem of poverty must be solved before environmental problems can 
be broached. But it would appear that man may not have the power to 
solve his problems one at a time. By the end of the century more than 
80% of a world popQlation of 7 billion will li~e in less developed 
countries. (133-304) With rising per capita consumRtion levels, the 
pressure for economic growth will be out of all proportion to the in-
crease in population, and it may not be possible to attain required 
levels of production due to environmental constraints. There are indi-
cations that the global environment i~ already overburdened. In many 
parts of the developing world, vast expanses of land are being lost to 
human use, primarily through deforestation and its shadow, desertification. 
<35-458) Africa has only 0,5 hectare of forest per person, and the 
Third World is losing its forest resource base at a rate which would 
exhaust it completely in 60 years. (35-459) In addition, there 
remains an area of potentially productive but threatened drylands 
covering 45 million km 2 or 30 per cent of the world's Land surface. 
<147-7) These Lands are Losing their ability to support useful species 
of plant and animal Life, and Losses to desertification are estimated 
to be 50 000 km 2 /yr. ( 35-464) 
The. Global 2000 Re.poJtt, which projects population, natural resources, 
and environmental trends over the next 20 years if policies and 
institutions remain unchanged, depicts conditions which are cause for 
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great alarm. In addition to substantial losses to deforestation and 
desertification, between 15 and 20 per cent of all species on earth 
could be lost by 2000. Air and water quality are expected to decline 
significantly, water shortages will be more widespread and severe, and 
climatic changes could have highly disruptive effects over large 
regions. The demand for fuel wood is ex.pected to exceed the ·supply by 
about 25 per cent, and the prices for fossil fuels are likely to 
increase rapidly as resources dwindle or supplies are interrupted. 
(77-2,3) 
The implications of such developments are ominous. There· are great 
political, as well as ecological, risks implied. Some of today's 
underdeveloped countries are yesterday's "overdeveloped" countries -
when the fertility of the land was lost, the civilization which it 
supported collapsed. The situation today is far more serious. because 
the entire world is affected. It may be difficult to alter the 
destructive pattern of development as the sheer momentum of our present 
activities could well be enough to drive us on for another four or'five 
decades on our present path. But since we do not know how to prevent 
the collapse that overtook all previous civilizations, it would be 
advisable to seek new and diverse strategies. (153-180; 70-84) 
STATEMENT OF THE APPROACH TO THE INVESTIGATION 
The approach to this investigation consisted of (1) formulating a 
series of questions which were relevant to the central thesis, (2) con-
ducting a multidisciplinary literature search to gather information per-
taining to the questions, (3) developing a method of assessing the 
information gathered, and (4) analyzing alternative policies using 
various concepts and criteria obtained through the literature search. 
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This dissertation is concerned with determining the importance of main-
taining natural and near-natural areas, with particular reference to 
deve~oping countries, where pressure for rapid and unconstrained develop-
ment is high and the perceived value of such areas is Low. While it 
may not be possible to answer the question "How much of the natural 
environment is necessary to man's well-being?" it is perhaps possible 
to argue that beyond some point further reductions in natural and near-
natural areas will rapidly increase risk to survival and reduce the 
quality of Life. 
Questions have a way of raising other questions, and the following List 
gives some idea of how the investigation branched as the answer to a 
particular question depended on the answers to several others. How 
much of the natural environment is Left and how much more can man afford V 
to Lose? What are the true costs of Losing natural and near-natural 
areas? What is the value of stable and diverse biotic communities? 
Can ecological imperatives be identified? How important are natural 
and near-natural areas to the quality of life? What constitutes the 
"good Life" for man? What are man's potentialities and "natural" 
goals? Can "quality of life" be adequately defined? What is the 
value of variety for man? How can decision-makers be encouraged to 
give more weight to values associated with natural and near-natural 
areas? How can development pressure be resisted? Can "development" be 
re-defined to incorporate values derived from maintaining natural and 
near-natural areas? How can "optimum" development be achieved? How 
can particular developments be evaluated for their contribution to the 
problem? How can short-term needs be compared to long-term needs? 
How can social progress be made sustainable? Can systematic procedures 
be developed for making trade-offs between short-term economic gains and 
long-term ecological risks? How important are risk and uncertainty? 
Can the future goals and values of society be predicted, and-how can 
present costs be weighed against future benefits? How important is 
intergenerational equity? To what extent does problem-solving in the 
present create problems for the future? How much of a burden can 
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present generations be expected to assume for the benefit of future 
generations? Is it reasonable to assume that future generations can 
Look after themselves? Isn't there a possibility that the present 
pattern of development will result in the exhaustion of vital resources? 
Who should pay for the high opportunity cost of maintaining natural and 
near-natural areas? How significant are efficiency goals relative to 
equity goals? Can a policy of maintaining natural and near-natural 
areas be made acceptable if affluent nations provide subsidies for 
poorer nations? 
An extensive, multidisciplinary Literature search was conducted to 
obtain information and opinions to provide greater insight into how 
these questions might be answered. The principal works consulted were 
in the fields of ecology, economics, psychology, philosophy, planning, 
and general environmental studies (see References). 
A method was developed for evaluating the choice between two policies. 
One policy would constrain development by maintaining certain portions 
of the natural environment in perpetuity, and the other would recognize 
no such constraint. The method involves describing the situation that 
faces the decision-maker, and then developing an approach to decision-
making which is based on formulating reasonable goals and evaluating 
the policy choices in terms of these goals. Goal formulation is based 
on an examination of the nature and potentialities of man, and makes 
particular use of Maslow's "hierarchy of needs" theory. Evaluation of 
the policy alternatives involves the consideration of various economic 
and ecological concepts~ 
STATEMENT OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
This dissertation suggests that maintaining natural and near-natural 
areas is necessary to man's well-being in two respects: (1) environ-
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mental buffering reduces risks to survival, and C2l natural amenities 
contribute to a higher quality of life. It is therefore recommended 
that developing countries promulgate a policy of balanced and controlled 
development which maintains significant elements of the natural environ-
ment to minimize ecological risks and maximize opportunities for ulti-
mately achieving a high and sustainable quality of life. It is 
further recommended that mo.re affluent countries subsidize a portion of 
the costs of maintaining natural and near-natural areas in poorer 
countries, and assist in developing appropriate technology to meet the 
basic needs of the poor and provide a sound basis for further ~evelop­
ment. 
Ecological imperatives are difficult to identify, and the quality of 
life concept is difficult to define. But there are ecological and 
psychological limitations on man's activities; materialistic Utopian 
visions must give way to more realistic visions of the future. Develop-
ment models should seek balance and sustainability achieved through 
smallness and decentralization, with production and consumption activi-
ties conducted in accordance with ecological principles. Personal 
fulfilment should depend not on gross material satisfactions (beyond 
what is necessary for meeting basic physiological needs) but on mean-
ingful work, continuing education, close family and community ties, 
abundant leisure time <well-used), and satisfactions to be derived from 
natural amenities. 
Such a model calls for setting aside extensive tracts of natural and 
near-natural areas as a form of investment in ecological and amenity 
resources. These areas would serve as outdoor Laboratories for science, 
Lend greater ecological stability to environmental systems, provide 
protection for present and future utilitarian species, afford opportu-
nities for aesthetic satisfaction and spiritual renewal, give greater 
variety to Life, and maintain options for future wants and needs. 
This model of development differs greatly from the current Western 
urban-industrial model, and its implementation would depend on many 
J 
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institutional adjustments to compensate for economic externalities, 
short social and political time horizons, and imperfect scientific 
knowledge. Some sacrifice in short-term efficiency and economic 
growth in order to achieve equity and environmental goals will prove to 
be more efficient in the Long-term and allow greater prospects of sustain-. 
able growth. Other options appear more efficient (because it is not 
necessary to pay the full social, political, and ecological costs today) 
and the future is too heavily discounted (due to Limited perspectives 
and ignorance of future ramifications). If new institutional mechanisms 
could force internalization of all externalities (and not just pollution 
costs), and permit an extension of relevant time horizons, then it may 
be possible to switch to development models which are more appropriate 
to the present condition of man. There is no reason why this should 
Lead to economic collapse, since production and consumption functions 
could be shifted into cultural services and greater environmental 
amenities. 
E.~ Schumacher is confident that future generations can enjoy a secure 
and satisfying existence, if only today's decision-makers choose the 
'appropriate path to development: 
. \ 
The gen~rosity of the Earth allows us to feed all 
mankind; we know enough about ecology to keep the 
earth a healthy place; there is enough room on the 
Earth~ and there are enough materials, so that 
everybody can have adequate shelter; ·we are quite 
competent enough to produce sufficient supplies of 
necessities so that no one need Live in misery. 
Above all, we shall then see that the economic 
problem is a convergent problem that has been solved 
already: we know how to provide enough, and do not 
require any violent, inhuman, aggressive technologies 
to do so. There is no economic problem and, in a 
sense, there never-ilas been. But there is a moral 
problem ... ( 130-159) 
It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of establishing clear 
and realizable goals for society; without clearly defined goals, it is 
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impossible to chart a course, and without clearly attainable goals, 
charting a course is Likely to be an exercise in futility. It is 
recommended that social goals should be based on the true, biologically-
determined needs of man. Objectives for reaching the goals should be 
quantified as far as possible, and minimum standards established and 
carefully monitored to ensure norms are maintained. While it may be 
difficult to determine precise levels at which natural and near-
natural areas should be maintained, it is suggested that a Level set 
arbitrarily high is preferable to one set too low. If technocrats are 
correct, and natural environments are not needed for survival, they are 
still needed for their amenity value. If technocrats are wrong, it 
will be desirable to have numerous areas in which ecological processes 
are virtually unimpaired, and which comprise reservoirs of genetic 
materials which may be needed to construct new development paths. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SITUATION FACING THE DECISION-MAKER 
"Now we. 6ac.e. the. que...6Uon whe.thvr. a. ..6WR.. h.i..ghvr. 
'..6tanda.Jtd 06 .i.i..v.i..ng' .i..-6 woJc.th lt6 c.o..6:t6 .i..n th.i..ng..6 n.a:twr.a..i, 
w.i..R..d, and 6Jc.e.e. •••• We. 06 the. m.i..noJc..i..:t:y ..6e.e. a law 06 d.i..m.i..n.i....6h.i..ng 
Jc.e.twi.Yl...6 .i..n pJc.ogJc.e...6..6 • ••• " ( 94-x vi i ) 
INTRODUCTION 
Decision-makers in developing countries generally assume that rapid 
economic growth and industrial development are much to be desired. 
Many believe that the adoption of modern industrial technology offers 
the best and fastest way to alleviate the urgent problems of the poor, 
eradicate gross distributional disparities, accommodate rising expect-
ations, and increase gene~al security and international influence. 
The enthusiasm for industrial development has been so great that Little 
consideration has been given to the potential dangers of disrupting 
traditional social patterns and making significant incursions into 
ecological systems. But social and ecological costs may in fact out-
weigh the.benefits of industrialization in the long run. Industrial 
solutions to development problems may lead to even greater social and 
environmental problems and to the emergence of institutions which will 
prove to be unsatisfactory but inescapable masters. 
Decision-makers are inclined to accept environmental disruption as the 
price of progress and discount the possibility of serious ecological 
breakdo~ns, often displaying a too-ready willingness to trust in tech-
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nology to solve all future environmental problems. There is a natural 
intertemporal bias which favours selection of the most efficacious 
solution to today's problems, even if this may create greater problems 
for future generations. However, if the socially relevant time 
horizon is extended sufficiently, so that the sustainability of social 
progress becomes as important as alleviating the plight of the poor, 
then more attention needs to be given to long-term risks attached to 
altering natural environments. 
THE PRESSURE TO PURSUE RAPID 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
The Nobel Prize winning economist Arthur Lewis once suggested that 
economic growth leads to greater control over the environment, implying 
that ecological problems' brought on by industrial development will 
always be amenable to technological solutions arising out of the process 
of industrial development. 
What distinguishes men from pigs is that men 
have greater control over their environment; 
not that they are more happy. And on this 
test, economic growth is greatly to be desired. 
The case for economic growth is that it gives 
man greater control over his environment, and 
thereby increases his freedom. (96-421) 
Lewis points out that greater control over the environment has Lowered 
death rates, shortened work hours, and freed man from much drudgery. 
He then goes on to discuss two serious problems which face political 
Leaders in developing countries - < 1) the increasing gap between 
production and aspirations, and <2> the increasing gap between 
resources and population growth - and concludes that economic growth is 
the only option available, suggesting that no-growth adherents have 
forgotten that the consequences of a population explosion may be much 
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more damaging to existing social structures and moral codes than the 
consequences of any likely increase in production would be. (96-435) 
Lewis's reasoning may be questioned on several points. First, it is 
not certain that economic growth leads to greater control over the en-
vironment. Economic growth could eventually result in destabilization 
and Loss of control over the en.vironment. Second, economic growth may 
have the effect of increasing aspirations and population growth at a 
greater rate than it increases production and resource availability, 
thus widening rather than closing the gaps - there may be a dynamic 
instability in the interactions between these factors which is exacer-
bated by economic growth. Finally, Lewis seems unaware of the 
potential consequences of increasing production in terms of ecological 
costs - these may be far more serious than the social and moral costs 
of not increasing production. 
There are certain conditions necessary to maintain a given rate of 
economic growth. Growth of the Labour force, combined with growth in 
the supply of other productive factors and with improvements in tech-
nology, result in a sustained rate of growth in the level of output of 
an economy. <133-305) One might question Cl) the necessity Cor 
desirability) of continued growth in the Labour force since this creates 
greater environmental burdens; (2) the long-term availability of 
other productive factors; (3) the ability of technology to keep pace 
with rapidly expanding requirements; and (4) the capacity of the en-
vironment to withstand impacts resulting from greater output of the 
economy. The process of economic growth Cas presently defined) seems 
to have two unavoidable consequences: ( 1) per capita consumption of 
natural amenities is ultimately reduced <which could impair the quality 
of life), and (2) there are growing risks to the sustainability of the 
process. 
Perhaps the greatest danger Lies in the irreversibility of some of the 
impacts (so that quality of Life cannot be restored after some point) 
and the fact that other options are systematically foreclosed and vul-
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nerability is increased as the process continues (so that risks cannot 
be reduced after some point). It would seem possible that environ-
' mental control could be Lost as a direct result of economic growth. 
The industrial-state paradigm envisages man as infinite consumer of 
goods and services and sets profit maximizing and economic growth as 
pre-eminent goals. Managing the earth, with its finite supplies of 
space and resources and its delicate ecological balance, and conserving 
and developing it as a suitable habitat for evolving man, is a far 
different task than that for which the present economic system was set 
up. ( 72-134) 
How much development do the developing countries need? Mishan suggests 
the architecture of social compassion should attend primarily to a 
"floor" of minimal material comfort below which nobody in the community 
should be allowed to sink. <110-127) Any system of development must 
be inspired by an acknowledgement of the right of people to acceptable 
standards of health, nutrition, education, Livelihood and social well-
being, consistent with human dignity. (147-44) However investment in -
durable capital goods and advanced education in developing countries has 
Led to rising expectations which are not compatible with social and 
environmental realities. Perhaps the root of the problem is an in-
appropriate vision of progress. The narrow concept of industrializa-
tion as the expansion of the manufacturing sector and the narrow concept 
of education as the academic and technical qualifications appropriate to 
modern, industrialized societies may account for the high failure rate 
of development programmes to substantially improve social conditions 
in many countries. 
It would seem desirable for developing countries to adopt a different 
model for development - a more gradual, balanced, wide-based pattern of 
growth would appear to have greater prospects of success and involve 
fewer environmental risks. This approach would imply a judicious use 
of resources consistent with Long-established conservation principles. 
Decision-makers should adopt a firm policy which recognizes constraints 
on economic growth and declares certain portions of the natural 
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environment inviolable as long as there is any ecological uncertainty 
regarding the level at which natural and near-natural areas must be 
maintained. 
The pressure for continued rapid economic growth will prove most diffi-
cult to resist. Even in developed countries, where concern for en-
vironmental quality and long-term security is much greater, this 
pressure is sometimes irresistible: the Alaska pipeline brought to the 
fore the difficulty of making sound environmental judgments when 
traditional values of national security and economic growth are at 
stake. ( 118-309) A more conservative pattern of development, based on 
intermediate technology rather than sophisticated modern industrial 
technology, will be difficult to sell to decision-makers who are faced 
with the exigencies of dire poverty and who are aware of the effi-
ciencies in production achieved by other societies. It is therefore 
imperative to clearly elucidate the nature of the risks and sacrifices 
hidden behind the Siren call of industrial development. 
THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF UNCONSTRAINED 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
People seem to have unlimited wants, and there is a widespread aversion 
to accepting some deprivation now in order to reduce the risk of an 
environmental catastrophe later. 
The religion of economics promotes an idolatry of1 
rapid change .... The burden of proof is placed on 
those who take the "ecological viewpoint": unless 
they can produce evidence of marked injury to man, 
the change will proceed. ( 129-124) 
The problem is that ecological risks are insidious and difficult to 
discern and evaluate; and since they cannot be conclusively proved to 
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be intractable, there is a tendency to dismiss them for Lack of evidence. I 
But decision-makers should remain cognizant of man's imperfect under-
standing. Perhaps the most significant insight since Darwin is that it 
~s,impossible to transcend the human reference point: our processes of 
thought may not sufficiently correspond to the structure of nature to 
permit us an understanding which is even approximately true. (86-155) 
We may be so constituted that much of nature must remain shrouded in 
mystery forever. 
If it is not possible to satisfactorily demonstrate absolute ecological 
Limits and imperatives, it is possible to compare the adverse environ-
mental effects of development schemes with their salutary effects to 
date. UL Haq has commented on the poor success of economic develop-
ment in developing countries, where for about two-thirds of humanity 
the increase in per capita income has been Less than one dollar a year 
for the Last 20 years. <145-185) The task of closing the gap between 
developed and developing countries seems hopeless: the increase in the 
per capita G.N.P. of.the U.S. in one year equals the increase that 
India may be able to manage in about 100 years. ( 145-185) Attempts to 
·narrow the gap are often counter-productive; many major development 
projects have Later turned into development disasters. The Aswan High 
Dam on the Nile, for example, brought irrigation to 400000 hectares of 
Land but may result in the Loss of millions of hectares in the Nile 
Delta where productivity depended on nutritious silt formerly brought by 
annual iLoods. <29-68) In addition, the project has resulted in 
greater evaporation Losses, a decline in the sardine fishery of the 
Mediterranean Sea, and an increase in bilharzia and malaria. (37-55) 
The Kariba Dam on the Zambezi has also had detrimental effects on 
' general productivity and has resulted in erosion, Land shortages, social 
upheaval, outbreaks of disease among Livestock, and famine. <37-191) 
Attempts to increase cotton yields in Peru through the widespread use of 
insecticides have actually resulted in Lower cotton yields and more 
pests. (37-264) When one compares the extremely modest accomplish-
ments with the environmental damage which has been wrought in the 
pursuit of economic development, and considers the possible Long-term 
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consequences of continuing this sort of policy, the alternative of 
adopting a more conservative policy seems more attractive. 
It is suggested that unconstrained economic growth and development may 
have three types of serious adverse effects in the Long-term: future 
options could be foreclosed, the potential for attaining a high quality 
of life could be impaired, and ecosystem destabilization could constitute 
a threat to surviv~l. These effects will each be discussed in turn. 
Options Foreclosed 
Natural resources essential to industrial processes are becoming more 
scarce. While improvements in technology may hold down prices for a 
time, abrupt increases in the real prices of certain resources are 
likely to occur event~ally, and this could effectively make these 
reso4rces unavailable <particularly to poorer countries). A policy 
solely committed to industrial development could thus prove short-
sighted. 
Similarly, there may be significant discontinuities in the exchange 
opportunity between natural amenities and other goods, so that the demand 
for natural amenities could approach infinity rather suddenly. Since 
the supply of these goods cannot be augmented, and they have no close 
substitutes, it would be prudent to anticipate this point in the ex-
change opportunity process where the terms of trade are drastically 
altered and ensure that some reasonable Level of natural amenities is 
maintained. 
The concept of irreversibility is vitally important to decisions affect-
ing natural goods since traditional demand analysis, in which the price 
of a commodity is determined by its relative availab,ility, cannot be 
applied in a satisfactory way. < 114-8) Krutilla stresses that: 
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Decisions taken by man which ~ffect irreproducible 
gifts of nature ... differ from decisions which can 
be undone if the consequences are deemed undesirable 
on hindsight. In an uncertain economic environment 
there is a value in the retention of an option which 
would be otherwise foreclosed. (91-14) 
The value of option demand is virtually impossible to estimate but in-
creases in significance whenever the results of a project (1) are 
irreversible for economic or technical reasons, (2) are large changes 
rather than small changes, and (3) have no close substitutes. (46-168) 
The indeterminable nature of this value, and its potential importance 
in a world in which the scale and rate of change is Increasing ex-
ponentially, are major reasons for adopting a more conservative 
approach to development and maintaining a substantial number of natural 
and near-natural areas. 
One example illustrating the importance of option demand is the incal-
culable value which certain genetic resources may have for future 
generations. A major concern of the Stockholm conference was the 
reported weakening of gene pools for agricultural plants and the fact 
that it is usually in w1ld or exotic strains that blight-resistant 
properties are found - strains which are fast vanishing. <141-252) 
Maintaining genetic diversity in these plants is a sensible form of 
insurance: of the three hundred thousand higher plants, man relies on 
only six hundred; only fifteen kinds of plants provide most of the 
world's food crops. <62-84) 
It is impossible to forecast what other species may be required in the 
future, but if they are to be available when needed it is necessary to 
provide natural ecosystems to ensure their continued survival. Every 
species of living organism represents a store of information which is 
irrevocably lost if it becomes extinct, and preservation may only be 
possible in the context of the entire,ecosystem to which a species 
belongs. <149-13) Human activities are increasingly disrupting natural 
ecosystems, and this appears to result in greater extinction rates and 
other forms of non-renewability. The prospects for arresting these 
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trends are not encouraging. As human pressure on the land increases, 
the hope for preserving rare species will fade and in the long term we 
can only save those species that can survive in a representative system 
of nature reserves and national parks, and those that are compatible 
with humans. <53-13) 
Maintaining natural environments confers a number of option benefits. 
There is the value of natural environments that have remarkable qualities 
for scientific research; the value that individuals place on retaining 
an option when faced with actions having irreversible consequences; and 
the value that some individuals place on the knowledge of the mere 
existence of nature. (91-124) None of these can be expressed in quanti-
tative terms, but it may be that due to the asymmetric implications of 
technology (which indicates that the supply of natural goods in 
relation to the supply of man-made goods will always be diminishing) 
natural environments will represent irreplaceable assets of appreciating 
value with the passage of time. <88-783) 
Quality of Life Impaired 
The quality of life (see "Definition of Key Terms", page iy') is to 
some degree dependent on~the quality of the environment. The conce~t · 
of environmental quality is often defined too narrowly as freedom from 
pollution, possibly because certain pollution costs are rather easy to 
visualize qualitatively and estimate quantitatively. However the loss 
of environmental amenities can occur without pollution, so even if 
obvious external costs of development are internalized, there may still 
be significant losses in environmental quality. These could include, 
for example, foregone ecological, aesthetic, or recreational values due 
to development projects. For each incremental enhancement of living 
standards something must be sacrificed - whether it be solitude, inde-
pendence, ideology, serenity of the environment or the stock of non-
renewable resources. ( 11-xi) Krutilla has developed methods for 
evaluating the environmental costs of specific developments, but these 
20 
are not suitable for use in developing countries where natural amenities 
are not yet appreciated sufficiently to offset perceived development 
benefits. (91-133) The problem is that by the time amenity benefits 
assume values equivalent to those of commodity benefits, the environ-
mental resources necessary to their provision will have been destroyed. 
Today's decision-maker can therefore not be exclusively concerned with 
. standard of living improvements if this is at the expense of natural 
amenities which will contribute to the future quality of life. The 
practice of ad hoc or incremental decision-making (which consists of 
making decisions at the margin, as they come up, one at a time) may have 
deleterious consequences for the quality of life of future generations. 
Decision-makers concerned only about today's optimal position can pro-
gress from one optimal position to another, each optimal position 
corresponding to a deteriorating situation. (106-138) This is true 
because time, population growth, technological innovation, and changing 
tastes alter the optimal position and there is no assurance that today's 
optimal position is on a path which can lead to future improvements in 
well-being. 
The problem of choice is thus complicated by considerations of the 
future and is further compounded by exceedingly subtle and intricate 
information problems, such as the problem of measuring disamenity in 
the absence of former users. Mishan has demonstrated that if all 
people become affected by the same degree of disamenity, a price-
di fference or premium for amenity cannot emerge in the market. If an 
investigator were to interpret such facts as indicating complete in-
sensitivity to disamenity by the community he would obviously under-
state the social cost. ( 109-326) It may therefore be prudent to 
question the long-term utility of material benefits made possible by 
industrial-development and allow for the possibility that natural 
amenities may be of considerably greater importance to the future 
quality of life. 
Industrial efficiency has generated immense economic wealth, but is 
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making civilization dependent on technological and social structures 
so complex that they are almost out of control. (50-269) There may 
evolve a rather inhuman 1984 type of social system which subordinates 
individual talents, needs, or desires to the survival of the social 
organism as a whole. (847116) Modern, industrial man, in his zeal to 
attain to ever-higher standards of living, may be eroding the quality 
of life. Technology has conferred many material blessings upon man 
but has increasingly deprived him of ~irect contact with nature, which 
may be of far greater importance (after basic needs are satisfied) to 
his well-being. Man is still an enigma, and no science has yet 
revealed what sources of sustenance are essential to his well-being or 
how his spiritual and aesthetic needs may best be satisfied. As 
Schumacher has pointed out: 
The extraordinary thing about the modern "Life 
sciences'' is that they hardly ever deal with life 
as such, the factor x, but devote infinite atten-
tion to the study and analysis of the physico-
chemical body that is Life's carrier ... since 
physics and the other instructional sciences base 
themselves only on the dead aspect of nature, they 
cannot Lead to phi losophy, if phi Losophy is to QiVe 
us guidance on what "Life" is all about.... To en-
hance our Level of Being we have to adopt a Life-style 
conducive to such enhancement, which means one that 
grants our Lower nature just the attention and care it 
requires and Leaves us with plenty of time and free 
attention for the pursuit of our higher development. 
( 130-29, 123, 153) 
The current environmental crisis may be attributed to the postwar tech-
nological transformation of productive activities which has had a 
surprisingly small effect on the degree to which individual needs for 
basic economic goods have been met. <33-271; 31-144) Instead, this 
new technology has Led to the production of a class of economic goods 1 
which may be regarded as non-essential but which provides much sought 
after comforts, conveniences, and amusements. Developing countries 
have generally adopted this technology and these values wherever they 
have been introduced and, in attempting to close the "standard of 
Living" gap with developed countries, are in danger of suffering even 
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greater losses in environmental amenities. A crucial question is how 
to determine the point of "ecological transition", which may be defined 
as a point at which a country's industrial activity reduces rather than 
enhances the quality of Life of its -citizens. (121-22) In some 
countries citizens have a per capita income more than enough to permit 
them to live enjoyable Lives, so far as that capacity depends on income. 
It may well be that in the United States, for example, the Loss of 
natural amenities in recent years (or perhaps even since the trans-
ition from a rural to an urban society) has not been compensated by 
increased consumption of economic goods. 
While it may not be possible to measure the declining marginal utility of 
extra units of material goods relative to other goods, it does seem that 
modern economies generate a "throwaway" mentality in which materialism 1 
<i.e., the desire to acquire more goods) is encouraged but Less value is 
attached to acquisitions, so that they are not cherished or kept. In 
pre-industrial or traditional societies, ordinary goods and chattels 
were themselves a source of gratification, not only in appreciation of 
their individual workmanship but also because of their rea'L scarcity. 
(110-120) It may not be intuitively obvious which system confers 
greater social welfare. 
Modern technology and industrial development are intended to free man 
from the drudgery of ceaseless toil and provide him with abundant 
leisure, but some observers question whether the results have been truly 
salubrious. Work has been degraded in the quest for ever-greater 
efficiency through emphasizing the more mechanical aspects of production. 
Industrial development has the effect of dehumanizing work, and this 
reduces the well-being of the worker. Economists tend to regard all 
"input" as disutility and "output" as utility and so they seek to 
"lighten men's toil". (106-208) However there may be utilities on the 
input side - work itself is not necessarily a bad thing, and there may 
be considerable satisfactions in work with a "human face". (129-141) 
Unpleasant toil is a result of the meaning of. work, rather than the 
task itself. Technology will never eliminate toil, but the right 
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social relationships and.attitudes will. (99-145) Work contributes to 
two sets of needs: the lower (physiological and security) needs, and 
the higher (belongingness, esteem, meaningfulness, cognitive, aesthetic) 
needs. Work may be considered a disutility in the first case and a 
utility in the second case. 
work: 
Schumacher lists three functions of human 
First, to provide necessary and useful goods and 
services. Second, to enable every one of us to 
use and thereby perfect our gifts like good stewards. 
Third, to do so in service to, and in cooperation 
with, others, so as to liberate ourselves from our 
inborn egocentricity. (131-3) 
But work in modern industry is inherently unsatisfying: 
Mechanical, artificial, divorced from nature, 
utilizing only the smallest part of man's potential 
capabilities, it sentences the great majority of 
workers to spending their working lives in a way 
which contains no worthy challenges, no stimulus to 
self-perfection, no chance of development, no ele-
ment of Beauty, Truth, or Goodness. <131-27) 
Thoreau also commented on the unsuitability of industrial work: 
You come away from the great factory saddened, as 
if the chief end of man were to make pails; bu~ in 
the case of the countryman who makes a few by hand, 
rainy days, the relative importance of human life 
and of pails is preserved .... <134-200) 
And Kierkegaard saw work as having religious significance, as constitu-
ting the path to consummation with God: 
To work is the perfection of the human. Through 
working the human being resembles God, who also 
works. And if, then, a man works for food, we 
shall not foolishly say that he supports himself; 
we shall rather say simply in order to recall how 
glorious it is to be human. (83-107) 
24 
Just as industrial development does not necessarily eliminate toil, 
affluence does not necessarily bring true leisure. The multiplication 
·of things and their rising custodial costs bring time into the calculus 
of allocating one's personal activities; men become enslaved to its 
measurement through marginal utility. C19-17) Although Leisure is con-
sidered important to quality of life, it appears to be what economists 
call an "inferior good" - its value in relation to other goods declines 
with increases in income. This is because as income rises, the cost of 
time also rises. Since the amount of time available to an individual 
is fixed, it becomes increasingly scarce Cand hence, expensive) relative 
to the expanding quantities of commodities that can be purchased with an 
ever-increasing income; therefore activities that are time-intensive 
become less attractive. (15-253) Industrial development thus leads to 
a paradoxical result - part of the goal is to gain freedom from cease-
less toil, but (beyond a certain stage of development> this does not 
result in increased leisure, and the amount of real leisure a society 
enjoys tends to be in inverse proportion to the amount of labour-saving 
machinery it employs. <129-138) Thoreau clearly recognized the value of 
leisure and the danger of sacrificing it to practice mundane occupations 
which do not lead to self-fulfilment: 
What are threescore years and ten hurriedly and 
coarsely lived to moments of divine leisure in which 
your life is coincident with the life of the universe? 
We live too fast and coarsely, just as we eat too fast, 
and do not know the true savor of our food .... It is 
only the irresolute and idle who have no leisure for 
their proper pursuit .... No man ever had the opportunity 
to postpone a high calling to a disagreeable duty .... 
We avoid all the calamities that may occur in a lower 
sphere by abiding perpetually in a higher. Most men 
are engaged in business the greater part of their 
lives, because the soul abhors a vacuum, and they have 
not discovered any continuous employment for man's 
nobler faculties. C 134-100, 129) 
The pace of life affects the quality of life, and economic growth tends 
to increase the size and complexity of human institutions governing the 
pace of life. Once social and economic institutions develop beyond a 
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certain point, a qualitative transformation takes place and control is 
effectively lost - human values are displaced as ne~ impersonal laws 
assume direcfion of social and economic processes; quality of life 
considerations fall by the wayside, and great risks to survival may 
become unavoidable. Rapid change in a society results in diminished 
freedoms and greater insecurity due to the failures of moral conventions, 
spillover effects, and exposure to new dangers and uncertainties. 
Decision-makers in developing countries should remain cognizant of the 
psychological costs of rapid development. Faster economic growth tends 
to introduce greater disruption and the need for making bigger readjust-
ments in previous ways of life and may thus increase the subjective 
sense of frustraHon and discontent. (112-203) This is especially 
relevant to societies which have existed for long periods with low levels 
of change, for it is then necessary to transform beliefs, habits and 
in.st i tut ions. c 96-430 > 
The transition from indigenous to modern technologies, linked as it is 
to rates of structurally unequal development, has proven an inadequate 
vehicle for integrated social change. Social disparities tend to worsen, 
indigenous value systems are degraded, and labour-intensive coping 
mechanisms are lost. (147-290> The consequence is often increased 
pressure on the most marginal resources. When faced with drought or 
other stresses, they collapse: in extreme cases, the productive base 
may be so degraded that people are forced to abandon their traditional 
livelihood and habitat entirely. (147-299) 
Puzo has documented the effects of economic change on the Ovimbundu tribe 
of the Luapula Valley in southern Africa which illustrates the far-
reaching effects a single change can have on the quality of Life of a 
traditional, polyfunctional society. This society has now adopted a 
system of intensive agriculture based on a single cash crop (maize), 
and this development has profoundly altered the social structure, 
habitat patterns, territorial and kinship concepts, and the use of 
·family Labour resources. (123-1092) Reliance on one crop has proved 
destabilizing: 
26 
The income that the people have come to rely on 
from maize (sometimes) declines to the point that, 
for example, migrations of Ovimbundu to the town 
and elsewhere for cash employment is a significant 
feature in the area today. Rising expectations 
probably have much to do with the migrations also. 
( 123-1093) 
The people are thus caught in a trap of inevitable periodic social dis-
ruption on the one hand and gradual social decay on the other. The 
inclination to resort to migration demonstrates how one change can pre-
cipitate others in a destabilizing chain reaction. Paradoxically, the 
very success of migrants in adapting to economic oppoptunity threatens 
the survival of indigenous Livelihood systems - productivity and social 
ties are Lost, traditional coping-mechanisms are Lost, and this Leads to 
an increased marginalization of those who remain behind. (147-300) 
The industrial ethic offers a tempting array of goods and services to 
replace more traditional values but the transition may not be readily or 
painlessly accomplished, and attempts to rapidly transform whole societies 
may only result in destabilization and a reduction in the quality of 
Life. Traditional societies are associated with behaviour patterns 
that put a premium on stability - when their religio-cultures break down, 
there ensues a period of chaos. (63-xi) If rapid economic growth and 
development result in the loss of social cohesion, stability, and feelings 
of security, then the price may be too high. Traditional societies are 
in danger of Losing their myths, both sacred and secular, and economic 
growth alone cannot fill this void. 
It may therefore be desirable to embark on a more modest pattern of 
development, which would allow for what Allison has termed "totemistic 
values" - if people feel confident that some relationships with their 
environment are in some sense "sacred", they feel more properly attuned 
to the world, more confidently "rooted" and less susceptible to 
"environmental neurosis". (2-127) Maintaining natural and near-
natural are.as would serve this important psychological function, which 
could have a multitude of desirable spin-offs: loyalty to country, 
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devotion to family, concern for the Land, feelings of security and well-
being, and a generally more responsible approach to Life. 
Ecosystem Destabilization 
All man's activities take place in and are ultimately sustained by the 
natural environment. The ecosphere is a closed system driven by a single 
external source of reliable energy, the sun. Man's well-being is 
dependent on the proper functioning of this system. The ecosphere is 
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comprised of sub-systems (ecosystems) which are inter-related in a com-
plex way, and it is not possible to determine with any degree of certitude 
the significance particular ecosystems or their constituent parts may 
have for man's future well-being. Economic activities may be thought 
of as man-dominated, open systems whlch are "housed" by the natural en-
vironment. Economic processes use "inputs" from the natural and man-
made environments to generate "outputs", some of which have utility to 
man. Economic processes depend entirely on certain ecological processes. 
If economic growth and development destabilizes natural ecosystems to 
the extent that crucial ecologi~al processes are disrupted, economic 
collapse could result. It is therefore necessary to take account of the 
effects unconstrained economic growth could have on the natural environ-
ment, with particular regard to the stability and proper functioning of 
ecosystems. 
Natural environments provide two types of benefits: objects of utility 
(which have value in their own right) and life-support processes <which 
are necessary to the continuation of man's activities). The former 
would include certain species of organisms, and the Latter would include 
nutrient recycling. Apart.from their own intrinsic value, species may 
also be essential sub-elements of ecosystems which contribute to the 
planet's total Life-support system. Both species and entire ecosystems 
are gravely threatened by the geologically retent advent of exponential 
human population and technological growth. 
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Man's activities since the Industrial Revolution have brought about an 
alarming acceleration in the extinction rate of species. Apart from 
the dir~ct opportunity cost of lost species (of unknown future value>, 
ecological processes have been altered as niches have become vacant. 
More populations are getting out of balance, and going toward extremes of 
great abundance or great rarity. (138-174> While there is some argument 
about the relationship between diversity and stability, stable populations 
are characteristic of ma~y organisms in undisturbed ecosystems, and there 
is ecologic strength and security in complex trophic structures. ( 138-141) 
But one of the more significant trends in modern times is towards trophic 
simplicity, a result of increasing human population and technological 
impacts. For example, hundreds of species of grasses and herbs which 
once covered the American prairies have been lost and replaced by a few 
agricultural crops and weeds, and the land now supports fewer animals. 
It has been calculated that the original population of game when the 
European arrived in the Uni.ted States was two and a half times as great 
as the present population of domestic livestock, both calculated in 
cattle units; and yet the v~getation was far better then than it i$ 
today. Cl-5) Loss of avifauna diversity in North America has brought 
about increased crop damage,disease vectors, and other problems due to 
exploding populations of less desirable, exotic species. Such changes 
tend to be irreversible: it is likely the original balanced1avifauna of 
pre-industrial North America can never be restored. (35-325) In addition 
to financial and aesthetic losses, there may also be a loss of resilience 
or stability in some ecosystems. In the Sahel, one observer reports 
that heavy grazing and drought have resulted in the loss of some species 
of wild flowers, and since bees need a continuous supply of flowers over 
the wet season, these losses have seriously affected honey production. 
The bee is apparently being displaced by the desert locust, which favours 
bare ground for breeding and has no need of the flowers. The locust 
represents a threat to agriculture crops, and may eventually impact 
systems far from their breeding ground. <147-207) All these effects 
are a direct result of the disruptive influence of man's activities to 
generate greater economic growth and development. 
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Economic growth may be.regarded as a process whereby economic goods are 
made available in exchange for certain natural amenities, the extinction 
of some biological species, and some degree of impairment to environ-
mental Life-support systems. (91-277) Historically, the terms of trade 
have generally appeared favourable but some of man's activities are now 
on ·such a Large scale that they are beginning to modify biogeochemical 
cycles and to change the physical or chemical bases of the global 
Life-support system, producing regional or global effects. (13-18} The 
ecosphere is made up of systems .which have varying capacities for ex-
ploitation - productive activities must be geared to these capacities 
or resource exhaustion and non-renewability will result. For example, 
soil fertility can be effectively Lost forever if the Land is over-
exploited sJnce, even under natural conditions of vegetation cover, 
nature takes from 100 to 400 years or more to generate 10 millimetres of 
top soil. (80-2/3) If a system of economic development is to be sus-
tainable, it must operate in accordance with certain principles of 
ecology. 
The total rate of exploitation of the earth's eco-
system has some upper Limit, which reflects the in-
trinsic Limit of the ecosystem's turnover rate. If 
this rate is exceeded, the system is eventually driven 
to collapse ... there is an upper Limit to the rate.of 
exploitation of the biological capital on which any 
productive system depends. <31-274) 
The difficulty is that the "upper Limit" is not determinable; it is 
beyond man's competence to define the absolute minimum supply of all the 
biological organisms and ecological systems and processes which are 
necessary to man's survival - or even to enumerate those which are 
essential - but it is important to realize that such Limits do exist. 
It would therefore seem wise to make provision for a reasonable supply 
of all natural goods and services in perpetuity. 
Economic development programmes are having such serious impacts on Local 
and global ecosystems that their effects must now be anticipated in the 
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planning process. <43-21> Unfortunately, planners seldom take explicit 
account of ecological costs because they are_so hard to predict and 
impossible to quantify. The true costs of lost gene pools and eco-
system destabilization, which are potentially far greater than any 
monetary costs, thus tend to be ignored. CWhi le some losses are truly 
incalcu~ble, estimates of the costs to repair damage to natural eco-
systems in order to restore natural service functions give some indi-
cation of the importance of ~reventing such damage - the estimated cost 
to restore natural aquatic ecosystems in the U.S. to specified levels 
by 1983 is $594 billion.) (_156-961) The stock of biological and eco-
logical capital in the form of species and ecosystems is rapidly 
diminishing, but to date this has been substantially unnoticeable. 
Environmental degradation represents a crucial, potentially fatal, 
hidden factor in the operation of the economic system. (31-273) These 
cumulating, deferred costs may not be noticed until they reach alarming 
~or even disastrous - proportions. 
The present scale of man's activities, and the rate at which natural 
environments are being transformed, may precipitate crises which are 
completely unmanageable. ( 122-11) Even if social and political insti-
tutions could bring population growth to a dramatic halt, the problem 
of biological resource destruction would persist. In fact, the problem 
could then worsen: if and when population growth is dampened in the 
poorer countries and they begin to experience more rapidly rising per 
capita incomes, the burden man imposes on the environment may rise 
more rapidly than before as resource use and throughput grow at faster 
rates. (60-158) Mishan is pessimistic as to the power of science to 
forestall tragedy if development continues at its present rate: 
In consequence of the sheer pace of technological 
innovation, there is an increasing likelihood that 
evidence about the range of physical side effects 
of any one or several innovations will come too 
late to avert misfortune and possible disaster .... 
Should calamity strike, it is more likely than not 
to encompass the whole world. True, our knowledge 
is much greater than it was in the past. But in 
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relation to the scale and range of our inter-
vention, it is much smaller. For the full range 
of ecological and genetic consequences of our 
current intervention in the biosphere cannot •.. 
be known for decades, and they could turn out to 
be disastrous and irrevocable. (110-84) 
Developing countries are not yet committed to the idea that social 
progress should be sustainable - poli~i~s tend to favour the maximum 
rate of return rather than the optimum rate of return. Inappropriate 
technologies are being applied'to accelerate production regardless of 
the social or environmental costs involved. Mineral industries replace 
local agricultural livelihood systems, an example of sustainable 
systems being damaged by short-term non-sustainable activities. <147-37) 
And agricultural practices which destroy soil fertility are replacing 
more balanced· practices in order to achieve greater short-term yields. 
In India, more than half of the land now suffers from some sort of soil 
degradation, and nutrients are being lost in amounts greater than that 
being applied in the form of fertilizers. (80-2/4) Man's relationship 
with the environment is becoming increasingly unstable and the price of 
present prosperity is growing ecological degradation which threatens 
the future. Developing countries particularly are reaching the limits 
of natural systems and destroying the long-term productivity of their 
land to supply today's food and fuel for rapidly growing populations. 
(160-18> The United States Council on Environmental Quality is con-
cerned about the relationship between economic development and environ-
mental quality in the Third World: 
... economic development cannot succeed unless 
development planning includes careful attention 
to the natural environment ... adverse environmental 
impacts can result inadvertently from the develop-
ment process itself and can endanger its results .... 
The guiding principle, clearly, is that social pro-
gress gained through economic development must be 
sustainable - meaning that the integrity of natural 
systems must be respected in the development 
process. (35-458) 
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Agricultural practices are one example of how natural ecosystems are 
being simplified and we are required to expend more and more energy in 
attempts to maintain some stability. <136-29) Energy costs could soon 
become prohibitive and other costs of ecosystem simplification - lost 
genetic resources and ripple effects (as tolerance limits are exceeded) 
to other ecosystems and large-scale ecological processes - could become 
so excessive as to threaten survival. Expanding agricultural product-
ion poses enormous ecological problems. New land cannot be brought 
under cultivation except at great cost because most remaining unculti-
vated lands have poor soils and many marginal farming lands may soon 
have to be abandoned. The introduction of modern innovations like 
boreholes and roads to market has altered the balance between the trad-
itional pastoralist and his environment to the point that many areas may 
become too denuded to support livestock at current stocking rates. 
(123-1076) When land is overexploited, soil structure and fertility 
deteriorate, vegetation cover is lost and topsoil erosion rates increase, 
runoff is increased and water tables lowered, pollution increases and 
the general landscape deteriorates, and the carrying capacity for wild-
life, domestic stock, and man is reduced. The ultimate result is 
desertification. Desertification can only be avoided if certain eco-
logical imperatives .are observed. A balanced exchange of water and 
energy is necessary to the health of what Leopold calls the "land 
organism", (94-273) but unrestrained agricultural growth often upsets 
this balance. In drylands, good years (normal rainfall) lead to stock 
increases or opening of marginal crop lands which damages the natural 
vegetation and exposes the land to destruction. This process may con-
vert periodic drought into an engine of long-term desertification. 
( 147-14) 
Developing countries are most vulnerable to desertification, and ill-
advised agricultural schemes intended to permit economic expansion and 
development may only weaken the land and thereby further weaken the 
condition of the people. For example, the development of large central 
watering holes fed by deep wells in arid regions such as Niger and 
Botswana, have resulted in extensive habitat degradation. (35-467; 126-26) 
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Unconstrained economic growth and development in the agricultural 
sector may ultimately cause greater poverty and more malnutrition and 
disease if it causes failures in the Land. The attempt to increase 
agricultural yields in developing countries through monocultures 
appears ecologically unsound: 
The green revolution, as presently run, creates 
huge monocultures which eliminate genetic varia-
bility and are unstable and disease prone. It 
requires enormous inputs of fertilizers, pesticides 
and energy. On the scale necessary these could 
have serious ecological effects on the agricultural 
ecosystem and on surround1ng systems. (8-2) 
Levels of high productivity are achieved by arresting normal succession-
al processes and simplifying ecosystems, but these gains are purchased 
at high cost (in terms of energy and other inputs>, which is even 
higher in marginal areas and can be expected to increase over time. 
These gains in productivity also result in Lost soil fertility and 
increased instability in the system (such as imbalances of predator-
prey relationships affecting crop pests) which appears to indicate that 
benefits will be temporary or only achieved with increasingly unaccept-
able costs and risks of catastrophic collapse. In contrast, traditional 
cropping systems, such as the Indonesian combinations of corn and rice, 
have proved more resistant to pests and more responsive to applications 
of nitrogen fertilizer than are monocultures. (80-14/11) Agricultural 
production should be viewed as a sustainable, cycl.ical process rather 
than as a short-term, linear process. 
Soil, climate, topography, and types of vegetation help determine vul-
nerability to desertification. Above all, Liability ro desertification 
is a function of pressure of land use, as reflected in density of popu-
lation or Livestock or in the extent to which agriculture is mechanized. 
<147-7) Desertification is not a process which is confined to desert 
fringes and in fact is more apt to occur in the greener area~ of dry-
lands where land use is intense and there are pressures to produce one 
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specialized crop over a period of many years. (147-221; 27) 
Desertification is a wide-spr~ad problem, of global significance, but 
particularly affecting developing regions of the world. Present 
desertification rates suggest that the world will Lose close to one-
third of its arable Lands by the end of the century. <147-9) This rate 
is a function of Land exploitati9n patterns deriving Largely from a 
general policy of rapid, unconstrained economic growth and development 
to meet rapidly growing needs at the Lowest possible <present) cost. 
There is impressive ecological evidence which indicates that this policy 
is now untenable. If we are to survive economically as well as bio~ 
Logically, industry, agriculture, and transportation will have to meet 
the inescapable demands of the ecosystem. (31-283) This will require 
new technologies, acceptance of Limitations on growth and development, 
and a commitment to maintaining some portions of the natural environment .. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Decision-makers are faced with the pressing demands of present genera-
tions and are therefore inclined .to neglect the higher needs of present 
and future generations. Ecological processes and environmental quality 
are not being given adequate attention, and it is generally assumed that 
science and technology will eventually free man from all environmental 
constraints. But economic growth results in the loss of certain natural 
amenities and may ultimately Lead to loss of control over the environ-
ment since many impacts from development are irreversible and reduce 
future options. Absolute ecological limits and imperatives are diffi-
cult to define but they do exist. 
Unconstrained economic growth and development could have serious long-
term consequences: great social· disruptions could result from rapid . 
and profound changes in technologies and institutions; maximizing 




MAN~S PLACE IN THE WORLD 
"That fund .l6 a. commun.l:ty .l6 the bM-i.c concept on 
ecology, but that fund .l6 to be loved a.nd 
0
./f.e.J.:ipected .l6 a.n ex.ten.ti-i.OJ'l. On eth-i.c..6 o II ( 94-x Vi i ) 
INTRODUCTION 
Industrial development may result in a production and consumption pattern 
which does not truly enhance man's well-being beyond the point of meet-
ing physiological needs. Perhaps rapid and unconstrained economic 
growth is not only dangerous but unnecessary: there may be alternative 
policies which lead to more desirable states of development. Decision-
makers would be well-advised to explore the nature and potentialities 
of man, and carefully examine the meaning of welfare, before deciding 
on a policy of development. A systematic and rational approach to 
decision-making would consist of formulating goals which are truly 
essential and reasonable, based on an understanding of the condition of 
man, and then developing a sound, realistic, and safe policy for 
achieving these goals . 
.... ---: 
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MAN'S RELATIONSHIP TO NATURE 
What is man's relationship to nature, and how vital is that relation-
ship to his continued survival and well~being? 
The Value of Natural Goods 
Man is completely dependent on the natural environment for energy, 
materials, vital Life-support functions, and certain irreplaceable 
amenities, yet modern political and economic syst_ems have not developed 
a procedure for accurately ascribing values to the products of nature. 
Some of the uses of the natural environment which are unpriced (and 
often unperceived) are: (1) recreational opportunities and aesthetic 
satisfactions, (2) storehouse for undiscovered resource substitutes, 
(3) stabilization of regional and global ecosystems, (4) provision of 
baseline and monitoring functions, (5) examples of ecological survival, 
(6) ecosystem rehabilitation models, (7) scientific research, 
(8) general education, and (9) insurance against unknown problems for 
further perturbing the ecosphere. <35-338; 43-22; 54-648) 
The innumerable specific functions of the natural environment all con-
tribute to the overall functioning of nature which makes Life possible. 
The Limited functions of natural and near-natural areas combine to make 
possible the infinite functions of nature. Since the whole is more 
than the sum of its parts, it is necessary to develop some mechanism 
for ascribing the greater value to the component parts - otherwise the 
essential Life-support functions of nature may ultimately be impaired. 
The Logic of conventional cost-benefit analysis is not holistic, and 
therefore a series of rational development decisions can Lead to an 
irrational result. Unfortunately there is no way to determine the im-
portance of specific areas to vital ecological processes, or even which 
environmental amenities have greatest utility to man, since man's know-
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ledge is grossly imperfect and since there is no unit of measurement. 
It is therefore necessary to rely on the judgment of specialists, and 
strive to ensure that estimates are conservative. 
Man's Way vs. Nature's Way 
The modern urban-industrial model of development has brought about a / 
remarkable transformation in man's relationship to nature. Consump t ion 
of natural resources has increased at astronomical rates, and countless 
natural and near-natural areas have been modified to permit increased 
production. The symbiotic relationship between town and countryside 
has turned into a parasitic relationship between city and countryside. 
Cities are incomplete ecosystems, like the abyssal depths of the sea, 
or terrestial caves. Giant, mechanised, single-crop farms, which have 
been created to feed cities, are unstable ecosystems, requiring sub-
sidized inputs at increasing cost. Nature allows such aberrations on a 
small scale, but technological man has begun to tip the scales drasti-
cally as his activities grow out of balance with the supporting natural 
environment. 
Natural ecosystems change and species become extinct by two very differ-
ent processes: natural evolution, and the impacts of man. The evo-
lutionary process consists of gradual changes in the environment and the 
gradual modification of species better suited to prevailing conditions. 
By contrast, the activities of man bring about sudden changes in the 
environment and rapid destruction of species, so that natural processes 
have no opportunity to replace them with more suitable materials. 
Natural ecosystems are "fine-tuned" by natural selection over long 
periods of time. Man makes sudden (and often large-scale) changes and 
produces oscillations which nature hasn't time to dampen out. Each 
time a garden is planted or an exotic plant is introduced, the web is 
imperceptibly shaken. Multiplied by all the trillions of instances, 
the disturbances become a tremor. The striking thing is the rate of 
man~induced change over recent years. Natural patterns evolve 
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gradually, which permits integration and improvement (catastrophic 
events, such as volcanic eruptions, have only local and temporary 
effects) while human patterns are now evolving quickly, which tends to 
reduce diversity and simplify systems. Man is rapidly simplifying the 
world by reducing species and habitat diversity. The whole of nature 
works one way and man works another way. Nature abhors waste, and 
proceeds by diversification and decentralization; man accepts waste, and 
believes in specialization and concentration. Nature uses time, spends 
it carefully, and so maintains equilibrium; man ignores time, makes 
rapid and arbitrary changes, and so upsets the balance. 
One economic concept does not occur in the ecology of animals and plants: 
overexploitation of natural resources. (98-12) Equilibrium of the bio-
sphere is maintained by many regulating processes which have evolved 
over geological time periods. Man has come to operate on a different 
time and space scale than anything else in nature. Since man's 
approach is at variance with the laws of nature, something must eventually 
give. And since man is wholly dependent on nature (and not only for 
raw materials and energy), he would appear to be in a no-win position 
with his emphasis on maximizing production and striving to maintain 
present rates of economic growth. The obvious solution is to scale 
back production and learn to live more humbly, in keeping with man's 
status as an animal - man's economic goals should be more modest, in 
proportion to his physical stature in the universe. As ecology has now 
sufficiently demonstrated, the doctrine that nature is infinitely 
malleable is not merely an illusion, but a dangerous delusion. ( 121-14) 
If complex ecological processes and diverse biological organisms have 
survival value to man, then provision must be made for protecting some 
natural habitat from man's more destructive influences. 
Spiritual Values 
The natural environment contributes not only to man's survival but to 
the quality of his existence. Direct contact with nature provides man 
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with aesthetic and spiritual goods which significantly enhance his 
well-being. Literature is replete with references to the salutary 
effects of natural influences, which suggests their value in bringing 
man closer to self-actualization or fulfilment. The most striking 
testimonials allude to the value of wilderness as a source of inspiration' 
and revelation. There appears to be no substitute for wilderness ex-
periences, and the value of wildness can hardly be appreciated by the 
uninitiated since its true import cannot be indirectly communicated. 
There are no words that can tell of the hidden spirit of wilderness, 
that can reveal its mystery, its melanchol~ and its charm. (113-150) 
The aesthetic experiences obt~inable through contact with wilderness 
are unique in several respects, as Robert Marshall has pointed out: 
Of the myriad manifestatioris of beauty, only natural 
phenomena like the wilderness are detached from all 
temporal relationship ..• in the wild places nothing 
is moored more closely than to geologic ages ..•. The 
sheer stupendousness of the wilderness gives it a 
quality of intangibility which is unknown in ordinary 
manifestations of ocular beauty .•• "the beauty that 
shimmers in the yellow afternoons of October, who 
could ever clutch it". (Emerson) .•. Because of its 
size the wilderness also has a physical ambiency about 
it which most forms of beauty lack ... when one looks at 
and listens to the w i l derness he is encompassed by 
his experience of beauty, lives in the midst of his 
esthetic universe .•.. A fourth peculiarity about the 
wilderness is that it exhibits a dynamic beauty ... 
the wilderness is in constant flux .... Another 
singular aspect.of the wilderness is that it gratifies 
every one of the senses .... Finally, ... for the brief 
duration of any pure .esthetic experience the cognition 
of the observed object must completely fill the 
spectator's cosmos .... In the wilderness, with its 
entire freedom from the manifestations of human will, 
that perfect objectivity which is essential for pure 
esthetic rapture can probably be achieved more 
readily than among any other forms of beauty. 
( 101-78) 
Thoreau was another ardent proponent of wilderness values: 
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... in Wildness is the preservation of the.World. 
Every tree sends its fibres forth in search of 
the Wild •..• The story of Romulus and Remus being 
suckled by a wolf is not a meaningless fable. 
The founders of every state which has risen to 
eminence have drawn their nourishment and vigor 
from a similar wild source •.•. Life consists 
with wildness. The most alive is the wildest. 
Not yet subdued to man, its presence refreshes 
him. <142-279) 
The value of wilderness depends on the condition of man - his perception 
of its utility is wholly determined by the nature of his relationship 
to it and all other aspects of his environment. Man fails to appreciate 
wild~rness if (1) he is burdened with physical suffering and depriva-
tion, or if (2) he is so alienated from natural influences that his 
powers of perception and spiritual capacities have atrophied. 
Unfortunately, wilderness has a low carrying capacity and it is obvious 
that the "spiritual renewaV' rationale is largely vitiated by the 
" physical impossibility of accomodating the teeming masses with adequate 
tracts of wilderness, particularly given the pre-eminence of physio-
logical needs and the malleability of the human· spirit. As the 
developed environment expands, the wilderness recedes. 
Tausig feel wilderness areas cannot survive: 
Seneca and 
Crowding threatens to destroy their fragile eco-
systems and to degrade their quality to the point 
where their consumption value will fall to zero for 
all potential consumers .... The very term 
wilderness area loses all meaning when the rate 
of utilization reaches high levels .... Projections 
of population and income growth rates ... point to 
a pessimistic conclusion .... <133-309) 
However, there is some economic value in what economists call "option ~ 
demand'' (maintaining an option, even though it may never be exer-
cised) and "non-participant demand" (taking satisfaction in the know-
ledge that some particular good exists, even ,though it will never be 
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consumed). <109-290) The problem is that no one knows how to measure 
these values, but they may be more important - particula~Ly 'to future 
generations - than is now generally recognized: there is something in 
the very name of wilderness, which charms the ear, and soothes the 1 
spirit of man. There is religion in it. (113-56) Perhaps future 
generations will attach great value to the simple knowledge that wild-
ness exists, so that in imagination at Least a man can still sense a 
wild delight in the Lovely and Lonely spots blooming in the world. 
Apart from true wilderness~ areas which have retained most of the 
characteristics of a natural enviornment still permit man to experience 
reverential awe for the beauty and greatness of a creation superior to 
him, and provide for special forms of recreation and pleasure. C98-76) 
Natural areas contribute in many ways to man's well-being, and there 
appear to be no satisfactory substitutes, particularly for city 
dwellers. Urbanized man finds outdoor activities in natural settings 
have special satisfactions. Deprived of the physical challenge of 
surviving through his own abilities, he feels frustrated, unhappy, and 
vaguely repressed. <113-259> Natural areas are a sanctuary from urban 
tensions, a place of spiritual renewal, a reminder that other modes of 
existence are possible, a place to Learn about how the world works, 
and a source of aesthetic gratification. 
Attitudes Toward Nature 
Man's relation to nature was irrevocably altered with the invention of 
agriculture. New attitudes toward the ecological community slowly 
emerged as man gained increasing control over his environment. Modern 
attitudes toward most natural objects tend to be either one of proprie-
tary interest or one of disinterest; few have a truly "sensible" 
relation to natural objects - an awareness of nature that adds to one's 
being rather than one's wealth. Aldo Leopold predicted the coming 
of a new Land ethic (94-261) but warned that it could not evolve as Long 
as man considered the Land an adversary or was alienated from the Land. 
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The urban-industrial ethic, which seems in the ascendency, is not 
compatible with the land ethic. How can one expect a sense of rever-
ential awe for anything in the young when all they ~ee around them is 
man-made and much of it is aesthetically displeasing? Industrial 
development has Led to Landscape blight and a society characterized by 
aesthetic and ethical vulgarity which represents an incalculable social 
cost. The urban-industrial man Lives. as part of a great artificial 
structure which has no symp~thy with nature - personal value systems 
·have been so distorted that the loss of natural amenities are not 
lamented. Man's life may be impoverished, but he remains insensible to 
his condition. 
Many conservationists have suggested that education can help restore 
man's appreciation of the natural environment and motivate responsible 
conservation efforts, but it seems unlikely that education alone can 
engender the concern that will be necessary to save natural and near-
natural areas. Natural. values can be appreciated properly only· if 
there is direct, sustained contact with natural goods. Beautiful 
nature films and wildlife photos, and interesting books and articulate 
Lectures on the need for nature conservation, have a superficial or 
transient effect because they are not connected in any meaningful way 
with the way modern man Lives. A child can admire the beauty of a 
tiger in a zoo, or the intricate construction of a honeycomb in a 
glossy photo, or the incredible trek of the wildebeest in a film, but 
their significance to modern Life is in the same category as Disneyland, 
comic books, and Tarzan movies. They are, simply put, not relevant -
they are not part of the individual's Life, and therefore are relegated 
to an order of reality which borders on the fictitious. If these 
species disappear in nature, the individual does not feel significantly 
affected. He may well be satisfied with zoos, magazine photos, and 
f i Lms. 
The call for better edu.cation will not save the natural environment if 
patterns of Living and development are not changed to be more compatible 
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with and bring man closer to nature. If nature is to be saved, a 
special relation is called for - and this seems not to be possible in 
urban-industrial societies, which are characterized by a "having-
oriented" rationality rather than a "being-oriented" rationality. 
(99-79) 
Perhaps the most serious obstacle impeding the 
evolution of a land ethic is the fact that our 
educational and economic system is headed away from, 
rather than toward, an intense consciousness of 
land. Your true modern is separated from the land 1 
by mahy middlemen, and by innumerable physical 
gadgets. He has no vital relation to it;. to ·him 
it is the space between cities on which crops grow. 
(94-261) 
New Ethics and Laws 
Industrial societies regard nature principally as a source of materials 
for development, but this v.iew seems both unethical and irrational if 
one reflects that natural goods come from powers outside man and cannot 
be re-created by man if he destroys them. Primitive societies had a 
different conception of nafure. Reichel-Dolmatoff has described the 
outlook of a primitive tribe of Indians, the Tukano in the Amazon, 
which may be typical: man is taken }o be a part of a set of supra-
individual systems which transcend individual lives and within which 
survival and the maintenance of a certain quality of life are possible 
only if all other life forms too are allowed to evolve according to 
their specific needs. <125-11) This is reminiscent of Leopol~'s land 
ethic, which rests on an ecological premise - that the individual is 
a member of a community of interdependent parts. This .outlook can 
also be rationalized in economic terms, since it is concerned with 
choice in the face of scarcity: the continued existence of other Life 
forms is chosen, in preference to other goods which might otherwise be 
provided, in order that the community might survive and enjoy a 




Industrial societies are ~haracterized by zealous materialism and high 
mobility which, in many countries, has destroyed the spirit of community, 
dismantled the extended family, and is now weakening the bonds of the 
nuclear family. Trust and obligation between individuals is displaced 
by the efficient functioning of machines and institutions, so that men 
are alienated from their fellow men, and sympathy and affection are 
replaced with distrust and resentment. There is a loss of social and 
psychological security, belongingness and love needs are frustrated, 
individual self-esteem is lost through role erosion, winning the esteem 
of others is more uncertain, and potential for self-fulfilment is 
' impaired. 
By contrast, traditional societies have a better sense of "home" and 
"family", and extended family situations generate a greater sense of 
security and equability. There may be less physical security than in 
an industrial society (though this is not necessarily so), but indivi-
duals feel they belong, are loved, and are needed and esteemed. 
Given a healthy traditional culture, opportunities for self-fulfilment 
can be high. 
The Effects of Growth 
Developing countries pay a price for adopting the urban-industrial model. 
Efficiency gains are accomplished at the cost of social disruption and 
loss of identity. Economic growth can, past a certain point, become 
counter-productive. Everything in nature is limited in size: growth 
and form are constrained by considerations of function. This is as 
true of societies as it is of individual organisms. The proper function 
of society is to ensure to its members companionship, prosperity, 
security, and culture. (85-23) However, if a society becomes too large, 
it changes character and function to become a "collectivist society", 
no longer concerned with the individualis+ic point of view. Social 
goals replace individual goals, and individual welfare is diminished as 
"density commodities" supplant higher goods. C85-57> If higher social 
and natural goods are to be maintained for the true benefit of the 
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individu~l, urban-industrial growth must be controlled. The problem is 
to design a pattern of development which meets the real needs of all 
individuals in a society. 
The Possibility of Ethical Solutions 
Individuals desire to maximize their own welfare, but moral philosophers 
have long exhorted man to not engage in acts which harm his fellow-man. 
Passmore lauds Leopold's land ethic but points out that even convention-
al morality will suffice to demand action against the polluter, the 
depleter of natural resources, the destroyer of species and wildernesses. 
<121-19) Economic relations must be subordinated to ethical goals~ 
The driving motive of economics should not be competition.but cooperation; 
not material gain but subsistence for all with dignity. (55-191) The 
question is whether ethical behaviour can prevail in the face of increas-
ing scarcity. 
Richard Leakey says that man's remarkable evolutionary advance was made 
possible by his cooperative - not his competitive - nature. (92-248) 
Early man apparently evidenced a strong concern for communal subsistence. 
However, perhaps man evolved so dramatically because natural selection 
strongly favoured "tribal fitness", something very different to 
altruism. Tribal fitness rests on a bipolar virtue: cooperation with 
tribal.brothers coupled with antagonism toward all others. <70-118) 
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Hardin feels that reciprocal altruism (apart from kin altruism) cannot 
exis~ (70-11) or at least cannot persist and eventually replace ego-
centric behaviour. <70-5) Ethical imperatives are not likely to 
supplant economic imperatives. 
The Need for Institutional Solutions 
Social designs cannot be completely free of coercion. Desired ends 
cannot be reached by trusting to reciprocal altruism, so it 1s necessary: 
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to design institutions to control individual behaviour. In traditional' 
societies moralists were often effective so Long as resources were 
relatively abundant and myths and taboos regulated behaviour. In a 
world of increasing wants and increasing scarcity, in which individuals 
are better educated and more sophisticated, new institutional mechanisms 
are requireo. Limitations on freedom - for individuals and for nations 
- are necessary to the maintenance of other rights and freedoms. If 
individuals are allowed to pursue their exclusive interests with complete 
impunity, all will suffer. 
The tragedy of the common pasture is that actions 
in the best interest of each and every individual 
are exactly the actions that destroy the commons 
for everyone .... It is in the best interest of 
each and every individual to put the interests 
of the whole society above his own .... <13-156) 
The impossibility of One World founded on altruism·does not detract 
from the prospects of One World founded on enlightened self-interest 
- it pays to cooperate and make sacrifices. But cooperation must be 
institutionalized and imposed since reasonabl~ individuals will not 
make sacrifices on a commons, and the whole of the supporting natural 
environment is a commons. 
I 
MAN'S LIMITATIONS IN TIME AND SPACE 
Society's activities are governed by three types of decisions - social, 
economic, and politrcal. Social decisions arise as a consequence of 
the collective attitudes of individual members of the public, and are 
most complex to trace because 'they result from the interaction of 
innumerable desires and attitudes. Economic decisions are of two 
types - production and·consumption: production decisions depend on 
available capital and potential returns on investment, and consumption 
decisions depend on income and current tastes and preferences. Polit-
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ical decisions are concerned with the total welfare of society. 
Social, economic, and political decision-making processes are all subject 
to a serious bias: information flows tend to be restricted by time and 
space limitations to what presently exists and to what is in close 
proximity. Social decisions are regulated by beliefs and attitudes 
shaped by present circumstances in a narrowly circumscribed environment; 
economic decisions are taken according to prevailing interest rates and 
consumption patterns; political decisions are heavily influenced by 
today's outcries and the degree of accountability of public officials to 
certain sectors of their constituencies. These temporal and spatial 
constraints constitute a most significant bias against decisions which 
are optimal in the long term. 
Individual and Institutional Limitations 
Man's true needs or ends cannot be determined solely by reference to 
present behaviour or prevailing tastes and preferences. Contemporary 
conceptions of man are based largely on today's particular circumstances, 
and may be grossly misleading. No one really knows· what man has been 
at other times and·places; modern man's thinking is cramped by the 
present, and he is so dazzled by his peculiar gifts that he fails to 
reflect on the gifts and truths held by his ancestors. Even less is 
known about what man may yet become. An evolutionary perspective is 
eminently desirable in decision-makers. Evolution teaches that 
diversity and adaptability are distinct advantages if a species is to 
have a future; keeping options open is important. But a planner's 
image of man is dominated by man's present aspirations and most imme-
diate traditions. Modern man is not a reliable model because, as 
existentialists have stressed, individuals are terribly limited in time 
and space. Mankind is more enduring and variable, but more difficult 
to define and plan for - it is therefore wise to hedge one's bets. 
The individual is moulded by social, economic, and political institutions 
- personal identity flows from institutional designs. Attitudes are 
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formulated and behaviour is guided by insidious institutional mechanisms, 
so that the individual becomes culturally conditioned to certain social 
and economic models. It is very difficult to alter the existing 
paradigm of economic growth and industrial development, which has 
proved enormously effective to date in giving man greater control over 
his environment, but which may prove ineffectual in controlling the 
environment under new circumstances only now emerging. New develop-
ments present new opportunities, which can create new preferences. 
These shifts in opportunities and preferences have a subtle effect on 
the process of choice: opportunities create preferences which dictate 
new choices which create new opportunities, a..d .ln6.ln-i.:tum. Neither 
individuals nor institutions have effective control over this process, 
which may lead to sub-optimal choices. 
For example, social costs are perceptions of something lost. <46-134> 
Maslow has commented on man's inability to count his blessings until 
they are lost, but some blessings cannot be measured, or even perceived 
immediately when lost (particularly if lost in small increments over a 
long time), and in this case new opportunities which may prove sub-
optimal can easily be chosen. Satisfactions derived from these new 
preferences may then further inhibit perception of the lost good even 
as Losses cumulate, further reinforcing the valuation problem. Thus, 
due to the influence of time, complete Loss of a higher good can be 
suffered without this being regarded as a cost. For example, the 
erosion of natural beauty in an industrial area, or the Loss of pleasing 
natural smells and sounds due to encroaching urbanization, may consti-
tute real and significant welfare Losses. But these normally occur 
at a rate which is imperceptible so that Losses appear inconsequential 
at the margin, and cumulative Losses (if perceived at all) appear 
unrelated to the provision of specific economic goods. 
One might therefore question the Logic of consumer sovereignty, upon 
which the science of economics rests. Consumers are believed to allo-
cate their time and money resources among goods and services in such a 
way as to maximize their satisfaction, but this may not be true. The 
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increasing power of corporate advertising and other influences which 
distort tastes and preferences can impair welfare in an imperceptible 
fashion, so that individuals are no longer competent to judge the way 
to maximize satisfaction. Decision-makers should exercise great 
caution in deciding to what extent one should cater to the wants of 
people. Present wants may .be completely unrelated to real needs. 
The individual does not always know what is best for him, his personal 
range of options are severely limited, and the future is unforeseeable 
<therefore heavily discounted) and of practically no concern past his 
own lifetime. 
In developing countries there is great pressure to develop "high con-
sumption economies" but decision-makers must first define their respons-
ibilities in terms of time and space: to what social unit should they 
properly be committed? If their ultimate obligation is to society in 
perpetuity, then it is highly questionable whether social welfare would 
be served by creating more wants in a world of scarcity to accommodate 
rising industrial capacity, particularly if this implies the loss of 
environmental amenities which may be necessary to satisfying higher 
needs which are unfortunately poorly perceived by present individuals. 
Rather than be guided by consumer demands, decision-makers should attempt 
to objectively identify and rank man's true needs and base policy on goals 
which are not distorted by limited perspectives. Goals related to 
economic welfare are not sufficient; it ,is necessary to attempt a 
definition of total welfare, even though there may be no measurable 
criteria to apply, so that more acceptable goals can be established and 
a more logical approach to assessing alternatives (in general terms at 
least) can follow. 
Decision-makers presently appear to assume goals in rather an arbitrary 
fashion - goals are foisted upon them by some immediate and compelling 
necessity, and these become pre-eminent by default: options important 
to long-term goals are lost to today's pressing demand~. If the 
·---- ' I future were not so heavily discounted, and the decision-maker's time 
horizon were extended, better goals could be formulated and society 
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would be better off. <Game theory strikingly illustrates how short-
term gains can turn into long-term losses very easily - in the case of 
the variable-sum two-person game, "The Prison~rs' Dilemma", the 
dilemma is resolved only by being longsighted.) (22-70> 
Limitations Imposed by Time 
Man has a very imperfect understanding of natural processes, particu-
larly their effects over long periods of time. The science of ecology 
was late in emerging largely because the complex interrelations of 
living things and their environment are so nicely balanced that the face 
of nature remains for long periods .of time uniform. <41-85) Man has 
difficulty even imagining the cumulative effects of minor changes in a 
simple landscape over immense periods of time - he casts a superficial 
eye over.the conformation of a mountain and fails to see the spectacle 
of motion and change which has given rise to it and which is still in 
progress. There is security in the slow, deliberate progression of 
natural processes. When one reflects·on the extent to which the world 
has been transformed by man since the Industrial Age began, and the scale 
and rate at which change has proceeded in the past few years, ~nd com-
pares this with the con a i~)of the world previously - how little it 
has changed, by comparison, over countless millions of years - one 
begins to perceive that something dramatic is happening, and concludes 
that something startling may soon come to pass. 
Man is truly familiar only with the events of his own place and time . 
. Art and literature cannot convey an adequate impression of the quality 
of life prevailing in other places and at other times, and it is not 
really possible to compare the level of amenity in, say, a highly 
urbanized socie{y with that in a completely rural society. There are 
simply no objective criteria to apply. For e~ample, in a developed, 
urbanized society, outdoor recreation is a good which is "highly income 
elastic" (preference for the good increases with income, but at a 
greater rate). <133-198) This fact reveals a subtle transformation 
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of outdoor recreation opportunities from the category of free goods to 
that of scarce goods. Formerly such opportunities were abundant, and 
more time and energies went into such pursuits; now, urban man must pay 
more (to enjoy less, in the case of certain activities, because congest-
ion and other impacts have reduced quality> but he may remain ignorant 
of this fact since former users are invisable (i.e., those who enjoyed 
higher quality experiences are no longer in the market>. 
This is a major reason why environmental problems tend to get out of 
control: there is little personal knowledge about previous conditions, 
effects are often subtle, and future impacts are difficult to forecast. 
This is part i cu larl y true of nor-i~oUut-:ibn impacts, but developing 
countries have generally not even recognized the dangers of pollution 
because there are as yet few· industrial and agricultural concentrations, 
and the pollution perception threshold is high in unsophisticated, 
impoverished societies. 
Man has demonstrated the ability to survive under a wide range of en-
vironmental conditions, but a readiness to accept a degraded environment 
should not be thought a virtue: 
I am sure that we can adapt to the dirt, pollution 
and noise of New York City or Sao Paulo or Calcutti. 
That is the real tragedy - we can adapt to it. As 
we become adapted we accept worse and worse condi-
tions without realizing that a child born and raised 
in this environment has no chance of developing his 
total physical and mental potential. (49-26) 
The body and mind can tolerate environmental degradation, but only at 
some cost to physical and mental well-being, so that the quality of life 
is reduced. Environmental diversity is also important to survival 
because man may neeq a range of behaviou~kills to cope ~ith the 
future. 
Man should not get embrojled in a future for which his evolutionary 
development has not yet prepared him. Many problems of civilized life 
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have their origin in the fact that we function in the technological 
world with a biology and psychology dating from the Stone Age; (50-47) 
There may yet be a genuine psychological need for traditional social 
patterns and contact with the natural environment. The fact that for 
over 3 million years a hunting and gathering economy shaped out social . , 
psychological, and physical evolution is surely not to be lightly 
regarded. <92-145> There have not been any significant biological 
changes in man since he gave up this way of life 10000 years ago. 
Perhaps the unique habit of collecting and sharing plant and animal foods 
gave rise to man's needs for belonging and esteem which Maslow suspects 
lie embedded in our genes, and perhaps these needs are threatened by 
urban-industrial growth. (92-148> If so, the whole fabric of social 
order is endangered. Man may be dislodged from the social niche for 
which he has been so admirably fitted over these many generations. 
There may be no substitute for an appropriate social environment to meet 
these psychological needs, and if urban-industrial social patterns 
destroy certain rituals and customs, this may Leave a void which cannot· 
be filled by any amount of goods. The combined force of technology 
and Law may then not be sufficient to prevent social collapse. 
Limitations Imposed ·by Space 
Man has Limits in space as well as in time, and individuals seems to 
function best in small groups within a familiar environment. Ecologi-
cal considerations during man's Long evolution kept group and terri-
torial size small. Modern cities are unfavourable to human relation-
, ships probably because they are incompatible in their present form with 
needs created during social evolution. (50-282) Many of the unmanage-
able problems of modern societies are simply due to the ever-increasing 
size of things. ·As a thing grows Larger, it becomes unwieldy and its 
survival requirements increase. Kohr says the effective size of a 
community is defined by four elements: the number of people, the 
density of the population, the degree of integration with the community, 
and the relative mobility of individuals. The optimum size of a 
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society depends on its function. Assuming reasonably high density, 
integration, and mobility, convivial societies should number about 100 
persons, economic societies about 5 000, political societies about 
10000, and cultural societies about 50000. Given low density, inte-
gration, and mobility Kohr suggests the· cultural society could be as 
high as 200000. Larger societies would repress social functions and 
create problems rather than bringing further amenities. <85-19) Kohr's 
analysis indicates that urban-industrial development may ultimately 
cause more problems than it solves. Perhaps decision-makers should 
implement controls on production and development to keep societies and 
their problems to manageable proportions. 
The Limits to Growth 
The effect a society's size has on the quality of life exemplifies that 
there~ limits to growth. Those who maintain that there are no limits 
to growth have pointed out various theoretical solutions to physical 
problems, without due regard for man's lim,itations in time and space 
or the effects of reductions in environmental quality .. Man occupies an 
extremely complex, finite world which he does not understand but which he 
is rapidly altering. ·Man hopes to understand and control this world 
with modern institutions and machines. However individual men have 
limited control over "the means of control". Ultimately, the power of 
man is limited by the quality of his institutions and his collective 
knowledge, and these are, unfortunately, grossly inadequate. This is 
why economic growth, which viewed from the point of view of economics, 
physics, chemistry, and technology, has no discernible limit, must 
necessarily run into decisive bottlenecks when viewed from the point of 
view of the environmental sciences. (129-25) Time, space, and other 
resources are needed to build a body of ecological and social knowledge 
and design the institutional mechanisms necessary to safely and effect-
ively manage the environment. If economic growth and development con-
tinue at present rates, it is possible that man will destroy his 
environment, or forever impair the quality of life, before sufficient 
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understanding and control is gained. 
The environmental sciences are concerned with the problem of constraints 
in the relationship between man and his environment. Very little is 
known about these constraints, and so environmental decisions are being 
made with inadequate information. A great deal of uncertainty attends 
the planning of major developments which affect ecological systems and 
environmental processes. Our understanding of the environment has by 
no means kept pace with our· capacity to alter it, and our ability to 
control our impact has fallen far behind; the economic institutions 
that sufficed when ecological side effects were mild and gradual have 
abruptly become inadequate. (47-xiv) Economic growth, if unrestrained, 
will likely lead to dangerous ecological or political breakdowns. The 
ultimate limit - posed by.the ~ffects of the Second Law of Thermodynam-
ics - lies beyond a whole serJes of possible catastrophes, from poisoned 
oceans to resource wars. Even if all these could be averted, the 
quality of Life could be expected to deteriorate as growth adds burdens 
instead of amenities to man's condition. 
Man has placed his faith in ·technology to solve all problems and avoid 
all dangers: a whole culture has evolved around the principle of 
fighting against Limits rather than Learning to Live with them. (105-150) 
Man has always lived in a world in which growth was possible and good; 
there was always some new place to go (if things went badly), and always 
something that needed to be done, and nature always provided the necessary 
space and materials. Up to now, man's problem has been bumping up 
against his own Limitations of physical stature, reasoning, imagination, 
and cooperative spirit; the obstacles to progress were Largely internal. 
I 
But now men are dimly perceiving that something is changing - man is 
running into new limits, which are outside himself and his power to 
control. 
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Limits to Equity 
Those who advocate economic growth and development point to the great 
poverty and inequity in the world and maintain that as long as there are 
scarcities in food, housing, health care, and other basic necessities of 
life, these must be given priority over maintaining the natural environ-
ment. The weakness in this argument is that if production of economic 
goods continues to grow at the expense of the natural environment, there 
will come a time when no goods will be forthcoming because the natural 
environment is needed to sustain life. The reason for scarcity is the 
insatiable demands of people. Satisfying these demands leads to 
greater scarcity. And all the while the natural environment, which 
serves to support life itself and provides amenities which enhance the 
quality of life, is eroded away. Economic goods cannot be given equal 
footing with natural goods since the former grows at the expense of the 
latter, and the latter cannot be replenished once exhausted. 
This raises a serious ethical problem. It is impossible to fairly 
distribute the world's goods. Political and economic solutions may 
yet be found to correct the most serious inequities, but it seems that 
the environment cannot support a high standard of livin.g for all. 
This is not just, but it is not rational to pursue unrealistic goals 
which contain the seeds of destruction. Policy should be based on 
essential and achievable goals. If all cannot be rich, perhaps all 
can have their basic needs satisfied. Since there are limits to growth, 
there are limits to equity. 
the situation: 
Garrett Hardin has eloquently summed up 
We are all the descendants of thieves, and the 
world's resources are inequitably distributed, but 
we must begin the journey to tomorrow from the 
point Where we are today .... For the foreseeable 
future survival demands that we govern our actions 
by the ethics of a lifeboat. Posterity will be 
ill served if we do not. (69-277) 
58 
THE FUNDAMENTAL UNIT OF CONCERN 
Before goals, objectives, and p6licy can be formulated, it is necessary 
to define the specific object of concern. It is perhaps not enough 
to say that the welfare of individual human beings ·is the ultimate con-
cern of decision-makers, since what is good for today's individuals may 
not be in the best interests of tomorrow's individuals. Bentham pro-
posed the greatest happiness of the greatest number as a guiding 
principle for decision-makers. But what if the greatest number be-
comes so great that the greatest happiness becomes unhappiness? Per-
haps the single most difficult problem which must be faced by decision-
makers is the population problem. Humanitarian concerns need to be 
weighed against quality of life considerations. Decision-makers must 
decide whether providing the highest quality of life for some optimum 
population will be the objective, or whether it will be to provide the 
optimum quality of life for the highest population which happens to 
occur. If the latter is selected, then there may be little prospect 
for the future quality of life. If the former is selected, then some 
I 
population policy will have to be promulgated and strictly enforced. 
There is a need to determine some fundamental unit which can be regarded 
as the proper concern of politics, since different policy objectives 
may be appropriate depending whether one considers individuals, institu-
tions, society, posterity, or some other conception of man. ALL such 
units are in some way related to individuals of course, but all are 
fundamentally different and require different policies. By shifting 
the Level of attention to a broader, more integrated Level of being, 
greater "good" may be achieved. Hooker has built two socio-economic 
models which illustrate the importance of defining the fundamental unit 
of mankind. One emphasizes the individual, and the other the social 
group. There are profound differences in what constitutes optimal 
decisions for each type, and even differences in the meaning of ethics, 
economics, freedom, Law, education, and politics. (75-174) Hooker's 
analysis indicates that social decisions favouring the family, tribe, or 
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community lead to healthier situations than those favouring separate 
individuals. (75-182) Social-oriented ends may be preferable to 
individual-oriented ends. 
Hardin interprets ethics on a supra-individual level which even trans-
cends such conceptions as society and posterity <which are only social 
entities limited in space or time, and which are still thought of as 
being composed of discrete and mortal individuals). Hardin suggests 
the ultimate biological entity is the "germ line", which is carried 
from generation to generation, is potentially immortal, and appears to 
be the object of evolution. This entity appears not to partake of 
reality only because individuals have a limited sensory apparatus and 
an imperfect notion of time. The reality of species is recognized 
because species are easily perceived in space and time, but the germ 
line is more plastic and represents a completely different level of 
' 
being. But the germ line may be considered an emergent property of 
life which might be regarded (by an outside, disinterested observer) as 
the supreme biological entity i.n any rational value system of the 
universe. <70-107) 
Nature is not an economizer of lives but rather an elaborator of 
systems. It is not the individual life pVL .6e. which counts, but the i 
perpetuation and elaboration of the biological system of which it 
temporarily forms a part. If survival is the ultimate criterion of 
value, then the survival of the system <the only enduring level of 
organization) must be assured. This may entail some loss of individual 
welfare or even some sacrifice of lives, but if the choice is between 
this and a course which may be judged to put the whole system at great 
risk, then the choice should be obvious - if the system perishes, all 
lives will perish. The humanitarian perspective, based on anthro-
pocentric principles and not on ecological principles, is not congruent 
with the evolutionary perspective which is central to an understanding 
of bi olog i cal real i ty. The "sanctity of l i fe" finds no support in 
nature, if that belief is the justification for cherishing the life of . 
each individual human being above all other goods. <70-116) It is 
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more important to cherish the life-support systems of nature. Main-
taining natural ecosystems necessary to the survival of the species ·must 
tak~ precedence to maintaining individual lives. 
As Hardin emphasizes, it is not wise to play half of God's role by 
designing institutions exclusively concerned with improving the lot of 
the individual - this has the undesirable effect of increasing man's 
numbers and decreasing man's resources to dangerous levels. If the 
fundamental unit of concern was society in perpetuity, this approach 
would be considered irrational. Hardin says there must be limits to 
altruism. (70-130> One cannot always ascribe pre-eminence to indi-
vidual human lives; the survival of man, and the quality of future 
lives, must at some point take precedence. Many decision-makers ig-
nore the subtle and future needs of man because they are preoccupied 
with the gross needs of the present mass of men. Pinchot said the 
fundamental principle of conservation policy is that of "use", to take 
every part of the land and its resources and put it to that use in 
which it will serve the most people. (113-171) This policy, in a 
finite world with growing human needs, is ultimately self-defeating. 
The conservation of nature cannot perpetually yield to the conservation 
of human lives and welfare because there will come a time when nothing 
is left that is of any use. The fundamental issue today is the 
balance between present and future needs, and it is first necessary to 
define very carefully what these needs are and then arrange them in 
some order of priority. 
Philosophers have not yet developed an ethics which adequately embraces 
posterity. Species success seems a rather abstract goal, not likely 
to inspire altruistic behaviour (and there is no possibility for reci-
procal altruism). However, if men may be said to love persons, and 
cherish certain places, and value certain activities, it may be possible 
to cultivate a concern sufficient to inspire the sacrifices required 
for posterity. 
Man cannot be considered apart from nature. The fundamental unit off\ 
' 
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concern cannot be man alone, but must also embrace some part of nature. 
The individual, however, may not perceive his special relation to 
nature, nor be concerned about posterity's need for nature. Most 
people feel that no economic - or indeed political - sacrifice must be 
made to nature. (98-16) Man appears to be an economic creature first 
and an ethical creature second; perhaps it is unrealistic to expect 
the individual to deal with the objects in his immediate environment 
in an uneconomic manner. It is necessary to first establish man's 
need for natural amenities and the vital life-sustaining functions of 
nature, and then turn attention to finding ways to make iMdividual, 
marginal decisions which will permit welfare improvements within est-
ablished environmental constraints. What is good for the individual 
must be consistent with what is necessary for mankind's survival and 
well-being. Once this principle is accepted, it is then a matter of 
defining welfare and assessing nature's capacity to provide a given 
level of welfare for society in perpetuJty. 
On the assumption that some minimum amount of nature is necessary to the 
survival and well-being of society, and accepting that this object is 
more important than the survival of any given individual, then some 
protection of nature should take precedence over the protection of 
individuals. There is therefore a point where some object of nature 
becomes more valuable than the life of some individual. It is even 
logical to suggest that the protection of large human populations is 
not of sufficient value to incur a significant risk to the last viable 
population of some species deemed essential to the very survival of the 
species, Homo -Oap~en...6. The question is: where are the lines around 
man and nature to be drawn? 
The land ethic is not likely to be widely embraced as long as there are 
hungry and desperate men and the concept of welfare is largely limited 
to physical criteria, or as long as man's welfare is perceived to be 
unconnected to the welfare of other forms of life. Even future 
generations seem of little consequence if wants are too great: a man 
who is not sure how to provide the next meal for his family i~ 
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hardly likely to worry much about the problems of posterity. <17-65) ! 
Decision-makers should construct an ecological framework for the law of 
the land, formally granting recognition to the importance of inter-
relationships within which no part can, without danger, claim absolute 
sovereignty in rights over all other parts. <140-xvi) Since the well-
being of mankind depends on the well-being of the natural environment, 
any goal which truly serves the environment serves mankind. From 
the individual's point of view, concerned exclusively with his own 
well-being, this congruence is not apparent. The land ethic wi LL not 
prevail against the economic ethic unless it is recast into law. Even 
·if man is the measure of all things, it is still possible to grant 
rights to nature by legally attaching natural objects to mankind, as if 
they were extensions to the body of society. The land ethic can be 
translated into law - all that is necessary is to formally invest some 
grou'p with inviolable property rights in nature. It is possible to 
make new ontological distinctions, legally recognizing the essential 
interconnections between societies of men and societies of nature. Per-
haps someday all mankind shall be, for some purposes, one jurally 
recognized "natural object". ( 140-10) 
The fundamental unit of concern may therefore be regarded not as the 
individual, or society, or posterity, or the species or germ line, but 
as an abstraction composed of the human species and certain natural 
goods which together form an interdependent system. Decision-makers 
must be as concerned about maintaining essential gene pools and well-
functioning ecosystems as they are about the condition of individual 
men or groups of men. Men are part of a whole, and it is the whole 
which is the proper object of attention. 
Unfortunately, no one knows which gene pools and ecosystems are 
necessary to man's survival and well-being, or at what level existing 
biological organisms an.d systems must be maintained to be safe. 
Ecologists may never be able to precisely define all the constituents of 
the fundamental unit of concern, but decision-makers must ensure that 
goals and policy will provide for maintaining in perpetuity significant 
amounts of the natural environment. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Development policy must'be predicated on an understanding of man's place 
in the world - his relationship to nature and to societies of men. 
Man's vital relation to nature and to fundamental social units has been 
damaged by urban-industrial developments. 
The natural environment provides a wide variety of amenities, materials, 
and life-support functions of incalculablevalue. Contact with nature 
provides man with aesthetic and spiritual satisfactions which have no 
substitutes and which immeasurably enhance the quality of life. Even 
the simple knowledge that "wildness" exists has great value for many 
people, although direct contact is necessary to establish a truly 
"sensible" relation to nature. However, 20th century man is trans-
forming the world on a scale and at a rate which is totally unprecedented 
in nature, and new ethical and legal codes are needed to replace myths 
and taboos which formerly protected natural goods from over-exploitation. 
Urban-industrial societies have not only alienated man from nature but 
have also weakened the viability of social units by promoting material-
ism and mobility; traditional rural and village societies provide a 
better environment for maintaining family and community bonds. The 
larger and more mobile the society, the weaker its interpersonal 
relations tend to be: competitive behaviour increasingly displaces 
cooperative behaviour, and economic values prevail over ethical values. 
Altruistic institutional mechanisms are therefore needed to control 
individual self-interest so that the best interests of all will be 
served. 
Any individual's perspective is seriously limited by his unique posilion 
in time and space. Man's attitudes and desires are insidiously 
shaped by processes over which he has little control. The average 
individual may not be competent to choose the way to maximize welfare 
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because of Limited knowledge and short planning hortzons; choices 
which appear optimal today may not be optimal· in the long-term. 
Decision-makers need to carefully define their responsibilites and goals, 
and it would seem prudent to keep as many options open as possible. 
Man has a poor understanding of the effects of time and the Limits of 
space. It is difficult to assess the extent to which man and nature 
can be degraded by a series of nearly imperceptible changes, but man's 
evolutionary history indicates that individuals have a genuine need 
for certain social relations and direct contact with the natural environ-
ment. These needs can best be satisfied if communities do not exceed 
some optimum size. If decision-makers wish to maximize.quality qf 
life and minimize risk to survival over long time horizons, then it is 
necessary to accept that there are social, economic, political, cultural, 
and ecological limits to growth. Since Limits to growth cannot be 
precisely determined, it would be desirable to constrain growth until 
man's impacts can be better understood and controlled. This means 
accepting some degree of suffering and injustice in the world, however 
a re-ordering of priorities should make it possible to at least meet 
the most essential needs of all men. 
Before decision-makers can formulate rational goals, it is necessary to 
define the fundamental unit of concern. While man may be the measure 
of all things, individuals have limited life-spans, cannot exist at all 
without support from the natural environment, and require certain social 
and environmental amenities if life is to have any pleasure or meaning. 
The fundamental unit of concern might be defined as consisting of 
society in perpetuity along with those elements of the natural environ-
ment which are necessary to man's survival and well-being. Since 
individuals cannot be expected to make sacrifices for posterity or 
nature, it would be desirable to extend legal protection to natural 
objects as if they were a part of mankind. And since no one knows 
what natural objects are or will be necessary to man's welfare, or at 
what level any biological system must be maintained, provision should 
be made to maintain substantial portions of the natural environment to 
protect all natural goods. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NECESSITY TO THINK ABOUT THE FUTURE 
"Pvr.hap.6 .they w.Wh . n OJt .the.Ve.. • • c.hU.dJr.e.n no:t only 
a c.hanc.e. :to make. a .f..lv~ng bu:t a.f..60 a c.hanc.e. :to 
e.xp~e..6.6 and de.ve..f.op a ~~c.h and v~~e.d a.6.6o~:tme.n:t 
ot} ~nhvr.e.n:t c.apab~.f.We..6, both wU.d and :tame.." 
(94-58) 
INTRODUCTION 
" Decision-makers should be committed to providing for the well-being of 
future generations, and this requires a commitment to maintaining sig-
nificant portions of the natural environment. The urban-industrial 
model of development is destructive of ecological processes and 
natural amenities of great importance to the well-being of future 
generations, but it is impossible to accurately estimate the extent and 
significance of these Losses. A guiding principle should be to 
manage the environment for optimum sustained yield, maintaining ade-
quate Levels of all resources for their possible value to future 
generations. It is not wise to assume that science and technology will 
always be able to cope with the problem of exhausted resources. 
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THE SOCIALLY RELEVANT TIME HORIZON 
People discount the future heavily because the future is unknown; 
today's actions have d i'f ferent effects for today and tomorrow, but to-
day's effects carry more weight. The practice of discounting thus 
favours today's population at the expense of future populations, and so 
a common procedure for evaluating costs and benefits of exploiting the 
natural environment <to produce short-term benefits at the cost of long-
term losses in natural amenities) distorts total welfare over long time 
horizons. In the case of actions which cause irreversible losses to 
future generations, it might be more appropriate to apply a zero or even 
negative rate of time preference. However normal practice is to large-
ly ignore long-term needs in order to satisfy short-term objectives. Non-
renewable genetic resources, natural objects, and ecosystems are 
being destroyed because future costs are not being given proper con-
sideration. 
The natural environment should be managed for the needs of all genera-
tions - a true humanitarian is properly concerned with providing for 
tomorrow, no matter how distant that tomorrow. To allow environmental 
destruction because the effects will only be felt in some distant 
future is a most improvident and inhumane policy. No civilization has 
ever recovered after ruining its environment; if we ruin the whole 
world, where is the "outside" to renew our civilization? <70-60) 
The rate at which irreplaceable natural resources are being Lost is 
already high and still accelerating. Environmental problems will be 
most severe in developing countries where there are complex environ-
mental pressures, rapid population growth, unprecedented rates of urban-
ization, and the urgent need to pursue economic development at whatever 
cost. <84-96) It is difficult to balance a decision-maker's 
responsibilities between present and future, but it is necessary to 
anticipate future needs and the effects irreversible decisions have on 
countless future generations. High Levels of consumption and 
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resource destruction vitiate environmental buffering mechanisms and 
diminish natural amenities - these problems cannot be solved by tech-
nology. If sustainability is the supreme criterion of value, a form 
of development which does not destroy the natural environment is 
necessary. 
Economic systems have built-in time-lags which may make them unstable. 
Decisions should be based on anticipated cost-benefit ratios to avoid 
future disruptions or even collapse. Goods which are certain to be-
come scarce should be taxed at a rate appropriate to the level of the im-
pending scarcity, and in some cases further exploitation should be 
prohibited. Such manipulations by a central authority are necessary 
since there are insufficient incentives in the economic sector to 
provid~ for the future. Owners of valuable natural goods cannot 
afford to maintain these goods ·for their social values and are inclined 
to use them for benefits which can be appropriated to themselves. 
There are also greater pressures to provide for today's needs and 
governments often circumvent the price system to achieve short-term 
gains for political expediency. There is a bias toward activities 
which are profitable and productive over short time horizons - the 
benefits· of maintaining natural areas, renovating urban environments, 
and improving the quality of education are examples of activities which 
receive insufficient support because they do not immediately contribute 
to national income, even though they ultimately contribute to maxi-
mizing national welfare. 
Long-term planning is essential, and future demands must be anticipated 
and weighed, and all benefits estimated over time, if development is to 
be rational. Planning should be particularly concerned with the eco-
logical implications of developments since these can lead to irretriev-
able breakdowns in society, comparable to the devastation of war. 
Economic analyses are terribly inexact due to the problem of uncertainty 
<which pertains particularly to ecological effects which are of a 
character and on a scale new to man's experience), and therefore 
favourable cost-benefit tests, for example, can hardly be co~sidered 
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RISI NG EXPECTATIONS. AND THE DI SAMEN I TY TRAP 
The phenomenon of rising expectations is spreading throughout the 
world. Man's increasing demands are being accommodated with Little 
regard for the effect rapid technological growth may have on natural 
amenities and the quality of Life. Negative feedback signals are 
obscured by production and consumption activities which have generated 
tremendous momentum. Man's impacts are already so great (and still 
growing at exponential rates) that there may already be insufficient 
reaction time to prevent substantial Losses of amenities. If modern 
technology and institutions permit survival without amenity, they are 
poor champions. 
Th·3 provision of natural amenities requires significant amounts of space, 
but the developed environment is spreading rapidly and men are achieving 
greater mobility. Sociologists have had insufficient time to assess 
the consequences (apart from obvious, short-term effects) and causal 
relationships are not sufficiently understood to anticipate future 
effects. Consumers demand ever-increasing quantities of man-made 
goods because the price of future disamenity remains unperceived. De-
veloping countries are generally willing to raise their standard of 
Living "at any price" - but the cost may be greater than is realized: 
underpricing irreplaceable natural areas and species is potentially much 
more serious than underpricing minerals, oil, or Labour. Future gener-
ations can be expected to attach great value to natural amenities. 
The danger is that the source of these amenities will be destroyed or 
irreparably damaged by the process of development, and the challenge is 
to take cognizance of this category of goods now, to protect the heritage 
of future generations. 
Hayes has asked whether it is better to save Serengeti now for its value 
to the future or utilize it by whatever means for the growing needs of 
hungry people just outside it. (35-469) If physical demands become too 
great, the sacrifice of such a treasure may actually come to pass. 
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Referring particularly to the situation in southern Africa, Hanks 
says: 
I have no hesitation in rejecting the aesthetic 
value of wildlife and the "wilderness concept" as 
a justification for conservation in Africa .... 
It is totally unrealistic to set aside a Large 
area of the continent ... when the Land in question 
is surrounded by an overcrowded,degraded and un-
productive Bant~ homeland. (64-13) 
But Lines-must be drawn somewhere to Limit the destruction of nature so 
that man's higher needs, as well as future needs, can be satisfied. 
Decision-makers should be concerned with satisfying~ of man's true 
needs, and not just his physiological needs and material wants; the 
Latter are potentially insatiable, and rising expectations for these 
goods are inevitably destructive of those parts of the earth which give 
it pleasantness. 
From the conventional economic point of view, it may be unprofitable to 
reduce depletable externalities to zero if transaction costs are sig-
nificant: the continuation of an "uncorrected" externality obviously 
may be consistent with Pareto optimality. ( 15-23) Therefore maintain-
ing natural amenities <which are public goods) may be regarded as 
inefficient, and their Loss can be rationalized in economic terms. 
However, the ultimate social cost may be inestimable. ALL sectors of 
society will bear this cost, but the poor, not having mobility to escape 
disamenity, will ultimately suffer more from the spillovers of develop-
ment than the rich. The more direct claim·physiological needs have 
on man's attention should not cause decision-makers to ignore higher 
needs, or allow material goods to become an exclusive preoccupation of 
the citizenry. Some short-term sacrifice in material prosperity would 
be more than compensated by Long-term gains in higher, more intangible 
values provided by natural amenities. Rising expectati~ns should be 
kept under control so that future quality of Life will not be sacri-
ficed to ever-rising standards of Living. 
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MAINTAINING OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The temptation to exploit all available resources for maximum yields 
may be nearly irresistible if present needs are great, but consideration 
of future needs - and maintaining the capability of the Land to satisfy 
them - dictates a policy of management for optimum sustained yield. 
This means that Land must be classified and managed for uses which will 
provide the greatest benefits over the Longest time period. Some 
wilder Lands are best suited to serve the special functions of the 
natural environment, including the function of repository for genetic 
resources which may have great future value. Such "option values" may 
conf identally be assumed to promise far greater benefits than any 
short-term, productive uses of these lands. Far too much development 
money is being expended in activities that Lead eventually to the casual 
and random destruction of Lands and resources that would have been 
better to have reserved for some more valuable Long-term use. <43-73) 
Values associated with biotic diversity will be greater in the future 
as resources become more scarce. The special values of natural and 
near-natural areas may become unimaginably Large. Developing countries 
should regard such areas as responsible investments in the future, and 
insurance against over-exploitation and collapse. The greater the 
number and size of areas maintained, the greater the prospects of future 
pay-offs or recovery. There is a Large margin of ignorance surrounding 
the urban-industrial model - if some areas are not reserved and options 
are not Left open, man may pass a climacteric after which there would 
be no alternative but to accept a Low quality existence, and deal ·with 
an endless chain of crises. 
Man may anticipate, with great certainty, that many resources will be 
scarce in the future, but it is not foreseeable which resources will be 
needed and in what quantities. If some minimum supply of natural and 
near-natural areas are not now provided to conserve genetic stocks and 
maintain vital ecological processes <at least sufficient to permit a 
72 
recovery from disaster), then it will become increas·ingly expensive, in 
terms of opportunity costs, to provide such "insurance" as time goes on. 
The rate of ecosystem destruction and species extinction is high, and 
as the amount of natural goods available shrinks daily, the possibility 
of effective action becomes more remote. Landscapes created by past 
agricultural or pastoral activities should be protected to maintain 
these activities as continuing ways of life. ( 151-22) Such areas would 
be important to science and research, and would preserve traditional 
knowledge. Their aesthetic and interest value could also provide 
economic returns from tourism. Preserving options is justifiable, 
even when future demand is uncertain, if restoration to the original 
state of affairs is exclusively costly. (59-99) There is a value 
associated with deferring a decision that will have an irreversible 
consequence potentially inimical to human welfare. (89~1065) 
Genetic materials necessary to strengthen domestic strains or meet new 
needs may acquire an almost incalculable value, and ecosystems essential 
to their survival thus acquire Like value. Since scientists cannot 
forecast which genetic resources will be needed (and when), all extant 
species and their habitats should receive substantial protection for 
their option value; a need for the careful identification of represent-
ative examples of major ecosystems and their acquisition on a basis of 
a national plan becomes a first priority. <76-1378) Careful planning 
based on Land-use inventories would minimize damage and preserve 
options. The costs of failure to plan the use of Land can be high, 
whether they be measured in terms of destroyed ecosystems, unmet 
human needs, urban decay, suburban sprawl, or lost revenues. Develop-
ment should be confined to areas where vital ecological processes will 
not be affected. Sufficient areas should be provided to conserve 
genetic resources. Areas of "critical environmental concern" should 
be so designated and accorded adequate protection. And Land-use con-
straint~ should be defined and Legally codified, with the intention of 
promoting a balanced pattern of Land use which maintains ample options 
for the future. 
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THE "EXHAUSTION OF RESOURCES FALLACY" 
Many economists have noted that the unit costs of raw materials for 
industrial output has been generally declining, indicating that tech-
nology improvements have more than kept pace with the challenges posed 
by dwindling supplies and new resource extraction problems. This has 
Led some to conclude that scarcity will not prove a constraint to growth 
but only a spur to technology. Others suggest that the decline in 
private production costs of extractive industry outputs might be more 
than offset by external environmental costs, so that society is paying 
more per unit of production but in a different coin - environmental 
amenities - and hence is no better off. The current consensus among 
Leading environmental economists appears to be, however, that the 
"exhaustion of resources" argument is fallacious, and there is therefore 
no absolute impediment to continued economic growth. 
Baumol and Oates claim that there is no danger of total exhaustion of 
our resources; it is, rather a matter of' increasing costs of extraction. 
( 16-97) The theory here is that as resources become scarce prices will 
increase, stimulati.ng exploration for new reserves or the development 
of subs ti tu tes. Seneca and Tausig put this case forcefully: 
... the modern conservation movement has largely 
freed itself of the exhaustion of resources 
fallacy (which) is the argument that because there 
exists only a finite amount of any given natural 
·resource in the biosphere, continued economic 
growth will inevitably exhaust the supply of this 
resource .... The flaw ... is that it fails to take 
into account the ability of a market system to 
adapt to the threat of shortages and of continued 
technological advance in the process of economic 
growth .... Scientists and economists now envision 
a future in which the only essential raw materials 
will be energy and the most basic chemical 
molecules. ( 133-10) 
The above argument has at Least three serious weaknesses: ( 1) "resource" 
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is too narrowly defined; (2) the market system needs time and inform-
ation to adapt; and (3) technology cannot solve some problems (e.g., 
thermal pollution, breakdown of ecosystems) and might be too costly or 
time-consuming in its development, and is not risk-free. Those who 
consider the exhaustion of resources argument fallacious or no longer 
relevant have failed to recognize three important facts: (1) natural 
organisms, processes, syst~~s, and s~bsystems are themselves essential 
resources; · (2) time and information costs in managing these resources, 
or compensating for their loss, can be prohibitively high; and (3) 
it is extremely unlikely that man can achieve meaningful control over 
all these resources, or find substitutes for them. The notion that 
man is dependent only on tangible, non-biological, elementary particles 
is profoundly dangerous. Man lives not by chemical molecules and high 
grade energy alone, but also by (among other things) ecological principles 
which cannot be transcended and for which there·are no substitutes. 
In Baumol and Oates's critique of "zero economic growth", <16-137) 
economic growth is seen as necessary because it is assumed that material 
demands will continue to grow. The authors discuss one category of 
resources - minerals - needed to fuel this growth, and conclude that 
threatened failures in supply can be indefinitely averted through 
recycling, improvements in output per unit of input, and the dis-
covery of substitutes. But perhaps they are addressing the wrong 
problem. Solving the mineral shortage problem will only result in 
more serious problems if increasing industrial activity puts an 
intolerable strain on the continued functioning of essential species 
and ecosystems. The same approach to this problem will be to no 
avail: biological systems cannot be reprocessed after exhaustion, 
their efficiency cannot be significantly improved <since living pro-
cesses are not amenable to technological innovation, being vastly more 
complex and mysterious than inorganic systems), and there are no sub-
stitutes for their fundamental units or some of their vital functions. 
It behoves decision-makers to remember that "the technological fix" 
cannot restore or provide meaningful substitutes for some categories 
of resources. An obvious example is the loss of species or natural 
processes which serve some essential or valued function (like fixing 
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nitrogen, or regulating the partial pressure of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere), or are necessary to the enjoyment of natural amenities 
(Like catching a rainbow trout or walking through a yellowwood forest~. 
Another limitation of technological solutions to the problems generated 
by economic growth is that it takes time to develop and apply them. 
Pressures from increasing population and per capita consumption growth 
rates will increase the rate of resource depletion (necessary to provide 
industrial inputs) and this rate could outpace exploration and extract-
ion and substitution technology rates. In any case, there must be some 
ultimate Limits (ecological and political) in a ~inite world, and the 
odds of reaching at Least one critical limit when the scale and rate 
of transformation is increasing exponentially are frighteningly high. 
The possibility that pressure will be reduced as Limits are reached 
(and costs become exorbitant> seems unlikely considering the rising 
expectations of the deprived and given the historical reluctance of 
the privileged to suffer even the slightest reduction in material well-
being in order to bring about a more equitable distribution of economic 
goods. This situation could prove calamitous; even if there are no 
theoretical technological limits, there are still most certainly 
political limits. 
The problem of ecological Limits is just as serious. Ecologists have 
Learned how difficult and dangerous it is to tamper with the intricate 
interrelationships of even small ecosystems. While some economists 
talk about meeting the world's mineral needs "from the mining of common 
rock, and the distillation of sea water'' (42-62) ecologists recognize 
that this would require inconceivable amounts of energy, present 
incredible waste disposal problems, and be enormously disruptive of 
many vital ecological processes. The ecological impacts of such Large-
scale undertakings are incalculable, but certainly they entail high risk. 
The ready willingness that some economists have displayed in accepting 
that rock, sea water, and energy are all that man needs in the way of 
resources betrays dangerous inattention to some vitally important 
questions, such as whether technology will be available when needed, 
76 
what the ecological effects will be, what costs are attached to in-
creasing special forms of energy production (e.g., the long-term 
hazards of nuclear wastes), what costs are attached to increasing 
general energy production (e.g., thermal effects), and what kind of 
world would result. 
Beckerman has suggested that it is possible for earth to carry 20 billion 
people at current American living standards simply by ·Using the vir-
tually limitless resources that exist of atomic energy, water, air, and 
the minerals locked up in common rock. ( 18-226) However he fails to 
suggest how the problem of heat disposal might be solved, to name just 
one very real problem which ecologists feel may have no technological 
solution. He also fails to discuss a host of other problems which 
could result in traumatic and potentially disastrous ecological, socio-
logical, and psychological upsets along the road to Utopia. The fact 
that resources theoretically exist in abundance, and technology may be 
available when needed, does not mean the growth problem may be presumed 
to be solved. The effects on the biosphere - such as destroying 
genetic resources (and the resulting loss of biological functions to 
which man's welfare may be inextricably linked), and the unknown but 
potentially damaging results from lost or destabilized ecosystems -
must all be carefully considered, and the' risks weighed, since some of 
these effects may well constitute megacosts which could make growth 
beyond a certain point absolutely prohibitive. 
It is perhaps desirable to explore a more viable approach to future 
economic development, one that does not involve so many physical trans-
formations and does not impose so many burdens on the biosphere. 
Ecology would suggest a "steady-state" approach, with physical stocks 
and flows being held relatively constant and activities disruptive to 
natural systems kept at some minimum Low Level. Such an approach 
would necessitate a redefinition of economic growth and a new policy to 
encourage those activities which enhance well-being but are not 
destructive or disruptive of natural goods. For nature as a whole, 
economic growth (as presently defined) has great destructive potential 
77 
and questionable salutary potential. If man identifies his future 
interests with nature, rather than material gain or technological 
advance, he will set about curbing this form of growth and concentrate 
on solving distributive problems (for political and ethical, as well a~ 
ecological, reasons). The choice is between a balanced, harmonious, 
relatively risk-free existence in association with nature's bounty, 
against a dangerous and sterile existence in a mechanized wasteland. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Natural goods are being destroyed because future costs are not being 
considered, and goods which do not immediately contribute to welfare 
tend to be neglected. The socially relevant time horizon should be 
extended to encompass future generations in perpetuity. This would 
require a pattern of development which is not destructive of the natural 
environment. 
Long-term planning must consider the ecological implications of 
development. Since ecological costs are poorly understood and forecast, 
risk-aversion should be given high priority. Future quality of Life 
should not be sacrificed to raise the present standard of Living. 
Urban-industrial development reduces the Level of natural amenities, 
which may be more important to future welfare than many man-made con-
veniences and amusements. Amenity Losses can be suffered without 
being perceived, and it is not possible to accurately estimate the 
extent of these losses or their effect on welfare. 
The natural environment should be managed for optimum sustained yield, 
' and option values should be maintained as responsible investments in the 
future. If development can proceed without conclusive evidence that 
costs will exceed benefits, there is great danger that some essential 
biological resource will be exhausted or some vital life-support 
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function will be irrevocably impaired. Many biological systems and 
ecological processes on which man's well-being depends have no sub-
stitutes, and institutional management is Limited by insurmountable 
time and information costs. Economic feed-back mechanisms may be · 
frustrated by political inertia, and technological Lags may prove in-
tolerable. Maintaining a steady-state economy would substantially 
reduce the risks of destroying invaluable natural goods. 
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CHAPTER 5 
AN APPROACH TO DECISION-MAKING: 
FORMULATING REASONABLE GOALS 
"Oppo.1c..tuni:ty fiOJc. e.xe..1r.c...We. ofi ill the. nOJc.mal. 
iMtinc.:t6 hM c.ome. to be. .1c.e.ga.Jr.de.d mOJc.e. a.n.d moJc.e. 
M an. inal.ie.n.able. Jc.igh:t. II ( 9 3-16 7) 
INTRODUCTION 
A rational approach to decision-making would be to identify man's true 
needs and then formulate goals based on the satisfaction of these ~eeds. 
Specific objectives and policies could then be evaluated in terms of 
these goals, providing a Logical framework for assessing alternatives 
and making choices. In order to identify the needs of man and deter-
mine how they may be best satisfied, it is necessary to consider the 
psychology of man and explore the meaning of welfare. 
MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS 
The psychologist Abraham Maslow contends that there are discoverable 
species-specific characteristics of humanness. (103-95) These give 
rise to the basic needs of man, on which well-being depends. The 
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basic needs are in the strictest sense biological needs; that is, 
their deprivation produces disease or illness. <102-734> Maslow feels 
these needs have a genetic basis and so terms them "instinctoid". An 
important point is that the organism itself dictates hierarchies of. 
values, which the scientific observer reports rather than creates. 
<103-97> Thus, a universal value system for man can be objectively 
determined, and man's true needs can be described and ranked in terms 
of relative potency, thereby providing a firm foundation for goal 
determination. 
Maslow distinguishes five basic needs <Figure 1): <1> physiologicql 
needs <the need for homeostasis or a constant, normal state of the 
blood stream); <2> safety needs (the need for feelings of persona~ 
security>; (3) belongingness and Love needs (affectionate relations 
with people in general>; (4) esteem needs (which include both self~ 
esteem and the esteem of others); and ( 5) the need for sel f-actuall za.,. 
tion <the need to be true to one's own nature; to do what one is best 
fitted for). Maslow describes two other needs which seem to be 
related to the need for self-actualization: cognitive needs <the need 
to know or understand), and aesthetic needs <the need to perceive 
beauty and avoid ugliness). ( 103-36, 39, 43, 45, 46) 
Maslow's theory further states that the basic human needs are organized 
into a hierarchy of relative prepotency. <103-38) As soon as one ~eed 
is satisfied, a higher need emerges. A want that is satisfied is 
no Longer a want, so that an individual is dominated and his behavioµr 
organized only by unsatisfied needs. (103-38) A man's outlook on the 
future thus depends on what need is dominating at present. For 
example, physiological needs are the most prepotent of all needs - if 
one is hungry, it is hard to imagine a world in which goods other than 
food play a very major role. Thus an idealist's conception of Utopia 
depends on his present metabolic state, and the degree to which other 
needs have been satisfied. ( 103-36,37> 
Maslow feels that one can distinguish between "basic needs" and needs 


























which are culturally-induced: 
The basic needs stand in a special psychological 
and biological status. There is something differ-
ent about them. They must be satisfied or else we 
get sick. ( 103-92) --
A "sick" man may be defined as one who's basic needs have been thwartec!, 
and this 
sickness in the individual must come ultimately 
from a sickness in the society. The good or 
healthy society would then be defined as one that 
permitted man's highest purposes to emerge by 
satisfying all his basic needs. <103-58) 
Man's highest need is self-actualization, which refers to man's desire 
for self-fulfilment, namely, to the tendency for him to become 
actualized in what he is potentially - to become everything that on? 
is capable of becoming. <103-46> Satisfaction of man's ultimate nreq 
- self-actualization - may be regarded as the supreme goal of societyt 
Maslow's theory provides a rational framework for formulating goal~ on 
which to base policy. It even indicates which goals must be given 
priority, and also reveals how rational men may be misled into giving 
too much weight to today's most pressing need (because higher needs 
cannot make themselves felt until Lower needs are reasonably satisfi~d) 1 
There remain difficulties however, such as how to decide wh?t social 
objectives are most appropriate in terms of these goals, and how to 
deal with the problem of Limited resources (for example, is it better 
to seek the maximum good for the maximum number, even if no individual$ 
achieve self-actualization, or is it better to permit some to achieve 
self-actualization, even if some others may then have only their Low-
est needs satisfied?). On the Level of society, value judgments must 
still be made and this requires a careful study of the condition of 
man. Finally, while it is assumed that man is the measure of all 
things, individuals are not immortal and do not exist ~n vaeuo; it 
83 
is therefore necessary to consider the needs of posterity and the con-
tinued existence of those natural good~ on which man's well-being 
depends. 
THE SPECIFIC GOALS 
The foregoing considerations suggest that there are five goals which may 
be regarded as proper and necessary to the well-being of society. 
Decision-makers .should seek to provide for: 
1. Health and physical well-being; 
2. Protection from violence and insecurity; 
3. Social stability and economic justice; 
4. Aesthetic, cognitive, and spiritual satisfactions; 
5. The needs and aspirations of future generations. 
Ensuring provision of the minimum requirements for health and physical 
well-being would satisfy physiological needs; protection from violence 
and insecurity would satisfy safety needs; improvements in social and 
economic justice would help provide for belongingness and Love needs 
as well as esteem needs; providing opportunities for aesthetic, 
cognitive, and spiritual satisfactions would contribute to the attain-
ment of the need for self-actualization; and planning for the needs 
and aspirations of future generations would help ensure that social 
progress will be sustainable.<Figure 2) 
While these goals may be regarded as hierarchical in concept, they 
should be considered inseparable: all goals are necessary to achieve 
a state of well-being for society and there should be no question of 
choosing to maximize some and neglect others. No amount of physical 
well-being will compensate for the Lack of aesthetic and other "higher 
~~ .... 
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order11 satisfactions - the need for self-actualization is as important 
as the physiological needs if well-being is to be maximized. Satis-
faction of Lower needs is a pre-condition for satisfying higher needs, 
but over-gratification of a need does not contribute to (and may inter-
fere with) the satisfaction of the next highest need. The five goals 
are therefore properly regarded as being five aspects of one goal, 
to maximize social well-being, and the challenge is to design a policy 
which provides the optimum balance of satisfaction among the five 
aspects of social well-being. 
THE MEANING OF WELFARE 
Economists have devised various indices of social welfare, but these 
do not necessarily actually indicate the well-being of society. The 
welfare theorem that economists have postulated suggests that in a 
market of perfect competition, if market costs reflect true social 
costs, then the best strategy to maximize individual welfare would 
maximize social welfare. This theorem rests upon the important 
assumption that collective welfare should necessarily be based on the 
summation of individual choices. However the rationality of incre-
mental decisions may not be a reliable guide to improvements in 
collective welfare. Even if it can be shown that for each individual 
a given action will yield more benefits than costs at· the margin, 
the aggregation of such benefits and costs for a number of individuals 
may provide a different result. This can happen if costs are enduring 
and benefits are not, or if the nature of the benefit depends on some 
advantage relative to others, or if individuals prove incompetent to 
foresee the eventual consequences of their decisions. Hooker, applying 
the Logic of the welfare theorem, suggests that Lemmings can be said 
maximize their collective welfare when individuals decide to migrate 
due to overcrowded conditions, although it is well known the entire 
population can Literally end up out to sea. (75-176) 
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Most indicators of social welfare are related to the provision of com~ 
forts or conveniences (and the maintenance of existing social machinery) 
which may increase well-being up to a point but may after that point 
actually reduce well-being. These indicators are only presumptions 
and may therefore be dangerously misleading. Decision-makers need to 
develop some yardstick for human content; this is the ultimate con-
cern of politics. (2-16) ~ 
Modern political systems seem to aim at salvation by machinery; they 
proceed on the theory that if we can all keep warm and full, the good 
Life will follow. <95-51) Maslow's theory indicates that the satis-
faction of physiological needs only precipitates the emergence of new 
needs <which cannot be satisfied in the same way), and has no Lasting 
value in itself: the blessings we have already achieved come to be 
taken for granted, to be forgotten, to drop out of consciousness, and 
finally, even, not be valued any more - at Least until they are taken 
. away from us. ( 103-xvi) Providing for physiological needs is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the good Life. Once s~b~ 
sistence Levels are passed, men's more enduring satisfactions are to 
be found in Love, trust, friendships and, in a civilized society, are 
augmented by their perceptions of nature, and of beauty, art and 
music. <18-74> 
It may be that economic growth in developed countries has not signi~ 
ficantly contributed to improvements in man's welfare (beyond meeting 
the most basic needs) and has in fact destroyed some cardinal sources 
of welfare hitherto available. ( 106-161) A central weakness of the 
market system is its inability to formulate public needs above those 
of the market place. (72-132) It is necessary to rely on other 
institutional mechanisms to provide for higher needs. Unfortunately, 
the influence of the economic sector is pervasive (even in planned 
economies), and it is commonly assumed that expansion of economic 
welfare necessarily contributes to improvements in social welfare. 
However, there is no evidence that the rich are happier than the poor, 
or that individuals grow happier as their incomes increase. <96-420) 
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This indicates that a policy dedicated to unlimited increases in any 
standard of living index may be unproductive, or even counter-product-
ive. We have all too easily equated rising standards of living with 
"the good life"; only recently have we begun to have serious doubts 
about the association between the two. (16-1> The evidence in 
economically developed societies suggests that marketing activities so 
alter tastes and preferences that individuals become persuaded they have 
illimitable material needs and that welfare depends on their satis-
faction. It may be that in consumer-oriented societies the satis-
faction of basic material needs stimulates more material desires 
·rather than a striving for self-actualization. (139-19) 
Wants vs. Needs 
The science of economics is widely regarded as being a trustworthy 
guide to welfare maximization by revealing how needs may be satisfied 
in the most efficient manner. Strictly speaking, there are no "needs" 
in economics. There are only choices - individual and collective. 
<110-243> Man can choose to improve his welfare by reducing his wants. 
This is the choice favoured by ecological considerations. But the 
economist generally seeks to maximize consumption over fairly short 
time-spans and so concentrates on improving the standard of living, which 
is measured by the amount of annual consumption, assuming all the time 
that a man who consumes more is "better off" than a man who consumes 
less; perhaps the aim should be to obtain the maximum of well-being 
with the minimum of consumption. ( 129-52) If a society becomes pre~ 
occupied with materialistic aspirations, the individual's higher needs 
may go unrecognized and unsatisfied while his Lower needs are satisfied 
to the point of satiety. There is a penalty for too much comfort and 
ease, a penalty of lassitude and inertia and the frustrated feeling 
that goes with unreality. ( 113-208) Life may thus be reduced to a 
shadow of its real potential, as it becomes possible to go through Life 
and never be passionately stirred. <65-65) 
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The "standard of living" shibboleth has dehumanized man; there should 
be a shift away from consumption of goods which encourage greed and 
envy. Peace and fulfilment cannot be attained simply through univer-
sal prosperity, and industrial progress can actually reduce man's 
welfare in the long run. (129-28) The bewildering assortment of goods 
offers the sort of expansion that is as likely to subtract from than 
to add to his welfare. (106-161) Certain spiritual or non-material 
goods should be set above material goods, as the former are infinite 
and infinitude can never be achieved in the material realm. (129-32) 
If (as it appears) there. is a conflict between these two classes of 
goods, then, once subsistence levels are passed, it would seem desirable 
to abandon the pursuit of further material goods and seek more rewarding 
satisfactions, such as are found in social intercourse, cultural 
accomplishments, and perceptions made possible through contact with 
the natural world. It is suggested that there is a point beyond which 
conventional economic welfare experiences rapidly diminishing marginpl 
utility, and it is at this point where higher order goods experience 
rapidly appreciating utility. If this point were properly perceived, 
then total welfare could be enhanced by trading consumption of econo-
mic goods for greater consumption of the products of nature and 
0ther goods . 
. After the most basic physiological needs are satisfied, discontent may 
arise more because of relative rather than absolute deprivation. 
Sociologists have noted the significance of the individual's perceptiop 
of his well-being in relation to that of others. Economists recognize 
this same principle, and call it the "relative income hypothesis". 
<106-160) The satisfaction of man's true needs are the proper goals 
of society, and their satisfaction does not appear to depend on income 
or equity improvements: any sensitive regard to social welfare would 
seek rather to alter our philosophy of Life than to alter income 
differences. ( 110-128) 
There may be some advantage to living in a traditional society, in which 
one's position is more or less fixed and accepted. Traditional 
• 
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societies provide institutions which clearly define roles and relation-
ships, and this lends security to the individual in respect to the 
rest of society. Such institutiorial mechanisms may be extremely 
effective in satisfying three of man's basic needs: safety needs, 
belongingness and love needs, and esteem needs. Modern industrial 
society, by comparison, is based on competitive principles and a 
striving for upward mobility which seems designed to ensure a perpetual 
state of insecurity, uncertainty, and frustration. Even if one 
achieves security, acceptance, and respect within his community there is 
no institutional assurance that these will not be lost. 
Work and Leisure 
Economic welfare is principally measured in terms of money income and 
voluntary leisure, but an important aspect of the condition of man is 
the satisfaction of work. It is interesting to note that economists 
acclaim economic growth largely for its reputedly salubrious effects 
in freeing man from ceaseless toil, while others attack "the econom.ic 
race" for undermining the health of modern m9n and claim that the 
pressure for an ever faster working pace renders man unfit for leisure. 
(98-19> There is no evidence that hard work, or long hours spent in 
work, is in itself undesirable. Work can be regarded as a good thing 
which confers at least three benefits: ( 1) a chance to develop 
faculties, (2) ~chance to join others in a common task, and (3) 
!· ·i 
the production of moreigoods and services. <129-49> The first contri-
butes primarily to the needs for esteem and self-actualization, the 
second to the needs for belongingness and love as well as esteem, and 
the third to physiological and security needs. In industrial 
societies, work has become more exclusively concerned with the efficient 
production of goods and services and less relevant to other needs. 
The potential for self-actualization, for example, is diminished when 
efficiency considerations lead to mass production techniques. Work 
should be seen in a Buddhist perspective - it is first joyful and 
creative activitiy which only secondarily produces something. (55-192> 
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Even the alleviation of kitchen drudgery has perhaps had insidious 
effects - members of a fami Ly do not eat together so often, or value the 
act of producing and preparing food so much, and this may be contri-
buting to the breakdown of the family observed in modern societies. 
Increases in leisure time may also be of dubious value, depending on 
how it is used. The mass of men in industrial societies seem bent·on 
the pursuit of mindless or vicarious pleasures and appear absorbed in 
petty, frenetic activities to allay boredom. This may be partially 
attributable to the. loss of direct contact with nature and a direct 
~oncern with fundamental necessities - perhaps meaningful work or 
pleasure depends on a certain relation to nature. Increases in lei~ure 
time made possible by industrial development do not necessarily contri-
bute to welfare since the ability to enjoy Leisure presupposes a state 
of mind, arising from a sense of ease and unhurriedness, which allow$ 
a person to immerse himself in the here and now. <110-158) Modern, 
industrial man has largely lost this ability. And part of the reason 
!s the pace of consumption: if welfare is measured in consumption, 
then everyone is striving to maximize consumption to maximize welfare. 
Sut something else is consumed in the process: time, peace of mind, and 
the ability to reflect and enjoy. Man may be losing his capacity for 
gratification and Living more superficially. Perhaps there is a 
negative relation between the technical complexity of a civilization 
and the individual's capacity for instinctual enjoyment. ( 110-166) 
The Road to Industrialization 
Modern man is rapidly losing his power of choice over how he will live. 
Once the processes of industrialization and urbanization have created 
a society which is basidally hedonistic, it may not be feasible -
economically, socially, or politically - to re-create society even 
though higher goals are subsequently perceived. A collective initia-
tive to forgo immediate and tangible benefits, or to sustain immediate 
and tangible Losses, in order to create for everyone a more wholesome 
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and radically simple style of life, or to forgo the familiar range of 
creature comforts and labour-saving devices in the quest for sources of 
more enduring satisfaction, entails a momentous social decision. 
(110-135) The road to industrialization and urbanization is paved 
with expectations of rising incomes and greater opportunities. If 
it could be demonstrated that this actually leads to a situation in 
~hich we need to work harder to pay for our needs, perhaps a new road 
to development could be chosen. (106-40> 
If quality of life, rather than simply the standard of Living, becomes 
the criterion of development, there may be greater recognition of the 
importance of natural amenities and environmental buffering mechanisms 
to man's welfare. Large, industrialized societies replace natural 
amenities with material amenities, such as cars, airplanes, and tele-
vision sets, which then become increasingly important as the individual 
finds he can no longer reach the inn, the theatre, the market, the 
fields, and the streams. (85-19) Kohr distinguishes three types of 
"necessities": biological, cultural, and technological. Biologicql 
necessities are imposed by man's constitution and his relation to the 
natural environment; cultural necessities are imposed by the social 
environment; and technological necessities are imposed by the built 
or man-made environment. Kohr feels that cultural necessities 
$timulate economic growth by making necessities out of Luxuries, and 
this has the effect of pushing subsistence Levels upwards - consumption 
increases without really improving welfare. Economic growth also 
increases the size of society and speeds some of its processes, generat-
ing technological necessities which are supplied by "density commodities" 
(such as driving Licenses, traffic Lights, etc.) Kohr's thesis is 
that economic growth improves individual welfare until society reaches 
a critical size and stage of development, and then welfare losses are 
experienced. The development trap is this: cultural and technological 
Luxuries have a way of turning into undesirable necessities (such as 
the automobile), and true biological necessities, which make a direct 
and genuine contribution to well being (such as the sights, sounds, 
92 
and smells of nature during a country walk>, are displaced and their 
value tends to be forgotten. (85-41) 
Therefore, improvements in economic welfare do not necessarily result 
in social welfare improvements. Costs of maintaining a complex in-
dustrial state increase disproportionately as economic development 
proceeds so that quality of Life can decline with further increases in 
the standard of Living. A major objective of developing countries 
should be to keep the costs of social machinery down - in the long 
run, this may be more important than production and distribution ob-
jectives. Many of the items included in Gross National Product <GNP) 
are actually transaction costs, or costs of a faster pace of life, 
which do not bring greater welfare. Much of an industrial nation's 
effort and ingenuity is spent in producing sophisticated products and 
specialized services that cater to basic biological and psychic needs 
which were more easily, and often more fully, met in pre./'i~dustrial 
societies. <110-46) The real measure of economic and~ocial welfare 
is not income at all, but the condition of the pe~~ or of society 
- which has only a slight relationship to GNP because GNP as currently 
calculated includes a large component of negative goods and services. 
<141-19) <An "amenities index" could theoretically provide more 
meaningful indicators of social welfare, but the difficulty in quanti-
fying and comparing amenities with marketable goods will probably 
remain insurmountable.) Decision-makers in developing countries still 
have the opportunity to direct their societies al.ong more responsible 
and satisfying development paths, and to discourage dangerous and unful-
filling activities based on the consumption of durable goods and energy 
(e.g., cars and petrol) by controlling infrastructure and financing 
(e.g., highway construction and automotive plants). The slate is 




There are two aspects to man's environment - the natural and the man-
made - and each contributes to man's well-being. The Level of utility 
of each member of the community is presumed to depend on two things: 
his own consumption of private goods and services, and the environ-
mental conditions to which he is exposed. (47-xx> It is difficult to 
~stimate the relative significance of natural and man-made benefits, but 
decision-makers tend to get fixated on economic utility and neglect 
natural goods. While there is no question that basic economic needs 
(food, clothing, shelter, .etc.)' have priority for any individual, it is 
important not to lose sig~t of 'the fact that consumption of commodity 
resources may destroy natural' goods vital to the satisfaction of other 
needs. It is possible that developing countries will destroy their 
supply of natural goods before they have achieved economic goals, and 
so fail to provide for future needs. It would seem desirable to build 
safeguards into the economic system against excessive Levels of develop-
ment and protect already scarce supplies of natural goods; such "goods" 
as wildlife, scenic vistas, space, peace, and quiet should be given 
full consideration in a policy of development, and a set of incentives 
should be adopted to ensure their provision in perpetuity. If this 
is not done, man may lose control over the environment and some of his 
own institutions, and there will be diminished possibilities for 
achieving aesthetic satisfactions and experiencing feelings of peace, 
self-sufficiency, and psychological well-being. In general, people 
in industrial societies do not seem to find their present mode of life 
particularly enjoyable; we need to experiment with alternatives which 
are at the same time Less polluting and Less wasteful of resources. 
( 120-99) 
The Importance of Environmental Quality 
Raymond Dasmann has observed that man's basic goals are sequential: 
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There are two things of fundamental importance 
to all people. One is to stay alive. The 
second is the quality of that existence. The 
second only comes into play when the first is 
provlded for .... (42-3) 
Many people say that developing countries cannot afford to be concerned 
about environmental amenities, and yet what is the value of a marginal 
existence? Dasmann's two goals are properly one. If the poor survive 
only to propagate more poor (and misery>, mankind is at a dead end. 
Adequate attention must be given the second goal, and it must be made 
Glear that the quality of existence depends on the quality of the environ-
ment - not on material goods. In fact the problem of staylng alive 
plso depends on the quality of the environment: where people are not 
~urviving is where people have destroyed their environment. Where 
people are surviving, the second goal usually gets corrupted and turned 
into a striving for material goods and a concern with the "standard" 
<rather than the "quality") of Living. 
Allison has described how the horrors of poverty can give way to some-
thing more subtle but also crippling - Like tradlng malnutrition for 
some other, more insidiously degenerative disease. As England solved 
the problems of working-class poverty, it encountered new problems 
associated with working-class prosperity: the ugliness, the mediocrity, 
the frightening expansion of urban and suburban areas, were the outward 
and visible sign of some deep-seated change for the worse. (2-52) 
People were saved, but the Landscape was sacrificed - the sustaining 
environment was degraded, diminished. Decision-makers of developing 
countries should consider whether this is an acceptable scenario, a 
model worthy of emulation. Is it economic to accept standardization 
which leads to dreariness and ugliness? If man perceives diversity 
and beauty as having spiritual utility, then these qualities have true 
economic value. It is disheartening that many dedicated conservation-
ists are reluctant to argue the economic merits of these "higher values 0 
~ is the population so far past optimum that spiritual values must be 
sacrificed just to meet the physiological needs of man, or should 
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decision-makers insist that some substantial provision be made for en-
hancing the quality of life? 
The quality of life depends on the quality of the environment, but 
environmental quality is a most complex concept. It is relatively 
easy to say what physical factors can lead to degradation of environ-
mental quality, but very difficult to specify what constitutes or leads 
to a high quality environment. Such judgments may not be subject to 
scientific determination, and it may be necessary to make rather unscien-
tific and subjective dec'isions about values and objectives before 
scientific methods can be applied to the task of maintaining environ-
mental quality. There is much evidence that the natural environment 
makes a vital contribution to the quality of life. Natural influences , 
inspire men and refine their character, while alienation from nature 
seems to have a generally debilitating effect on spirit and character. 
The good life would require that society be so organized that people 
are not far removed from the immediate sight and sound and rhythms of 
nature. ( 110-154> 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Man.appears to have objectively determinable needs and it would seem 
reasonable to derive social goals from a study of man's true needs 
rather than from culturally-induced needs or "wants". Man's biologic-
ally determined needs are of three types: materialistic (physiological 
and security needs), social (belongingness, love, and esteem needs), 
and moral or spiritual (the need for personal fulfilment>. These needs 
are organized into a hierarchy of relative prepotency, so that the 
lower needs must be reasonably satisfied before higher needs are felt. 
There is a danger that decision-makers can get fixated on the needs of 
lower levels and neglect the higher needs, or get fixated on the needs 
of today's society and neglect the needs of posterity. 
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Over-gratification of one need does not contribute to satisfying other 
needs; the ultimate goal is to provide the optimum balance of satis-
faction of the various needs of man for. all time. Too much emphasis 
on materialistic needs leads to environmental problems and shortages of 
resources to satisfy higher needs. It would seem prudent to recognize 
environmental limits and the diminishing marginal utility of material 
goods to provide for physical well-being and security, and restrict the 
production of superfluous economic goods in order fo provide greater 
social and economic justice and greater opportunities for aesthetic, 
cognitive, and spiritual satisfactions. 
Most indices of social welfare are inadequate or misleading, and 
economic welfare does not necessarily correspond to social welfare. 
Man can improve his total welfare by reducing material wants and 
trading excessive consumption of economic goods for greater consumption 
of natural amenities. 
Industrial development has dehumanized work, reduced the value of 
leisure, destroyed natural amenities, vitiated environmental buffering 
mechanisms, and imposed great technological burdens on society. Trad-
itional societies may offer more opportunities for meeting safety, 
belongingness, and esteem needs than do modern societies. Traditional 
societies also offer significant opportunities for spiritual and aes-
thetic satisfactions through intimate contact with nature. Development 
in traditional societies must be carefully controlled and directed so 




THE PROPER PURSUITS OF MAN 
"The. que..o.tlon. ~, doe..1.:i the. e.duea.:te.d e-i...tlze.n. fin.ow 
he. ~ on.ly a. eog -i..n. an e.eolog-i..ea.l me.eha.n.~m? That 
-i..6 he. w-i..ll wo.1tk. w-i..th that me.eha.n.~m h~ me.n.W 
we.a.lth and h~ ma.:te.Jt-i..a.l we.a.lth ea.n. e.xpa.n.d -i..n.de.6-i..n.-i..:te.-
ly? Bu:t that -i..6 he. .1te.6UJ.:ie..o :to wOJtk w-i..th -i..:t, -i..:t 
w-i..ll ul.tlmate.ly g.1t-i..n.d h-i..m :to dUJ.:i:t?" < 93-64 > 
INTRODUCTION 
Decision-makers have two ultimate responsibilities, and every choice 
should be evaluated in the Light of these over-riding concerns: ( 1) 
will a given action in some way contribute to the further development 
of mankind (so that man may become what he has it in him potentially to 
become), and (2) does the action entail any increased risk to the 
survival of mankind? Many decision-makers appear to be concerned only 
about providing for the Lower and culturally-induced needs of man, 
and show Little concern for the way in which present decisions affect 
posterity's prospects. This chapter will examine the reasons why 
the most important pursuits of man - to survive and achieve fulfilment 
- do not preoccupy the thoughts of most decision-makers. 
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FULFILMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND 
THE HIGHEST DEVELOPMENT OF MANKIND 
The proper concern of the state is to provide its citizens with the 
good Life, the J.>ummum bonum. Welfare economics is concerned pr imar i Ly 
with physical well-being, and accepts consumer preferences as given; 
man's higher needs may go unperceived and neglected. Psychology and 
philosophy are concerned with elucidating these higher needs and pro-
viding an orderly system of ideas by which to Live and to interpret the 
world. ( 129-75) Maslow calls for a "normative biology" ( 102-725) 
and says it is Legitimate and fruitful to regard instinctoid basic 
needs as rights as well as needs. <103-xii i) This provides the basis 
for establishing social goals, as well as criteria for evaluating a 
society: that society is good which fosters the fullest development 
of human potentials, of the fullest degree of humanness. (102-726) 
Attainment of the highest need - the need for self-actualization - is 
the ultimate criterion of success. Decision-makers m~st consider the 
quest to satisfy man's highest aspirations as their ultimate concern. 
The final goal of society should be to produce healthy, fulfilled 
organisms. 
Higher needs are essentially positive in conception. Satisfaction of 
belongingness and Love needs, esteem needs, and cognitive and aesthetic. 
needs produces happiness, joy,contentment, elation, or ecstasy, 
whereas frustration of these needs may produce only the most subtle 
signs of disutility. This is in striking contrast to the obvious 
physical and psychological manifestations of failure when physiological 
and security needs are not satisfied, and the subtle signs of utility 
when they~ satisfied. Lower needs clamour for attention; higher 
needs are more difficult to discern. Decision~makers are therefore 
inclined to adopt a basically negative approach to social goals: they 
seek to avoid need frustrations rather than to positively meet needs. 
This attitude results in a bias against higher needs, and a nearly 
exclusive preoccupation with providing for physiological and security 
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needs. But filling empty stomachs - as necessary as that may be -
w i LL not result in the good life if other needs are subsequently frus-
trated, Lower needs cease to play an active determining or organizing 
role as soon as they are gratified. ( 103-57) It is therefore necessary 
to plan and provide for the satisfaction of higher needs which, because 
they can never be completely satisfied, will always provide potential 
for further gratification and greater well-being. 
Economic activity is primarily concerned with satisfying physiological 
and security needs, but because of the prominence of these needs the 
term "economic welfare" is often thought of as being synonymous with 
"social welfare". However, over-gratification of physiological and 
security needs Leads to a kind of psychological suffocation. Material-
istic pleasures are necessarily shallow because Lower needs have 
Limited potential for gratification. Over-consumption of economic 
goods only results in satiety or boredom rather than satisfaction, and 
inhibits the emergence of higher needs. Since the individual is 
unable to perceive his real needs, he may seek relief from stupefication 
or agitation through further consumption of a type which provides 
sensory titillation or some form of escapism. Finally, all that is 
sought is a kind of effete pleasure, a pale imitation of joy, or else 
some reckless and desperate source of stimulation. 
What is needed is a change in attitudes and behaviour, to be more 
sensuous in our attitude to the world, more ready to enjoy the present 
moment for itself, instead of frenetically seeking the power ,and 
?ecurity that possessions offer. (121-20) Institutions should be de-
signed to free man from greed and short-sightedness. The consumption 
of consumer commodities and the attainment of great physical security 
r. 
are not man's only pleasJres, and do not give purpose to his existence. 
Civilization's most notable achievements are intellectual and spiritual, 
and bear little relation to economic welfare and technological develop-
ments. Perhaps the ancient Athenians were one of the most successful 
societies in history: they made their society one designed to bring 
all its members to the fullest development of their highest powers. <72-133) 
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Rather than seeking greater material satisfactions through economic 
growth, the ancients cultivated man's inexhaustible appetite for beauty\ 
and knowledge, permitting a kind of growth which truly enhances man's 
. well-being. Economic welfare is a necessary but not sufficient con-
dition to achieve true well-being. 
What then is meant by "well-being"? Is the answer not simply to realize 
fully the extent or potentialities of one's being, to know one's inner-
most depths and manifold relations, to raise the level of one's aware-
ness of all thing~ to feel sympathy with the universe, to exult in exist-
ence? And are not all common answers too limiting and therefore false? 
Nature is of utmost significance in providing for two of man's basic 
needs: his physiological needs, and his need for self-actualization. 
The first permits survival, and the second makes survival worthwhile. 
Both needs must be accommodated; survival must be made worthwhile. 
Man achieves psychological freedom through his relation with the environ-
ment. Exposure to natural influences, such as the beauty and purity found 
in wilderness settings, has an elevating or ennobling effect, and there 
may be no comparable source of such satisfactions. The natural en-
vironment is primarily a means to the person's self-actualizing ends. 
( 103-68) 
THE SUSTAINABILITY OF SOCIETY 
A commitment to maximizing individual welfare implies a commitment to 
posterity. We should be concerned about posterity because men have 
not yet achieved all that they have it in them to achieve. (120-83) In 
order that individuals may achieve self-actualization, society must 
survive. All social goals depend on the su~tainability of society. 
It is therefore i~perative to adopt the safest mode of development for 
meeting the needs of individuals. The first criterion by which a 
development policy should be judged is its potential for survival. 
If the promise of individual gain is purchased at the cost of reduced 
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prospects for society in perpetuity, then the policy should be con-
sidered untenable. 
The concept of survival is the criterion of value linking economics, 
ecology, and ethics. The sustainability of a system is the ultimate 
imperative. Since individuals are almost exclusively concerned with 
their own finite time horizons, it is necessary to design institutions 
in such a way that social progress will be sustainable. Individuals 
are commonly motivated to leave an estate, (89-1069) but more immediate 
concerns have much higher priority. Decision-makers must balance 
todqy's needs against the sustainability principle, and decide on the 
trade-off between the rate of progress and the degree of risk which is 
acceptable. 
Given the critical importance of ensuring survival, one would assume 
it rational to always accept minimum risk; however there are two 
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major difficulties: ( 1) present problems overshadow future problems, 
and (2) there is great uncertainty as to the nature and 
seriousnSss of future problems. The result is an inclination to dis-
count the future and concentrate on today's problems. A preoccupa-
tion with rapidly solving the most immediate problems has led to a 
policy of encouraging economic growth and industrial development and a 
general belief that the ensuing risks to posterity are acceptable for 
one of several reasons: ( 1> if present needs are not met, there may 
be no fµture; (2) posterity can only benefit by economic development; 
(3) if resources are actually finite, posterity will exhaust them ulti-
mately anyway; and (4) the resilience of nature is so great that it is 
not necessary to be concerned about eco-catastrophes. These presump-
tions should be more carefully examined. 
The primacy of present needs: Satisfaction of present needs cannot 
take precedence over maintaining the en-
vironment's capability of sustaining society. It is paradoxical that 
environmental destruction is defended on the grounds of saving or im-
proving the condition of priceless human Lives when environmental 
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proteGtion can legitimately be defended on the same grounos. If it 
is nqt possible to put a price on a human life, it is not possible to 
put a price on the sustaining natural environment. Since nature 
supports human life, if one must choose between saving vital natural 
goods and saving a given number of inolvidual Lives, environmental 
concerns should take precedence. Even the Laudable objective of est-
ab~ ishing a floor for poverty, beyond which no one would be allowed to 
fall, is unrealistic unless it is tied to a population policy to pre-
vent population growth from being checked only by misery, after 
essential resources are exhausted. Decision-makers should view the 
destruction of the environment as a matter of great urgency, as great 
as any other problem. Vnfortunately, de~ision~makers have a propensity 
ta disparage dangers which are not immediate or which are not confined 
to their constitvency - distant or more ~eneral dangers tend to be un-
perceived or ballyhooed. 
The effect of today's progress on posterity: Passmore says today's deci-
sion-makers can help 
posterity by making the world better~, and implies that this is the 
Limit of their obligation. <120-92) But what if present improvements 
can be calculated to engender greater future risks? Increasing pro-
ductivity tooay often Leads to decreases In the carrying capacity of 
an area due to resource exhaustion or environmental damage. Man's 
activities have always had some adverse Local and regional impacts, but 
the scale and rate of present impacts threatens the ability of the whole 
earth tq support life. Unwittingly, we have created for ourselves a 
new and dangerous world, and we would be wise to move through it as 
though our Lives were at stake. <31-231) Unfortunately, economic 
institutions are afflicted with myopia: private time preferences 
differ from social time preferences regarding the importance of a future 
benefit or cost, resulting in a rate of consumption that is too high 
and a Level of investment that is too Low to adequately provide for 
future generations. Individuals with finite Life expectancies are 
Likely to be guided in their private consumption decisions in a 
manner that is not necessarily optimal for a society that has a 
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collective commitment to life in perpetuity. (91-61) Consumption 
decisions which require irreversible developments have the effect of 
decreasing the buffering capacity of the natural environment, and there-
fore policies which favour high consumption increase environmental risk. 
Today's advancements can make posterity worse off. 
The implications pf finite resources: Beckerman insists that the 
problem of finite resources is 
not really a "problem" at all: he maintains that either resources are 
finite in some meaningful sense, in which case even zero ~rowth will 
fail to save us in the long run, or resources are not really finite in 
any meaningful sense. (18-232) This view overlooks the fact that some 
finite respurces are renewable and can sustain society indefinitely so 
lon'g as limitations governing renewability are observed. This suggests 
that development should not be based on finite, n9n-renewab~e resources, 
but should rather be directed toward achieving a steady-state system 
based on renewable resources. The present techno9ratic system is based 
on non-renewable resources which will eventually be exhausted -
potential replacements are effectively finite because of ecological 
constraints; this system is already approaching Limits and appears to 
be almost out of control, A new way of life, based on minimum per 
capita consumption of energy and materials which are certain to remain 
available, would appear preferable to one that recognizes no Limits. 
What is clear is that a way of life that bases itself on materialism, i.e., 
on permanent, Limitless ~xpansionism in a finite environment, cannot 
last long. ( 129-137) Present growth rates certainly cannot be sus-
talned. The decision before us is the choice among the means available 
to bring the process to an end; and the question is whether there is 
still sufficient time or control. <16-130) Many economists agree 
with ecologists that there are environmental limits to growth, but 
there is still great disagreement as to how near those limits are. 
Nature's capacity to cope with man's impacts: Dubos has commented on 
the amazing resilience of 
nature after major ecological disturbances (from volcanic eruptions to 
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ice ages) and the gr~at number of species which have become extinct. 
These observation$ have led him to conclude that the need to maintain 
the balance of nature cannot provide a valid case for conservation. 
(50-164) There is~ however, a profound difference between natural 
processes and man-directed processes: man's impacts now are occurring 
on a scale and at a rate which is totally unprecedented in nature, 
While the earth itself may survive any conceivable disturbance, man 
may not. If the survival of man is of concern, the balance of nature 
is of concern; it is surely prudent to allow developments to proceed 
at nature's pace rather t.han man'$· Although man has modified the 
natural env~ronment drastically, and destroyed countless ecosystems 
with relative impunity, there is in~reasing evidence that co$ts are 
now becoming glpbally significant. Ecologists warn that rnan cannot 
risk major modification of the biosphere except at the risk of his own 
extermination. (43-30) The risks of ~ong-term, g~obal modifications 
are difficult to assess because little is known about the absorptive 
capacity of the biosphere or t~e possible synergistic effects of fuulti-
farious impacts - there are too many complex variables and obscure 
interrelationships, and ecological limits are not known. The theory 
of emergent properties - which suggests that systems display new, unfore-
seeable properties at different ~evels of organization - suggests the 
possibility that if the natural environment becomes too fragmented, new 
ecological effects may appear and these may have devastating impacts 
on man's well-being. The penalty for reducing species diversity and 
ecosystem stability may be greater (and nearer) than is generally 
believed. Even a low probability of ecological catastrophe is not a 
good risk if one considers the magnitude of the cost should it occur. 
Some ~onservation effort toward maintaining the balance of nature would 
I 
reduce this level of risk. The balance of nature exists only because 
no species has ever triumphed too completely in the struggle for 
existence. It is possible t9 win all the battles but one and still 
lose the war. Man's successes cqu~d ultimately be self-defeating. 
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THE $TEADY-~TATE SO~UTION 
The thr,at tq man's survival is du~, ironic~lly, tp hi' Gonsidera~le 
ac;:comp~fshments. Success ~as permitted a degree pf growth and complex-
ity whic;:h nqw challen~es man's ability to contro~ his futur~ actionsi 
. ' 
l?r.imitive man had less control ov~r his immediate environment, but more 
control over lllis own actions~ sp lived in greater harmqny with natµre. 
Primitiye co5mologies and 
1
myths gave rise to rftl,lalistic behaviour 
which ac;~ordellf with e~ological principles and so had high adaptive 
value, <125-5> Modern technology has given rise to extraordinary 
. ~hC111ges in rnants rel~ti9n to nature_ .but there has been insufficient 
· time to receive and interpret feedback processes necessary to adapt to 
new conditlon~. !f man Is to maintain hi~ evol4tlonary fltne?s, he 
must develop new mechanisms of adaptation or ?~ow the rate of change. 
It may be possible to create altruist!~ institutions to take the place 
of cosmologies and myths in regulating change and pehaviour to permit 
. continued adapt at ion. The selective advantage of cooperation has been 
increasing with man's numbers, and man can no longer afford to be in 
confli~t with nature or other mep. Man's survival can be attributed, 
in part, to a gradually expanding system of ethics which first embraced 
kith and kin but later, out of evolutjonery necessity, came to embrace 
tribe, community, and nation. A new extension of ethics seems necessary 
because the struggle for survival has entered an entire~y new dimension, 
encompassing all of nature and affecting countless f4ture generations. 
Man needs to develop a land ethic, and a posterity ethic. The question 
whether to reduce ecological risks is a moral issue and morality has 
suryival va~ue. 
A major constraint on action is uncertainty. 
p9orly under5toqd, and no one knows the need? 
is what le~ds to discounting the future, but 
pe to seek a steady-state. While we (Tlc;iy qe 
Ecologjcal risks are 
of posterity. Uncertainty 
a better response would 
uncertain ap to the 
I 
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precise nature of the dangers confronting the land and posterity, 
we may be reasonably certain that there is some significant danger 
associated with economic growth and industrial development based on 
finit~, non-renewable resources. Thi~ growth has, to date, kept the 
wolf at bay but has als0 h~d the effect of increasing the size of the 
wolf - man is feeding th~ problem rather than s9lvi~g or conquering 
it. What is needed is a restructuring of man's way so as to reconcile 
him to his ecological niche. (136-115> All renewable resources should 
be managed on a sustained yield basis to ensure that the overall pro-
ductivity of the land is maintaineq in perpetuity. Policy instruments 
might include zoning, extraction charges, and shadow pr1c1ng. The 
ultimate goal should be to achieve a steady-state economy, which is 
defined by four characteristics: (1) a constant human population; 
<2> a constant population (or stock> of goods, including capital; 
<3> the levels at which the two populations are held constant are 
sufficient for a good life and sustainable for a long future; (4) 
the rate of con$umption of matter and energy by which the two stocks 
are maintained is reduced to the lowest fea~ible level for the human 
populations. (13-149> 
' 
The traditional objective of conservation ~achieving the wise and 
efficient use of scarce resources - i? basically in accord with trad-
itional economic precepts and may b~ understood to ultimately countenance 
consumption to depletion 1 If environmental quality and ecological 
integrity are to be maintained, an explicit commitment must be made to 
achieving a balanced, harmonious, sustainable use of resources which is 
not in ac~ord with a materialistic, purely utilitarian economy. It is 
necessary to adopt an ecological rather than a conservation perspective, 
and aim at improving the quality of Life rather than the standard of 
living. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The good society may be defined as that society which fosters the fullest 
development of human potential. Satisfaction of Lower needs is a 
prerequisite to the satisfaction of higher needs but there is a·da~ger 
that the more subtle higher needs will go unrecognized and unmet as 
decision-makers confine their attention to the more compelling physio-
logical and security needs. Over-consumption of lower needs does not 
contribute to well-being but does interfere with the pursuit of higher 
needs. Institutions must be designed to focus attention on the higher 
needs, such as the need to perceive beauty and acquire knowledge. The 
natural environment contributes to the satisfaction of material needs 
and aesthetic, cognitive, and spiritual needs; a healthy environment 
is necessary to produce healthy, fulfilled organisms. 
Development of the good society must proceed in a way which maximizes 
the prospects of long-term social survival. Since individuals tend to 
"live for today" it is necessary to design institutions to ensure that 
social progress will be sustainable. The urgency of today's problems, 
along with the difficulty in calculating future risks and the inclination 
to trust to future technology, has resulted in wide-spread acceptance 
of a policy committed to rapjd and unconstrained economic growth. 
This policy has led to great environmental problems, fewer options for 
future action, excessive Levels of consumption by some sectors of 
society, a commitment to an ever-expanding system of production based 
on non-renewable resources in a finite world, and an unwarranted faith 
in nature's ability to withstand any Level of exploitation and continue 
to provide for man's needs. 
Man is losing control over his own actions and may thereby lose 
control over the sustaining environment. Adoption of a Land ethic 
seems necessary if the man-nature relation is to achieve equilibrium. 




THE NEED FOR CONSERVATION 
"Sc..{.e.n.c.e. ha..1.:i g,i_ve.n. M ma.n.y doub:t.6, but .{.:t ha..1.:i 
g,i_ve.n. M a.:t le.a..1.:i:t one. c.e.Ji:ta..{.n.:C!f: :the. :tJc.e.n.d o 6 
e.volution. .<A :to e.la.bo~a.:te. a.n.d d.{.ve.Ji-0.{.fiy :the. 
b.{.o:ta. •••• V.{.ve.Ji-0.{.:C!f me.a.n.-0 a. fiood c.ha..{.n. a.,i_me.d :to 
ha.Jtmon..{.ze. :the. w.{.ld a.nd :the. :ta.me. .{.n. :the. jo.{.n.:t 
.{.n.:teAe.-O:t 06 -0:ta.bD~ . .{.:C!f, p~oduc.tiv,i_:C!f, a.n.d be.a.u:C!f." 
(94-253; 93-164) 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will introduce two general policy options for development: 
one would be constrained by a provision for maintaining natural and 
near-natural areas, and the other would recognize no such constraint. 
The chapter will then be concerned with determining the special 





Two general policies for achieving the stated goals will be evaluated: 
1. A policy of rapid and unconstrained development in 
order to quickly alleviate physical suffering and 
deprivation and improve the general standard of 
Living. 
2. A policy of development constrained by a provision 
for maintaining certain natural and near-natural 
areas in their present state in order to minimize 
ecological risks and maximize options which may be 
important to enhancing future qual~ty of Life. 
The first alternative would be concerned with achieving maximum economic 
growth and industrial development, and would not be constrained by any 
requirements to maintain pa~t of the natural environment in its present 
state. Principle objectives might be to improve the efficiency of 
production and the distribution of goods and services to raise the 
standard of Living. Modern technology would then probably be used to 
increase production and expand and improve the developed environment, 
and development would Likely be based on the urban-industrial model. 
The second alternative would restrict the conversion of natural to 
developed environment by mandating that certain areas are not to be 
altered in any way which affects the present structure or functioning 
of the natural environment. While the pattern of development outside 
these areas might follow the standard urban-industrial model to the 
extent possible, the use of alternative technologies might be prefer-
able, even though the rate of development and overall efficiency of 
production would be comparatively Low, in order to ensure stability and 
permit balanced progress. 
/ 
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THE VALUED PRODUCTS OF NATURE 
In order to evaluate the two policy alternatives, it is necessary to 
consider the possible effect on man's well-being of losing certain 
natural goods and impairing certain natural functions provided by the 
natural environment. Man may eventually be able to turn "spaceship 
earth" into an artificial capsule and meet energy and food needs through 
advances in technology (e.g., nuclear fusion and unconventional agri-
culture) but for the foreseeable future the provision of many essential 
goods and services will require the continued functioning of the natural 
environment. Vital. ecological processes and biological organisms 
'· 
have no substitutes and cannot be reconstructed, recycled, or made more 
efficient beyond a certain point - they are beyond the control of tech-
nology. Economic analysis should incorporate ecological analysis, but 
benefits of the natural environment have received little attention in 
cost-benefit studies, and the calculation of environmental costs of 
development is generally restricted to pollution costs, or the manage-
ment of residuals. The total value of natural goods cannot be cal-
culated, but attempts to estimate the monetary value of some of the 
benefits indicate they are very high, such as a minimum value of $1,8 
million for the services of a 930-ha Georgian river-swamp-forest 
ecosystem in groundwater storage, soil binding, water purification, and 
streamside fertilization. < 156-961) 
The well-being of man depends on the well-being of the land. Leopold's 
concept of the land as an organism which is becoming moribund engenders 
new economic arguments for conservation. (93-156) If natural eco-
systems are regarded as living things which benefit man, there must 
be concern about their plentifulness~ integrity and vitality. Natural 
ecosystems can be endangered in the way species are endangered <they 
can be threatened with extinction) and in an additional way: they can 
be diminished or impaired - their healthy functioning can be irreparably 
damaged. Ecologists are just beginning to understand the importance to 
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man's agricultural and social systems of maintaining the diversity and 
life-support processes of the natural environment. If man manipulates 
~ecosystems in an attempt to increase productivity or utility to man, 
he may destroy some of the goods and services of nature on which his 
continued existence depends. 
Westman has compiled a list of "structural benefits" (nature's free 
goods) and "functional benefits" (nature's free services) provided by 
natural ecosystems. The former include marketable products and genetic 
resources, as well as the use and appreciation of ecosystems for recrea-
tion, aesthetic enjoyment, and study. ( 156-961) The latter include the 
absorption and breakdown of pollutants, the cycling of nutrients, the 
binding of soil, the degradation of organic waste, the maintenance of a 
balance of gases in the air, the regulation of radiation balance and 
climate, and the fixation of solar energy. ( 156-961) Natural areas are 
also important in maintaining soil fertility, stabilizing hydrological 
cycles, and providing habitat for flora and fauna of incalculable value. 
(13-101) Natural vegetation prevents erosion, reduces sediment loads 
in water bodies, decreases flood peaks, and increases water discharge 
during dry periods. <43-210) Although net productivity may be low, 
natural ecosystems are characterized by selection for quality rather 
than quantity of organisms, high ecological efficiency in terms of 
biomass supported per unit of energy flow, and maximum information con-
tent and minimum rate of gain in entropy. ( 149~11) 
The Value of Stability and Diversity 
Natural ecosystems serve to maintain ecological equilibrium at the 
local, regional, and global levels. Stability reduces risks.and other 
costs to man, and permits the continued evolution of a rich diversity 
of biological organisms. This diversity is important to man because of 
the vital roles various species play in ecological processes. The 
interrelationships of living things and the physical environment are 
extraordinarily complex <no efficiency engineer could blueprint the 
I 
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biotic organization of a single acre) and so it is not possible to 
clearly identify which species are performing functions valuable to 
man. (93-161) For example, the klamath weed in California is a strong 
competitor but a fle~ beetle keeps it to the forest; this control 
mechanism is "invisible" (i.e., the effect cannot be seen until the 
beetle is removed). (158-36) Since man has no way of knowing which 
species are beneficial, it would seem prudent to maintain the highest 
level of species diversity, which necessitates maintaining large areas 
of natural habitat. 
·.f"· 
Species diversity is also important because of the direct utility many 
species may have. Some species serve critical agricultural functions, 
such as pollination, nitrogen fixation, and the control of agricultural 
pests. These functions all have great economic value. ~The wild 
progenitors of agricultural species possess characteristics needed by 
domestic strains to resist disease or withstand new conditions. Other 
species may suddenly acquire great value for medicinal properties, or 
as new sources of food. Wild plants and animals may permit the est-
ablishment of new industries in developing countries. ( 149-29) The 
carrying capacity of an area is greater in mixed communities than in 
one-species communities because 'different parts of the ecosystem are 
exploited by different animals, <147-35) and some wild animals which 
are efficient converters of natural vegetation into meat may be 
harvested to increase food production without major investment or 
habitat alteration. The strategy of modern agriculture has been to 
adapt a few species to a wide range of ecological conditions'. Perhaps 
it would be better to utilize a wider range of species which are 
already adapted to their present environments. Maintaining natural 
environments conserves species and habitats which may be needed in the 
future. 
The Value of Natural Influences 
Natural environments also provide natural amenities which add interest, 
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pleasure, and beauty to life. Nature offers a rich variety of sensory 
impressions of great cognitive, aesthetic, and spiritual value. Con-
tact with nature is important to the quality of life - without natural 
influences, we risk the loss of our sensual perceptions. <27-20) 
Little is known about man's perceptions of environmental quality. 
Goodey says research on the effects of sensory stimuli and the percep-
tion of natural beauty and open space has been neglected. (150-59) This 
vital research, which includes cross-cultural perception, indicators 
of perceptual quality, and cross-cultural studies of environmental 
preferences, could have an important bearing on future environmental 
objectives. Maintaining a large variety of natural and near-natural 
areas is necessary for this and other research. 
Man's physical surroundings have a profound influence on his character 
and outlook. The fact that natural environments are being traded for 
developed environments has far-reaching implications. Natural sounds 
and smells are replaced by the cacophony of traffic and noxious odours. 
Inspirational views and soothing landscapes are replaced by dreary, 
cluttered streets and rigid skyscrapers. Unresponsive, mechanical 
objects supplant living things. The pace and goals of life change. 
The rich sensory stimulation of nature is lost, and the quality of life 
is thereby reduced. If the products of nature cannot be enjoyed in /' 
any significant measure, life is diminished. Decision-makers should 
consider natural influences important to well-being, and attempt to 
guide development so that man will stay in close contact with nature. 
Some pure wilderness should also be maintained (though few will be able 
to enjoy it firsthand) because vicarious consumers derive satisfaction 
simply from knowing that certain rare or remarkable species and 
environments still exist. <91-22) 
The Fragility of Natural Systems 
Once modified, natural environments cannot be perfectly restored or 
simulated. Aesthetic and recreational interests demand authenticity, 
\ 
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and research in the Life and earth sciences cannot be conducted in arti-
ficial environments. While some functions may be restored, rehabili-
tation efforts are much more expensive than prevention costs, and never 
completely successful. Ecosystems can be so altered that they are 
effectively Lost forever. For example, if the Okavango Swamps were 
ever to go dry, there would soon be irreversible alterations: soils 
would be oxidized, fires would rage, and plant associations would 
change. (59-98) No one knows how much change or damage an ecosystem 
can withstand and retain its capacity for self-adjustment - complex, 
nonlinear processes are involved and there is no quantitative method 
of assessing the state of an ecosystem. Proposed changes should be 
assumed to degrade an ecosystem unless exhaustive investigation indi-
cates otherwise, particularly if there is unc~rtainty about the signifi-
cance of the ecosystem over Long time horizons. Irreversible decisions 
affecting Local ecological processes, scenic wonders, and gene pools 
differ from decisions which can be reversed if they prove undesirable. 
Krutilla suggests it will be efficient to proceed very cautiously with 
any irreversible modification, and priority use of the natural environ-
ment should-be assigned to nondestructive pursuits. (91-73) Caldwell 
advocates a policy designed to reduce the extent of .damage to the bio-
sphere until a more adequate applied ecology can be provided to prevent 
the foreclosure of future possibilities because of present, high-risk, 
irreversible decisions. (25-937) 
Odum's computer analysis indicates that as the proportion of natural to 
developed environment declines past optimum, there is a rapid deterior-
ation in the quality of the total environment and a rapid increase in 
costs incurred due to the Loss of natural Life-support systems. 
Odum's preliminary estimates indicate there is a precipitous decline of 
the value of the total environment when the natural environment falls 
to 40% of the total. ( 117-187) There is therefore considerable danger 
in being Lulled by slight and supportable environmental deterioration 
into an overshoot condition. Overdevelopment m~st be anticipated and 
prevented, even though making conservative estimates as to what 
proportion constitutes the optimum means accepting significant opportunity 
costs. 
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The Need to Conserve 
Conservation has often been interpreted as meaning the wise use of 
natural resources in an economic sense, over fairly short time horizons, 
rather than meaning ecological wisdom in t~e philosophical sense, 
suggesting the permanent coexistence of man and nature. Natural and 
near-natural areas are needed to develop and test the scientific theory 
of ecosystem development, which will lead to greater ecological wisdom 
and a better understanding of what conservation entails. Central to 
the idea of conservation is balance: conservation is achieved when the 
elements are in balance and it is lost if one resource is unduly ex-
ploited at the expense of another. (79-13) There must be a balance 
between the natural and the developed environments. The problem is to 
foresee where the balance lie,s, since a thing's value is not always 
recognized until it is in short supply. Natural goods have normally 
been in good supply, whereas consumer commodities have been in short 
supply. Wilderness was feared and hated in earlier times, but it is 
easy to imagine that the unrelieved prospect of developed environments 
could be feared and hated in the future. Wilderness was previously 
shunned because it exposed one to suffering and danger. Today, jaded 
city-dwellers seek out wilderness to experience certain challenges 
which involve the pleasure of suffering, and the novelty of danger. 
( 113-56) In developing countries particularly, natural goods are still 
undervalued, and the benefits of wilderness seem superficial and 
elitish. Decision-makers must anticipate new value systems as material 
aspirations are satisfied and the wilderness recedes. While the 
reduction of the wilderness has been a good thing, its extermination 
would be a very bad one. ( 113-187) 
If futurist technocrats are correct in assuming that all of man's 
material needs can be supplied with only energy and basic molecules, 
and that technology will be ready when needed, then there should be no 
objection to maintaining substantial portions of the natural environ-
ment to meet man's spiritual, aesthetic, and recreational needs. 
Since amenity resources cannot be augmented, or their scarcity value 
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reduced, by advances in production technology, and since commodity 
resources can be augmented by future technology, preservation benefits 
may be expected to increase over time relative to development benefits. 
The planner should favour preservation because in the Long run this 
would maximize the flow of benefits from scarce natural environments. 
Decision-makers must anticipate an increase in the supply of commo-
dities relative to amenities and present decisions must take account of 
future relative values. 
Natural goods have c&nsiderable option value but the market cannot 
communicate the option demand nor can the resource owners appropriate 
the option value. (89-1065) Future users would pay present owners to 
maintain healthy ecosystems, gene pools, and psychic phenomena, but 
transaction costs are infinite. These option values are beyond calcu-
lation. For example, Krutilla reports that half of the new drugs 
currently being developed come from botanical specimens, and since only 
a small fraction of the potential medicinal value of biological specimens 
has yet been realized, preserving the option to examine all species 
among the natural biota represents a value of some consequence for 
human welfare. (91-15) When evaluating choices between development 
and preservation, Krutilla stresses the significance of the additional 
cost attributable to the alternative that forecloses future options, 
because of the irreversibility of miscalculation. (91-15) The conversion 
of natural environments gives rise to two irreversible costs: the 
foregone future extractive output, and also to a Loss (in perpetuity) 
in value from the undisturbed environment. (91-47) It is also im-
portant to recognize that benefits from developments tend to diminish 
over a time as a function of advances, specifically in the technology 
of production. (91-142) Therefore, the current value of benefits 
cannot be projected to hold, while the opportunity costs (in Lost 
amenities) can be projected to increase. 
As manufactured goods become more abundant and 
natural amenities more scarce, the trade-off 
between them will progressively favour the 
Latter. Natural environments, hence, represent 
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assets of appreciating future value. 
(89-1069) 
The destruction of the natural environment represents an irreversible 
event carrying a cost for present and future generations that normally 
does not attend the use of commodity resources. (91-265) 
·The cumulative effects of destroying the natural environment are not 
yet known, but there may be critical thresholds where social costs 
become extremely high. When developed systems become too large, they 
may suddenly put unbearable demands on the natural life-support 
system. This could be allowed to happen because ( 1) man undervalues 
the support he gets from natural environments and (2) man underestimates 
the rapidly increasing maintenance costs of greater development. 
The significance of these values and costs, and the insuperable diffi-
culty in estimating them, suggests the necessity of setting high 
standards for the level at which natural and near-natural areas will be 
maintained. Even though these standards would perforce be set at 
somewhat arbitrary levels, they should be absolutely irrevocable unless 
solid ecological evidence is advanced to justify adoption of a less 
conservative standard. The great difficulty would lie in maintaining 
a commitment to standards in the face of rising expectations and 
greater demands for development. 
Odum has attempted to calculate the proportion of the environment which 
should be left in its natural state. He recommends that until systems 
analysis procedure can be refined and become a basis for political 
action, it would be prudent for planners everywhere to strive to pre-
serve 50per cent of the total environment as natural environment. 
( 117-183) Odum based this estimate on calculations of the minimum per 
capita acreage requirements for what he considered a quality environment 
in an area blessed with good soil and abundant water - obviously the 
figure would vary from region to region, and would depend on many 
factors. Conservative estimates should be adopted initially; these 
can be adjusted Later as research makes greater precision possible. 
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The important thing is to define the general principles by which the 
correct direction can be determined - these principles should not be 
lightly regarded because they cannot be accurately quantified. 
THE ECOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE 
In the Founex Report, En.vbc.on.me.n.t an.d Ve.ve..f.opme.n.t, Miguel A. Ozorio 
Almeida denies that man need be concerned with the balance of nature: 
The problem to be solved in fact is not achieving 
an "ecological balance", but, on the contrary, 
obtaining the most efficient forms of "long-term 
ecological imbalance". . .. In fact nothing short 
of a chimpanzee society could be considered as 
fully integrated into ecological equilibrium. 
(4-43,44) 
The real question is not a choice between balance and imbalance, but 
how to decide what constitutes a reasonable balance. It is not 
necessary to live as chimpanzees to maintain ecological equilibrium, 
but it is necessary to accept some limits to man's impacts on nature. 
Jhe problem is that development threatens to exhaust biological 
resources and impair certain non-biological resources which are necessary 
to maintain essential ecological processes at a reasonable cost. 
This could result in ecosystem breakdowns, which in turn would result 
in economic, social, and political breakdowns. Technology cannot 
recreate the unique biochemical factories which power ecosystems, and 
cannot duplicate the functions of vital ecological processe~. 
Almeida's phrase "long-term ecological imbalance" is contradictory. 
All systems which persist must exhibit a state of balance. Ecological 
systems are self-governing by virtue of regulating or negative feedback 
cycles. This achievement is termed homeostasis. Positive feedback 
cycles are rarely found in nature and are brief, disruptive events (such 
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as fires and avalanches) which are characterized by tumultuous,destruct-
ive forces. These events result in a high degree of internal disinte-
gration, eventual exhaustion, and sudden stillness. Such events are 
contained by discontinuities in the environment, which makes renewal 
possible. 
Homeostasis is so indispensable for the preservation of Life that we 
can scarcely imagine its origin without the simultaneous "invention" 
of the regulating cycle. (98-6) In negative feedback cycles, a change 
in one part of the system is soon equilibrated. If impacts are too 
great or come too quickly, or if the system is altered so as to reduce 
equilibrating elements or increase response times, the cycle can be 
broken and the system will collapse. An ecosystem's stability is thus 
dependent on its various interc9nnections and their relative speeds of 
response. (31-38) Man appears to be overloading many ecosystems 
and interfering with the system of feedbacks which permits equilibrium 
to be maintained. Rivers which are young in geological time are 
already eutrophic because man has increased the level of inputs and 
exceeded the assimilative capacity of the system, while some ancient 
rivers remain oligotrophic because their homeostatic mechanisms are able 
to cope with natural inputs. In agriculture, actions to control pests 
have also reduced predators and this has had the effect of increasing 
the costs of control and the incidence of failures. Desertification 
is spreading in arid zones because man has pushed the Land too far: 
It is when drought strikes land-use systems that 
are stretched beyond their usual limits that its 
consequences can be disastrous and maximum and long-
Lasting degradation can occur .... These ecosystems 
are delicately balanced .... Their necessary adapta-
tion to water deficiency results in life forms which 
are highly specialized ... ( 147-20) 
These Life forms protect fragile soils; when the natural vegetation 
is destroyed, the soil is exposed and eventually lost. Failure in 
resilience usually arises from sudden and severe disturbance - almost 
always the work of man. (147-21) Habitat degradation occurs quickly in 
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areas with arid conditions or poor soils, and natural· recovery may 
take impractical periods of time, while reconstitution may be too 
costly. 
It is the complex balance maintained by Limiting factors and tolerance 
Limits which has often been ignored and Led to the degradation of an 
ecosystem or the virtual destruction of a population. Exceeding even 
one tolerance Limit in a balanced system can have disastrous ramifica-
tions. Many development projects have gone awry because of inattention 
to Limiting factors and tolerance Limits. Homeostasis is partly a 
function of size and susceptibility to extrinsic forces. Man's' 
development schemes are increasing in size and number and therefore 
creating Larger and more nonhomeostatic or artificial ecosystems which 
have intrinsic instabilities that must be controlled by direct action. 
(138-132) The cost of control is increasing, as is the risk of 
collapse. However there is no way to determine how great the risk is, 
or how destabilizing any given action may be - the inherent complexity 
of any ecosystem's capacity to counteract external disturbances is 
beyond man's capabilities of calculation. Even the elimination of 
certain bacteria from the ecological system to which they belong 
usually involves a risk of provoking imbalances which at first may not 
even be suspected, so imperfect is our knowledge of the profound re-
lationships between Living creatures. ( 148-37) 
Most ecosystems exhibit a high degree of interrelatedness which has 
evolved over a Long history of species co-adaptation. Some ecologists 
feel that in such systems there is a relationship between species 
diversity and ecosystem stability: as the number of biological com-
ponents is reduced, the system becomes Less stable. Ecosystem complex-
ity can therefore be regarded as insurance against stress-induced 
instability. Natural systems evolve to a point of maximum complexity 
which may be regarded as optimum for that system's continued stability 
and survival: If the system's complexity is reduced, its integrity 
and vitality is diminished and its functioning is to some degree 
impaired. This need not be significant to man since the system will 
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tend to adjust to this Lower Level of co~plexity; however the more 
simplified and vitiated the system, the greater the danger that some 
perturbation will precipitate a collapse rather than an adjustment. 
Every system has a "breaking point" and this point may be approached in 
a series of innocuous and apparently costless steps until the cumulative 
impacts reach a critical level and a traumatic breakdown ensues. Even 
the ecosphere has limits in terms of self-regulation, but because of 
its great size and overwhelming complexity, it is impossible to judge 
how near or far the global system or any regional system may be from 
the threshold of a failure which would significantly imperil man's 
well-being or survival. 
Man should therefore be concerned about his increasing ecological iso-
lation as the developed environment reduces ecosystem and species 
diversity. Since man depends on the interlinked functionings of many 
species, and these dependencies are not always determinable, he should 
proceed on the assumption that all species have evolved a role in the 
ecosystem and that the removal of even one species may result in the 
alteration of that system. Many species once considered completely 
insignificant are now known to be essential to the economy of the 
community (e.g., earthworms, ants, termites). Leopold implores man 
to consider every part of. the land mechanism as good, whether this is 
obvious or not: to keep every cog and wheel is the first precaution of 
intelligent tinkering. (93-147) When habitat diversity is reduced, 
species may be lost; if species are Lost, other species are then lost 
or threatened; since ecosystems are composed Largely of biological 
building blocks (all ecosystems are bound together by the structural 
and functional characteristics of their component species), the eco-
system itself is weakened. < 135-25) Ecosystem alterations may be 
irreversible if too many biotic components are lost or the abiotic base 
is permanently altered; overcropping of species, destruction of vege-
tation, soil laterization, or erosion to bedrock can reach Levels 
beyond which regeneration or repair becomes intolerably slow. 
The biosphere can be regarded as a Living organism - there are Limits 
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to its regenerative capabilities, and if enough parts are destroyed 
the threshold of survival can be reached. Sir Frank Fraser Darling 
has cautioned that the ultimate irony confronting technological man 
may well reside in the fact that nature's most potent threats to hum~n 
welfare are not her destructive power but the fragility of the web of 
Life, the delicacy of those skeins which bind species to species. 
(122-8) The most wide-spread cause of "ecological bankruptcy" may be 
the gradual wearing-out of the environment - the stressing of natural 
systems beyond their· capacity for regeneration. (25-942) 
The root of man's ecological problems is that he has adopted dangerous 
new ways to satisfy his wants. No economic system can be regarded as 
stable if its operation strongly violates the principles of ecology. 
(27-42) Accelerating production is already pushing tolerance margins, 
which should be regarded as a capital asset. Production and consump-
tion can become bad things; it is necessary to regard human welfare 
as a stock rather than a flow since the stock concept can be viewed in 
terms of homeostasis: in a Limited system, it is necessary to restore 
depreciated capital. <23-78) Man is impinging on vital mechanisms 
and is hopelessly ignorant of what the consequences will be, but he 
certainly faces the possibility of making the planet unfit for Life. 
( 153-178) 
Global monitoring systems are not Likely to provide sufficient warning 
of impending collapse of Large-scale ecological processes since these 
cannot be altered quickly. Little is known about the interactions of 
regional ecosystems and sub-continental biomes, but it is at this Level 
that policy guidance is most needed. Policy-makers often fail to 
perceive impacts of Local development on adjoining regions. For 
example, Hardin contends that development programmes in Nepal have had 
a devastating effect on other regions becaJse increased population 
pressures in Nepal have resulted in greater run-off (due to deforest-
ation and erosion) which have increased the severity of flooding in 
India and Bangladesh. Hardin concludes one can confidently say that 
the more Lives are saved in Nepal and Assam the more Lives will be Lost 
" 
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in India and Bangladesh. <70-95) The cost of imbalance due to develop-
ment may thus nullify the benefits. Almeida's idea that development 
is desirable regardless of the resulting imbalance may be based on 
illusory gains. Rapid, unbalanced developmeQt can entail excessive 
costs which are not always obvious but are ultimately paid nonetheless. 
The notion that progress is possible without maintaining ecological 
equilibrium is fallacious and dangerous. Man lives in a world 
governed by ecological forces beyond his understanding and control. 
Balance is the result of all forces impinging on the biosphere, and a 
certain degree of balance is necessary to man's continued existence. 
Development should not be thought of as a way to "cheat nature", and it 
must be accepted that there are limits to development. The safest 
development policy will be that which has the least impact on the 
supporting ecosystem. Development must adopt in principle the idea of 
constructing without dramatically changing the ecological character of 
an ecosystem - activities that maintain rather than activities that 
change the system should be favoured. ( 159-15) Development should 
therefore proceed at a pace and in such a manner that balance is 
assured. 
The best defence against misapplied technology is 
the ecological approach, which should govern all 
actions concerning land .... Successful land use 
practices collaborate with ecosystems instead of 
fighting them. ( 147-46) 
THE LIFEBOAT IMPERATIVE 
' If the urban and agro-industrial model fails or encounters serious 
difficulties, there must be separate, viable environments to which man 
can repair and find the materials necessary for existence. As the 
developed environment has spread, the character of the earth has 
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changed. What was a self-governing and ·balanced system is now largely 
subject to man's influence and is becoming increasingly unbalanced. 
If the whole of the developed environment is regarded as man's new 
spaceship, then remaining natural and near-natural areas may be regarded 
as extremely valuable lifeboats. Surely no ship's master would venture 
on a perilous and uncharted journey in a new and untested vessel with-
out an adequate number of lifeboats aboard. 
Man's circumstances are changing rapidly and there is insufficient 
information to predict the outcomes of alternative courses of action. 
In recent years, natural resource managers have developed the concept 
of "total ecosystem management" which recognizes that we are still 
relatively ignorant about techniques for managing whole ecosystems. 
(35-339) This approach involves accepting some reduction in short-
term yields in order to ensure stability and renewability; the idea is 
to manage ecosystems for all their uses and services, not just the most 
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important or more obvious ones. Applied on the level of the ecosphere, 
total ecosystem management involves maintaining some natural and near-
natural areas for their special contributions to the global ecosystem. 
Unesco's Man and the Biosphere Programme is promoting the establishment 
of protected areas for baseline and other scientific studies, for 
serving as benchmarks for monitoring of changes in the structure and 
functioning of ecosystems, for the advancement of environmental educa-
tion, for maintaining ecological stability, and for aesthetic and 
cultural reasons. (149-5) Such areas would also protect gene pools and 
fragile environments, and would increase man's options for the future. 
The concept provides for core areas to be surrounded by buffer zones 
which could support tourism and recreation, facilitate manipulative 
research, and serve as bases of comparison with core areas. 
Maintaining Gene Pools 
Natural and near-natural areas are necessary if valuable genetic 
-·-------~ 
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contain an essential protein-making chemical which has improved the 
food value of sorghum. Such discoveries will become even more important 
because of the expanded needs of Larger populations in the future. 
<149-14) Some technocrats may not agree, but might concede that main-
taining some insurance is a wise policy, well worth the cost. The more 
materials that are available to agricultural science, the greater the 
prospects of important discoveries. Recent high-yield varieties of 
rice and wheat have proved vulnerable to disease and need to be crossed 
with wild progenitors to gain resistance, but genetic stocks have 
been seriously depleted. Thousands of varieties of T~i:tleu.m ~pe.f.:ta, a 
relative of wheat, once existed in Iran, but have disappeared complete-
ly in the Last 20 years. <43-169) The simple fact that pathogens 
work faster than plant geneticists should be a matter of grave concern 
to decision-makers - if man becomes too dependent on "miracle" varieties 
of grain, and they are attacked by some virulent pathogen, world stocks 
of food may fall drastically. Ultimately, success in outpacing new 
strains of disease hinges on the preservation of genetic resources. 
(43-170) Native plants, kept in natural ecosystem reservoirs, are 
needed for hybridation in the endless battle with disease and insects. 
It cannot be determined which varieties will be required, or what other 
plants may produce new domesticates, so it is necessary to provide 
protection for all wild species. 
Gene banks, which keep seeds viable in cold storage, are physically 
feasible but evolutionary processes are then halted and the species· 
may not be suited to new environmental conditons. Zoos and botanical 
gardens are not suitable conservation mediums for the opposite reason 
- evolution continues and tends to render species unfit for natural 
environments. The prospect of gene and species synthesis is not 
promising due to high costs, and also because a new gene is not 
necessarily an adapted gene and may not survive outside the Laboratory 
or, alternatively, may meet with no natural controls and prove de-
structive. <149-26) Therefore, considerations of efficiency, cost and 




Odum has said that variety is not only the spice of life but also a 
valuable stabilizing factor. <115-253) Maintaining variation in the 
countryside has a cost <reduction in production efficiency) but pro-
vides insurance against other costs (such as those associated with dis-
rupted or exhausted environments). Development should be modelled 
on the evolutionary success of diversification in nature. Perhaps the 
most forceful argument for maintaining diverse, healthy-functioning 
landscapes is that we do not know the aspects of that diversity upon 
which our long-term survival depends. (54-650) It is not just rare 
and restricted species that are of concern, but all aspects of the 
natural environment. A system of protected areas should include repre-
sentative communities and ecosystems from all parts of a landscape. 
Protected status is usually reserved for endangered species and natural 
ecosystems which have little agricultural potential. It is important 
to ensure that~ species_, communities, and ecosystems are accorded 
protection. Many regions have come under agricultural use and Little 
indigenous vegetation is left. In such cases, relatively undisturbed 
or "near-natural" areas should be incorporated into a system of reserves 
to provide these geomorphological Locations to species which need them. 
There are several reasons for maintaining near-natural areas: they 
serve to buffer natural areas and their populations from disturbances; 
they have characteristic species, communities, and ecosystems which 
are of interest in their own right; they can be used in ecological 
investigations of the processes of natural recovery; many have special 
aesthetic appeal; and they may suggest more suitable methods of ex-
ploiting the environment. 
Maintaining Areas for Research 
l 
Protecting Landscapes is Less expensive than rehabilitating Landscapes. 
Natural and near-natural areas can make a significant contribution to 
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man's understanding of how development should proceed, particularly in 
marginal environments (such as arid regions) where development pro~ 
grammes have often resulted in~disaster. Undisturbed ecosystems and 
traditional Land-use practices should be maintained for research pur-
poses, to elucidate the mechanisms of resilience and productivity in 
stressed ecosystems. ( 147-248) These "examples of survival" <54-650) 
have great economic value since study of successful (Long established) 
systems can provide invaluable guidance to designing man-dominated 
systems or repairing faulty ones. Some natural environments require 
permanent protection since they are already close to the threshold of 
non-renewability. 
Ecological research, still in its infancy, promises to significantly 
improve man's ability to manage the environment. The present state of. 
ecological knowledge is woefully inadequate, and development schemes 
are proceeding without knowledge of their ultimate effects. In South-
east Asia excessive clearing of forests unexpectedly Led to Lower rice 
yields by causing fluctuations in river flow. (80-1/11) In Africa 
attempts to convert enormous areas of savannas and bushlands into Large-
scale groundnut and sunflower plantations were disastrous failures 
because the programme was ecologically unsound. (37-116) Every 
community and ecosystem is different, all are governed by complex inter-
relationships, and none is adequately understood. The value of main-
taining natural areas for scientific study can hardly be exaggerated. 
Much knowledge has been gained already, and perhaps the clearest lesson 
to date is that ecosystem manipulation produces uncertain results. 
The study of ecology requires more physical space and more time than 
other scientific disciplines: ecosystems cannot be studied in the lab 
and their processes sometimes involve cycles of many years. Large 
natural areas and viable populations are needed for ecological studies. 
These studies are necessary to provide a better understanding of eco-
system structure, functioning, and dynamics, changes in biotic and 
abiotic components over time, the ways in which ecosystems differ and 







areas, including all major ecosystem types, is necessary to the est-
ablishment of baseline and monitoring stations for conducting this 
research. One of the edges of ecological knowledge is in this area 
of man's interaction with Living systems, his optimal cropping of them 
to sustain his own numbers, and the utilization of the productivity of 
vast areas which could nevertheless retain their aesthetic and amenity 
value. <74-415) Greater ecological knowledge will be needed to deal 
with future environmental challenges, and advances will depend on the 
availability of suitable areas for research and verification of eco-
logical theory. The goal of developing some ecological predictive 
capability is dependent on numerous, Long-term studies to examine 
successional stages, regeneration times for recovery, productivity and 
carrying capacity, and methods for speeding change and recovery. 
(149-25) 
Ecosystems may some day be described by quantitative Laws, so that 
general responses to various management strategies can be predicted. 
Development could then proceed on a truly rational basis; until then, 
a conservative and cautionary strategy should be employed, minimizing 
impacts and maintaining natural environments to the greatest extent 
possible. 
Maintaining Options 
The need to keep options open for man's future is of paramount import-
ance. Land which is presently "untouched", or which has been used in 
a way which has caused no perceptible deterioration over several 
generations, should not be disturbed by new development programmes. 
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature ( IUCN) has 
advocated the establishment of a system of "protected Landscapes" 
which would maintain near-natural areas for their social customs 
evidenced through Land use practices, which are disappearing under 
modern technology. (78~17) Protected Landscapes would have aesthetic 
value, anthropological interest, and may have high scientific interest 
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as reservoirs of genetic materials associated with Land use practices 
which are disappearing from Lands managed by modern agricultural tech-
nologies. Some of these areas could be made available for tourism. 
(79-13) Anthropological reserves would permit scientists to study the 
evolution of man and his relationship with the Land, and permit societies 
Living in harmony with the environment to continue undisturbed by 
modern technology. (78-29) It is possible that study of traditional 
skills and knowledge will prove useful in planning man's future inter-
actions with the environment, and inspire wiser patterns of development. 
And the preservation of this knowledge may even provide us with variant 
cultural modes necessary to survival. (152-529) Modern man has not 
proved a particularly good steward; it would appear at Least prudent to 
make provision for ways of Life that are Less dependent on destructive 
use of increasingly scarce resources. C42-136) Near-natural areas can 
serve this purpose. Such areas could also provide for alternative 
Life styles - those who do not want to Live in cities or join agri-
business should have an opportunity to Live in near-natural areas 
where traditional practices and values can be found. 
Maintaining Bases of Recovery 
The present global pattern of human interventions into natural eco-
systems is producing ecological upsets of increasing frequency and 
magnitude. Escalating costs of control could become insupportable, 
and Large-scale ecological disasters could become alarmingly common. 
Recovery from such disasters might be extremely difficult if there are 
insufficient natural and near-natural areas to serve as bases of 
recovery. Dubos says that undisturbed native marshes, prairies, 
deserts, and forests are at present the best assurance against the 
potential hazards inherent in the truncated, oversimplified ecosystems 
that are being created. (50-165> Natural and near-natural areas can 
be thought of as a kind of bank where reserve funds are kept whJle more 
speculative investments are made elsewhere. If there is a collapse 
in the developed environment, Large remnant patches of natural ecosystems 
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could serve as reservoirs of ecological vitality and centres from which 
healing could begin. Perhaps the greatest justification for maintain-
ing large tracts of natural and near-natural areas is to provide the 
space and resources for renewal if the developed environment falls 
apart - the lifeboat imperative. 
The Cost of Accepting Limits 
A po~icy of maintaining natural and near-natural areas constitutes a 
self-imposed limit on development ~nd resource consumption. This may 
lead to less waste and more efficient use of resources, and stimulate 
development of new and more appropriate technologies which would not be 
regarded as economically feasible if no resources were reserved. This 
reservation on resource use would 'serve as an advance warning of 
resource limits, and force technocrats to demonstrate what must ultimate-
ly be accomplished: the satisfaction of man's needs without further 
destruction of biological resources. If technology fails to meet the 
challenge, one then has this reserve to fall back on, and time to 
develop another strategy while eking out what remains of nature's 
bounty. Adopting a self-imposed limit would reduce risk, increase 
prospects for a higher quality of life, improve long-term efficiency at 
the cost of short-term efficiency, and maintain options for the future. 
Decision-makers are faced with great pressure to maximize output over 
short time periods. Evolutionary responsibilities are overshadowed by 
present socio-political demands. The opportunity cost of maintaining 
natural and near-natural areas may seem great to resource hungry popula-
tions, but the costs of losing these areas might be unbearable to future 
resource hungry populations. An accurate evaluation of the policy 
alternatives would weigh the value of nature's free goods and services 
in perpetuity against the value of depreciating development projects 
to today's populations. The opportunity cost of maintaining natural 
environments is very low if one uses a long time horizon, and this 
cost should be regarded as an insurance premium. Such an investment 
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should be considered worthwhile for at least two reasons: (1) the 
natural environment is rich in biological materials which collectively 
serve valuable, life-sustaining functions which we only dimly under.-
stand, and (2) man has not yet found uses for countless biological 
·organisms which will one day instantly appreciate in value, and it is 
necessary to maintain a full range of ecosystems to protect .these un-
known but potentially priceless components - one future finding may 
well be worth all the opportunity costs of preservation. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Certain natural goods and services have incalculable value for mankind, 
but their value is not readily perceived and therefore they tend to be 
accorded insufficient attention in the decision-making process. The 
natural environment provides diverse materials and functions which have 
direct utility or lend stability to man-dominated systems. Natural 
amenities enhance the quality of life, and contact with nature instructs 
and inspires man, contributing to the process of self-actualization. 
Natural ecosystems can be irreparably damaged, and future options 
irrevocably lost, by poorly planned developments; great caution and 
restraint should be exercised as long as ecological effects cannot be 
accurately predicted. The future value of natural goods must be anti-
cipated since losses are irreversible. Some option values may b.e con-
sidered priceless and should be maintained even at great opportunity 
costs. A self-imposed limit on development would not really be so 
costly in the long term because such a policy would result in more 
efficient use of available resources. 
In any case,'a balance must be maintained between the developed and 
natural environments. The cumulative effects of losing natural environ-
ments may be disastrous, and therefore standards should be firmly 
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established at conservative levels. The vital importance of homeostasis 
is not perceived by decision-makers who favour the most rapid path of 
development. Man's activities are causing mpre natural systems to get 
out of balance, and ecologists say that this threatens the continued 
functioning of the developed environment. 
Apart from their stabilizing influence, natural and near-natural areas 
represent a form of insurance in case'the developed environment collapses, 
and act as banks for maintaining genetic resources and variety in the 
landscape. They also serve as laboratories for research and preserve 
a spectrum of land-use options. The total opportunity costs of main-
taining substantial portions of the natural environment could well be 
compensated by future discoveries of new uses for natural goods. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE INSIDIOUS EFFECTS OF DEVELOPMENT 
AND POTENTIAL CONTROLS OR SOLUTIONS 
"Ifi, the.n, we. c.an live. without gooJ.>e. mUJ.>ic., we. may M ( 
we.U do a.way with J.>:t.a.Jc.J.>, oJr.. J.>unJ.>e..t.6, OJr. Iliads. But 
the. point iJ.> that we. would be. fioo.f.J.> to do a.way with 
any ofi the.m." < 93-171 > 
INTRODUCTION 
What is called "progress" does not necessarily lead to Utopia. Short-
term solutions can give rise to new problems, and these may finally 
prove intractable. Development cannot proceed indefinitely at the 
expense of the environment; means must be found by which the acti-
ties of man are brought into a harmonious relation with the processes 
of nature. 
135 
THE "VICIOUS CIRCLE SYNDROME" 
The Founex Report claims that continued development is the only answer 
to many of the environmental problems of the developing countries, but 
fails to consider that continued development may create new and more 
serious environmental problems which cannot be solved in the same way. 
( 7-27) Herbert Spencer once commented on how greater problems seem to 
succeed the eradication of "natural" problems: 
Suffering and evil are nature's admonitions; they 
cannot be got rid of; and the impatient attempts of 
benevolence to banish them from the world of Legis-
lation before benevolence has Learned their object 
and end, have always been more productive of evil 
than good. (2-36> 
Solutions to problems often have a way of producing more problems, 
more fuzzy and indistinct, and more difficult to solve. The m0st 
obvious and direct solutions to today's problems are not necessarily to 
be desired. 
The unconstrained exploitation of remaining natural and near-natural 
areas to meet the growing needs of man is a self-defeating strategy. 
This policy is comparable to that of providing new water sources for 
livestock in Lands already overgrazed: the immediate problem is solved, 
but relief is temporary; Livestock numbers increase, and the Land is 
further degraded. The ultimate outcome is negative because the avail-
ability of resources per head is reduced and more numbers are at 
greater risk. Until increases in human populations can be adequately 
controlled, rapid and unconstrained development will be self-defeating 
because the Long-run consequence of all technical improvement is an 
enormous expansion of the number of people who Live in misery. <22-41) 
Hardin says the population problem cannot be overcome by development 
because of Gregg's Law: "You can't cure a cancer by feeding it". 
<67-74> This harsh metaphor is apt because the global environment is 
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being rapidly debilitated by the explosive gr~wth of population and 
technological impacts - the earth is Literally being eaten away. The 
idea of encouraging this growth at the expense of all nature should be 
considered alarming, yet the major response so far to overpopulation 
pressure is to find new ways to provide for more people. 
This vicious circle persists because of failures of perception -
decision-makers cannot clearly see the ultimate effects of their actions. 
The immediate effect may be most beneficial and salubrious; the ultimate 
effect may be disastrous. There is no such thing as an isolated act 
of charity - the effects of everything we do spread far beyond the 
narrow goal our acts are aimed at. (70-99) The experience of DDT is 
instructive. The benefits - saved Lives and increased prosperity -
would appear to far outweigh the costs - a few dead birds and other 
minor disamenities - but this cost-benefit comparison is too narrow to 
be valid. Benefits may prove temporary, and more serious ecological 
costs may be incurred Later. DDT applications remove insect predators 
and create new species of pests, and traditional pests evolve resistance. 
Consumers also come to expect pest-free produce. The ultimate demand 
for and costs of controlling insect pests is Likely to be far greater 
than if DDT were never used. And the DDT solution has created totally 
new problems (Long-term threats to health and ecological stability) 
which are potentially catastrophic. Other actions which have disrupted 
ecological processes also have great potential ·for disaster; taken 
together, man's numerous intrusions into the delicate environmental 
fabric are producing long-term Liabilities which may constitute an 
unbearable debt. 
Modern agricultural practices require pesticides, chemical fertilizers, 
high-yielding varieties of seeds, and a high degree of mechanization to 
be successful. But there are serious side-effects to each of these 
techniques for achieving higher yields, and poorer countries may find 
it impossible to control these side-effects. Temporary success is no 
assurance, because the costs of control increase over time. The great 
danger Lies in becoming completely dependent on methods which are 
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exceedingly costly and vulnerable to disruption. 
Bentham maintained that the only proper end and purpose of government 
is to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest number. (2-79) 
This statement contains a sinister trap - the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number may be no happiness at all. If total welfare could be 
measured, it would surely be better to provide only for that number of 
people beyond which the addition of one more individual would result 
in a net welfare loss for the population. This point can never be 
determined, but it is important to recognize that it exfsts. What 
transcendental principle tells us that the maximum number living the 
most miserable life is the best number? (66-171) Decision-makers should 
not attempt to provide more and more if it will ultimately mean less for 
all and an uncertain future. Development must lead to a balanced 
society in which basic needs are met and the risk of social collapse 
is low. 
THE "NIBBLING SYNDROME" 
No decision can be considered in isolation - the effects of every action 
combine with effects of other actions to produce results which may be 
unintended. Shedon calls this the "tyranny of small decisions". 
(90-206) It is necessary to have a holistic view and a long time 
horizon to avoid what may be termed the "nibbling syndrome": a series 
of small decisions, each having a desirable result, when taken together 
may have very undesirable results. For example, the gradual clearing 
of forests to develop a region may have no adverse effects until incre-
mental Losses reach a significant threshold, and then perhaps the 
destruction of additional hectares of forest will result in significant 
costs. Westman says there may be a non-linear relationship between the 
destruction of a certain amount of habitat and the resulting perturbation 
of the climate. (156-962) Southwick says it is possible to experience 
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rather sudden disturbances to populations, and even whole biogeographic 
regions, as a result of some tolerance Level or Limiting factor being 
exceeded. (138-151) The United Nations Report on Desertification points 
out that in drylands apparently insignificant changes can trigger pro-
found physical effects. Even a small change in one component can 
radiate effects through the entire ecosystem, and minor shifts in water 
and energy balance can throw the system beyond the critical threshold 
whence natural recovery will not normally occur. <147-21) 
Decision-makers tend to be unduly influenced by dramatic or obvious 
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events; small, almost imperceptible changes fail to be accorded 
sufficient attention. Environmental impacts are often insidious. Be-
cause these forces act extremely slowly we are apt to ignore their exist-
ence or, if we recognize them, to belittle their importance. (58-101) 
These cumulative effects are seldom explicitly considered until their 
damage is done. For example, millions of acres of arable Land 
have been destroyed by the progression of salinity and by secondary 
formations as a result of irrigation in India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and 
Turkey. (37-61) Numerous examples of Local and regional ecosystem 
breakdowns are known to have resulted from gradual, almost imperceptible 
alterations, and it is possible that the same phenomenon will finally 
Lead to a breakdown of global proportions. 
The difficulty is that no .concepts have been advanced to evaluate the 
cost of incremental Losses, and knowledge is Lacking for assessing how 
near the biosphere (or any ecosystem) may be to some critical Limit. 
However it is certain that heavy Losses - in both species and natural 
ecosystems - are presently being sustained, and one may assume Limits 
are more or Less rapidly being approached. Decision-makers must Look 
beyond the obvious Losses and consider the possible cumulative effect 
of these Losses on complex ecological systems. These systems cannot be 
understood or their behaviour predicted by examining the properties of 
their component parts. Man's growing impacts can be expected to have 
synergistic effects, and these cannot be foreseen. The most prudent 
cou~se would be to reduce the number of impacts and the Level of Losses 
in natural systems. 
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THE ENGINEERING FALLACY AND INAPPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY 
A major problem around the world, in both market and planned economies, 
' 
is the "edifice complex", the view that any construction that alters the 
environment in favour of "progress" is a good thing and virtually any 
pristine piece of nature can be improved by human intervention; <16-81) 
The roots of this complex are not difficult to detect. Andrew Jackson, 
a United States President ( 1829-1833), once said: 
What good man would prefer a country covered with 
forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to our 
extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and 
prosperous farms, embellished with all the improve-
ments which art can devise or industry execute. 
( 113-40) 
But we are now in new times, facing new realities, and attitudes must 
change. Many leaders of developing countries are still possessed of 
a frontier mentality, characterized by a desire to subdue nature and a 
willingness to take risks. This was once an admirable trait, but now 
it is simply too dangerous; not just a few families, but whole nations 
and future generations are the stakes riding on current high technology 
gambles. 
The "engineering fallacy" is the assumption that future demands (based 
on projections of current demands) must always be met by some feat of 
modern engineering which modifies the natural environment in the place 
where the demand originates. Thompson discusses a major water project 
in southern California, where it was forecast that an additional 9 
million people would require water by 1985. The engineering fallacy 
is to assume that the problem must be how to get water to the area where 
these people may want to be; but the problem could be recast as "How 
do we get the people to the water?" ( 141-239) The Latter is the ecolo-
gical approach because it permits solutions which are Less damaging to 
the natural environment; such solutions may appear Less efficient or 
Less desirable, but in the Long run maintaining greater environmental 
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quality is both efficient and desirable. Passmore says it is a proper 
criticism of Western society that, in its - often childish - enthusiasm 
for technological "advance", it has failed adequately to consider the 
costs of introducing new devices and has defined "costs" far too 
narrowly. ( 120-49) Technological gains are sometimes not really gains 
at all, although this may not ·be obvious. Seneca and Tausig imply that 
in the United States access to recreation areas has been improved by the 
interstate transportation system, high incomes, and sophisticated tech-
nology; but actually people used to have better access when they could 
go through their back door and over the fence. ( 133-198) 
Lynn White feels that engineers have not formulated any truly meaningful 
ideals to which they can dedicate themselves, unlike doctors, lawyers, 
academics, and the clergy (who are all committed to liberating man from 
some real scourge, such as disease, injustice, ignorance and sin). 
White suggests that engineers study ecology and the humanities in order 
to develop an ecologically sound and humanized technology to better 
serve the true needs of mankind. ( 157-147) 
New technologies in agriculture are spreading rapidly over the world, 
with Little regard to whether they are truly appropriate for local con-
ditions. If thousands of people die from famine or flood, the under-
lying cause may be that the wrong technology was adopted - one that 
permitted dangerous developments, such as reliance on scientific and 
mechanized agriculture, which resulted in overpopulation and overcrowd-
ing in flood prone areas at the same time it was exhausting the soil 
and Leading to greater erosion. The Founex Report recognizes the need 
to Look at the way in which a development activity relates to the 
carrying capacity of a country's natural, and even social, system. 
<7-16) But the recommendation of this report is to continue with 
development objectives and selectively treat environmental side-effects 
with remedial actions - there is no discussion of adopting a general 
eco~ogical approach to development. Perhaps normal development tech-
niques will only worsen the situation - what is wanted is a means of 
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providing the basic necessities in a balanced, ecological manner. 
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Kneese advocates greater economic development to improve the material 
circumstances of the people in developing countries yet fears the combined 
forces of population growth and urbanization will put dangerous strains 
on ecological systems. (84-98) The phenomenon of burgeoning urban 
centres poses several perilous social and environmental problems. If 
near-natural environments cqn be. made more appealing, perhaps the ex-
plosive situation in urban development may be defused. Engelhardt 
suggests that new industries should not be allowed in "over-populated 
megapols" because they only attract more people and add to urban 
problems. (56-136) Odum has shown that as a city grows, it puts a 
disproportionate strain on the surrounding natural environment. If 
Large areas of natural environment are not preserved to provide the 
needed input from nature then the quality of Life in the city declines 
and the city can no Longer compete economically with other cities that 
have an abundant life support input. <117-183) The normal response to 
problems brought on by growth is to borrow resources <at an ever-
increasing cost) to support even more growth in the hope that growth 
will make more resources available. However growth can only make 
greater demands on the Life-support systems of cities. Odum suggests 
that cities ought to be diverting more of their energy to maintaining 
the quality and efficiency of the environment already developed, and to 
reducing the stress on vital life-supporting natural environmeht. 
<117-183> The problem is conceptually very simple: since rapid 
technological and population growth produces a strong drive to conv~rt 
natural environment into developed environment, this positive feedback 
must be neutralized by an equally strong negative feedback control 
built into economic and political systems to prevent over-development. 
(117-180) 
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METHODS OF CONTROL 
There are no market solutions for maintaining the natural environment 
because of the high transaction and enforcement costs involved, but it 
is possible to introduce other institutional mechanisms to diminish 
these costs. George Berg has defined an institution as an anticipating 
device designed to pay off its members now for behaviour which will 
benefit and stabilize society later. (70-80) Instruments of land-use 
planning include taxation, zoning, cuim~n,V.,:tJc.a:ti..ve ~vr.v~.tude (in France), 
and conservation easement (in the USA). ( 124-15) For example, valuable 
agricultural lands threatened by urban growth have been saved by a tax 
structure based on the actual value of the land (rather than. the po ten-
tial value for development), and by strict zoning for agricultural 
purposes only. Other options are to purchase key areas to form the 
core of a larger preservation zone over which control can be acquired 
through "less than fee" techniques, such as the purchase of scenic ease-
ments and purchase of the landowner's development rights. The Green-
l ine Park concept in the USA uses all these regulatory tools to maintain 
"living landscapes", which are areas which have notable scenic, recrea-
tional, cultural, and ecological value. <35-247) 
Decision-makers should anticipate future conditions of supply and demand, 
and give full weight to option values lost by irreversible developments. 
Krutilla advocates a shadow tax to discourage development activities 
which significantly reduce future options. This tax should be equal to 
the option value, defined as the difference between expected consumers' 
surplus and option price, the sum of money the individual would pay now 
for the right to consume (at a predetermined price) in the future. 
(91-70) Such a tax could then constitute a risk premium; but even 
under risk neutrality, there is an option value to refraining from 
development if it is assumed that new information will arise over the 
passage of time which will permit better decisions to be taken later if 
the present (irreversible) project is not undertaken. These consider-
ations would dictate the use of a severence tax or legislative zoning 
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to impose a premium on or altogether stop developments that involve 
"nontrivial irreversibilities". (91-268) Baumol and Oates say that 
in the case of any depletable resource for which production costs rise 
as supply diminishes, the pricing problem can be solved by forecasting 
costs to future generations and basing current prices on the costs of 
consumption over all time periods. Perfect forecasts would lead to 
an intertemporal Pareto optimum. (15-68) 
Institutional solutions are needed to achieve intertemporal efficiency 
because different generations cannot bargain over inheritence and con-
sumption levels. Severence taxes on the extraction or consumption of 
depletable resources would lead to a more optimal arrangement. The 
object is to ensure that the relative scarcity of the resource and the 
damage done by extraction or consumption is fully reflected in the 
costs. Such charges may slow development, but they are economically 
and ecologically correct. The government could assume all property 
rights associated with the natural environment and then determine the 
appropriate level of, and charges for, disruption to ecological values. 
(In some cases, certain species could serve as ecological indicators to 
provide a low cost monitoring mechanism to regulate use.) Resource ex-
traction or environmental destruction rights could be auctioned to the 
highest bidder <this would not help determine appropriate levels, but 
would be an efficient means of administering resource development once 
levels are set by ecological analysis). This technique would ensure 
that private users of public goods pay fully for their use. 
Another source of intertemporal inefficiency is the fact that in future, 
benefits enjoyed by a preceding generation may be Lost, but the costs 
may still be there. The Later generations would gladly pay the earlier 
not to undertake the project, so that everyone would be better off, but 
transaction costs are infinite. The best policy instrument to increase 
efficiency in this case might be Legislative zoning. Zoning is a 
means of internalizing the potential external costs that might follow 
from unregulated private development of Land and is part of an overall 
social planning process that attempts to take into account the proper 
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balance between amenity and economic development and still allow the 
market mechanism scope for achieving allocational efficiency within the 
regulated framework. (133-228) Nijkemp recommends 
a land-use plan which delimits the amount and 
location of natural areas on the basis of inform-
ation about a desirable future level of urban-
industrial development. Then such areas might 
be zoned into the public domain, before the pro-
cess of Land speculation raises the market price. 
( 114-8) 
The United Nations Report on Desertification recommends policies of Land 
zoning based on estimates of climatic risk to discourage the extension 
of cropping beyond certain environmental Limits. (147-52) Zonation can 
also be used within natural areas to increase genetic diversity and 
promote gene flow. (149-22) 
The benefits associated with natural areas inevitably appear insignifi-
cant compared to opportunity costs of foregone development in any "common" 
context because it is always possible to make somebody better off by 
giving up a few more natural amenities so Long as there is population 
or technological growth. Thus natural amenities become diluted and 
debased unless they are set aside and protected from encroaching 
development. Mishan proposes the establishment of "separate facilities" 
to maintain those natural amenities which could not survive marginal 
comparisons in a situation which "is common to all". ( 106-114) Mishan 
also recommends that Laws be passed which give people rights to natural 
amenities. Under existing laws, people must pay to preserve amenity 
and have no means of Limiting in advance. the level to which their wel-
fares may be reduced in consequence of the spillovers yet to be produced. 
(109-448) Developing countries should anticipate this situation and 
provide Laws that will ensure environmental quality will be preserved 
since future generati~ns will undoubtedly place greater value on environ-
mental amenities.· The Longer this is deferred, the more difficult it 
will be to return to any former level of amenity since costs will be-
come increasingly prohibitive and there will be nothing to prevent 
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spillovers increasing without Limit, and nothing to prevent the environ-
ment sinking ever Lower in the scale of amenity. <109-448) If men were 
invested with property rights in natural amenities, development would 
proceed along radically different Lines: the cost of over-development 
would become prohibitive, and the earth would retain more of its beauty 
and pleasantness. There are of course great information and enforce-
ment problems to the implementation of amenity rights. 
•, . 
'· 
Stone suggests natural areas and objects could themselves be invested 
with Legal rights. While repairable damage to the environment might 
be balanced and weighed, irreparable damage could be enjoined absolutely. 
<140-38) Information problems would also be serious here, since it 
might be difficult to precisely define when the environment has been 
damaged irreparably, or determine what actions are responsible for 
irreparable damage. 
The concept of "the public trust" is central to any attempt to maintain 
natural goods. This is the idea that certain common properties are 
held by government in trusteeship for the use of the general public. 
This concept is based on three principles: (1) some resources are too 
important to make them the subject of private ownership; (2) some 
resources should be made freely available to the entire citizenry 
because they partake so much of the bounty of nature; and (3) the gov-
ernment should promote the interests of the general public rather than 
assist in promoting private benefits. (60-165) Ecological values and 
natural amenities are among the common properties which must be held 
in trusteeship. The government should set standards for the provision 
of these natural goods, and standards, once adopted, should be rigorous-
ly maintained. A developin9 country should not be so committed to the 
benefits of development that it neglects the responsibilities of the 
public trust. 
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APPROPRIATE LAND USE 
Natural ecosystems have evolved over millenia and therefore the biotic 
components are well-adapted to the abiotic conditions. Modifications 
by man, if abrupt and extensive, are almost always detrimental to the 
natural system and require great inputs of energy to maintain product-
ivity and equilibrium. Modern technology therefore does not "improve 
on nature'' and benefits may be short-lived. Modern agricultural 
practices rapidly destroy soil fertility to maximize production, but the 
farmer cannot compete unless he engages in these practices: 
is a main contributor to the environmental crisis. <31-148) 
agribusiness 
If prime 
farmlands can soon be degraded, marginal Lands can be quickly devastated. 
Areas which have only recently come into agricultural use tend to be 
marginal lands - limiting factors are more critical, and development 
prospects are sl1ght and very risky. The African Special Project on 
wildlife conservation (undertaken by FAO and IUCN> found extensive 
habitat degradation as a result of ranching and farming activities in 
unsuitable areas. ( 126-26) In savanna and grassland systems, heavy 
grazing by domestic livestock reduces the storage of nutrients in green 
leafage and makes plants more vulnerable to drought. Also, vegetation 
cover is removed and soils are compacted, which increasesevaporation 
and decreases infiltration. These effects are more serious in marginal 
areas, which may already be stressed by poor soils or adverse climatic 
factors. 
The UN Report on Desertification suggests that in lands too dry for 
rainfed cropping the natural vegetation usually forms the most efficient 
pasture in terms of upkeep, grazing returns and.protection of the soil 
surface. <147-49) Lands which are marginal for Livestock production 
may yield greater production from wild animals because the Latter can 
make better use of the indigenous vegetation. Game animals can be 
used to support recreation and tourism industries, as well as for meat 
and Llve sale. Traditional societies Living in marginal areas often 
have recourse to the productions of natural ecosystems during drought 
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and seasonal food shortages; activities such as gathering, hunting, 
fishing, and the Like are one answer to "famine years" and "hunger 
months" . ( 123-1 094 ) 
Many Luxuriant tropical Lands are also fragile and unable to sustain 
agricultural activities. If tropical forests are cleared for shallow-
rooted, short-cycle crops the soil soon loses its fert i l i ty and is 
exposed to weathering. Such areas are best left in their natural 
state for their ecological values, and to maintain future options. It 
is preferable to practise intensive management of better lands and 
leave marginal lands in.their natural state. For example, it makes 
much more sense, economically and ecologically, to invest development 
money in improving the quality of existing rangelands than it does to 
bring new areas of land into livestock production. (43-106) This 
approach would permit more natural ecosystems to remain in existence and. 
" fulfil their essential functions. 
The value of wetlands has also been greatly underestimated, as is 
evidenced by the substantial sums which have been spent in the United 
States to restore wetlands. Wetland ecosystems are now being managed 
as renewable resources, and it is generally accepted that they confer 
more benefits than any alternative use. This further demonstrates 
that natural ecosystems can sometimes provide an alternative that is 
preferable to irreversible development. (35-319) 
APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY 
Modern technologies are not always appropriate to social and environ-
mental circumstances but are nonetheless rapidly displacing traditional 
technologies around the world. Indigenous technologies are normally 
rational and in harmony with ecological conditions because they have 
evolved the capability of utilizing marginal resources in an efficient 
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manner without degrading the resource base. An important feature of 
these technologies is that they do not rely on fossil fuel inputs 
(the costs of which may be expected to increase significantly in the 
future). Indigenous technologies can be improved by certain inter-
mediate technologies which utilize labour and other r~latively abundant 
resources, rather than capital and increasingly scarce resources (such 
as petroleum and natural gas). Intermediate technologies are eco-
logically more acceptable because they are designed to improve soil 
fertility, retard erosion, and use natural substances. These techno-
logies are easier to use and introduce, and ~lthough the potential for 
high profitsmay not match that of advanced large-scale technologies, 
there is less capital outlay and faster return on investment. The risk 
of technical, organizational, or environmental failure is very low, 
and problems are small and tractable. Developing countries with poor 
or limited resources initially require technologies that are generally 
low cost, easy to use, small scale, based on locally available resources, 
Labour intensive, culturally fitting, and environmentally acceptable. 
( 147-321) 
Traditional practices should not be supplanted by modern practices but 
should form the basis for further development, because they use tested 
skills and strategies to exploit difficult environments. For example, 
nomadism has proved a viable strategy in drylands, and shifting agri-
culture allows fertility to get back into the soil. Nomadic pastor-
alism and shifting agriculture depend on mobility and low human popu-
lation densities. If patterns of settled Land use are imposed, the 
land may not be able to support new life styles and growing populations. 
The 'Kung bushman of the Kalahari have been very successful in a harsh 
environment for millennia by minimizing damage to the resilience of 
natural ecosystems and by Limiting population growth through various 
features of their social organization. The recent introduction of 
agriculture and herding have increased pressure on the resource base 
with harmful effects. Puzo discusses the Khumbi people in southern 
Africa, who are farmer-herders (depending heavily on milk) but are also 
hunters, gatherers, and fishermen. Utilizing game precludes the 
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problem of bush encroachment <which is brought on by selective grazing 
of cattle), and so the carrying capacity of the land is not diminished 
even though the system attains a productivity nearly as great as ranch-
ing. (123-1090) Puzo feels that this traditional system is not only 
eminently adapted to the envfronment but perhaps is better off without 
"modernization". Systems like the Khumbi's should be studied to see 
how intermediate technology might improve production without adversely 
affecting the ecological equilibrium which it has so admirably achieved. 
THE AVAILABILITY OF AID 
The Founex Report calls for an increase in aid to poor nations' efforts 
to improve and protect their part of the global household. (7-31) 
Many regional and global environmental problems might be averted by 
appropriate aid programmes. Timely and effective aid can reduce future 
costs due to major ecological breakdowns, and can save genetic resources 
which have international significance. Developing countries are often 
rich in genetic diversity but lack funds to institute conservation pro-
grammes. Peoples of developed countries have evinced great interest in 
and appreciation for wildlife and wild areas; these should therefore be 
regarded as valuable biological and cultural resources for all peoples 
of all times. The demand for parks exhibiting wildlife and natural 
scenery has significantly increased because ·more affluent peoples have 
achieved tremendous spatial mobility; it is logical and just to call for 
subsidies from the source of that increased demand. It may be antici-
pated that future demand for a wide variety of natural goods (some of 
which may not now be appreciated at all) will be far greater. It is not 
reasonable to expect poorer nations, in which such resources happen to 
exist, to assume the full costs of maintaining these international 
treasures. The Proposed Principles of the Declaration on the Human En-
vironment makes reference to the special needs of developing countries 
and the special obligations of the richer countries in providing assist-
ance. (62-171) 
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Many resources associated with natural and near-natural areas are 
thought to be valueless by the nation which has them but are of consider-
able value to other nations or to the world community. Such resources 
are sometimes scarce on the global Level but abundant Locally and so 
use is unregulated. Demand for natural goods always Lags behind 
supply (which is fixed) so that present behaviour is not appropriate -
future demand must be anticipated. It is therefore desirable to com-
pensate present users for foregoing further infringement. The World-
watch Institute has recommended creation of a global cost-sharing scheme 
under which the wealthier nations would contribute to the cost of 
protecting wildlife and the ecosystems that support it in the poorer 
i 
regions of the world. (35-469) 
Local populations affected by the establishment of parks, reserves, or 
other schemes for maintaining natural and near-natural areas should 
participate in and benefit by such developments if they are to remain 
viable. When it is necessary to re-establish people in new homes and 
occupations, financial assistance is available through "funds-in-trust" 
arrangements with Unesco, whereby Member States can make funds avail-
able for specific activities in developing countries . .<151-37) Support 
for maintaining natural areas may be had from the World Heritage Con-
vention, Man and the Biosphere Programme, International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature, and World Wildlife Fund. 
Given present technological and ecological constraints, there are not 
enough resources to permit every developing country to become an indust-
rial power. Thompson estimates that if all countries were to achieve 
the economic Level of the United States it could mean an increase of 
200 times the present natural resource and pollution Load on the world 
environment, which could be insupportable. ( 141-6) This has Led Paul 
Ehrlich to suggest that developed countries have a special responsi-
bility to assist developing countries in maintaining their traditional 
ways of Life with access to the fruits of industrial societies. ( 141-6) 
Peoples of developing nations may have great pride and high aspirations, 
but decision-makers must set realistic and safe objectives. Modern 
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technological aid has often had undesirable results, and direct finan-
cial aid can be a trap if it leads to perpetual dependency, social decay, 
or environmental hazard. Aid should be directed at bringing about appro-
priate development, which does not encourage people to destroy the carry-
ing capacity of their land but to live in harmony with it. Principal ob-
jectives of an aid programme might be to promote self-reliance, social 
st~bility, an~ ecological equilibrium.. In alL cases, aid should be 
directed at what is.clearly obtainable, clearly needed, and clearly safe. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A policy of development which has the effect of increasing demand on the 
one hand and scarcity on the other is ultimately self-defeating. The 
very foundations of the biosphere are being threatened by stresses which 
are essentially imperceptJble over a human life-span. The sustaining 
environment may gradually be weakened until critical tolerance Levels 
are exceeded and essential life-support systems begin collapsing on a 
large scale. 
The widespread application of engineering solutions to human problems 
has resulted in great ecological damage and may eventually lead to an 
untenable situation. Over-development must be prevented by adopting 
appropriate institutional mechanisms if the "public trust" is not to be 
violated. This involves determining the best management practices for 
achieving optimum sustained yield from all ecosystems. 
The use of appropriate technology to meet human needs minimizes ecological 
risks, social disruptions, and political vulnerability. Poorer nations 
should be assisted in developing this technology and should be compensated 
for foregoing Large-scale industrial development. More substantial aid 
should be provided by the richer nations to assist poorer nations in im-
proving human welfare without damaging the environment. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INSTITUTIONS 
"The. Phy;.,ic.;., 06 be.au.ty i-6 one. de.paJttme.n.t 06 
na.twc.al ;.,c.ie.n.c.e. ;.,tiU in. the. VaJtk. Age.;.,. • • • The. 
aJtt 06 £.and doc.to~in.g i-6 be.Ing p~ac.tic.e.d with 
vigo~, but the. ;.,c.ie.nc.e. 06 .f.a.n.d he.al.th i-6 ye.t 
to be. bMn." ( 94-146, 274) 
INTRODUCTION 
Although it is widely recognized that there is some risk associated with 
pursuing a policy of rdpid and unconstrained development based on the 
urban-industrial model, most decision-makers place great faith in man's 
institutions - particularly in science, technology, government, and 
economic institutions such as market and pricing systems - to mitigate 
or contain all conceivable side-effects. An examination of these 
institutions reveals certain Limitations and weaknesses which would 
indicate that their potential for dealing with Large-scale and Long-term 
environmental problems has been greatly over-rated. 
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SCIENCE 
Science has been extremely effective in producing new instruments of 
power, and has unleashed a technological revolution which is altering 
the world at a rate and on a scale which is truly impressive. But 
science has not been so successful in predicting, explaining, or 
correcting many side-effects of transforming natural environment.s. 
Nature is enormously complex and remains shrouded in mystery: 
The systems of nature are characterized by their 
diversity, their spontaneity, their variety, their 
high degree of differentiation, and their multiple 
functions. The standard methods of scientific and 
statistical analysis cannot yet be employed in 
understanding these systems. An analysis of 
separate components cannot give the necessary insight 
into the importance of mixtures of effects and 
interactions of environmental conditions. Our con-
cept of single cause-and-effect events cannot pro-
duce usable conclusions in the complex natural 
environment. <136-4) 
The scientific method searches for the causes of observed effects, and 
is most successful when a problem can be isolated and tested against 
controls. However many of the problems of development cannot be tested 
in isolation, and nature's great complexity cannot be reduced to a few 
simple abstract concepts. It is too often forgotten that in the absence 
of experimental isolation, real-world feedback makes causes indisting-
uishable from effects. (13-151) The specific causes of ecological 
disasters may be extremely complex, and observations may be completely 
obscured by time and space Limitations. 
Science has developed a specialized character which is much better at 
reductionist analysis than at creative synthesis. <25-936) Through 
reductionist analysis, we attain objectivity, but we fail to attain 
knowledge of the object as a whole: only the "Lowest", the most 
superficial, aspects of the object are accessible to the instruments 
we employ. ( 130-64) Science has been so preoccupied with reductionism 
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that supraindividual systems have suffered benign neglect. ( 116-1289) 
New properties emerge at every level of organization, and the study of 
lower levels will never fully explain the characteristics of higher 
levels. Since every system is more than the sum of its parts, it is 
necessary to study impacts to ecological phenomena at the ecosystem 
Level. Our really big and important problems cannot be solved, or 
even coped with, on the basis of piecemeal stt.jdy no matter how sophis-
ticated or technically advanced are the methods employed. ( 115-252) 
All of science's failures in preventing ecological disasters are due to 
the Lack of a holistic approach. Maslow insists that the holistic 
outlook must be adopted, and suggests that the atomistic way of thinking 
is a form of mild psychopathology. (103-xi) 
The prevailing reductionist approach in science tends to isolate 
scientific disciplines from each other, and all of them from the real 
world. (31-191) More multi-disciplinary investigations are req~lred, 
but the explosion of knowledge has brought a greater tendency to 
specialize. The applications of new scientific discoveries are having 
increasingly complex and far-reaching ecological and social effects, and 
more concerted, holistic research must be undertaken by the biological 
and social sciences. Broad spectrum systems analyses are urgently 
needed for a number of environmental and social problems, as well as 
for natural resource management problems. (138-112) 
Ecology is not yet close to developing a predictive capability. 
Ecosystems may be far too complex to ever model successfully. Computer 
models are Limited because some variables remain undiscovered or change 
character. Ecological events cannot be predicted because their in-
herent complexity often Leads to sudden qualitative changes in response 
to gradual, quantitative ones. (31-219) It is also impossible to fore-
cast synergistic effects which arise with gradual, quantitative changes 
in two or more variables. Boulding has cautioned against trusting to 
mathematics and sophisticated computer programmes for guidance in pre-
venting ecological mistakes: 
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By means of mathematics we purchase a great 
ease of manipulation at the cost of a certain 
Loss of comp Lexi ty of content. If we ever 
forget this cost, (it) may be our undoing. 
( 22-115) 
Darwin once suggested an interesting exercise in scientific humility to 
reveal the extent of our ecological ignorance: 
It is good thus to try in imagination to give 
to any one species an advantage over another. 
Probably ih no single instance should we know 
what to do. This ought to convince us of our 
ignorance on the mutual relations of all organic 
beings; a conviction as necessary, as it is 
difficult to acquire. <41-89) 
The ecologist is thus confronted with a field of study which can never be 
fully understood, and he finds it necessary to adopt inexact methods, 
render qualified judgments, and admit that he may be wrong. This Leads 
to credibility problems and a general reluctance to follow the ecologist's 
advice. Sir Frank Fraser Darling Laments the ecologist's apparent ina-
bility to make constructive proposals in the face of specific and urgent 
problems. (39-100) Decision-makers tend to be men of action, bold and 
positive, who appreciate the hard facts and clear plans they get from 
engineers and technocrats. Ecologists, by contrast, raise vague alarms, 
stress the symbolic importance of issues, and warn of distant dangers due 
to incremental ism or synergistic effects. Technologists solve present 
problems, while ecologists are usually concerned with preventing 
possible future problems. 
What is reasonable behaviour in the Light of inadequate knowledge? 
Many decision-makers adopt the attitude, "If we're not sure it's bad, 
Let's go ahead". This is exemplified by a statement by Almeida regard-
ing the unknown effects of pollution and attempts to control pollution: 
It is quite clear that the existing situation of in-
complete knowledge precludes drastic action in most 
fields. Action might worsen the situation rather 
than improve it .... (4-50) 
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Almeida would defer action on pollution control until all the evidence 
is in, but by then much irreparable damage could be done. His attitude 
toward the possible dangers of increasing co2 levels in the atmosphere 
displays a similar disregard for irreversibility, when he suggests that 
if it takes a hundred Years to feel the effecfs, we may have the time to 
improve our knowledge and thus risk fewer mistakes in dealing with the 
problem. <4-49> But once co2 Levels are raised, there may be no way 
of dealing with the problem. Unfortunately many decision-makers feel 
that future scientific discoveries can "undo" today's mistakes and are 
prepared to Leave today's mounting problems for tomorrow's scientists. 
Science cannot be trusted to develop the ability to control the effects 
of failures in complex ecological systems. Ecosystem upsets are be-
coming increasingly difficult to manage, and scientists disagree on 
what to do. One example is the experience of the degraded St Lucia 
estuary: despite a voluminous Literature now available neither biologists 
nor engineers seem to be agreed on a management plan for the St Lucia 
system. (76-1373) This illustrates the importance of preventative) 
action - isolated ecosystem disasters could prove unmanageable. Then, 
as more disasters occur, ther~ could be cumulative or synergistic effects 
destroying the equilibrium of Larger systems. 
The key concepts of ecology are interdependence, Limitation, and com-
plexity. Any policy of development must be concerned with the implications 
of these concepts: it is not possible to do just one thing; there are 
Limits to any system; ultimate effects are not foreseeable. Ecology 
is a young and inexact science but it can give guidance to other disci-
plines. The princlpal Lesson is restraint. The effectiveness of man's 
powers is Limited by his ignorance of ecological forces. 
Man's interposition in nature is more Likely to be harmful than good 
because there is an infinite number of wrong answers to any given 
problem. (25-934> Long-established methods of dealing with nature are 
safer - the knowledge requirement is far Less. Developing countries 
should not covet Western science and technology since these "wealth-
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producing" instruments are likely in the end to cause more harm than 
good; science has not proved an effective guide to technological 
action in the natural world. (32-xxii i) As science develops, it no longer 
merely investigates the world; it creates the world which it is in-
vestigating. (22-121) Since man does not have effective control over 
his instrument for fashioning new environments, he could come to occupy 
an increasingly inhospitable planet. 
A constant theme in planning controversies is the attempt to make (and 
rationalize) choices between sets of benefits whose financial value can 
be calculated ("developments") and sets of benefits whose social value 
is thought to lie beyond financial calculation. (2-27) There is no 
scientific way to resolve such disputes. Those who put their faith in 
the scientific method to solve the political, economic, social, and 
ecological admixture of problems facing developing countries must realize 
that science has provided no objective criteria for determining what man 
should strive for and what price should be regarded as acceptable for 
attaining any goal. Decision-makers need to develop. a value system 
based on a personal acquaintance with nature before planning developments 
to solve social problems. Science and technology cannot provide mech-
anical rating systems to forecast what will be important to man. Maslow 
says it is necessary to proclaim values by which scientific investigation 
is to be guided: 
I believe it can be shown that normative zeal ... 
is quite compatible with scientific objectivity 
and indeed even makes conceivable a better, more 
powerful science <than) when it tri'es to be value-
neutral ... (103-xxiv) 
Perhaps it would be wise to make a pre-emptive value judgment and adopt 
a rule that no situations must be allowed which are not containable by 
simple, straightforward actions. 
has the eminent advantage that it 
and keeps programmes manageable. 
A conservative policy of development 
precludes many hydra-headed monsters 
This single virtue is worth many 
brilliant schemes to solve problems overnight since it avoids the possibly 
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inextricable morass of large-scale ecological disturbances. 
TECHNOLOGY 
Historian Arnold Toynbee says the marriage between science and technology 
(which he dates at about 1660) generated for the West a material power 
' that quickly put the rest of the world at the West's mercy. (143-26) 
The whole world has become enthralled by the Western way of life. 
I 
Since the industrial revolution began, modern technology has completely 
transformed the way of life and the face of the land in developed 
countries around the world. Developing countries are attempting 
to adapt this t
1
echnology to solve a wide range of social problems in a 
short period of time. The industrial model has been eagerly accepted, 
even though it has brought many problems and has not yet been subjected 
to the evolutionary test of survival CWaller calculates that agro-
industry has fed less than 4 per cent of mankind so far). (152-530) It 
( 
is expected that technology will alleviate want by increasing production, 
but some critics maintain that modern industrial technology generates 
forces which carry production beyond what is reasonable: success in 
stimulating production leads to glut, and the way to prevent glut is to 
produce gluttons. C73-21) At the same time, side-effects of production 
Lead to deterioration in environmental quality. It is highly question-
able whether this approach really improves human welfare - social and 
ecological breakdowns appear inevitable. 
Initiators of large-scale development programmes in developing countries 
have often failed to consider the full costs of importing modern tech-
nology. Farvar and Milton, commissioned to study the effects of such 
programmes, reported that little concern had ever been given to antici-
pating ecological costs and side-effects. C57-xv) Scudder's study of 
the Lake Kariba project revealed that no ecological surveys of the lake 
basin or the relocation areas were initiated prior to the decision to 
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proceed. <32-xxi i) The social effects of developments are also often 
ignored - the attempt to relieve traditional societies from physical 
hardships, and provide short-term economic benefits, often results in 
great social disruptions. Traditional myths and institutions which 
bring about stable relationships between man and man, and man and 
nature, are sometimes sacrificed or traded for Less effective and less 
satisfying social institutions. 
When technology fails, technocrats claim the failure was due to improper 
application or other "sheet technicalities", but perhaps these are not 
random accidents of progress, but rather the systematic consequences of 
some deep fault in our approach. <32-xxi) Ecological "mistakes" are 
perhaps unavoidable when there is a major intrusion into a complex 
natural system; unforeseen effects are inevitable, and the damage is 
quite likely to be greater than the benefits of the project. Many 
developing countries have fragile ecosystems with Low carrying capa-
cities. Traditional systems of Land use may be far superior to modern 
systems designed for other environments. For example, in drylands it 
is desirable to keep grazing pressure light by (1) utilizing different 
animals (each of which uses different parts of the Land) and (2) by 
keeping the animals moving. But modern ranching methods are sometimes 
adopted to increase productivity, even though this reduces flexibility 
and often Leads to overgrazing and resource degradation. 
Once modern technology is applied, it seems to generate a momentum of 
its own and become an almost autonomous force, creating problems which 
seem to require still more technology. This dynamic force has its own 
rationale, which may be completely divorced from man's real needs and 
highest aspirations. The constant search for technological solutions 
to new problems <which have been created by other technological 
"solutions") obstructs and may even preclude long-term planning directed 
toward higher goals. It is entirely possible that technological 
advance tends inexorably to destroy the sources of satisfaction of 
ordinary people regardless of the form of economic or social organiza-
tion. (2-84) Odum warns that the promise of today's technological 
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magic could be all too easily traded for a hell-on-earth tomorrow. 
( 115-250) 
Modern technology has given man immense power, but man uses this power 
in ways which are destructive of the environment. Every benefit is 
purchased at some cost to the environment, but this cost is often 
deferred and put onto future generations. It is a dangerous illusion 
to think that man's industrial system can develop independently of 
nature's life-suppor_t system. It is important that environmental degra-
dation not be seen as merely a technical problem - many ecological and 
social problems are far too complex to be amenable to technological 
solutions. The enormous problems of the industrial state are ultimate-
ly unsolvable in the present paradigm precisely because their origins 
are in the success of that paradigm. (72-131) Continued reliance on 
the industrial state model of development is a poor strategy because 
(1) nearly every technological innovation creates still new environ-
mental problems, (2) resource exhaustion could outpace technological 
innovation, and (3) there appears to be no technological solution to 
the ultimate problem - heat pollution. 
Industrial development by its very nature destroys natural goods on 
which man's well-being depends. How much environmental destruction 
can be tolerated is not known; there must certainly be critical 
thresholds beyond which the quality of Life is rapidly reduced and risks 
to survival are greatly increased. Once these thresholds are reached, 
it will be too late to rectify the situation: 
Increases in the demand for the services of 
natural environments cannot be met by increases 
in the supply .... There is no known technology 
for the production of a new natural environment, 
which is the accident of geomorphology, weathering, 
and biological processes involving a time span far 
exceeding human planning horizons. (91-11) 
Technology cannot solve those environmental problems which may be expected 
to arise when the destruction of natural goods reaches a critical thres-
hold - technology can only exacerbate this type of problem by making 
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possible developments which create even greater scarcity. 
Decision-makers need to consider new approaches to solving the problem 
of scarcity in a finite world. "Technological fixes" invariably have 
undesirable consequences because modern technology is in conflict with 
nature. The industrial model of development is not viable because it 
involves processes which are destructive of the environment and therefore 
not sustainable. A new approach to development should be adopted -
one that is based on an understanding of man's relationship to the natural 
environment, and will permit progress to be sustainable. Jimoh Omo-
Fadaka says: 
Industrialization and a high rate of growth of GNP 
have brought increased unemployment, poverty, and 
misery throughout the Third World ... the only hope 
for the people must be based on Low-impact techno-
logy for the support of small-scale decentralized 
communities. (42-10) 
The spread of mechanized agriculture in India and Pakistan, for example, 
has significantly reduced the need for Labour per acre and displaced 
hundreds of thousands of farm tenants who have migrated to cities where 
they cannot find work or adequate housing. <154-168) Stavrianos fore-
sees the emergence of a new technology which will be simple and inex-
pensive, and lead to a qualitatively different civilization: 
In technology the thrust is adaptation to human needs 
and aspirations - or transition from aristo-tech-
nology, which places excessive demands on capital, 
energy, and materials, to demo-technology, which 
makes minimal demands, has correspondingly minimal 
impact on the physical environment, and can be 
afforded by poor nations as well as rich. ( 139-19) 
This new technology would be knowledge intensive rather than capital 
intensive and permit improvements in the quality of life without in-
creasing risks to survival. <139-19) Schumacher has said that he cannot 
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think of anything which man really needs that cannot be produced very 
simply, very efficiently, very viably on a small scale with a radically 
simplified technology, with very little initial capital. (131-21) 
Development projects should be scaled down, and then as ramifications 
of development become generally understood and controllable, scope could 
be gradually and selectively widened. However, since many complex and 
far-reaching interactions between man's activities and the environment 
can never be adequately pre-tested, technological innovation must always 
be limited. Decision-makers should consider the achievement of greater 
stability and lower risk to be well worth some,,sacrifice in the material 
standard of living. Many material goods and modern pleasures are 
actually remedial in nature, serving as compensation for the Loss of 
higher goods and greater pleasures that were had in abundance in simpler 
times. Therefore, increases in the "standard of Living" (after basic 
physiological needs are satisfied) may actually represent increases in 
the Level of subsistence, so that the quality of Life is unimproved 
or reduced. If society's goal is to improve the quality of Life, 
rather than the standard of Living, then adopting modern technology may 
be counter-productive. 
Garrett Hardin has remarked that the greatest weakness of Utopian vision-
aries has been to ask the simple question, "And then what"? <71-5) 
After man achieves material abundance (which after all only satisfies 
his lower needs), what will he seek then? A diverse and beautiful 
natural environment might yield far greater satisfaction (in addition to 
far greater security) than would more material goods. Krutilla feels 
future technologies will develop substitutes for conventional natural 
resources but will never be able to re-create natural goods, and therefore 
the real cost of refraining from converting our remaining rare natural 
environments may not be very great. (88-784) It is important to maintain 




Individuals extend their influence by creating social, economic, and 
political institutions, but these become unwieldy and dang'erous. As 
institutions increase in size and complexity, the degree of control 
exerted by individuals is decreased. Thus, greater influence over nature 
is purchased at the expense of hazard. Man now faces problems of un-
precedented dimensions, which require a superlative degree of perception 
and coordination to manage. Some of these problems appear to be 
beyond the control of society's institutions, which are Limited in 
. . 
organizational sophistication and integration, particularly in networks 
of communication. This implies that man should seek to Limit his 
influence, not extend it. 
Governments appear to have Limited capability of adapting their policies 
in anticipation of an environmental hazard; only in response to it 
after it has become apparent. (8-9l But an uncontrolled approach to 
development, in ecologically sensitive areas particularly, will Lead 
to a series of increasingly serious, interlocking environmental disasters. 
There is an urgent need for Land use surveys on which to base planning 
for man's inherently fragile and unexpandable resources of Land. 
(154-90) Only recently has it become necessary to recognize that 
global resources are not infinite, and therefore social commitments must 
now be Limited. Most nations have overestimated the ability. of the 
earth to provide and underestimated the costs of improving welfare; the 
Law of diminishing marginal productivity is beginning to be felt on a 
global scale. 
Optimum Levels of resource exploitation cannot be accurately determined, 
but some decision is required and Levels should be selected by political 
rather than economic processes. Undue reliance on price ~ignals alone 
can Lead to types of resource use that grossly contradict amenity and 
human values. It is because the market is a Limited tool for dealing 
with collective needs and systems that government planning and a measure 
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of public financing are indispensable to the creation of a decent human 
env i ronment. < 154-89, 108) 
The famous precept of utilitarianism, "the greatest good for the greatest 
number", sounds laudable but is useless as a guide to political action. 
One course of action may provide the greatest good in terms of market 
valuation but another may satisfy the greatest number. In the absence 
of objective standards of valuation, it is necessary to rely on the 
judgment of policy makers. There is a danger in democratic and social-
ist countries that satisfying the greatest number may lead to a "great-
est good" per capita which is very low. <In a totalitarian country, 
the danger may be reversed - the greatest good may accrue to only a 
I 
few, and the greatest number may suffer miserably.) There is no clear 
rule by which to be guided, but it is necessary to achieve some balance 
between private and public welfare. 
Allison says individuals always want to maximize their private welfare, 
even at the expense of the public welfare, and their wants are normally 
predictable. If population density is such that someone will lose if 
another gains, then the expressed private interests of all parties is 
(1) unrepresentative, (2) uninformative, and (3) self-cancelling: they 
are unrepresentative because private benefits do not reflect public 
benefits; uninformative because all private benefits are very similar; 
and self-cancellJng because granting a private benefit to one person 
is offset by imposing a cost on someone else. Therefore it is important 
to look beyond the individual's expressed desires and consider what ideal 
public good can be done or undone by sets of alternatives. Public 
benefits are often too thinly spread to attract much support and can 
therefore be systematically eliminated, to the detriment of future users. 
Public benefits must be evaluated differently to private benefits 
because they have significant and Lasting general effects. (2-68) 
Political processes tend to proceed by a calculus that is sequential and 
incremental rather than comprehensive. <49-61) This "incremental 
rationality" does not Lead to an optimum condition; it is necessary to 
\ 
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make comprehensive plans for the Long-term. Krutilla says decision-
makers must take a broad view of resource use as a system which needs 
all its parts, and not make trade-offs in isolation: 
If such decisions come up one at a time ... all of 
the resources or conf jgu~ations of land forms and 
biota necessary to indulge Less common tastes will 
be extinguished over time .... No adequate mechanism 
exists in the public sector for automatically allo-
cating among the qualitatively different demands in 
their relative proportion. (89-1067) 
Politicians and bureaucrats are motivated to allocate society's resources 
in a way which will further their careers, and the costs of a severe 
misallocation of society's resources can be enormous. <133-107) All 
institutional arrangements and political systems ~re characterized by 
failures of accountability and accessibility. Freeman Lists three 
factors militating against optimum social and environmental decisions: 
(1) policy makers act in their own self-interest; (2) policy makers 
search for policies whose costs are hidden or can be shifted to less 
influential elements of their constituencies; (3) policy makers try· 
to postpone decisions (since every decision has a cost) and t'o avoid the 
costs of a decision by shifting the responsibility for making it. 
(60-167) Decision-makers have the power of determining which alterna-
tives will be considered - some groups, some issues, and some techniques 
of political action are defined as unacceptable, if not illegitimate; 
the definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power. 
( 136-176) This permits "nondecision-making" by cultural and ideological 
values, by established procedures, by strong opposition, or by imperfect 
administration of policy. <136-177) There are thus many pitfalls in 
institutions for governing. 
Responsible decision-makers will attempt to fairly consider all alterna-
tives and choose the one which will maximize total social welfare. 
Philosopher Charles Frankel says a decision is responsible when the man 
or group that makes it has to answer for it to those who are directly 
or indirectly affected by it. (67-66) Truly responsible decisions are 
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rare because decision-makers usually are not held directly accountable 
by large segments of the population who are nonetheless affected by 
their decisions. 
Even if a decision-maker sincerely wishes to maximize social benefits, 
he has percept~al and conceptual biases which may prevent him from 
sharing the views of those who will be affected. In addition, a 
problem will usually be defined in terms of one's ability to deal with 
it, which inhibits one's understanding of the true nature of the 
problem. Political and bureaucratic organizations are based on 
principles and assumptions which limit their vision, understanding, and 
response. Also, the political process gives limited information on 
public preferences to decision-makers, particularly the intensity of 
preferences, and therefore even voting does not necessarily lead to a 
clear articulation of the public interest. <133-106) Finally, some 
groups have greater influence than do others by virtue of better organ-
ization or financial resources. For example business interests enjoy 
advantages over environmental groups, and are likely to be more enduring. 
Decision-makers must guard against bias and undue influence, and be open 
to all alternatives - but it would appear that the possibilities of a 
meaningful ecological politics hardly seem to exist. (136-179) 
In developing countries, ecological circumstances are not always favour-
able for rapid development but officials often forgo ecological surveys 
and disregard ecological criteria because of ignorance, bias, or high 
costs. The temptation to produce fast and highly visible results is 
usually overwhelmingly great. To obtain ecologically sound development 
planning, it is necessary to construct procedural or institutional 
barriers and channels to constrain the normal operations of human 
behaviour. <25-936) Passmore notes the danger of authoritarian approaches• 
to ecological crises, but sees no way to overcome the selfishness of 
economic habits which does not entail the shifting of decisions about 
choices from the market to governments. (121-23) Hardin points out 
that institutions can be altruistic, whereas individuals are not by 
nature altruistic; institutions can therefore, if designed properly, 
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serve as reliable decision-mechanisms. (70-80) 
Maslow regards man as being by nature good, but social institutions must 
be designed to bring out this goodness: 
Individual and social interests under healthy 
social conditions are synergic and not antagon-
istic .... From this misconception <that they are 
antagonistic) follows the phrasing of civilization 
and all its institutions - school, church, court, 
legislation - as bad-animality-restraining forces ... 
(103-85, 86) Recognize instinctoid needs to be 
not bad, but neutral or good, and a thousand pseudo 
problems solve themselves and fade out of existence. 
(103-87) 
The self-perceived role of the decision-maker is crucial - is he to 
restrain evil in man, or is he to free man's good impulses from frustra-
tion? It is healthier to think of social institutions as instruments 
for assisting individuals in satisfying their needs, which are good or 
neutral - institutions need not "contra~' man; they should rather serve 
to liberate him from his lower basic needs so as to permit his attaining 
fulfilment. 
All development must be based on sound planning. Allison says planning 
problems are not technical problems but political problems. <2-14) 
The fundamental problem however is basically ecological: determining 
which interrelationships are more critical to human and ecological well-
being. (25-928) The development process is inherently ecological and 
demands an ecological approach. Planners face a formidable challenge: 
Planning must accommodate a complexity of factors 
including diverse social and economic benefits which 
cannot be readily compared, long time horizons which 
create imponderable forecasting probabilities, a 
lack of a pricing mechanism for both social benefits 
and land held in the public domain, and an infinite 
array of individual and combined investment possibi-
lities. In addition it must cope with rapidly 
accelerating technological change. (5-207) 
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The Founex Report stressed the importance of bringing the environmental 
issue within the overall planning and decision-making machinery. (34-81) 
Environmental management requires an institutionaF structure to provide 
for comprehensive planning and coordination. Better planning and 
accountability will permit development to proceed at Lower ecological 
cost. Institutional mechanisms are needed to ensure that potential 
impacts will be systematically identified before programmes begin and 
ecological costs will not be ignored for political advantage. 
The Founex Report recommends a number of institutional arrangements for 
developing countries to implement more effective environmental control. 
These include environmental ministries, setting up standards for monitoring 
by special institutions, establishing assessment boards and management 
services, passing legislation for norms and assigning Liability, and 
assigning property rights to hitherto unprotected resources. (7-26) 
The Rockefeller Foundation recommends the creation of a Planning Board 
which would be independent, with full subpoena powers, and whose members 
would be elected to serve terms of 25 years or more. This Board would 
be forced to argue its case before the public and its elected, account-
able Leadership and thus serve as an advocate for the Long-term interests 
of present generations and gen~r~tions yet unborn. ( 13-137) Robertson 
suggests creating a Bureau of Ecological Standards charged with determin-
ing appropriate environmental practices to maintain ecological integrity. 
<127-12) Hanks advocates establishing an Organization for Regional 
Co-operation and Development for southern African countries. Such an 
organization could undertake a more rational approach to Land-use planning 
because it would have more options and flexibility; valuable natural and 
near-natural areas ·could be maintained if development pressure could be 
shifted to more suitable areas. <64-14) These and other institutional 
mechanisms should be carefully examined for their potential in overcoming 
the present failings of political and bureaucratic organizations in 
planning and managing the development process. 
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ECONOMICS 
The science of economics has not developed a m~thod for assessing the 
true value of natural goods. 
Natural ecosystems are scarce resources. In a modern 
industrial society, however, social institutions such 
as the market system often fail to establish 
"economic values" for natural ecosystems and to allo-
cate them to their socially optimal uses. <46-136) 
Economics has also failed to develop a procedure for making decisions 
concerning the natural environment which will result in optimal sustained 
yield to maximize welfare over the Long-term. The marginal approach 
to making economic decisions, Like the reductionist approach to investi-
gating natural phenomena, results in a failure to perceive certain 
realities - there is a failure of perspective when phenomena are 
examined in isolation, narrowly circumscribed in space, and frozen in 
time. Decisions cannot be based on a fragmented commodity conception 
of the world when the world is in fact an integrated Living system. 
(75-177) Cumulative effects over significant periods of time and 
Larger regions of space tend to be ignored by business and bureaucratic 
institutions with Limited concerns and responsibilities. Unfortunately, 
social institutions are usually designed to respond to Limited efficiency 
criteria. Baumol and Oates cite an example of this bias in institution-
al structures. In response to water conservation appeals in northern 
California, consumption fell past the 2.5% goal to a 40% reduction, 
whereupon water officials, finding themselves facing a Large drop in 
revenues, threatened to increase rates if consumption did not increase. 
This demonstrates the insidious institutional bias favouring high 
Levels of production and consumption - the response to Low consumption 
is to stimulate more consumption, while the response to high consumption 
(assuming absolute Limits have not been reached) is to provide for 
even higher Levels of consumption. Society has been tyrannized by the 
con~ept of prof its - social goals are reduced to this one criterion, 
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which does not necessarily improve welfare. Man needs new measuring 
sticks to gauge the success of economic actions in meeting the real 
needs of man. (16-299) 
A pattern of development based on ever-increa~ing levels of consumpti6n 
holds special dangers for developing countries. As demand grows while 
the resource base shrinks, prices will rise. Poorer nations may not 
be able to afford higher prices just at the time when new social 
patterns based on greater consumption become well-established. Higher 
prices may then have such a disruptive effect on consumption patterns 
that social and political institutions could be thrown into chaos. If 
rising expectations cannot be met because of higher prices, the potential 
for economic, social, and political breakdowns is as great as if 
resources were suddenly depleted - demand may prove immutable and 
beyond the reach of institutional influences. Of central importance 
is the timing and extent of price rises as global resources become in-
creasingly scarce and costly - general and rapid price rises may not 
dampen demand but only fan discontent. This of course could lead to 
anarchy or revolution. 
Past experience is not a good guide to the present economic climate; 
global demand and resource exploitation are increasing at an unprece-
dented rate. The prospects for substitution and adjustment to market 
forces are not encouraging - there may simply be insufficient time to 
effect a smooth and rational social response to growing scarcities. A 
safer course would be to instigate a different pattern of development 
and direct demand to other resources which can be provided on a sus-
tained-yield basis. Boulding has suggested that the traditional 
village economy, especially of Asia, may be more of a prototype of the 
world to come than the economies of the great age of expansion. 
(22-148) This is because the village economy is cyclical. Perhaps 
decision-makers of developing countries should seek to pattern develop-
ment after the cyclical economy, maintaining resource independence 
and high renewability to avoid dangerous dependencies on uncertain or 
non-renewable resources. 
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Economics has particular relevance to the policy alternatives, and it 
may be fruitful to consider how certain economic concepts can be 
related to the evaluation process. The following three chapters will 
examine in greater detail the fundamental assumptions of economics, and 
the policy choices will be analyzed in terms of key economic concepts. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Man's institutions governing development have limited potential for pre-
venting or ameliorating social and ecological problems which result from 
modifying natural environments. It is therefore advisable to establish 
institutional safeguards limiting the influence of man's activities on 
the natural environment. 
Science has been more successful at reductionist analysis than at creative 
synthesis, and has not yet developed predictive or corrective powers 
with regard to large-scale environmental systems; some natural pheno-
mena are characterized by such overwhelming complexity or occur on such 
vast space·and time ?Cales that it is unlikely man will ever under-
stand or control them. Decision-makers are by nature inclined to give 
greater credence to the more exact sciences, which produce fast, 
visible results, and discount the vague warnings of ecologists. But 
there is no guarantee that tomorrow's science will be able to solve 
problems arising from today's·actions. Since man may never have 
effective control over his instruments of power, he should exercise 
great caution and restraint in their application. 
Modern technology is rapidly transforming the world by means which have 
not been adequately tested; it is not certain whether this approach 
to development really improves total human welfare. Technological 
innovations seem to ~p~o fiacto create environmental problems, and this 
suggests that they may not be relied upon to improve the overall con-
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dition of man. Natural goods can be destroyed but cannot be replaced 
by technology, and so "technological fixes" are Limited by nature and 
cannot be applied ad in6ini..tum. 
The effective operation of governments is Limited by their structure 
and their networks of communication: all governments are far from being 
omniscient, and they should therefore use their considerable organizing 
power with great care and seek to Limit their influence on the natural 
environment. Most governments have overestimated the efficacy of 
Legislation and the potential of well-intentioned development pro-
grammes, and underestimated the social, economic, and ecological costs 
of improving welfare. Decision-makers tend to respond to crises rather 
than undertake Long-term, comprehensive planning. Sequential decision-
making is not Likely to result in an optimum pattern of development. 
There are many inherent dangers in political and bureaucratic processes, 
such as failures of accountability and accessibility, and perceptual and 
conceptual differences between the governors and .the governed. It is 
necessary to design institutions in such a way that the effect of human 
failings is minimized. Institutions should not control man, but 
rather serve to release him from false appetites and guide him to self-
fulfi Lment. New institutional mechanisms are needed to ensure that 
development will proceed with minimum social and ecological costs. 
Economics offers little guidance for Long-term development action 
affecting natural environments since economic decisions are made by 
reference to the margin and fail to account for the full· value of 
natural goods and services. Economics has a narrow frame of reference, 
employs limited efficiency criteria, and is based on implicit value 
judgments which are of questionable validity (e.g., the assumption that 
consumption of economic goods is a principal indicator of welfare). 
A development programme designed to increase consumption is dangerous 
unless achieved Levels can be sustained, and there is a high probability 
that political or ecological failures will someday dramatically reduce 
all production based on imported or non-renewable resources'. 
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CHAPTER 10 
EXTENDING THE HORIZONS OF ECONOMICS 
"I be.£..-i.e.ve. tha..t ma.ny ofi the. e.c.on.om.ic. fiOJtc.e.-6 
.iYl.-6.ide. the. modVtn body-pol.i.t.ic. aJr.e. pathoge.n..ic. ~n. 
~e.-6pe.c..t to haJr.mon.y w.ith the. land ••• we. -6hould 
-6e.e.k. -6ome. OJtga.n..ic. ~e.me.dy - -6ome.th.in.g tha.t wOJtk.-6 
fi~om the. .iYl.-6.ide. on the. e.C.OYl.Om.ic. -6VtUC.~e. 0 II 
(93-153) 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the concerns and objectives of Economics will be briefly 
examined with a view to assessing their relevance and validity given 
the present human condition. Conventional economic criteria may no 
Longer be acceptable now that man's activities are having global im-
pacts. To determine the true efficiency or utility of development pro-
grammes, it may be necessary to extend economic analysis to ecological 
phenomena over Longer time horizons. Such analysis may indicate that 
programmes which serve equity and environmental quality goals are to be 
preferred over programmes which improve short-term efficiency or 
stimulate higher economic growth rates. 
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THE SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS 
The art of making political and social decisions to improve human wel-
fare has long been heavily influenced by the science of economics, which 
has unquestionably been most useful in describing how certain aspects 
of human welfare can be improved. The science of economics has develop-
ed a way of thinking about and dealing with problems of human welfare, 
with the ultimate object of maximizing well-being in society as a whole. 
This science has been largely concerned with improving material welfare, 
partly because of the primacy of certain material needs, and partly 
because goods and services which contribute fo physical well-being 
more readily lend themselves to quantificati6n and manipulation than 
do other elements which contribute to man's well-being. 
Economics is concerned with two fundamentally different problems: (1) 
how can more goods and services be created for a given cost (or how can 
the ratio of benefits to costs be improved), and (2) how can the 
distribution of goods, services, and costs throughout society be made 
more equitable? Metaphorfcally, the concern of economics is to in-
crease the size of the cake and give everyone a fairer slice. Given a 
rather restricted definition as to what constitutes the cake, so-called 
"developed" countries have been remarkably successful in increasing the 
size of the cake <the efficiency criterion) but somewhat less success-
ful in giving everyone a roughly equal share (the equity criterion). 
Less developed countries have not been particularly successful on either 
count. While concern for equity is widespread and appears to be grow-
ing, the prevailing (and sometimes overwhelming) concern in most 
countries is to improve efficiency and increase economic growth, with 
the idea that benefits can always be redistributed (so that an increase 
in total ·benefits can be made to improve the condition of everyone). 
This nearly universal focus on the efficiency criterion and preoccupation 
with achieving increased production of industrial goods and related 
services has perhaps had some unfortunate results. It has resulted in 
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an overabundance of some goods and services - production surplus to 
needs at a given level in the hierarchy of needs, and therefore of 
questionable benefit in improving well-being - while there has been inade-
quate production (or inadequate distribution) of other goods and 
services essential to meeting the most basic needs of substantial 
numbers of people. Even now, in drought-ravaged Africa, for example, 
some population sectors are enjoying increasing prosperity while others 
are suffering the effects of starvation. The idea that economic 
growth through technological innovation is a good in itself <since 
"more" can always be made "better" through redistribution and increasing 
consumption levels) may not be correct. Perhaps the goals and concerns 
of economics should be re-examined to see whether priorities should be 
re-ordered, and whether the concepts and methods of economics can be 
applied to fundamentally different needs of men and societies. 
Economics is a sophisticated social science which, more broadly defined 
and interpreted, can perhaps be applied to traditionally "non-economic" 
aspects of total human welfare. The science of economics offers a way 
of thinking about choices which need not be narrowly circumscribed by 
considerations of quantification and confined to problems of production 
and consumption of that class of goods and services which contribute 
to what is traditionally called "economic welfare". Economics has 
evolved considerably from the days when Adam Smith first drew attention 
to the presence of an "invisible hand" in the free market which alloca-
ted goods and services in a manner which (given the existing distribu-
tion of income) could be considered more efficient than would be the 
decisions of any political body. Later, attention was drawn to certain 
failings in the free market and the need for institutional mechanisms to 
correct for these failings. There may well be failings in the present 
concepts and general approach of economics, just as there were found 
to be "real-world" failings in the operation of the free market. Of 
growing importance are the ecological and spiritual costs of development, 
and the concomitant threats to the sustainability of social progress 
and the quality of life. These considerations must be brought into the 
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economic calculus if decisions about further economic development are 
to be rational. Recent investigations into environmental and "psychic" 
costs (133) indicate that economists may have a most significant 
contribution to make in developing criteria and evaluation techniques for 
making choices pertaining to total human welfare. 
The science of economics is concerned with bringing about improvements in 
man's well-being through a systematic analysi~ of the choices available 
to man. However the scope of this analysis has been Limited by the 
difficulty of determining precisely what constitutes well-being, and by 
the even greater difficulty of measuring improvements in well-being. 
For these reasons, the science of economics has been Largely confined to 
considerations of material or physical well-being and to those goods, 
services, and conditions which can be readily measured in terms of money. 
If it can be admitted that precision is not necessary to accuracy, it 
may be possible to extend the concepts of economics to embrace the 
totality of well-being and apply the methods of economics to assist in 
making choices pertaining to the higher ne~ds and aspirations of man, 
including those for which no market is conceivable. For the important 
thing is to systematically evaluate choices which bear on man's welfare, 
and to determine the direction, if not the distance, which a given 
choice will carry us. 
The general concepts and methods of economics seem eminently suitable 
for assessing difficult decisions concerning man's relationship with 
his environment. Already the problems of pollution have been brought 
into the economic calculus and been shown to be amenable to economic 
analysis. It would seem reasonable to extend this treatment to that 
other category of environmental problems: the loss or disruption of 
natural goods, services, and conditions. 
Economics is based. on the notion of commensurability: goods and 
services can be measured in terms of their utility, which forms the 
basis of exchange. While individual assessments of utility are Largely 
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subjective, in the market there emerges, through the interactions 
between individuals, an objective measure of utillty which is called 
an exchange value. This value is rather easily quantified or mone-
tized, which serves to facilitate transactions and provides the basic 
units of measurement deemed necessary for a scientific analysis of 
choice. There are at Least two problems with this approach as a guide 
to making decisions which affect human welfare: ( 1) the exchange value 
may bear Little resemblance to use value (i.e., the notion of utility 
can be distorted by various influences - such as advertising - on 
tastes and preferences, or faulty perceptions due to Limited time and 
spatial horizons, or simply poor judgment>; and (2) there are categories 
of needs the satisfaction of which depends on the existence of con-
ditions too subtle and complex to be traded in the market place. 
It is suggested, therefore, that strict adherence to the use of monetary 
measurements in determining commensurability may be grossly misleading 
and unnecessary to the calculation of what constitutes well-being, and 
this reliance on precise quantification has constrained the application 
of the economic method and overemphasized the significance of those 
categories of human needs which more readily Lend themselves to quantifi-
cation. 
The difficulty of course is to determine satisfactory standards of com-
parison so as to deal with incommensurables in a reasonably objective 
manner. It is proposed that. in spite of this difficulty, the general 
approach of economics can be applied to decisions affecting total - and 
not just "economic" - welfare. If the subject matter of economics can 
be re-defined to include all goods, services, and conditions which 
impinge on man's well-being, and which can be manipulated ("chosen") 
by man, then the potential contribution of certain economic concepts 
and methods might be greatly enhanced. What is Lost in precision may 
be offset by what is gained in relevance. 
The question remains as to whether this proposal is a Legitimate 
extension of the science of economics. Economics has evolved from the 
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art of bartering to a relatively precise science of valuation. But 
this accomplishment may obscure the fact that what is being measured 
with such precision is not quite the right thirg. The fact that two 
farmers can agree on· the number of race horses that will be exchanged 
for a piece of land, or the amount of money that will change hands when 
either is sold, does not indicate that an "accurate" valuation has been 
placed on horses or land - some values will be perceived, and some will 
not. The fact that both men are satisfied, that a bargain has been 
struck or a price fixed, indicates only that neither suspects a failure 
of perception on his part. Yet it is almost certain that one has had 
the better of the bargain - perhaps the one who receives the land has 
underestimated its grazing potential, or failed to consider the aesthe-
tic value that his children will see, and the other has failed to con-
sider the costs of catching runaway horses, or getting involved in 
gambling disputes. The point is that the exchange value is not 
necessarily an accurate reflection of the true use value. 
The problem of how many race horses should be traded for a piece of 
land (i.e., based on the intrinsic value of each, if this could be per-
ceived), is essentially as intractable and unanswerable as it ever was, 
and while the "invention" of money greatly facilitated the exchange of 
such goods it did not greatly contribute to (and in fact may have made 
more aifficult) solving the basic problem of the fundamental incommen-
surabi l ity of unlike goods. <Perhaps pricing has made it too easy to 
"assess" trade-offs and this has compounded errors in judgment.) 
This problem has many aspects, but perhaps chief among these is the 
questionable competence of the individual to correctly perceive the rela-
tive utility of two goods, particularly over longer time horizons. 
From the point of view of society (and future generations) another 
problem emerges: the highly questionable willingness of the individual 
to take decisions (based on value judgments) which are in the general 
interest, if this entails some sacrifice on the part of.the individGal. 
This more general difficulty can be partially resolved through institu-
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tional mechanisms, but the problem is then transferred to a different 
Level and becomes one concerning the competence and willingness of 
institutions to take the right decisions. 
There are many potential sources of error in making decisions affect-
ing welfare, and perhaps the inability to use money to measure the true 
utility of some amenities is not the most serious of these. More 
serious is the possibility that certain vital or inestimable goods will 
be given inadequate consideration, or left out of the decision-making 
process altogether, because of the difficulty inherent in evaluating 
them, or because they are simply not perceived. 
ECONOMICS AS A GUIDE 
Positive economics is concerned with certain activities of man which can 
be observed and measured accurately enough to result in a plausible 
science of explanation and prediction. No assumptions are made regard-
ing the needs of man, what sort of world this should be, or what people 
should value: Human behaviour is explained in terms of wants. All 
"wants" are regarded as being inherently neutral; no qualitative 
distinctions are made. Value judgments have been rejected in order 
to retain an objective position in describing how economic systems 
work. <99-3) Since all wants are equal, it is assumed that consumers 
max·imize welfare by selecting that mix of goods which best satisfies 
their wants. 
Decision-makers generally place great credence in the science of 
economics, and ~neconomic behaviour is considered anathema. However, 
positive economics may well be a poor guide for action because it 
examines behaviour without reference to needs or values, and perhaps 
"economic behaviour" is motivated by base desires and has nothing to do 
with higher values (such as spiritual, aesthetic, and cognitive 
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satisfactions, or even survival). Conventional economic analysis is 
therefore Limited in usefulness, but given certain assumptions about 
the human condition from other disciplines (such as psychology, ecology, 
and philosophy), a sef of objectives can be formulated which provides 
the basis for normative economics. The "economic man" need not be 
materialistic; economics provides rules for making optimal choices, 
and these can be applied to any set of objectives. The problem is to 
agree on objectives. 
If it is agreed that man has certain needs, and that these needs are 
qualitatively different, then a framework of values is provided for the 
concepts of economics. Just as man's needs range from the material to 
the spiritual, economics can be applied to the mundane or the sublime. 
How does one objectively rank the relative values of man's needs? 
Lutz and Lux suggest that the more necessary for Life, or Life-support-
ing, a particular good, service, or experience is, the more important 
it is. (99-18) This would imply that ecological needs are most 
important of all, even though they are not "wants" to most people. 
Mainstream economics is not equipped to consider the ecological reality 
in which man must Live, and is therefore not a reliable guide for 
planning activities in the real world. 
While Lower needs (i.e., physiological and security needs) are more 
important in the sense of being more fundamental, or necessary to well- , 
being, higher needs cannot be disregarded if well-being is to be maxi-
mized.· When a prepotent need is satisfied, the next need in the 
hierarchy emerges more clearly and acquires greater value. When a 
prepotent need is not satisfied, the path to higher needs is blocked and 
the individual becomes fixated on a Lower need. (99-22) This has 
perhaps resulted in an unfortunate exaggeration of the value of consumer 
commodities (and a concomitant undervaluing of natural amenities and 
their more ethereal satisfactions) which has given rise to the Age of 
Material ism. 
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Few of us would be willing to say that material 
goods are the only real goods and that increase 
in wealth and comfort is the only end worth pur-
suing. But just because we have Learned effective 
methods of increasing both, we practice those 
methods with so much enthusiasm that we begin to 
act as though what they get us were ,the only things 
worth getting. (86-77) 
Our conception of man has been so influenced by his material appetites 
that we have come to regard man as a producer-consumer-schemer and have 
completely forgotten about his social and spiritual sides. That is 
why most forms of consciousness are neglected or considered a burden. 
We need to consider the whole man, and the full potentialities of the 
human being. 
It is vitally important to clearly establish the objectives of society 
and then apply economic analysis to man's activities. Perhaps many of 
the products of nature should be considered "ends,,. rather than "means", 
and perhaps acquiring more comforts and conveniences are "means" which 
serve very Limited "ends". If economics is applied only to the produc-
tion and consumption of material wants then GNP becomes the criterion, 
the object of study becomes the "means" <to ill-defined "ends"), and 
the proper "ends" (human needs and potentialities) are ignored or given 
short shrift. 
Economics, which has Long been the science of 
materialistic value~, has now to move beyond 
materialism. The growth that we need to seek 
now ... is in the realm of the fully human, i.e., 
the non-material or spiritual. Spiritual growth 
is called for, not material growth. This is the 
meaning of self-actualization .... The great and 
beautiful answer to the problem of rapidly 
dwindling resources is to direct growth along the 
Lines of human development, not further material 
development. (99-301, 304) 
In dealing with Large magnitude options which can result in major en-
vironmental modifications, conventional economic analysis is not adequate. 
Techniques for marginal or incremental analysis cannot cope with the 
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bewildering array of costs and benefits associated with vast complexes 
of actions over significantly long time horizons. The value of many 
facets of natural environments are inaccurately assessed at the margin, 
producing a grossly unreliable evaluation of alternatives. There .is 
Little point in attempting a detailed quantitative assessment in these 
instances. Also,economic measurements of innovations are primarily 
concerned with improvements in present consumer satisfaction. But the 
Long-term effects of these innovations on natural amenities may be .. , .. 
vastly more significant since they Lead to irr.eversibilities which 
cumulate and persist, affecting untold future generations (whose prefer-
ences are poorly represented, since the preferences revealed in the 
market are a reflection of present tastes due to present income and in-
come distribution). Finally, there is no satisfactory way of ascribing 
values to the use of natural amenities. 
non-convertible into monetary terms. 
There are many uses which are 
There is no reason to confine the application of economics to activities 
that can be measured in monetary terms. While the absence of a 
"measuring rod" precludes precise quantitative comparisons of costs and 
benefits of alternative activities, the use of general economic concepts 
and methods may indicate the desired direction of policy, and the 
exact magnitude of the trade-offs involved may not be essential to 
making correct policy decisions. The application of economic concepts 
to policy options which are normally regarded as purely political 
problems may be a useful way to visualize and consider the choices -
one can think of "goods" in other than monetary terms, and a qualitative 
analysis may still be attempted. In fact, perhaps economists should 
first define goods in a qualitative manner since there is a basic 
incommensurability between, for example, natural amenities and manu-
factured commodities, and the concept of "cost" should be different for 
different types of goods. 
Economics stands between the "hard" and the "soft" sciences. Perhaps 
the economist's concern with emulating the powers of exact explanation 
I 
183 
and prediction 'characteristic of the natural sciences has inadvert-
ently led to a shift in focus from human to material considerations, 
and a concern with quantitative rather than qualitative calculations. 
Perhaps economics should expand its horizons into what Kohr has called 
"meta-economics" <85-168) and become, as Schurpacher has suggested, 
not an exact science<but something much greater: a branch of wisdom. 
( 129-223) 
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY 
The "Big Trade-Off" 
What is called the "economic problem" - the problem of scarcity - is 
in essence a moral problem and cannot be considered without reference 
to moral principles. The most significant thing about the concept 
of scarcity is not than an individual must choose to have less of one 
thing in order to have more of another, but that he must choose how 
much he is to have relative to what others may have. The individual 
must choose what degree of deprivation on the part of others he is 
willing to accept in return for a given level of consumption for 
himself. 
The world is divided into two worlds: the developed and the under-
developed: Those who occupy the developed world have the power to 
choose how the world's resources will be used and distributed. The 
U.S. Council on Environmental Quality forecasts that if present trends 
continue, the developed world will enjoy a per capita income of 
$8000 in the year 2000 while the underdeveloped world will have a 
per capita income of only $6 00. <77-3) There are two distinct 
problems regarding underdeveloped countries: Cl) the material standard 
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of Living is Low, which affects health and welfare in a direct, 
physical sense; and (2) the gap between developed and developing 
countries, perceived to be unjust and widening, gives rise to discon-
tent, unrealistic Levels of expectation, and potential for conflict 
between nations. There is thus an "absolut~,problem" and a "relative 
problem", and the Latter poses the greater threat to natural environ-
ments and political systems. 
The "poverty problem" is perhaps even more serious than is generally 
realized. Per capita income is often used to describe an under-
developed country but this may be greatly misleading because ( 1) not 
all income may be available for consumption, and (2) there may be 
grossly unequal distribution of income masking the poverty of the 
masses. The Latter appears to be worsening~ causing greater pressures 
for development. <112-202, 203) 
Few would argue that rises in output and more equitable distribution 
are not desirable in developing countries. The former tends to be 
considered an economic problem and the latter a political problem, and 
it is commonly assumed that satisfactory progress can be made on both 
fronts simultaneously. But perhaps there is some inherent incompat-
ability in these two objectives and they cannot be jointly pursued: 
emphasis on maximizing output might cause a maldistribution of in-
come. If this is so, it might be preferable to concentrate on equity 
even if it means reduced output. 
There may well be a fundamental conflict between these two basic 
economic objectives, and if so it is necessary to decide which should 
be given priority. Two key characteristics of the efficiency object-
ive are: ( 1) benefits are distributed to those who can pay for them, 
and (2) benefits and costs are summed and compared without considering 
how they may be distributed. (46-143) It is important to remember 
that the potential Pareto improvement test takes no account of 
\ 
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change in the distribution of incomes. Therefore one welfare 
criterion may easily contradict the other. A commonly offered solu-
tion to this impasse is to pursue potential Pareto improvement and 
then take redistributive measures in the hope.of bringing about an 
actual Pareto improvement. There is thus a tendency for governments 
to apply the efficiency criterion to a proposal, such as doing a 
cost-benefit analysis <which is not concerned with questions of dis-
tributional significance), and then try to make adjustments' to 
correct for the disparity in resulting income distribution. If the 
equity criterion were given a truly equal footing with the efficiency 
criterion, development would follow a radically different course. 
It appears that equity c~n be achieved only with some loss in effi-
ciency. Meeting the vertical equity criterion reduces efficiency 
since it affects incentives, which results in a loss of potential out-
put. The question is: how significant are such losses in comparison 
to improvements in equity? · Seneca and Taus i g suggest that the 
government must determine the magnitude of net gains and losses among 
various groups and individuals and then some.how balance the desira-
bility of the distributional effects against the pure economic effici-
ency effects revealed through straightforward cost-benefit analysis. 
( 133-20) The government must first decide what its priorities are, 
and then assess alternative programmes in accordance with the weight-
ing it decides to give to income distribution tests and cost-benefit 
tests. International bodies such as the United Nations and the World 
Bank must also decide whether developing countries will benefit more 
by emphasizing efficiency or equity tests. 
Growth and Redistribution 
Some economists argue that if "efficient" programmes fail equity tests 
they should proceed anyway because in the long run the poor will 
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benefit from large total output, and in the short run tax and transfer 
programmes can substantially rectify maldistribution of income. 
(133-130) One sometimes gains the impression that this argument is 
a great subterfuge to' enhance the political feasibility of programmes 
designed to aggravate the existing maldistribution of income and 
wealth, but perhaps .ln more developed countries there is some merit 
in it, and techniques such as adjustment assistance have served to 
alleviate equity problems of a local or transitory nature. (15-211) 
For underdeveloped countries, however, experience has shown that 
"trickle-down" economics does not work. In Iran, for example, 
phenomenal increases in GNP failed to improve the condition of the 
large majority of Iranians in both urban and rural areas, and this cir-
cumstance contributed to the eventual overthrow of the Shah in early 
1979. Even in the most developed countries poverty is widespread, 
and in less developed countries (after years 6f economic growth) it 
remains rampant - it has been estimated that two-thirds of mankind 
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will have an annual per capita income under R500 in the year 2000. 
(77-3) Economic growth apparently does not help the poor. 
UL Haq stresses that redistribution cannot be counted on to solve 
equity problems brought on by uneven economic growth which results 
from the almost exclusive concern with efficiency criteria, and he 
cites three reasons for this: (1) Poor societies have often very 
poor means of redistributing incomes. (2) Income flows are not 
financial: they are in the form of physical goods and services. 
<How does one convert luxury housing into low-cost housing, or cars 
into buses?) (3) The institutions which create growth are not 
neutral as to its distribution. ( 145-186) It appears that re-
distribution will also prove ineffectual in alleviating the plight 
of the poor. 
_,. 
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Is Growth Always Good? 
Distribution is a problem in both the growth and no-growth cases, 
but there are some who feel that "zero-economic growth" and equity 
are not compatible goals, and environmental quality and equity are 
also not compatible goals. This argument contends that equity goals 
depend on growth. Baumol and Oates quote Solow as saying: 
The only prospect of a decent Life for Asia, 
Africa;--and Latin America is more total out-
put .... Thus, there is indeed a trade-off 
between progress toward a more equitable in-
come distribution and that toward a quieter, 
cleaner world of zero growth. (16-142) 
There is an assumption here that there are no insurmountable political 
or ecological barriers to growth, and this could be a profound error. 
There may well be unavoidable and unsolvable social and environ-
mental problems along the growth path which would be disastrous for 
the poor as well as the rich. Given finite resources, ecological 
imperatives, and the vagaries of social and political forces, it 
must be recognized that there are real, incontrovertible constraints 
on growth. 
This raises the question of risk. As developed countries grow more 
concerned about the quality of their environment, the risks and 
burdens of pollution and disruption will be increasingly transferred 
to the poorer populations of the world. Higher production may raise 
GNP and per capita income, but this implies greater resource destruc-
tion and environmental damage. The situation is exacerbated by in-
equitable income distribution within a developing country since 
more production per capita, is needed to satisfy the minimum needs 
of the entire society if the income structure is inequitable. Risks 
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can therefore presumably be reduced by pursuing~equity goals within 
' 
a society. 
Global risks may also be reduced by new production strategies de-
signed to advance equity between nations and thereby partially re-
store environmental balance. For example, a shift from the use of 
ecologically costly synthetics produced in developed countries to 
the use of ecologically safe natural products produced in developing 
countries would further the cause of both environmental quality and 
international equity. 
However there are some who feel that the cause of equity constitutes 
a threat to survival. Human Ecologist Garrett Hardin feels justice 
is unattainable and its pursuit is dangerous - he maintains that 
the choice is between imperfect distribution with enhanced prospects 
of survival and marginally improved distribution with seriously 
imperilled prospects of survival: 
... distributional justice is a Luxury that cannot 
be afforded by a country in which population over-
whelms the resource base. In a poor country, if 
all people are equally poor - if there is no 
special privilege - the future will be universally 
discounted at so high a rate that it will 
practically vanish. Posterity will be cheated; 
and being cheated it will, in its turn, be still 
poorer and will discount the future at an even 
higher rate. Thus a vicious cycle is established. 
(70-81) 
Perhaps the world has not yet reached the point where distributional 
justice would so impoverish society; but the population explosion 
indicates the world may be rushing towards such a point. Rather 
than discourage equity, it might be preferable to encourage new, non-
material istic goals - a new life-style based on and inculcating a 
new ethic. 
solution? 
Can the science of economics contribute to such a 
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Dohan points out that while we cannot estimate the economic gain from 
ethical behaviour, or some decision which favours non-monetized bene-
fits, we can determine the costs - this is simply the difference in 
net present discounted value between the economic benefits foregone 
by not undertaking the project and those of the most profitable alter-
native. (46-167) This suggests a policy to balance efficiency and 
equity considerations, and reduce global risk: a careful cost-
benefit analysis of project proposals could reveal the opportunity 
cost of foregoing a development (in order to maintain nonmonetized 
benefits) and this cost could be paid as compensation to the(poor) 
country foregoing the project. This provides a rational basis for 
aid since it promotes distributional go~ls while observing efficiency 
criteria, and it has the effect of reducing adverse ecological 
impacts. 
Whatever the merits of this suggestion, most economists in this era 
of industrial expansion feel that rapid economic growth is absolutely 
necessary and that man's economic problems are not really due to 
growth itself but the misallocation of resources. <18-18) However 
growth may lead to more serious allocation problems rather than 
solving them. Schumacher has suggested that modern industry seems 
to be inefficient to a degree that surpasses one's ordinary powers of 
imagination. Its inefficiency therefore remains unnoticed. ( 129-108) 
Another writer <Morris) asks: Is it efficient to use a half a glass 
of oil to produce a glass of milk? And is it efficient to mass 
produce goods if all the workers are thereby frustrated? <111-328) 
Efficiency criteria must be related to specific goals to be meaning-
ful. 
This raises the question as to whether maximum economic growth is truly 
related to efficiency and welfare improvements. Perhaps gross in-
efficiency and inequity can produce rapid economic growth which only 
appears to improve welfare. Is growth then good? The problem is to 
establish appropriate criteria: perhaps the industrial state's 
efficiency and welfare criteria are unsatisfactory. It is suggested 
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that ecological and equity criteria should be pre-eminent, and it is 
further suggestea that these dictate the desirability of lower indus-
trial growth rates. The predominant concerns should be not how much 
is produced and at what gross level of efficiency, but rather how 
production affects ecological balances and how goods are distributed. 
Measures of ecological efficiency and social satisfaction should 
replace GNP and per capita income measurements. 
Since poor societies have limited capital, they should not pursue 
maximum efficiency <which would benefit only a few) but rather full 
employment, to get more equitable income distribution and permit sus-
tained economic development along a broad front. This would mean 
accepting lower average productivity and per capita income, but it would 
provide a more realistic approach to curing chronic poverty and in-
creasing overall social satisfaction. 
It will be difficult to convince developing countries that maximum 
growth and efficient production are not suitable goals when there exists 
such an enormous gap between the developed and underdeveloped countries. 
The idea of progress still conjures up favourable images from scientism, 
technocracy, and utilitarianism which have preached the virtues of 
efficiency, growth and consumption so successfully for so long. But 
there are other, perhaps now more appropriate, forms of progress, and 
the science of ecology may be able to point the way. While this 
science and this situation are recent developments, history provides 
ample illustrations of what happens when man in his greed neglects en-
vironmental realities. 
In Syria 400·000 hectares of man-made deserts 
have buried a hundred ancient cities. Egyptolo-
gists are digging through peripheral Saharan sands 
to probe the secrets of once well-watered towns 
and villages. The Babylonians once grew two wheat 
crops a year and grazed sheep in between. Today 
their land is barren. The timber that helped 
make the Phoenicians a great naval power has been 
replaced by dunes .... (29-68) The Hellenic epoch 
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and the greatness of Greece were based on natural 
resources and persisted as Long as the forests 
produced timber and the equilibrium ot nature was 
preserved. When the balance was disturbed by 
ruthless exploitation of the forests and over-
production of cattle and goats, the power of 
Greece declined. The same destructiJe course 
followed in the Roman Empire, though it took longer ... 
(37-111) 
Dubos warns that the Land tends to deteriorate when it is exploited to 
serve gross selfish interests or when economic efficiency and producti-
vity are the sole criteria. (50-147) What then should man be seeking, 
and what criterion should he apply to development? Dubos sums it up 
well: 
Efficiency may be an essential criterion of modern 
technology, but man is not a machine. Diversity, 
not efficiency, is the ~.ln.e qua non of a rich and 
creative human life. (50-287) 
The Pre-Eminence of Equity 
Although growth and efficiency may be dubious goals in themselves, the 
equity goal seems central to the concept of welfare. Perhaps the 
principal concern of developing countries is that past patterns of 
development have led to unacceptable distributional consequences. 
Equity considerations are at the heart of the matter - economic growth 
and efficiency are seen as ways to bring about social and economic 
justice.. Developing countries are therefore suspicious when Lower 
growth rates and alternative technologies are proposed to achieve en-
vironmental quality or nature conservation objectives since it seems 
apparent that the costs will be distributed differently to the benefits. 
For example, benefits derived from game parks in Kenya are certainly 
not going to the poor pastoralists and farmers, who are not only 
suffering direct agricultural losses caused by wild animals but are 
also bearing heavy opportunity costs in foregoing the use of potential 







Kenyans in government and the tourist industry, and to overseas tour 
operators, airline companies, international hotel chains, and other 
interests outside the country - while recreational and aesthetic 
benefits flow to affluent visitors from developed countries. 
Decision-makers in developing countries resent this situation, and it 
is widely assumed that pursuing environmental quality objectives is 
not desirable because of these distributional ·problems. However there 
is no intrinsic difficulty if institutional arrangements can be forged 
to ensure benefits flow to those who bear the costs. In fact, develop-
ment of recreational and aesthetic resources would tend to be in-
herently more equitable than development of some other economic 
sectors, and may be useful in achieving a global redistribution of 
income, employment, and wealth through international tourism and trophy 
hunting. Undeveloped countries rich in natural attractions would 
perhaps be well-advised to develop these "non-exhaustible" resources, 
which can bring wealth to a country indefinitely, in preference to 
developing depletable resources which can drain wealth from a country 
rapidly. It will, however, be necessary to charge the appropriate 
prices and ensure that the appropriate people benefit. 
The choice between efficiency and equity is of paramount importance. 
In striving for economic efficiency, it is advantageous to make the 
already good better and neglect the already weak. (99-276) This is 
unethical and inhumane. The efficiency criterion is of Limited 
applicability in human affairs. Evolution may favour efficiency 
rather than effort or justice, but mankind has generally chosen to be 
guided by ethical considerations as well. If one recognizes ethical 
constraints to human behaviour, the efficiency criterion is not 
relevant unless it is tied to the equity criterion. Developing 
countries are trying to become more efficient without sufficient regard 
for the effects a given pattern of development (the urban-industrial 
model) has on distribution and general well-being. Given humanistic 
principles, it would be better to adopt a model which stresses 
equitable development first and efficient development second. 
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The problem of equity has perhaps not been taken seriously enough in 
economic planning. Economists have devised five criteria for measur-
ing economic performance, of which four relate to efficiency <Pareto 
optimality, social welfare, broad productivity, and GNP), and one 
relates to equity (distribution of welfare). (47-xx) It may be, how-
ever, that the distributional consequences of a policy are the most 
important measure of economic performance. Ignoring equity can be 
dangerous in today's politically volatile world, and the equity-
efficiency trade-off has profound implications for the welfare of future 
generations. Future users, as well as the present poor, are under-
represented in the market and political arenas. Political economy must 
be guided by considerations of equity as this may prove over time to be 
the most truly "efficient criterion" (in the most meaningful sense of 
the term). 
ECONOMICS, GROWTH, AND DEVELOPMENT 
The Present Formula 
A major goal of developing countries has been to promote economic growth 
in order to bring about improvements in welfare, particularly for the 
poorer sectors of society. The formula has generally been to increase 
the factors of production by importing sophisticated technology so that 
the level of output can be greatly increased, to the presumed benefit 
of all. However it appears that this formula has not been particularly 
successful in "curing" underdevelopment or improving the welfare of the 
poor. 
One problem is that the gap between developed and underdeveloped 
countries is so great that the latter can hardly expect to achieve a 
rate of growth that can close this gap, so that even with growth, 
underdevelopment can be a permanent state. Lutz and Lux calculate 
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that to close the gap poor countries need to grow at about 10% or get 
aid about 10 times above present (1979) Levels. (99-273) Given 
resource Limitations and political obstacles,.such rates must be con-
sidered unrealistic. Another problem is that ;the poor do not necessa-
rily benefit from economic growth. In free ~arket economies, the poor 
Lack the purchasing power to share in the benefits of growth. Sur-
prisingly Little is known about the poor but perhaps satisfaction of 
their needs should be the principal goal of economic development, rather 
than achieving the maximum rate of growth, particularly since it would 
appear virtually impossible to break out of underdevelopment by growth 
alone. Emphasis on the advantages of impersonal allocation of re-
sources by the market results in suffering the disadvantage of imper-
sonal distribution of welfare. Perhaps there is no satisfactory, ob-
jective way for the science of economics to deal with welfare questions, 
but it would appear that distribution of welfare considerations should 
take precedence over those concerned with efficient allocation of 
resources. 
To this end, a new set of indicators of successful development should 
replace present measurements of GNP or per capita income. These indi-
cators should include elements relating to natural environments as they 
affect human welfare. At present, essential ecological functions and 
other significant benefits accorded by nature are excluded from GNP 
while wasteful depletion of resources and environmental pollution are 
included. (13-148) Economic health need not be defined in these trad-
itional terms; what is valuable economically is not Limited to what is 
produced by man. Economic development should be related directly to 
improvements in man's well-being and not simply to the production of 
consumer commodities and capital goods. Natural amenities and ecolo-
gical benefits serve important welfare functions and should be counted 
as part of GNP. 
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The Population Problem 
Developing countries tend to disregard such considerations because of 
their very real and very pressing physical needs. Economic growth is 
seen in terms of industrial production because of its presumed efficacy 
in satisfying man's most elemental wants. Many observers are con-
vinced that industrial development will eventually result in a solution 
to the most basic economic problem - meeting physiological and 
security needs - and this in turn will lead to a reduction in family 
size, thus defusing the "population bomb". But if population is not 
soon contained, the economics of the situation will quickly result in 
even greater weakness: there is less surplus to trade for needed goods, 
which further reduces the supply of needed goods, which further weakens 
the country. This logical progression is not altered by aid (which 
does not really confer strength), and the situation is only ameliorated 
by reducing population growth. Even if economic growth surpasses 
population growth, welfare improvements will proceed at a slower pace 
than would be the case if population were not growing. Population 
control can only strengthen a country and speed its development. 
It appears that the present pattern of economic growth will not generate 
the negative feedback necessary to control population growth because of 
simple space and time constraints. Ecologists might suggest the situa-
tion is somewhat analagous to that which resulted in the collapse of 
the elephant population in Tsavo National Park: the elephants had the 
reproductive and destructive power to destroy their closely circum-
scribed environment in a relatively short time. Ecological feedbacks 
require a certain amount of time and space to be effective. 
Perhaps the lesson for man - particularly the point about time - should 
be pursued and examined in economic terms. Mankind's growing numbers 
create greater demands for consumer goods which are purchased at the 
expense of natural goods which are in finite supply. Trade-offs 
between consumer goods and natural goods usually take the form of a 
deferred exchange in an imperfect market. Only part of the costs are 
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paid immediately on receipt of the benefits (costs to natural systems 
are deferred) and there is a great danger that the point in the discon-
tinuity in the exchange opportunity where the price of some natural good 
becomes virtually infinite will not be foreseen. This possibility of 
deferred exchange in combination with the existence of an imperfect 
market poses a great risk for society. Discounting should take account 
of deferred costs, but since ecological costs are so hard to predict and 
impossible to quantify, they tend to be ignored; yet these costs (such 
as are associated with lost gene pools or eco'system destabilization) 
are potentially far ~reater than any present or near-term costs. In 
addition to the problem of cumulative impacts, there is the problem of 
inertia. As debts mount up, response time shortens. 
There is little doubt that options are rapidly being foreclosed as the 
stock of biological and ecological capital (in the form of species and 
ecosystems) is diminished, but due to the scale and nature of the 
effects the growing risk has remained substantially unnoticeable. The 
economic system appears to be afflicted with myopia, and this inatten-
tion to the ecological costs of economic growth may prove fatal. 
Those who maintain that developing countries cannot afford to be con-
cerned abouut environmental degradation should recognize that when the 
costs of economic growth are ultimately paid, all will suffer but the 
costs will be borne primarily by the poorer elements of society. 
Economic "Success" 
Developed countries are considered economically successful and so are 
faithfully imitated by Lesser developed countries. But by what 
standard are we to judge success? The criteria for economic success 
... 
must be based on an understanding of human nature and human needs. If 
"economizing" means making more effective use of scarce resources to 
improve human welfare, then much of what passes for successful economic 
deve(opment really constitutes economic failure. Because GNP and per 
capita income criteria are Limited, an economic system is judged 
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in terms of what it produces and not in terms of what it destroys or 
throws away. This has fostered a callous di~regard for the integrity 
of nature and encouraged a "throwaway society" based on reckless exploit-
ation and characterized by a growing insensitivity to natural amenities. 
In an urban setting, where buildings are plentiful and parks are 
scarce, it would seem more truly economic to preserve a small park 
rather than erect another building. But there is a subtle process of 
erosion at the margin, because of restricted criteria, so that an 
additional building is perceived to confer greater utility than the 
existence of a park. (Using GNP or per capita income criteria, the 
choice is a foregone conclusion and a cost-benefit study would be a 
sham.) It is easy to calculate the benefits of a building; more 
difficult to judge the opportunity costs of losing another park. 
Other criteria for economic success, and a new approach for making 
resource allocation decisions, are needed. A first step might be to 
recognize the fundamental differences between different categories of 
resources. At the moment the products of nature are treated as income 
rather than capital, and this has led man to believe the "problem of 
production" has been solved. But perhaps limited resources should be 
considered as capital, and their use deducted from net national income 
(unless there are clearly substitutes in the offing which are ecologi-
cally acceptable). Natural goods appear to lie beyond the pale of 
economic thought, and certain effects of their loss are now ignored, 
just as pollution effects were ignored previously. The fact that 
economic incentives do not bring about a truly efficient allocation of 
natural goods is a form of market failure. This significant source 
of environmental problems, unlike pollution problems, has not yet been 
the subject of much significant theoretical and applied work in 
economics. (84-13) 
Pollution is not the only problem of environmental economics. There is 
a critical difference between activities which do not substantially 
impair the substance of a resource and those which consume, pre-empt, or 
destroy a resource. For this latter category, choices among different 
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alternatives must take account of special costs resulting from profound 
modifications of the environment, and the ability and willingness of 
society to incur these costs. 
ECONOMICS AND ECOLOGY 
The words "economics" and "ecology" derive from the Greek word o.<..k.o.o, 
meaning "house". These disciplines are both concerned with the manage-
ment of man's "house", but economics has been applied primarily to the 
functioning of man-dominated systems and ecology to the functioning of 
nature-dominated systems. The interaction between these two classes of 
systems is all-important. Odum has stated that there must be some 
optimal proportion between the natural and developed environments. 
( 117-180) Environmental management is concerned with incorporating 
ecological principles into economic systems and forging linkages between 
the rules of nature and man's rules of production and consumption. ' 
Environmental management thus seeks to create an "economic ecology" 
which will serve as a more holistic and reliable paradigm of the reality 
in which man is embedded. 
There is, however, an inherent dichotomy in these two systems which 
arises from different perspectives of time - economics is moved by 
short-term considerations <the ephemeral forces governing political and 
market institutions), whereas ecology operates on a time scale tha~ en-
compasses cycles spanning aeons. If the perspective of economics is 
extended sufficiently, the differences become illusory since ecolo-
gically sound actions will be considered economically sound as well. 
The existing dichotomy is dangerous. For example, economists tend to 
be more concerned with farmers' incomes and the production of cash 
crops than with the needs and the workings of the Land (from which these 
goods flow) because the land is often simply regarded as a tool of 
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production and a tax base. It is vitally important to point out the 
economic value of soil stability, vegetation cover, and water quality -
and the ecological mechanisms on which these depend - since such "goods" 
are the underpinnings for the whole economic edifice. At the same time, 
ecologists often fail to perceive the economic character of ecological 
values, thereby forfeiting forceful arguments'.for conservation, and 
very often remain aloof from the difficult question of how decision-
makers are to meet the growing needs of humanity for greater economic 
welfare. Ecologists might find economic concepts useful in prescribing 
I 
values for ecological assets. The all-too-common presumption that 
benefits deriving from natural ecosystems, being free and often indirect, 
have no economic value should be vigorously refuted, and knowledge of 
economic concepts and methods may assist in formulating some acceptable 
approximation of their economic value which could be decisive. 
A better understanding of economic concepts might also help ecologists 
appreciate the precise nature of threats to species and natural eco-
systems. For example, Konrad Lorenz has concluded that whales will not 
be hunted to extinction, and his reasoning is based on an analogy 
between the density-dependent relationship of prey and predator and that 
of whale and whaler. (98-10) The reasoning is that whales will survive 
because as the number of whales declines past some critical point, 
whalers will be forced to switch to some other prey. This is an 
example of applying an ecological concept where an economic concept 
would be more appropriate. As Clark has shown, it is conceivable 
that a highly capitalized and efficient industry may have the resources, 
technology, and motivation to administer the eoup d~ g~ae~ if the social 
rate of discount is high enough and the marginal private cost is Low 
relative to the marginal private benefit from the last whale needed to 
maintain a viable population. (28-632) 
Clark's analysis of the exploitation of whales might be extended to the 
exploitation of natural ecosystems, since the basic causes of priv~te 
overexploitation of the resource - high economic value, high rate of 
discount, and Low rate of reproductive (or reconstructive) potential -
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would all seem to apply. The widespread belief that private ownership 
results in socially desirable behaviour (assuming obvious externalities 
are internalized) may be ill-founded. 
The existing urban-industrial paradigm, to which so many developing 
countries aspire, envisions man as a consumer with a nearly infinite 
capacity for goods and services contrived by man. Given this paradigm, 
it makes sense to consider rapid industrialization and economic growth 
<and maximization of profits to raise capital for more growth) as 
supreme goals. But this view of reality differs greatly from the view 
held by ecologists, who see definite limits (imposed by finite supplies 
of space and other resources) to the production and consumption of 
economic goods and an urgent necessity to maintain equilibrium (due to 
rigid constraints imposed by ecological cycles and other imperatives of 
nature). The present economic system appears to have been dictated by 
a model of reality which is incomplete. 
Attempts to broaden the frame of reference of economics so as to include 
the subject matter of ecology may result in a better model of reality 
to which the various concepts of both sciences could be applied. Such 
a synthesis may be at least partly possible since both are concerned 
with choice and interaction between human beings and the natural environ-
ment, and the demand for and supply of various goods. Where these two 
disciplines cannot be integrated, their juxtaposition will serve to 
illuminate how they conflict with regard to reality and help determine 
which might make the better guide for solving a particular problem. 
Government policy should take full cognizance of both economics and 
ecology, and attempt to recognize and objectively weigh all the 
relevant parameters of each. 
Economic systems are subsystems of the natural environment. The 
developed environment receives inputs from the natural environment which 
can be processed and exchanged. Economics focuses on the activities 
of these open subsystems, which are normally studied in isolation over 
short time horizons <human life spans or shorter), and whose efficiency 
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can be expressed in monetary terms. However, the system which en-
compasses economic systems and makes all economic activity possible 
must be studied on a different time scale, and its efficient operation 
cannot be understood in monetary terms. The Laws of nature transcend 
and ultimately regulate economic Laws. If the operation of the natural 
environment is impaired, the developed environment is debilitated. An 
inefficient environment will result in an inefficient economy. 
For example, one point that the ecologist would make is that the econo-
mic process if fuelled by solar energy (stored and direct) which flows in 
a Linear progression from Low to high entropy. The whole of economic 
Life feeds on Low entropy and produces high entropy. <82-20) A second 
point is that there are certain elements and cycles in nature which are 
absolutely essential to human Life and well-being. These must be con-
sidered priceless and their value must be reflected in non-market terms, 
such as self-preservation and the enjoyment of Life <the ultimate 
criteria of value?). 
Economic Life thus depends on certain elementary conditions, such as the 
availability of high quality energy, the efficient cycling of vital 
elements, the assimilative capacity of the environment, and the con-
tinued existence of certain biological organisms and the ecosystems on 
which they depend. Decision-makers should remember that not all values 
can be reflected by prices, and economic activities can destroy these 
unpriced but indispensible goods of nature. 
Economists are inclined to regard throughputs of the physical system as 
benefits rather than costs, but these "benefits" can also be thought 
of as costs to the system. (23-77) Transformation of natural goods 
into consumer goods is achieved at the cost of higher entropy in the 
system. Ecologists recognize these costs to the system and consider 
system costs as fundamentally more important than costs to the individual 
since the system sustains the individual. Advocates of greater growth 
must realize that these extra benefits will be purchased at some cost to 
the system which supports them, and that they (or their progeny) may 
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ultimately pay more than they reckoned. These "entropy costs" may 
be relatively insignificant for a time and easily supportable, but it 
seems probable that there are significant discontinuities in the trade-
off between natural and consumer goods so that at some point an infinite 
price would suddenly appear for the natural good. It would be prudent 
to anticipate this deterioration in the exchange opportunity process and 
ensure that growth does not reach this point: 
The challenge for decision-makers is to calculate the hidden ecological 
costs for every economic benefit. The danger lies in the temptation 
to ignore these costs and simply defer payment. Economists would 
surely agree with ecologists that environmental protection is "economic" 
I 
in the long run, at least to the extent which would guarantee the con-
tinued healthy functioning of the ecosphere <which "houses" the economy 
which "houses" man). The big and unanswerable question remains: 
which parts are essential? Perhaps the best answer is that all parts 
should be considered potentially essential until proved otherwise - man 
needs more time and research to be clear about this. Until we are more 
certain about which species and natural ecosystems we can "afford" to 
lose, it would be eminently desirable to adopt a global shadow-project 
policy, with wealthier nations compensating poorer nations, to insure 
against ecological collapse. 
Perhaps as human activity approaches biophysical limits there will 
emerge a new theory of value reflecting ecological utility, and alloca-
tion will be directly influenced by ecological principles so that prices 
and decision rules will ensure ample ecological safety. Such a theory 
of value would more accurately reflect the true biological and psycholo-
gical benefits to man, and the full costs of all inadvertent or wilful 
damage to man and the natural goods on which he depends. 
Economists might do well to study ecology, and seek to develop a model 
of economic equilibrium similar to models of ecological equilibrium. 
The two systems may be sufficiently analagous to stimulate new insights. 
For example, ecosystem models can be analyzed in terms of price-profit 
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mechanisms. An ecosystem goes through a process of succession because 
.it generates a "biological profit" which is re-invested to. expand 
production. When a climax condition is reached, costs equal benefits 
and no further profits are generated -· i.e., the value of inputs catches 
up to the value of outputs, which results in equilibrium. Ecological 
imperatives govern productive processes in ecosystems so that an eco-
system evolves a strategy which is appropriate to the availability and 
reliability of inputs (of energy and nutrients) for further development 
or homeostasis. If the system is physically unstable, particularly if 
•; 
energy and nutrients are abundant, the strategy may be to maximize 
throughput. If the system is stable, the strategy may be to minimize 
throughput and maximize structure. Both strategies will result in a 
state of equilibrium which produces the optimum level of development 
consistent with the requirements of long-term survival in that particular 
environment. Economic systems should strive for the same result and 
seek the level of production which yields the highest sustainable 
state of social development, defined as the optimum level of satis-
faction of man's basic needs in perpetuity which can be obtained with 
available energy and nutri~nts from physical and cultural systems. In 
an economic model with limited inputs to a stable system, the level of 
outputs should be governed by social thrift to permit optimum production 
over long time horizons. In such a system there is a limit to profits, 
and pursuit of private g9in may conflict with ultimate social goals. 
/ 
Hooker has suggested that if coherent principles for maximizing 
collective welfare could be identified, then a new approach to economic 
analysis could be possible: you continue to assume cost-benefit analysis, 
but you replace commodities with,deviation from optimal design; it is now 
an economics of design deviance. (75-182) Hooker feels this could be 
a systems economics that will match ecology. Perhaps totally new 
approaches such as this are urgently needed to solve totally new 
problems as we reach the limits of production. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The science of Economics has been primarily concerned with efficiency 
improvements in the production of goods and services, and economic 
growth and increased levels of consumption have come to be regarded as 
supreme social goals. Comparatively little attention has been paid to 
equity improvements or those aspects of well-being which do not stem 
from economic goods. However, economic concepts can be applied to 
choices regarding total human welfare, and account can be taken of 
ecological and spiritual costs and benefits, as long as it is accepted 
that these cannot be quantified. 
Economics would be a bet.ter guide to improving welfare if the concept 
of "wants" were replaced with that of "needs". The emphasis on wants 
has led to widespread fixations on consumer commodities which can only 
satisfy lower needs or "neurotic" needs. The higher needs then fail to 
emerge, and so are neglected. 
Two of the most urgent challenges facing decision-makers today' are to 
improve the distribution of the world's goods and services, and to arrest 
the decline of environmental quality. These challenges represent great 
political and ecological dangers and must be·given priority. However, 
there appears to be an inherent conflict between efficiency and equity 
objectives, and economic growth may lead to poorer environmental 
quality rather than to greater equity. Accordingly, future development 
should be more concerned with the distributional and ecological conse-
quences of a proposal and less concerned with the effects on efficiency 
and growth. Development programmes should be cbmmitted to providing 
full employment, eradicating poverty, and maintaining environmental 
quality. 
The adoption of modern industrial technology may not sufficiently 
benefit the poor or serve to contain population growth in time to pre-
vent widespread disasters due to social and ecological breakdowns. 
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New patterns of economic development and new criteria for economic 
success are needed to encourage the truly efficient use of natural 
goods to improve well-being. 
The horizons of economics should be broadened to consider the effects 
of economic activity on the structure and functioning of natural 
systems Con which all economic activity ultimately depends). Economic 
systems are open-ended; they receive inputs from the natural environ-
ment and all outputs are eventually returned to the natural environ-
ment. Economic systems thus have two types of impacts on sustaining 
ecological systems: depletion impacts, and pollution impacts. Know-
ledge of the effects of economic activities on natural ecosystems over 
time, and knowledge of the true extent and nature of all benefits from 
the natural environment (nature's "free" goods and services), are of 
paramount importance in determining what is truly efficient for sus-
tainable development. Ecological costs should be calculated for every 
economic benefit. Since these costs can only be approximated, 
estimates should be conservative and shadow-project policies should be 
adopted until more ecological knowledge is gained. 
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CHAPTER 11 
APPLYING ECONOMIC CONCEPTS 
TO THE POLICY CHOICES 
"On.f.y e.c.onoml6u ml6ta.ke. phy-6.foaf. opu.f..e.nc.e. nOJt 
4~c.he.-6 •••• We. c.an a.f...f.. -6e.e. p4ofi~t ~n c.ovt-6~vation 
p4ac.tic.e., but the. p4ofi~t ac.~ue.-6 to -6oc.~e.ty 
4ath~ than to the. ~nd~v~dua.i..." < 93-31 , 156) 
INTRODUCTION 
Turning to the question of how to determine which of two policy choices 
might be more reasonable to adopt, given the five social goals based on 
Maslow's hierarchy of needs (see pp. 79 and 83), it is suggested that 
economic concepts and methods can be applied to a general analysis of 
social and ecological trade-offs inherent in the policy choices, inclu-
ding those which are clearly not monetizable, or even quantifiable. 
A discussion of how economic terms might be interpreted and used in 
such an analysis, and an overall rationale for this approach to evaluating 
alternative policies, will follow. At the same time, an attempt will 
be made to explain how traditional interpretation and usage of economic 
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terms, concepts, and methods may fail to result in selection of the 
policy option which can be considered optimal in terms of total human 
welfare over longer time horizons. 
ECONOMICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 
Economics is the science of choice in the presence of scarcity. The 
first thing that might be said regarding the choice between the two 
policy options is that unconstrained development does not allow con-
sideration of the fact that natural and near-natural -areas are becoming 
increasingly scarce, and are therefore increasing in value. Instead, 
there is an implicit assumption that more goods, obtainable through 
further development, will always be more highly valued than any 
(reduced) amount of natural or near-natural areas. This quite common 
assumption may be due to the wide-spread feeling that natural and near-
natural areas are infinitely abundant, free, or of no value. In fact 
these areas are becoming alarmingly scarce, can be maintained only at 
some increasing opportunity cost, and certainly have some, perhaps 
incalculable, value. 
The concept of scarcity implies choice, and choice depends on the 
relative utility of two goods, which in turn depends, in part, on 
previous consumption levels of each good by the consumer. This is due 
to the law of diminishing marginal utility: as one obtains more units 
of a given good, the relative utility of each additional unit will 
dlminish. The choice between any two goods therefore depends not 
simply on relative availability or on some intrinsic value but on 
previous levels of consumption of these goods since this affects the 
present utility function of further increments of each. Choice there-
fore takes place at the margin - one weighs the marginal benefit of 
obtaining an additional unit of one good against the marginal opportunity 
cost of foregoing the benefit that would result from obtainihg an 
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additional unit of the other good. This cho1te may be said to be 
rational if it is assumed that the consumer is a competent judge as to 
what constitutes utility, and his perceptions of the marginal utility 
of each good (towards enhancing his well-being over some relevant time 
period) are fundamentally correct. 
The notion of "consumer sovereignty" - that the consumer knows what is 
in his best interests - is absolutely central to positive economics. 
It is assumed that, given sufficient information and freedom to choose, 
the consumer will act in such a way as to maximize his own welfare. 
It is also assumed that, for society as a whole, if an action results in 
a net improvement in the Level of well-being in a society - that is, if 
the "gainers" gain more than the "Losers" Lose - then society is better 
off and, on efficiency grounds at Least, the action is justified. 
However, it is conceivable that consumer tastes and preferences may be 
so distorted by various external influences, and assessments of utility 
may be so complex, and conceptions of welfare may be so nebulous, that 
consumer choices may not result in welfare gains and may actually 
diminish welfare. This is particularly true of the higher needs of 
man, and it seems reasonable to surmise that those mechanisms which 
appear to result in the efficient satisfaction of the Lower needs of 
man may actually inhibit the efficient attainment of higher Levels in 
the hierarchy of needs. It may thus transpire that the free market 
institution is eminently suited to efficiency improvements at one Level 
. of man's hierarchy of needs and utterly obstructive to efficiency 
improvements at another Level. 
In fact, there are substantial grounds for believing that consumers 
are not competent judges as to what constitutes advances in their own 
welfare (much Less that of society as a whole) and if this is even 
roughly true, much of present economic theory (e.g., welfare economics) 
must be considered Largely irrelevant or potentially misleading as a 
guide for improving total human welfare. For example, consumers may 
not be able to make accurate utility comparisons between economic goods 
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and natural goods at the margin. The concept of exchange value as a 
measure of relative utility works well for certain categories of goods 
(for which markets can be created) because this' value reflects the 
scarcity condition of a commodity whose need is easily perceived and 
readily appreciated; increases in this value signal producers that 
there is a growing scarcity of this commodity. However the actual use 
value of the commodity at a particular point in time may be quite 
different to its exchange value - for example, under certain easily 
imagined circumstances, a glass of water may have a high use value and 
a low exchange value while a glass of diamonds may have a Low use 
value and a high exchange value. This paradox of value has been 
resolved in the case of goods for which markets can be created; for 
these goods, it is the marginal utility which determines the value. A 
man who is desperately thirsty and prepared to pay any price for the 
first glass of water may find the marginal utility of a glass of water 
rapidly declines relative to that of a glass of diamonds as his thirst 
is quenched and future supplies of water are assured. 
However, for goods, services, and conditions necessary to the attain-
ment of higher needs, use value may be high but poorly perceived, parti-
cularly at the margin, and exchange value may always remain indeter-
minable. The consumer may not be competent to assess utility at the 
margin for such goods, or make rational trade-offs with other goods 
which have established exchange values. Consumption decisions pertain-
ing to non-marketable goods with high use value should be based on 
evaluations of total utility, rather than marginal utility. But use 
value is difficult to determine if the consumer has no (or little) 
previous experience of the good, and an appropriate exchange value is 
hardly determinable in the absence of a market. 
There is thus a propensity to substitute goods useful only in satis-
fying lower level needs for goods that are necessary to meeting higher 
level needs. Consumers display a tendency to confine their attention 
to that array of goods whose value is more easily ascertained - one is 
naturally attracted to what one most readily perceives and understands, 
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and inclined to neglect other, more elusive (but potentially more 
welfare-enhancing) goods, to the ultimate detriment of one's total 
welfare. Natural goods which confer spiritupl, aesthetic, cognitive, 
or ecological benefits have high use value but low or nil exchange value 
due to the impracticality of setting up a mar~et. The true (use) 
value of these goods is not obvious to the unjnitiated or the unen-
lightened, and therefore they are often traded for a mess of pottage, 
as Thoreau noted in 1861: 
But most men, it seems to me, do not care for 
Nature and would sell their share in all her beauty, 
as long as they may live, for a stated sum - many 
for a glass of rum. Thank God, men cannot as yet 
fly, and lay waste the sky as well as the earth .... 
It is for the very reason that some do not care for 
those things that we need to continue to protect all 
from the vandalism of a few. ( 134-217) 
The concept of externalities has greatly enhanced the usefulness of 
economics in investigating environmental problems. To date this con-
cept has been largely confined to the problem of pollution - the 
unnatural accumulation of materials in the biosphere which adversely 
affects man's well-being - but it is equally relevant to the other en-
vironmental problem, that of resource destruction - the depletion of or 
disruption to natural materials, organisms, and systems, the loss of 
which adversely affects man's well-being. The reason for the attention 
given pollution, and the relative neglect of resource destruction, is 
presumably because the former is more immediate and obvious in its 
effects while the latter has not yet made a striking appearance and 
is far more subtle and insidious in its impacts on man's well-being. 
The principal idea of the externality concept is that an individual 
fails to take into account all the costs and benefits of a proposed 
action because he will not have to bear all of the costs or will not be 
able to reap all of the benefits of that action. His decision is 
therefore not optimum for society as a whole. For example, modern 
industrial systems do not normally include in the cost of what they 
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produce such diseconomies of production-and distribution as the spewing 
off of effluents into the air or the overloadi'ng of the land with solid 
waste, but the citizens of the community must pay these costs either as 
taxpayers or as victims. ( 154-49) This problem applies particularly 
to public goods, which cannot be owned by anyone because of their 
indivisable or diffuse nature, and the high transaction costs of est-
ablishing a market for them. One widely acclaimed soluti.on to the 
problem is to find mechanisms which lead producers to make more efficient 
decisions by "internalizing the externality". One way to achieve this 
is through the intervention of a central authority in the free market, 
forcing producers (in the case of external diseconomies) to bear costs 
approximating those imposed on society and permitting them (in the case 
of external economies) to accrue benefits approximating those 
bestowed on society. The principal difficulty lies in determining 
the magnitude (the degree of utility or disutility) of the external 
effects, and in the case of resource destruction this difficulty may 
prove well-nigh insoluble. However the concept of externalities is 
extremely relevant and useful in considering these general environ-
mental problems and is essential to any Logical approach to making en-
vironmental decisions. 
Another useful concept to environmental decision-making is that of cost-
benefit analysis. The idea of weighing costs against benefits consti-
tutes a logical, systematic approach to decision-making. Three major 
impediments to this approach are: < 1) the difficulty in measuring costs 
and benefits, (2) the difficulty in expressing costs and benefits in 
monetary terms, and (3) the problem of determining relevant time 
horizons. However the general framework of cost-benefit analysis seems 
eminently suitable for presenting and analyzing mutually exclusive 
policy choices in terms of selected goals. 
A more detailed discussion of economic terms and the relevance of economic 
concepts in making environmental policy choices, follows. 
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SCARCITY 
Scarcity can be attributed partially to the niggardliness of nature and 
partially to the insatiability of man. After the possibilities of 
trade have been exhausted, there are two possible solutions to the 
problem of scarcity: by making nature more productive, or by reducing 
the demands man makes on nature. The decision as to what strategy to 
adopt must take account of the relative feasibility and risk attached to 
these two "solutions". Perhaps the most sensible approach to dealing 
with sca~city would be to first emphasize waste reduction and the con-
servation of stocks, and only then consider ways to increase production. 
However the Latter option is usually given greatest emphasis, since 
historically the possibilities of production have seemed without Limit, 
and there has always been a "consumption race" <motivated Largely by a 
fear of forfeiting one's share of the resource base to someone else). 
But now resources essential to industrial processes - and, more alarm-
ingly, to ecological processes - are becoming more scarce. Granted 
that supplies may not be abruptly exhausted, and that technological 
solutions may be theoretically possible for alleviating most or even 
all supply shortages eventually, the transition to new sources or tech-
nologies may involve significant time Lags. This may result in the 
appearance of insurmountable social and political obstacles, since 
rising prices of resources due to scarcity and increased costs associated 
with Lower grade deposits may impose intolerable economic burdens, 
particularly on poorer countries. These constraints could put many 
"solutions" beyond the reach of society. 
Scarcity may be said to both derive from and create "wants". Satisfying 
wants does not necessarily reduce scarcity but does increase scarcity 
if stocks are reduced, thereby exacerbating the problem, Like scratching 
an itch. There may emerge a destructive cycle: satisfying want Leads 
to greater scarcity, which may Lead to greater want, etc. There is 
both a physical and a psychological aspect to the problem of scarcity, 
and technology can be applied only to the physical aspect. Instead of 
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increasing production to alleviate want in a world of scarcity (and 
thereby increasing scarcity and compounding the problem>, perhaps ways 
should be found to decrease want directly; the "psychologkal" 
solution would appear viable and far less dangerous than the "technolo-
gical" solution. A policy of maintaining natural and near-natural 
areas would be consistent with this approach.'· 
CHOICE AND THE MARGIN 
It is unrealistic to think there is anything sacrosanct about natural 
areas. The benefits to be derived from maintaining natural or near-
natural areas must be compared to the sacrifices which such a policy 
entails. Economic theory posits that the rational basis for choice 
between further economic growth and greater protection of natural areas 
is by reference to the margin: there is a point where the benefits 
derived from one is outweighed by the costs of losing the other. There 
is no absolute imperative associated with either environmental protec-
tion or economic growth. The question is not one of either-or, but 
whether the point of optimum trade-off is determinable. 
In practice, the problem of choice is a difficult matter. For example, 
choosing a house involves non-quantitative comparisons between attri-
butes which are designed to meet physiological, safety, belongingness, 
esteem, and aesthetic needs. Multidimensional choice cannot be 
rigorously assessed. In addition fo its inherent complexity, choice 
takes place in a limited framework which normally consists of a partial 
set of indicators of man's well-being. These tend to be items which 
confer utility directly and almost immediately. Goals which are 
somewhat abstract or remote, and intermediate goals <which do not in 
themselves confer utility>, tend to be undervalued and underselected. 
Ecological goals for example are not likely to be regarded in the same 
light as more conventional goals, and in fact may not even be considered 
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as serious choices. The problems of consumer compe,tence and the 
welfare of future generations are extremely relevant here.· If 
society's present preferences are known, and these favour additional 
present consumption at the cost of (1) present environmental quality 
and (2) future consumption, risk, and environmental quality (even if 
all are discounted to present value equivalents), would the resulting 
choice necessarily be either optimum or Legitimate? It seems Likely 
that current consumption will tend to be disproportionately favoured in 
such calculations because of the natural bias of present generations 
toward present consumption and the difficulty in forecasting future 
preferences <which may result in a tendency to systematically underesti-
mate the significance of risk and environmental amenities to future 
generations). 
Even if the "means to ends" are considered in the same way as the ends 
themselves, and future generations are given adequate attention, there 
remains a serious metric problem: how much better (or worse) is one 
thing compared to another? This problem appears insoluble - there 
are simply no socially acceptable criteria or standards to apply. 
Decision-makers are faced with the impossible task of making "inter-
personal utility comparisons'', which involves assessing how individuals 
feel about trade-offs and then adding up these feelings to arrive at a 
net social value, <46-139) This difficult process may be somewhat 
circumvented by seeking a "potential Pareto improvement", but this still 
requires difficult judgments as to what will leave at least one person 
better off after compensating others who might be made worse off. In 
any case, the efficiency objective is thwarted by the need to consider 
multiple objectives for society which cannot be valued at all <equity, 
stability, security, etc.) and which often dictate the choice to be 
made. It seems highly unlikely that the point of optimum trade-off 
may be determined with any degree of confidence. It may therefore be 
prudent to systematically err on the side of safety, and choose the most 
conservative estimate of the opti~um Level of protection for natural and 
near-natural areas. 
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~ome economists suggest that maximizing choice is the most important 
objective of economic development and the most useful criterion of 
success. But economic growth does not necessarily increase the range 
of vital or meaningful choice since advanced technology and commerce 
bring with them their own imperatives and impose certain constraints on 
an individual's freedom. For example, an individual's choice of work 
and place of domicile are restricted to what is made available by the 
current technology and pattern of settlement. In industrial societies 
it may no longer be very feasible for many people to choose to be a 
certain kind of artisan or live in the country. In the same way, an 
individual's choice of natural amenities may be lost in the process of 
·industrial growth and development, and it may be that these losses are 
not compensated by the acquisition of economic goods. The degree of 
"meaningful choice" available may be a better indicator of social 
welfare than is economic growth. With rapid industrial development, 
trivial choices may abound and multiply <particularly those concerning 
material goods) while the choice of natural amenities (which can lend 
greater enjoyment to life) may be diminished and effectively denied 
to most individuals. Maintaining natural amenities increases the range 
of meaningful choice, which is important to welfare. 
An interesting illustration of the difficulty in defining where true 
choice lies is the generally accepted statement that members of modern 
developed economies are "choosing" to'limit family size because they are 
relatively free from the disease, deprivation, and insecurity that 
"forced" their ancestors to have lots of children. A plausible alter-
native explanation is that these people simply cannot "afford" to have 
more children because they are "forced" to consume high cost commodities 
by the industrial-urban system they find themselves in, and the value 
of children and the extended family has been appreciably diminished by 
the transition from a rural to an urban milieu. The question as to 
who has the greater choice and who is better off is perhaps not easily 
resolved and depends to some extent on whether one is inclined to 
emphasize family values or material and status values. The assumption 
that rising affluence brings about a reduced desire for large families, 
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and that this "decision" involves completely free choice arid is a wholly 
rational trade-off, is misleading; if a modern urban resident chooses 
a large family, he is assigning himself and his family to a purgatory 
of poverty unlike his rural grandfather's condition. There is a quali-
tative difference that is not reflected in income comparisons. 
One major problem is that present generations have no way to accurately 
compare the choices that have been gained and lost over time because 
"former users are invisible": former generations may have attached 
great value to choices which are not available to present generations. 
This suggests another interesting problem, perhaps equally intractable 
but more significant: if choice is made at the margin, and assuming 
that Maslow's hierarchy of needs (in which the satisfaction of one need is 
a pre-condition for the recognition of another need) is an accurate 
description of reality, then choice can be applied to only one need at 
a time and not to the trade-offs involved in man's whole "need set". 
That is, the incremental nature of choice, and the progressive success-
ion of needs for which choices are made, may make optimal decisions 
impossible. For example, a decision-maker in a poor country has a 
narrow framework in which to exercise choice: the trade-off is between 
the most immediate, essential needs on the one hand and environmental 
quality on the other. Constrained by considerations of time and an 
almost exclusive preoccupation with the most pressing needs of man, the· 
decision-maker is inclined to neglect other categories of needs for 
which there is no urgent demand but the inclusion of which would pro-
foundly influence the choice as to how much environmental quality (or 
how many of the products of nature) should be sacrificed. Thus, it 
may be that choice at the margin will always produce sub-optimal trade-
offs by the very nature of the process. 
In any case, if a major goal of society is to maximize the range of 
choices open to an individual, it would appear necessary to maintain 
special environments, such as, wilderness areas and regions for nomadic 
pastoralists, even though these can only be utilized by minority 
groups. In addition, the loss of special environments may represent 
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a cost (to a few groups) which is totally out of proportion to the few 
benefits (spread thinly over the masses) to be derived from any 
development. This is clearly uneconomic. 
THE LAW OF DIMINISHING MARGINAL RETURNS 
It would seem that there must be some point in the industrialization 
process when the Law of diminishing returns will result in diminishing 
living standards, and that this might constitute an unambiguous way to 
determine when industrial growth should be curtailed. However this 
reasoning assumes some ultimate Limit on material wants, as if these 
could ever be satisfied, and neglects the prodigious ability of industry 
to find infinite ways of stimulating wants. In fact,. industry has 
capitalized on the Law of diminishing marginal utility - largely through 
the power of advertising - by promoting dissatisfaction with one thing 
while furnishing another to take its place. The question is whether 
this plethora of goods and services is adversely affecting the capacity 
to enjoy Life <might not gluttons become jaded but remain insensible to 
their condition?) and whether the value of Lost amenities can be known 
or appreciated so there is some reasonable basis for choice at the 
margin. It is possible that the diminishing marginal utility of con-
sumer commodities will go unrecognized. 
Another potential problem is the effect of population growth on the 
trade-off between natural amenities and improvements in the standard 
of Living. Population growth results in disproportionate increases 
in per capita production costs due to the Law of diminishing marginal 
productivity. If the standard of Living is held constant (or allowed 
to rise), then providing for one extra person witl involve a proportion-
ately greater usage of energy and other resources than for the Last 
person, which implies correspondingly greater Losses in natural amenities 
available to the remaining population. An examination of the present 
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global situation would indicate that decision-makers everywhere have 
incorrectly forecast the costs of improving·material welfare, and have 
made social commitments that we cannot really afford, because of a 
general failure to perceive the true diminishing marginal productivity 
of natural resources. (5-205) 
The theoretical optimum population would be that in which the utility 
accruing to the last member joining the population just equals the 
disutility imposed on all other members by his presence. Even if one 
could measure and aggregate disutilities, changing utility functions 
(due to the effects of congestion, isolation from the natural environment, 
and environmental modifications on tastes and preferences) would make 
such calculations essentially meaningless since one could not be com-
pared with another and the condition of "greatest utility per capita" 
could not be unambiguously determined. 
The concept of diminishing marginal utility also applies to natural 
amenities. One cannot appreciate wilderness if there is too much of 
it in one's Life, anymore than if there is too little. The utility 
function depends on one's perceptions, which may be influenced by 
education but depend Largely on the degree of contact with the utility-
conferring object. Since experience determines the level of maximum 
utility (and alters it), and since there is no substitute for experience 
(which is unique, incredibly complex, involves unidirectional time, and 
is _limited to small samples of potential space and experience sets), 
there is no method for accurately fixing this optimum level. The 
utility of natural amenities cannot be objectively estimated in any 
meaningful way, and therefore one must rely on evidence from the past 
and on intuitive judgments in seeking the optimum Level of exposure to 
natural environments. 
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PUBLIC GOODS AND COMMON POOL RESOURCES 
Public goods cannot be privately owned (and potential users cannot be 
excluded from using them) because they are either too large, diffuse, 
indivisible, or intangible. Examples are oceans, rain, air, and 
nutrient cycling. Public goods are sometimes defined as "undepletable" 
since it would appear that an individual can increase his consumption 
of such a good without diminishing the supply available to others. 
(15-19) The logical extension of this thought is that public goods, 
once provided, cannot become scarce and therefore can present no 
economic problems. However this is misleading since, for example, my 
presence in a wilderness can in fact reduce the availability of wilder-
ness to others, and most public goods can become scarce through the 
combined actions of individuals and hence are, in an important sense, 
"depletable". 
Certain public goods, such as wild animals, soil organisms, ecological 
processes, and untamed wilderness are particularly vulnerable to abuse 
since they are not associated directly with private goods (unlike air 
or water, which are used in one's home and known to be important to 
health and welfare) and therefore tend to be regarded as unrestricted 
common property which can be violated with impunity. Hence while there 
is concern about air and water pollution, little attention is paid to 
the loss of natural ecosystems, even though the former may always be 
purified if disutilities become significant, while the latter may not 
be restorable by the time disutilities are recognized. 
It is useful to distinguish between public goods which cannot be exhausted 
and those which can be depleted to zero and lost forever. Baden calls 
this second category of goods "common pool resources" - such goods have 
multiple owners (or people with rights to use the pool) and are poten-
tially destructible. (9-144) This latter circumstance presents an 
especially serious externality problem: whereas many public goods can 
at worst only be undersupplied (and can always be provided in increased 
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amounts Later), common pool resources can be completely eradicated. 
Problems associated with common pool resources arise from the following 
circumstances: (1) ownership of the resource is held in common; 
(2) users have independent rights to the use of the resource; (3) no 
one user can control the activities of other users; and (4) total use 
or demand upon the resource exceeds the supply. <119-157) The "invisible 
hand" cannot be applied to common pool resources because if individuals 
try to maximize their self-interest, all will eventually become worse 
off. It is therefore desirable to transform common pool resources 
into public property, and so convert free goods into goods which are 
costed and allocated in the public interest. 
Some common pool resources can be invested with private property rights 
to a Limited extent - such as wildlife species on enclosed farms - but 
thi~ solution is unsatisfactory because it is subject to the vagaries of 
the market, which seems to have a built-in bias for goods which have 
the greatest short~term utility to one individual. The market system-
atically favours individual, gross, or short-term needs over social, 
sublime, or Long-term needs. While the shrinking commons has produced 
incentives to invest private property rights in some resources (such 
as wild game), this is Likely to prove a futile holding action because 
the full social benefits of these resources will never be captured by 
the titular owners - some of the benefits are intangible and dispersed, 
and are therefore distributed in a different way to the costs. The 
increasing opportunity cost of maintaining such resources will render 
the market solution inadequate, since definition and enforcement costs 
are insuperable. 
The dwindling supply of natural ecosystems cannot be arrested by a 
market solution because these systems and the functions they serve are 
common pool resources. It is not practical to institute a system of 
private ownership in the case of asset-units which are very Large (such 
as Large natural areas) or diffuse or intangible (such as the functions 
of natural ecosystems). Ecological benefits are undervalued in a 
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market because the special characteristics of these goods preclude 
pricing and payment - property rights cannot be specified, transaction 
costs are high, knowledge of the goods is grossly imperfect, and at 
least some of the benefits are collectively enjoyed. A prudent man will 
not freely give up some other good to enjoy these benefits, since they 
fall to him just as readily if he gives up nothing. No technical 
solution to this problem is feasible, therefore a social solution is 
required: public ownership is necessary. 
Small ecosystems can be privately owned but a competitive market is not 
likely to emerge for their most significant values. If goods of a 
public character are put under private ownership, the resulting net 
social benefit is likely to be less than if managed by an enlightened 
public agency. The Cape of Good Hope Nature Reserve in South Africa 
was established because private farmers were not motivated to preserve 
the flora and fauna of the tip of the Cape Peninsula. However, while 
private ownership does not necessarily protect natural areas and their 
values, common ownership is far more likely to result in their destruc-
tion. In a finite world of increasing scarcity due to increasing popu-
lafion and technological growth, there is a great danger that common 
pool resources not entrusted to and actively managed by some public 
body concerned for the social interest will be abused by individuals 
bent on pursuing their self-interest. Garrett Hardin, who calls this 
the "tragedy of the commons", suggests mutual coercion mutually agreed 
on because injustice is preferable to total ruin. (65-60,62) 
Baden has made an interesting suggestion which seems intuitively correct. 
If management is not imposed, the outcome of competition for a common 
pool resource will be a de fiaeto monopoly of the resource by the group 
generating the Largest negative externality. <10-244) It seems Logical 
to assume that the most ruthless and efficient exploiters will reduce 
the utility of a common pool resource to other users, and so ultimately 
drive other users away from the resource. The process itself may be 
far from obvious, however, as when birdwatchers find Less to watch and 
turn to other pursuits, perhaps even to ones which contributed (through 
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second or third order interactions) to the disutility which drove them 
from their avocation. Thus externality effects may favour recruitment 
to the externality-imposing activity, a positive feed-back mechanism 
that is ecologically unsound. This insidious phenomenon could be 
pervasive and of extreme significance since many higher-order needs are 
satisfied with common pool resources. <This may account for the 
degradation of cultural as well as natural environments - perhaps wide~ 
spread "poor taste" is a reflection of the power of Large negative 
externalities, and the failure to create institutional mechanisms to 
counteract this power.) 
EXTERNALITIES AND THE PROVISION OF NATURAL GOODS 
Private markets cannot be established for certain recreational, aesthetic, 
and ecological values associated with natural areas. The market cannot 
save the special values of natural ecosystems for two reasons: first, 
it fails to generate information about social values. Second, it fails 
to provide incentives to allocate resources to confer the greatest 
social benefit. It may be in the best interests of society if land-
owners leave some ecosystems in their natural state, but the problem 
of externalities precludes a market solution. This is due to the 
inability of parties who would incur opportunity costs in maintaining 
these natural systems to exclude "free riders" and appropriate to them-
selves the full benefits of their actions. Assigning private property 
rights to the products of nature would not solve the problem since the 
costs of setting up a market would be prohibitive; this would involve 
obtaining information on the activities and welfare functions of 
innumerable individuals, effecting and enforcing contracts, and other 
high transaction costs. It is the "public good" character of natural 
areas which dictates the control and ·management of natural amenities 
by a central authority. 
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Unfortunately many governments do not manage these public goods effect-
ively. The price system tends to exert an i~ordinate influence on how 
resources are used, even though these goods are removed from the market 
and it may be recognized that many of them h~ve value but simply 
cannot be priced. Public preferences are not clearly revealed in the 
case of public goods, and because the influence of the price system is 
pervasive and Looms Large as a mover of men, natural areas and their 
associated amenities are undervalued and often consumed at a (near) 
zero cost to produce goods for which a price is more easily determined 
and from which benefits can be more readily appropriated. 
This pattern may become even more pronounced as population increases, 
demand for material goods increases, and an economy's activities expand. 
The actual rate of increase in external environmental costs resulting 
from this situation is difficult to estimate, but it may be substantial 
(Krutilla conjectures it is at Least equivalent to the observed decline 
in private production costs). (90-19) These external environmental 
costs comprise two types: those which result from pollution effects, 
and those which result from the Loss of some natural good. An example 
of this Last type of externality is the inefficient allocation of 
wetlands because farmers must bear the costs of maintaining unproductive 
Land but cannot reap the benefits, such as harvesting the total 
production of ducks. If an agency acquires and assumes management of 
these wetlands, or undertakes to compensate the farmer, the obvious 
question might be: what valuation should be placed on duck production 
relative to alternative uses (such as building sites, agricultural 
production, etc.>? The not-so-obvious (but increasingly important) 
question is: what valuation should be placed on other productions and 
functions of the wetlands, in Light of the growing scarcity of wetlands, 
relative to these same alternative uses? Here the agency or central 
authority is even more Likely to fall down - it is easier to estimate 
the value of ducks than the value of detritus production. 
How effective is the agency Likely to be in externality accounting and 
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making decisions ~hich yield maximum net social benefit? The agency 
has a mandate or a mission to provide for the more obvious and imme-
diate needs of an expanding population with increasing per capita 
demands. There is an incentive to go for maximum sustained yield and 
set quantitative goals, but this objective does not consider certain 
qualitative goals and does not even ensure economic efficiency (since 
not all costs to the Land and other resources are considered, which 
would give optimum sustained yield or best net economic yield). 
Dohan has suggested four ways to track down externalities and determine 
their economic value with "shadow prices": ( 1) trace the effects of 
an externality to its interface with an economic activity; (2) use 
proxies which are closely related and have market-based values; (3) use 
a questionnaire to determine willingness to pay; and (4) construct 
"contingency prices" <prices necessary to change the decision) and 
evaluate for reasonableness. <46-154) These methods may produce 
better decisions at the margin, but all have serious deficiencies or 
Limitations. 
Externalities pose even more subtle and difficult problems: the sum of 
a whole series of decisions by farmers or agencies, each decision 
apparently rational in itself, could result in making everyone in 
society worse off. Externalities that in isolation appear insignifi-
cant have cumulative effects and at some point these may become signifi-
cant. These are hidden social costs with a time dimension. Perhaps 
the concept of externalities needs to be given a broader interpretation 
and ways must be found to reduce their incidence - not only firms, but 
central authorities and households, are not considering the full costs 
(in time as well as space) their actions impose on society (defined as 
all men, present and future). The externality concept has been 
narrowly applied to the way firms in present society impose monetary, and 
sometimes "psychic", costs, but the concept should be extended to all 
parties for all time to come, and allow the consideration of all costs 
- including cumulating ecological costs and risks to survival. Mishan 
has said: 
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The introduction of an adverse external effect 
. into the economy is a bad thing no matter how the 
economy adapts to it. By internalizing the bad, 
or by optimizing the output that produces the bad, 
we are doing no more than making the best of a 
bad job. < 109-118) 
And Coase has suggested: 
When an economist is comparing alternative social 
arrangements, the proper procedure is to compare 
the total social product yielded by these 
different arrangements. The comparison of private 
and social products is neither here nor there .•. 
the problem is to devise practical arrangements 
which will correct defects in one part of the 
system without causing more serious harm in other 
parts. <30-123) 
It may be that, in addition to doing a better job of discovering and 
accounting for externalities, the economic planner must suggest that 
some acceptable method of coercion or enforced cooperation be adopted 
.. 
to escape the harmful effects of externalities. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Natural and near-natural areas are becoming scarce and are increasing 
in value relative to consumer commodities. However this may not be 
obvious to the individual making consumption decisions because the 
connection between these two categories of goods appears most tenuous 
from his limited perspective. Economic institutions designed to 
satisfy lower needs may systematically obstruct the emergence of 
higher needs and the perception of how they might best be satisfied. 
The concept of "exchange value" may obscure the relative utility of 
goods for which no market can be created, so that material goods (for 
example) may be preferred to other goods which actually have higher 
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"use value". Two other economic concepts of particular relevance 
to environmental problems, the externality concept and the cost-
benefit concept, have serious practical limitations with regard to 
assessing depletion and disruption costs. 
The traditional response to scarcity - improving nature's productivity 
- is less appropriate now that environmental limits are being approach-
ed. Man should attempt to reduce his demands on the natural environ-
ment. The conventional practice of making choices by reference to 
conditions at the margin is also questionable because it favours 
satisfaction of lower needs over short time horizons <which implies 
that higher needs and future generations will be neglected). Choices 
pertaining to the natural environment should be based on long-term, 
conservative planning estimates. 
The law of increasing marginal opportunity cost indicates that provid-
ing for more people or improving their standard of living results in 
proportionately greater losses of natural goods. Common pool 
resources can be completely exhausted by unregulated exploitation -
"the tragedy of the commons" - and ~o institutional safeguards must be 
adopted to avoid externality effects. However, government provision 
of public goods is complicated by the difficulty in determining true 
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INTRODUCTION 
The various products of nature have value for man. These goods are 
provided by nature without cost - no toil or other payment is exacted. 
Man is therefore inclined to take such goods for granted and, when 
pressed, finds it strangely difficult to count up these blessings. 
Perhaps the first step is simply to list some of the goods arising from 
the natural environment which may be said to have value for man. 
Natural areas provide wild plants and animals for a host of uses: 
medicine, food, clothing, still undiscovered resources, recreational and 
tourism uses, aesthetic uses, watershed protection, landscape stability, 
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environmental baseline and monitoring uses, educational uses, rehabili-
tation models, outdoor scientific research laboratories, and mechanisms 
which protect man from known and unknown dangers. In short, natural 
areas provide man with security and enhance the quality of his life. 
What value can be placed on such goods? 
THE PROBLEM OF VALUATION 
What becomes of man will depend less on what machines he invents or what 
governments are imposed upon him than on what values he creates. <86-172) 
It is commonly assumed that the science of economics has developed 
acceptable methods of determining the relative value of things, and that 
the decision-maker can be confident that valuations used in cost-
benefit analysis, willingness to pay comparisons, and other procedures are 
rational and reliable. However the two major economic theories of 
value cannot be applied to natural goods which ~annot be exchanged, and 
therefore economics offers little guidance on decisions involving this 
vital and ubiquitous category of goods. 
The labour theory of value holds that a thing's value is determined by 
the labour involved in its production. By this criterion, natural goods 
have no value at all. The utility theory of value, which is based on 
subjective preferences which give rise to market prices, is restricted 
to exchangeable goods. This measure of value necessarily excludes all 
common pool resources. Many natural goods thus elude economic valua-
tion techniques and other ways of estimating value must be sought. The 
Law recognizes that normative judgments of value must sometimes replace 
market evaluations: 
Where the article or thing is so unusual in its 
character that market value cannot be predicated 
of it, its value, or plaintiff's damages, must be 
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ascertained in some other rational way and 
from such elements as are attainable. (140-32) 
Economists have tried to find ways of assigning values to natural goods, 
such as asking people what they would pay for given quantities, but such 
estimates are unrealistic since they involve attaching exchange values to 
things which will never be exchanged. Environmental quality may thus 
be incommensurable. However it is obvious that people will trade some 
environmental quality (or natural goods) for other benefits or goods, 
and some attempt must be made to estimate the terms of trade. The 
danger is that numerate-minded economists will be inclined to favour 
methods which produce precise results but may involve irrelevant concepts 
(such as willingness to pay estimates), rather than methods which pro-
duce rough estimates which more accurately reflect the reality (such 
as might be obtained through literature and historical surveys, or 
properly constructed questionnaires). There is no point in being 
guided by findings whose sole merit is that they were easy to obtain and 
quantify. 
EXCHANGE VALUE vs. USE VALUE 
The value of.a thing can be conceived either in terms of its total utility 
or in terms of its marginal utility through what it can bring in exchange. 
Even for consumer commodities, the two are rarely equal <the difference 
is called the consumer surplus). The market price is the measure of 
the exchange value, and this may be much lower than the utility value 
(except in the unusual case when there is a horizontal demand curve). 
(44-346) Since the allocation of scarce resources is based on estimates 
of exchange values, consumer goods which happen to have low exchange 
value but high utility value, and natural goods which have no exchange 
value at all but extremely high utility value, may be grossly 
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mi sa l located. Because natural amenities have high use value but low. 
exchange value (due to their public goods nature), ·this class of goods 
will tend to be displaced by consumer commodities with higher exchange 
value and lower use value. The widespread a$sumption that the use cf 
exchange values in making allocative decisions necessarily leads to 
efficient results and improves welfare may be erroneous. 
The utility value of a thing cannot be easily measured, which is why 
exchange value has become the standard. Utilitarianism has had to 
ascribe monetary value to goods (even to time) and therefore money, 
which is only a means of exchanging goods, has appeared to acquire an 
absolute value, so that it is often mistaken for an end rather than a 
means. The language of prices has become so universally canonized 
that price seems to have the power to confer value and, concomitantly, 
unpriced things seem to be valueless. Man-made goods (which are easily 
priced) are therefore accorded unreasonable value, and the products of 
nature are undervalued. 
The problem of valuation is a serious one. Things of incalculable 
value are devalued when given a price. And ascribing monetary value 
to a natural good, such as a natural ecosystem, implies that all its 
values are accounted for and that a competing good with highet monetary 
value is a superior choice. Cost-benefit studies systematically under-
value natural goods by assigning exchange values (an imperfect mechanism 
which is grossly misleading) or neglecting them altogether. The true 
utility of such goods must be recognized but not priced - some other 
method of weighing their value must be attempted which will more 
accurately reflect the degree of satisfaction the good confers. If a 
good is thought to have great or inestimable value, then that judgment 
must accordingly find expression in the economic calculus. This sounds 
a messy procedure, full of pitfalls and subject to bias and manipulation. 
But present procedures for economic analysis are hardly more satis-
factory if vital goods cannot be valued properly, or even considered; 
in fact, these procedures have a built-in bias and allow inadvertent 
manipulation, since opportunity costs of providing natural goods are 
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allowed to rise so that demand falls off, even though the intrinsic 
value remains unchanged. 
Krutilla and others have attempted to value the opportunity costs of 
lost natural goods, relate the values of amenity and commodity resources, 
and discern the transformation value of natural goods into man-made 
goods at the margin. <91-3, 8) Elaborate procedures have been devised 
to apply welfare maximizing criteria to specific projects, but these 
studies are costly and Likely to be rejected in developing countries 
where natural goods seem abundant and manufactured goods are scarce. 
PERCEPTION AND CHOICE 
A major difficulty confronting the conservationist is to get decision-
makers to perceive the economic value of organisms and processes which 
Literally cannot be seen. A thing tends to be appreciated in direct 
proportion to the visibility of its utility. Nitrogen-fixing bacteria 
are Likely to be undervalued because they are invisible to the eye and 
their beneficent function is only remotely and imperfectly conceived. 
Their priority at the margin <where decisions are made) is therefore 
unrealistically Low, or completely unrecognized. 
There is no satisfactory way to determine which natural amenities have 
greatest utility, or the Level at which certain ecological processes 
must be maintained, since there is no standard unit of measurement. It 
is therefore necessary to rely on experience or the judgment of special-
ists. The decision-maker who has not Learned the value of trout fishing 
or nutrient cycling must Listen to the fisherman or the ecologist. 
This does not.solve the problem of valuation since information bits are 
not interchangeable or commensurable, Like monetary bits, and communi-
cation failures compound the difficulties in evaluating the reliability 
of the data. The fundamental problem facing the decision-maker 
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attempting to maximize social welfare is the difficulty in concept-
ualizing the value of dissimilar goods, services, or conditions in 
order to make meaningful comparisons permitting a rational choice among 
mutually exclusive alternatives. The danger inherent in this situation 
is that goods, services, and conditions which can be readily valued in 
terms of money will be inordinately favoured when trade-offs are made, 
and this will result in a general decline in welfare. 
To illustrate the difficulties involved in making such choices it may 
be useful to examine one particular problem, such as what level of 
wilderness to maintain. Krutilla has developed methods of evaluating 
trade-offs of wilderness benefits against benefits of specific develop-
ments <91-133) but these are not useful in developing countries where 
benefits associated with wilderness are not yet appreciated sufficiently 
to offset even trivial benefits from development. By the time natural 
amenities come to assume values equivalent to those of consumer commo-
dities, the environmental resources necessary to their provision may 
well have been destroyed. The question here is how much importance 
can be attached to present value structures which are based on temporally 
limited perceptions and habituation patterns. The point is that the 
value of a resource is associated with the perceptions of the user rather 
than external criteria, but perceptions may be faulty or can change over 
time as conditions change: what is considered a dismal swamp today may 
be considered a high quality wilderness tomorrow. 
Thevalue of wilderness can thus range from near-zero to near-invaluable, 
depending upon ever-shifting circumstances which alter man's condition 
and therefore his relation to wilderness. Wilderness may appear for-
bidding and empty to a starving savage who has little appreciation of 
aesthetic matters Cor little need for adventure and contemplation), but 
his descendents may feel differently (and have different needs). It 
is not really wilderness itself, but the satisfactions it makes possible 
which can be said to have value, and man's perception of its utility is 
wholly determined by the nature of his relationship to it and all other 
aspects of his environment. There are certain sights, sounds, and 
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other experiences which have no counterparts outside wilderness. These 
will, in time, possibly lead to an increased appreciation of wilderness 
in presently underdeveloped countries, stemming from a fundamentally 
different relationship (when wilderness is no Longer a threat, or the 
prevailing condition). 
However there are other possibilities. Perhaps in the process of 
development, wilderness will become so diminished or vitiated that it 
will Lose its value. Or perhaps future generations will become so 
thoroughly urbanized and their value systems so altered that the 
wilderness will not hold any attractions or provide any satisfactions. 
Some conservation economists seem to assume that tastes and preferences 
will change in favour of natural amenities due to the "Learn-by-doing 
phenomenon" (as evidenced by the recent surge of interest in camping and 
back-packing in more affluent countries), and that the bequest motiva-
tion will increase as natural amenities decrease, (88-783) but this 
ignores the possible effects of congestion and insulation from natural 
influences. 
There is a propensity among conservation economists to equate rarity 
with scarcity, and this can Lead to erroneous assumptions and Lull the 
conservationist into a false sense of security that wilderness will be 
preserved. For example Baden assumes that because natural amenities-
are becoming more rare, their value must increase: he suggests that as 
a country becomes increasingly wealthy and accumulates an even greater 
volume of "stuff", the value of an additional unit of "stuff" declines. 
Concurrently, natural amenities are more rare and, hence, more valuable. 
(10-243) This is a fundamental error - rarity has nothing to do with 
value. Scarcity implies value because the term suggests something is 
in short supply, and therefore presumably is being sought for some 
purpose, and hence has value. We do not value the smallpox virus, 
although it is exceedingly rare, just as the rarity of the snail darter 
says nothing about its value (and perhaps the environmental movement 
is Losing credibility by going to exaggerated Lengths in attaching value 




well become both more rare and less valuable at the same time. Valua~ 
tion is in the mind of the beholder, and it seems quite possible that 
future generations may become so completely divorced from natural 
influences as to lose all respect and appreciation for natural phenomena. 
In this case, natural goods might be rare but not scarce, and the quality 
of life may be substantially impaired but th~s fact might.remain 
unnoticed. 
AN APPROACH TO VALUATION 
The decision-maker is thus in a bit of a quandry. He must consider the 
welfare of future as well as present generations, and he cannot trust 
the value judgments of either. Perhaps conventional methods for 
estimating value and making trade-offs are spurious, and the decision-
maker should not give them much credence, but rather come to an informed 
value judgment based on a careful reading of history and literature, and 
an examination of the findings of the social sciences. A comprehensive, 
interdisciplinary approach - with particular emphasis on the evidence 
provided by the past <the experiences and intuitions of our more perspi-
cacious ancestors) - may prove far superior to the incremental, ad hoc 
approach, no matter how impressive the latter's number-crunching, or how 
neat and tidy the results. 
It would seem desirable to integrate economic concepts with ecological, 
ethical, and philosophical concepts, and perhaps the first step should 
consist of comparing the various meanings of the term "value". 
Economic values in their first intent are quantities of money, while 
ethical or human values are qualities of Life. (99-41) There are some 
types of ecological, ethical, and philosophical goods which have such 
high social value that if they were priced, the consumer surplus could 
not be defined. It is possible for a demand curve to become infinitely 
steep, and at that point the supply of the good is minimal by any 
criteria. For some goods, like water, it is relatively easy to define 
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this point. For others, like natural ecosystems, it may be beyond our 
competence. But it is important to remember that at some point, the 
normal (economic) meaning of value is transcended, and value comparisons 
with any number of other goods becomes m~aningless (as when a kingdom 
is gladly traded for a horse or diamonds for a glass of water). 
Economic analysis seems incapable of dealing with such sharp discontin-
uities in valuation because the focus is on man's works, and the works 
of nature (where these singularities commonly occur) are generally taken 
for granted. Nature appears, from the economist's limited perspective, 
as a cornucopia overflowing with energy and materials. The underlying 
network of supporting life processes, and the spiritual, aesthetic, and 
ethical values associated with natural goods, often remain unseen and 
unvalued. 
When the ecologist sits down to enumerate the valuable functions of the 
natural environment he tends to compile a long list. However he 
cannot simply hand this list to the economist as a guide for making 
decisions at the margin because the functions are not quantified and 
there is no way to determine the exact contribution of any one good. A 
natural ecosystem is clearly limited in value, but the whole is more 
than the sum of its parts and one ecosystem may have greater value than 
is apparent. Unfortunately there is no mechanism for apportioning the 
value of the whole to the component parts, and the greater good can be 
eroded away in a series of cost-benefit analyses. It is important to 
remember the interconnected nature of ecological systems (and the fact 
that individual services are almost certain to be undervalued) when one 
compares costs and benefits and attempts to determine the ultimate 
social value of a project. There are always unseen costs, since it is 
not possible to identify some functions of nature until they are Lost, 
and some Losses are felt only after some time (or only when losses 
cumulate>. Once lost, many natural goods cannot be replaced or their 
loss compensated because only nature can provide them and this takes 
time <which may not be available). 
Past experience, when nature was relatively abundant, is not an appropriate 
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guide for today's decisions. The demand for natural goods appears to 
be increasing while the supply is decreasing. Some goods may be quite 
scarce on a global level, but still abundant on the national level 
<where they are treated as free goods, with unregulated use>. Economic 
analyses should take the broadest and longest view, and provide ample 
margin for unknown values and cumulative effects. 
The concept of value should not be limited to the degree of utility 
obtainable. There should be some mechanism for valuing goods which 
ensures that those which are useful but fragile (or can be easily 
exhausted) receive a much higher valuation than those which are hardy 
or can be readily renewed or replenished. Many useful natural goods 
are unique and irreplaceable these characteristics should be considered 
to greatly enhance their value (in addition to any other considerations). 
The concept of irreversibility is important to valuation because demand 
may become infinite as a good becomes unavailable. If this is foreseen, 
use of alternative goods at higher costs can be accepted so that supply 
of the good will not be reduced to this point. 
While many natural goods cannot be recovered once lost, some damaged 
natural systems can be repaired and put back in their original condition, 
or ways can be found to compensate for some of their lost functions. 
Dohan suggests shadow prices may be determined for ''the public service 
benefits'' of natural ecosystems by using the concept of public oppot-
tunity costs. This involves calculating present and anticipated 
expenditures to replace or recover public-service functions once provided 
by natural ecosystems. <46-161> The Loss of benefits in moving to a 
situation of lower environmental quality is added to the extra costs of 
economic resources to maintain the Lower state of environmental quality. 
It is interesting to note that the shift of the cost curve results in a 
new optimum Level of environmental quality, so that there remains a , 
permanent penalty to be paid for forfeiting the original benefits. 
This Lower level is optimal in the sense that under the new circumstances 
no other Level could now yield Larger net benefits - but of course the 
new Level of environmental quality is a Less satisfactory Level. This 
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procedure therefore gives some indication of t.he costs of losing natural 
goods in monetary terms, and demonstrates that trading natural goods for 
a few million dollars is not always economically sound. 
Dohan suggests that it is futile to go further and attempt to assign 
monetary values to benefits that are distantly related to economic 
aspects of Life and without close economic substitutes. (46-163) How-
ever he stresses that nonmonetlzable benefits and costs should be boldly 
Listed along with the monetizable benefits and costs. C46-f64) There 
are enormous difficulties in giving an accurate impression of the extent 
of such costs and benefits due to (1) uncertainties Cone cannot even 
roughly predict many consequences, particularly second and third order 
interactions) and (2) ambiguities in communication C in the absence of a 
Language of quantification, one must rely on imprecise and potentially 
misleading terms). For example, nebulous values such as option demand, 
non-participant demand, and bequest demand should be included in cost-
benef it calculations, although it is not clear to what extent these 
contribute to welfare or how one can estimate welfare Loss in terms of 
these values when natural areas are altered. The danger is that the 
nonmonetizable costs of Losing natural goods will be clouded in confusion 
and systematically underestimated, while the monetized benefits of a 
development project are more Likely to be clearly perceived and fully 
recorded. Undertaking a cost-benefit analysis which seeks to estimate 
the quantities and probabilities of~ values, not just marketable ones, 
is a daunting task. However this is no reason to abandon such an 
approach in favour of conventional cost-benefit analysis. Taking 
refuge in the simplicity of numbers provides no escape from the com-
plexities of reality. 
WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND COMPENSATION 
ALL attempts to price unmarketable goods are unsatisfactory because 
' • 
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informed value judgments are thereby distorted. Exchange values simply 
cannot be determined for use values, and so attempts to define the 
consumer surplus cannot be achieved by simulating an equilibrium market 
price, Some economists maintain that exchange values can be approxi-
mated since consumers reveal (or can be made to reveal) their willingness 
to pay for diffuse public goods in various ways. The reasoning is that 
people would be willing to pay for these goods if there was a market for 
them, and that this willingness to pay can be estimated by various 
techniques. In fact, it is posited that as alternative supplies of the 
good are reduced, the willingness to pay may increase to the point where 
private markets will emerge (as the cost of setting up a market becomes 
feasible). Some economists have even suggested that valuation and 
allocation problems might best be resolved by distributing property 
rights to nature, but it is difficult to see how (and by what criterion) 
all natural goods could be distributed, or how definition and enforcement 
problems could be resolved. ( 133-68; 91-33) 
Willingness to pay can be estimated directly or indirectly. A person 
can be interviewed with the object of determining the maximum.price he 
would pay to avoid being deprived of some good,or the costs which he 
incurs to experience some benefit can be measured (the presumption being 
that the benefits are equal or superior to these costs). However such 
interviews produce spurious results (for several reasons) and cost 
estimates can grossly understate the benefits. It is difficult to 
persuade people to reveal their preferences, which may be unfathomable 
even to themselves, and people are often observed to say one thing and 
do another. The cost estimate approach can be somewhat improved by 
asking how much an individual's costs would have to increase before he 
would forgo the item in question, but this is still a very arbitrary 
calculation. And in fact perhaps the most sensible answer to an 
inquiry as to what constitutes the maximum price that can be attached to 
a wilderness experience, for example, is that it is priceless (in the 
original sense of the term): it is worth any amount, from nothing to 
everything, depending on circumstances. If a price is put on wilderness 
(such as a use feel it might suddenly Lose all value. (Whether a woman 
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offers her affections or charges a price can greatly affect the value of 
the experience. Any theoretical price for Love is purely arbitrary 
and meaningless.) The "cost" of pricing may thus be exceedingly great. 
It might not be so surprising if an old outdoorsman indicates a Low 
willingness to pay for fishing his favourite stream. This may only 
mean that paying would ruin the experience. In fact, those who feel 
most strongly about this (which usually includes those who value the 
resource the greatest) are apt to indicate a Low willingness to pay. 
The object of the exercise is thus defeated (unless we are willing to 
invert the analysis, and consider the Lowest price to indicate the 
highest valuation). 
Willingness to pay estimates are further complicated by the inability 
to perceive the past or future utility of a good. This means that the 
potential utility of a good (which may be far greater than its apparent 
present utility) is completely ignored. It may be more profitable to 
investigate welfare functions of former users (through Literature and 
history) than to base decisions on the estimates of present (perhaps 
ignorant or incompetent) users. 
One of the problems with using willingness to pay measures of value is 
the bias stemming from a person's ability to pay. If a man is poor, 
he cannot attach a price corresponding to the true value of the good if 
that price exceeds his income. Even a rich man cannot put a price on 
a priceless good. Is it reasonable to bound valuation of higher order 
goods by income constraints? Such a procedure ensures inaccurate 
valuation. Perhaps willingness to sell would constitute a better 
measure of the value of such goods. Willingness to sell would give a 
maximum estimate of the value while willingness to pay would give a 
minimum estimate - the difference may be considerable, and the Level of 
environmental quality will be determined by which measure is used. As 
an illustration, if an individual is asked what he is willing to pay to 
save some wilderness area from destruction, his answer will vary greatly 
from the one he would give if asked what he is willing to accept to 
allow this wilderness to be destroyed. In the Latter case, assuming 
240 
wilderness is in short supply, there are likely to be some people who 
will put a very high premium on maintaining the wilderness while (given 
a certain level of general prosperity> the rest of society will put a 
comparatively small premium on the per capita share of benefits from 
exploitation. It is quite possible that the sum of exploitation benefits 
will not equal the sum of preservation benefits, in which case a poten-
tial Pareto improvement is not possible because those who gain from 
development could not compensate those who would lose. Since property 
rights in wilderness are not defined, the situation is ambiguous: 
potential losers may not be able to stop a wilderness development by 
their aggregate willingness to pay yet the developer may not be able to 
compensate the losers if the project is undertaken and still show a gain 
from the development. The question of who owns the goods of nature is 
therefore pivotal. If firms own the natural environment, households 
must be willing to pay for maintaining a given level of environmental 
quality; if households are the owners, firms must compensate households 
for any deterioration in environmental quality. The initial state of 
ownership determines whether a move to another situation is a Pareto 
improvement . 
It is suggested that households (or some surrogate, such as a central 
authority) rather than firms should be considered the rightful "owners" 
of natural goods on logical and ethical grounds. The household is the 
firm's ~cvl.6on d'e:tJi.e, and it is the individual as consumer which should 
be regarded as the ultimate economic entity. If individuals can be 
considered to have "certain inalienable rights" it is only reasonable to 
include the rights to environmental quality and certain essential 
products of nature among these. There are no logical or ethical grounds 
for distributing the property rights to nature among firms which are, 
after all, only specialized legal entities serving an economic function. 
Therefore the willingness to sell measure should become the criterion, 
and minimum compensatory payments should be calculated for projects which 
destroy or damage natural goods. Since cost-benefit analysis is 
concerned with potential Pareto improvement, assessments should be based 
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on estimates of the compensating variation, which Mishan defines as the 
sum of money which, if received or paid after the economic change in 
question, would make the individual no better or worse off than before 
the change. (109-391) If the compensating variation of gainers ex-
ceeds that of losers, there is a potential Pareto improvement - sufferers 
must be (potentially) compensated for loss of welfare, after which there 
must be benefits remaining to provide a net gain. In the case of large 
potential loss to a few people (as when highly-valued natural goods are 
destroyed) it may prove impossible to compensate the victims and still 
show a net gain, particularly if the benefits to the remainder of society 
are relatively trivial and if the change is under conditions of certainty. 
While still imperfect, the compensation principle might be the best way 
to bridge the gap between exchange values and use values. Though 
prices would still be inferred, higher goods are less likely to be 
undervalued in a trade-off with priced goods. Being unconstrained by 
income, natural goods will be traded more in accordance with one's 
perception of their true use value. Where this becomes infinitely 
large, development should not proceed. If more pressing needs subse-
quently come to the fore, development can resume. 
There are still some serious conceptual problems with this method of 
calculating trade-offs, and these might invalidate all the sophisticated 
sampling techniques, careful data collection, and advanced statistical 
analyses used in such an approach. The whole mathematical edifice 
rests upon a very fragile complex of assumptions: individual choices 
and behaviour concerning highly abstract goods are rational, amenable 
to direct scrutiny or introspection, and are comparable in monetary 
terms. This seems untenable. Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect 
individuals to arrive, after a few minutes (or even hours) of thought, 
at a value for higher order goods, as if this procedure could be equated 
with choosing between various cuts of meat, or setting an upper Limit 
on the price of a stick of biltong. Individuals may not be competent 
to determine any price for higher order goods. It may be just as well 
to let informed decision-makers calculate the compensation variation 
utilizing other sources and techniques. 
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THE SHADOW PROJECT CONCEPT 
The shadow project concept has strong advantages over the compensation 
principle for cost-benefit analysis. It is based on the assumption 
that nature must not be degraded any further and any proposed project 
must be accompanied by a "shadow project" to ensure no Loss in environ-
mental quality. The cost-benefit analysis need not be concerned with 
the incalculable values of natural goods, and is Largely freed from 
the difficult task of foreseeing what impacts will result (and estimating 
their costs), but need only be concerned with the monetary costs to 
maintain the environment as it is now. The concept of replacement 
value clearly reduces the problem of converting use values to exchange 
values, as many non-quantifiable effects are avoided. 
The shadow project concept follows Logically from investing all indivi-
duals with rights in the products of nature, and is analagous to con-
cepts for solving pollution problems, wherein a producer is required 
to pay for the use of public goods. Developers would have to pay for 
all the externalities they impose - they have no "rights" to damage or 
exhaust nature, and must therefore either internalize the externality, 
obtain aid, or cancel the project. 
Stone has suggested that the objectives of welfare e~onomics would be 
furthered if natural objects were themselves given Legal rights. Legal 
disputes would then involve consideration of the full environmental 
costs to society rather than the partial costs now borne by Litigants: 
we in effect make the natural object, through its guardian, a jural 
entity competent to gather up fragmented and otherwise unrepresented 
damage claims, and press them before the court. ( 140-28) These would 
include nonmonetizable damages and have the effect of institutionalizing 
their value - it would make the violation of rights a cost by declaring 
the "pirating" of them to be the invasion of a property interest. 
Stone feels that wherever it carves out "property" rights, the Legal 
system is engaged in the process of creating monetary worth. ( 140-29) 
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The obvious difficulty with this approach is the high cost of imple-
menting the shadow project. For developing countries such costs are 
not likely to be acceptable, but perhaps developed countries will be 
prepared to partially defray these costs in the for~ of aid because, 
taking a global perspective, they may feel that natural goods are 
already in short supply and their demand for these goods might warrant 
such expenditures. 
Shadow projects are not likely to be accepted in a world of increasing 
want ruled by short-term political expediency.· Decision-makers must 
be unusually long-sighted to accept such costs or insist that developers 
cannot use up natural goods without paying for them. In addition, 
shadow projects are limited in scope. Natural amenities will be lost 
with any development, and many cannot be replaced or their loss compen-
sated because only nature can provide them (and we may not even know 
what they are until we feel the effects of their absence). The best 
shadow projects would avoid as much damage as possible (and not just 
restore damaged areas, or pay for their destruction), but the high cost 
could be perceived to be totally unrealistic. In addition, the 
structure of relative prices today may bear Little relation to those 
of the future. Shadow prices are Likely to shift upwards as future 
scarcities become more severe. Should these be anticipated? This 
would only increase the costs (and decrease the Likelihood) of implement-
ing shadow projects. 
Other attempts to determine values for natural goods include the 
functional component approach and the energetic valuation procedure. 
(114-5, 7) These involve assessments of natural functions and primary 
production respectively, and attempt to relate these to monetary 
values. It is doubtful whether decision-makers will accept the premises 
on which such calculations are based, although these exercises serve to 
give a more thorough understanding of the kinds of values natural goods 
have. Unfortunately, most decisions affecting natural goods still 
tend to be based on highly questionable comparisons with economic goods 
whose current monetary values derive Largely from fortuitous and 
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transitory conditions. The guidance value of such judgments is 
nullified by the inability of "man the consumer" to make decisions 
which will improve social welfare. 
THE COMPETENCE OF "MAN THE CONSUMER" 
Rationality and Competence 
According to Seneca and Tausig, sustained economic growth is necessary 
to solve the basic economic problem of man - scarcity. <133-347) But 
to what extent should specific needs and desires be satisfied? At what 
point does satisfaction and gratification become satiation and glut? 
It is easy to get fixated at a Low Level in the hierarchy of needs. If 
fixation is on material needs, the result is materialism. 
is on the social needs, the result is egotism. (99-14> 
If fixation 
Economic growth can be the cause of scarcity for some goods by creating 
a superfluity of other goods. Natural amenities are becoming scarce 
partly because of growing materialism. Consumers are choosing material 
goods at the cost of foregone natural goods. The question is, are 
consumers competent to make these trade-offs; are their decisions Likely 
to improve their welfare? Keynes regarded economic growth as a way 
to free man of material wants so that man could realize his higher 
potential - not as a good in itself, but rather as a prerequisite for the 
good Life. Keynes felt that materialism would die an unmourned 
death. (133-347> The evidence to date does not support this view. 
Leopold said the ultimate issue, in conservation as in other social 
problems, is whether the mass-mind wants to extend its powers of compre-
hending the world in which it Lives, or, granted the desire, has the 
capacity to do so. <95-55) Most men have not had sufficient exposure 
to ecological realities to accurately judge their significance: 
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There are two spiritual dangers in not owning 
a farm. One is the danger of supposing that 
breakfast comes from the grocery, and the other 
that heat comes from the furnace. (94-6) 
Urbanized man is poorly placed to perceive his ultimate relation to the 
natural environment, or recognize the potential of natural amenities to 
satisfy his higher needs. One cannot readily appreciate what one has 
not experienced. 
Welfare economics and democratic political theory are both based on a 
value judgment: that the personal wants of the individuals in the 
society should guide the use of society's resources. (84-19) This 
judgment is of the most profound significance since some wants may be 
insatiable and ultimately destructive of goods which are necessary to 
satisfying higher needs. Individuals are said to behave rationally 
when they purposefully attempt to maximize their economic welfare by 
searching for the largest and best collection of consumption goods and 
services they can afford. ( 133-51) However, rational individuals are 
not necessarily competent to discern which goods and services would 
maximize their welfare because they may lack information or experience. 
Tastes and preferences are shaped by complex processes, and the source 
of consumer wants is not subject to direct scrutiny or introspection. 
Information is costly, and consumers may regard the costs of additional 
information as being greater than the potential benefits. 
The problem of consumer competence is not simply one of unscrupulous 
producers moulding the desires of gullible consumers. The problem is 
far more insidious and intractable. What happens is that the consumer 
proceeds, by a series of reasonable steps, to occupy an unreasonable 
position. Rational, self-serving actions ~an lead ultimately to an 
irrational, self-damaging result. The consumer may be competent to 
make decisions to maximize present welfare, and remain incompetent to 
make long-term, orchestrated decisions to maximize future welfare -
he may be able to stay near the centre of the road, but not able to 
choose the right road. 
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For example, advances in technology lead to the introduction of new 
products which may bear hidden, long-term costs. The consumer's 
evaluation is likely to take cognizance only of immediate monetary and 
opportunity costs. Long-term, intangible opportunity costs, and 
cumulative or synergistic costs, tend to remain unperceived or under-
estimated. Benefits, on the other hand, may depreciate in time. 
When a consumer buys a television set, the novelty value is particular-
ly high at the time the decision is made, but in time this fades. 
Opportunity costs - such as for~one exercise, sleep, family activities, 
etc. - may soon outweigh the entertainment benefits, but these costs 
may remain unperceived. 
Difficulties are compounded when future generations are considered, 
The decisions of present consumers affect the options and well-being of 
future consumers whose tastes and preferences are not taken into account. 
The calculation of discount rates is almost wholly arbitrary and reflects 
present biases. There is a need to apply some systematic method for 
determining worthy goals, and consumer decisions should not be regarded 
as a reliable guide to maximizing welfare. 
Greed and Shortsightedness 
The major sources of our ecological disasters -
apart from ignorance - are greed and short-
sightedness .•. money-making is the rational norm 
in comparison with which all other pursuits are 
irrational and abnormal. <121-20) 
Individuals seek to maximize their own personal welfare over short time 
horizons. Since gross material satisfactions appear to have obvious 
welfare-enhancing value, and since today is more important than tomorrow, 
the pursuit of monetary wealth and the creation of economic goods seems 
rational even if common 
systems are impaired. 
processes is likely to 
pool resources are destroyed and life-support 
The value of natural amenities and ecological 
be unperceived or disregarded by most people, 
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Mishan has developed a procedure for evaluating the welfare effect of 
risk to life which involves aggregating the valuation of each member 
of society, but points out the great difficulty in arriving at indivi-
dual values since people are generally ignorant of the degree or 
meaning of risk. (109-318) It is therefore highly unlikely that indi-
viduals can competently assess the significance or value of far more 
subtle losses in welfare arising from more complex variables. Fischer 
points out that willingness .to pay measurements may be grossly dis-
torted by advertising and other propaganda designed to manipulate 
preferences away from a "natural" environment and toward an environment 
characterized by consumer goods. (58-99) Results of attempts to 
measure willingness to pay will vary according to a wide variety of 
circumstances unrelated to the true value of the goods to the user. 
Consumers do not have stable preferences, are not able to assess 
relative preferences accurately, and do not clearly perceive how the 
loss of natural goods affects welfare. 
Spiritual and aesthetic values generally seem to compare unfavourably 
with material values. Part of the problem is the difficulty in making 
such comparisons; since spiritual and aesthetic satisfactions cannot 
be expressed in monetary terms, the proponents of such values often 
say they are "priceless" and dismiss any comparison with "base" material 
goods. It might be well to stress the ultimate relation of money to 
all classes of benefits rather than to simply argue that some cannot 
be priced, in order to dramatize the callousness of many real 
decisions. For example, people often accept the loss of natural 
amenities, or separation from family, to take a job which offers only 
a slightly bigger pay packet. It would perhaps be a useful exercise 
to carefully evaluate the benefits of the extra money in relation to the 
foregone opportunity costs of specific "priceless" goods rather than to 
simply say the latter is incalculable. Few people actually go through 
such an exercise, and therefore grossly underestimate the value of lost 
natural or social amenities traded for a few trivial comforts. This 
irrational behaviour is due to faulty perception and an arbitrary 
approach to decisions. 
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Levels of Perception 
Modern man perceives his role as a consumer of man-made goods much more-
readily than he does his role as a consumer of nature's goods. Mishan 
points out that people willingly give up their choice to experience the 
goods of nature as if it were unavoidable, but may be expected to take 
great exception if trivial consumer commodities should be withdrawn 
from production. ( 109~128) Beckerman exemplifies this disparity in 
perception when he ridicules efforts to conserve tigers, salmon, and 
oysters because they make a negligible contribution to the welfare of 
the average person. (18-112) Beckerman has a more prosaic notion of 
utility, and measures welfare in strictly economic terms. This 
perspective is too narrow; it is necessary to consider the value of 
beauty and wonder in wild things, and adopt a holistic outlook to per-
ceive emergent values when things are taken together. Such higher 
spiritual and aesthetic values exist, and can be demonstrated empirically. 
For example, Litton and Craik have identified objective "factors of 
recognition" for Landscape resources which are used to categorize 
"compositional types". Litton demonstrated that aesthetic perceptions 
can be analyzed and explained, and Craik confirmed objective criteria 
are valid by running comparative perception tests. This interesting 
collaboration between a Landscape architect and a psychologist revealed 
that people seem to agree on the effects and special values of 
specific Landscape phenomena. <90-265) 
Habituation and Sensuality 
Urbanized people often display an irrational fear of nature, and feel no 
empathy with natural or wild surroundings. As the proportion of urban 
to rural population grows, attitudes toward natural goods may become 
increasingly indifferent, disparaging, or even hostile. Man is 
becoming habituated to unnatural environments, and Losing his sensitivity 
to natural influences. This constitutes a most insidious, positive 
feedback process which could be reducing the quality of Life. The 
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aesthetic and spiritual benefits of regarding awe-inspiring natural 
beauty in solitude and silence may be Lost to experience, and the Loss 
may go unnoticed and unmourned. If decision-makers were to follow 
popular preferences, fewer and fewer natural areas would be maintained. 
Even seriously degraded environments seem to eventually become acceptable. 
Disinterest is all too common among the very people who Live amidst the 
ugliness of industrial wastelands: they are resigned to it, and they 
are unprepared to pay for rehabilitation. (14-153) When environmental 
. I 
quality is Lost, people become insensitive to their surroundings and 
are not prepared to pay for restoration because they have forgotten (or 
perhaps never knew) the pleasures of a quality environment; it is 
important to prevent the erosion of environmental quality, because Losses 
are Likely to be permanent. 
Passmore says sensuality is necessary to ecological concern, that rising 
totally above sensuousness is utterly destructive of man-nature relation-
ships. <121-21) But how does one restore sensuality to industrialized 
man, or to inhabitants of degraded Landscapes and members of impover-
ished societies? Man the consumer has been too malleable to psycho-
logically destructive forces, and has Lost his sensibilities. He cannot 
be regarded as a competent judge, or an effective agent in his own 
salvation. 
Joseph Wood Krutch has said: 
Perhaps when the time comes that there is no more 
silence and no more aloneness, there will also be 
no Longer anyone who wants to be alone ... inevitably 
the desire for a thing must disappear when it has 
become no Longer attainable. <87-36) 
Lamont Cole wonders whether we are selecting for genetic types only those 
who can satisfy their aesthetic needs in congested cities, <6-43) and 
Kenneth Allsop believes that a new race of "de-natured" men will emerge 
and our concepts of quality and beauty and harmony will be obsolescent 
and doomed to extinction. <3-xiv) 
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Beckerman mentions the enormous practical and conceptual problems 
involved in actually estimatin.g the value people would attach to an im-. . 
proved environment, but then disregards the lmplications of these 
problems. (18-29) Economic welfare may bear Little relation to total 
welfare, and it is possible that improvements in economic welfare can 
sometimes reduce total welfare. The notion of "consumer sovereignty", 
which is central to the Logic of welfare economics, may be a dangerously 
misleading concept. People may not be good judges of the value of main-
taining environmental quality relative to the value of other goods. 
Personal and Collective Risk 
Little is known about how perceptions of hazard, particularly indirect 
hazards such as those associated with ecosystem damage, affect behaviour. 
Crucial knowledge is Lacking of the processes that Link publication and 
dissemination of information and individual and public actions. (150-54) 
Lord Ashby has commented on the importance of risk-taking attitudes: 
unless these are understood, politicians will not be able to restrain 
pressure for short term benefits at the expense of Long term welfare of 
the environment. (8-9) Ashby's incisive analysis of public attitudes 
toward hazard suggests: 
These attitudes are a function of three main 
variables: Ca) the frequency with which a hazard, 
or a nuisance, or a disamenity is Likely to occur; 
Cb) the number of people who are simultaneously 
affected by the e~ent; and Ccl the propinquity of 
the event. Thus 7000 people killed over a year is 
not regarded as a problem calling for urgent 
national enquiry. But 70 people killed at one 
moment in a plane crash or a railway accident, pro-
vided it is in one's own area, is a terrible tragedy ... 
(8-9) 
If political response to hazard is determined by public attitudes, there 
will be insufficient attention paid to remote or uncertain hazards. 
People do not seem ready to assign resource values on the basis of Long-
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term considerations or mere statistical probabilities of danger. <54-651) 
Uncertainty is the key difficulty - people accept risks because (1) 
they are not fully aware of the potential costs, and (2) they expect to 
avoid these costs. If the welfare economist accepts such faulty con-
sumer assessments as a guide to decisions, the decisions will be faulty. 
In seeking a Pareto improvement, the economist engaged in allocative 
studies traditionally follows the practice of evaluating all social gains 
and losses solely on the basis of individuals' own evaluations of the 
relevant effects on their welfare, given the information they have at the 
time the decision is taken. (109-318) The problem is that the mass of 
men may be grossly uninformed as to what will contribute to the general 
welfare; if all members of the public knew the outcome of a risky 
decision before it was taken, those who would suffer by that decision 
could not always be compensated by those who would benefit. 
In addition to the problem of uncertainty, there is the problem of limited 
interest. Hardin stresses that freedom to pursue individual self-
interest inevitably leads to tragedy in a finite world: individuals 
solely concerned with maximizing their own welfare will ultimately destroy 
the source of general welfare. <65-52) The decision-maker cannot base 
his decisions on the limited perspective of materialistic individuals. 
What is needed is a unitary and harmonious world view as an intermediary 
to ensure collective survival. (55-192) This suggests the need for 
institutional solutions. 
Need for Imposing Standards 
Man is not a wholly rational animal and those who believe in the omni-
potence of human reason and learning should be aware that man's control 
over his impulses is apparently very limited; man's emotional and 
instinctive drives are not always subject to reason and must be checked by 
institutional or culturally-conditioned systems. (98-35) It is 
necessary for decision-makers to lead and direct, rather than acquiese 
and submit to public demands which entail great ecological risks. The 
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principal obstacles to the solution of ecological problems are in fact 
political, to persuade or coerce citizens into actions. (120-57) 
Stone feels that education alone is not likely to be effective in pro-
tecting the environment. There are an increasing number of humans, with 
increasing wants, and there has been an increasing technology to satisfy 
them at "cost" to the rest of nature. Thus, we ought not to place too 
much hope that a changed environmental consciousness will in and of 
itself reverse present trends. <140-47) Consumer competence is limited 
by poor information, lack of foresight, inadequate ability to reason, and 
the problem of the commons. Thus a consumer need be not only ecologically 
informed but also compelled to make decisions collectively in the proper 
institutional framework. <46-138) 
To sum up, consumer decisions affecting natural goods (which are common 
pool resources) cannot be trusted to improve general welfare for two 
reasons. First, consumers have short time horizons and are incorrigably 
biased in favour of personal satisfactions immediately obtainable. 
Second, even if consumers are persuaded to consider the general good, 
individuals lack information on the benefits of natural goods and cannot 
estimate their value, so there is no rational basis for making incremental 
decisions. Competing man-made goods have obvious and measurable utility, 
so that marginal decisions will always favour these. This "market 
advantage" Leads to cumulative effects which will reduce the quality of 
Life and increase the risk to survival. There are thus insidious 
mechanisms in the consumer's decision-making process which tend to drive 
natural goods to exhaustion. There is no point where the most en-
L ightened and best-intentioned consumer will freely choose to forgo 
material goods for his exclusive consumption to make available more 
natural goods for general consumption. It is therefore necessary to 
establish institutional mechanisms to control the trade-off between 
natural and man-made goods so that some balance can be maintained. 
This involves making objective, informed value judgments as to the Level 
of natural goods necessary to provide for future quality of Life object-
ives with Low risk to survival. Due to the generally Low Level of 
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ecological understanding, it may initially be necessary to set rather 
high standards for maintaining natural goods and this will require con-
siderable political courage, will, and wisdom. 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Many development projects which damage or exhaust natural amenities appear 
economic because they are heavily subsidized - examples include prefer-
ential tax treatment, understatement of capital costs for public projects, 
and deficit sales of natural resources. The'true costs are thus hidden 
by fiscal mechanisms as well as a failure to consider environmental degra-
dation, so the developer is able to justify a project by shifting two 
typesofcosts onto the public. It is the task of the cost-benefit 
analyst to correct these anomalies. Krutilla has suggested that an 
examination of hidden subsidies often reveals that the net value of an 
apparently profitable development plan is in fact negative. If it re-
mains positive however, then some account can be taken of environmental 
opportunity costs; or, since this is a daunting task, one could at Least 
state how large these must be to quash the development. <91-91) 
Cost-benefit analysis is concerned with identifying and measuring social 
benefits and opportunity costs arising from alternative proposed actions, 
and then determining whether one alternative is preferable to another by 
virtue of an excess of benefits over costs. Conventional cost-benefit 
analysis is Limited to consideration of economic values because these 
can be expressed in monetary terms and added together algebraically. 
Natural ecosystems clearly contribute to man's economic well-being but, 
due to their "public goods" nature, market values cannot be established. 
A cost-benefit analysis is properly concerned with all changes in man's 
economic well-being resulting from the alternative actions, including 
external effects. Since the market ignores some values and distorts 
' 
others, an important objective in cost-benefit analysis is to provide 
I 
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correct estimates of all economic effects on social well-being. This 
would include the effects of pollution <which have been widely recognized 
in recent years) and the effects of eradication <which have been 
generally ignored, largely due to the difficulties in perceiving, mea-
suring, and monetizing these effects). 
Cost-benefit analysis depends on clearly defined alternatives and the 
existence of a welfare function which permits quantification of the 
alternatives. The rationale behind this approach is that monetary 
measures correctly specify the relative contributions to welfare made by 
diverse and otherwise completely incommensurable goods, services, and 
conditions. The procedure is to list all consequences of each alter-
native and then estimate the benefits and costs of each consequence. 
The problem is that information for identifying, quantifying, and assign-
ing money values to these benefits and costs is insufficient and the 
estimates are therefore inaccurate. Some er i ter i a will fail to be con-
sidered (because their significance is not foreseen), the measurement of 
others will be based on guesswork, and money valuations are likely to 
change rapidly over time due to changing circumstances. 
These failures are likely to be most pronounced for benefits and costs 
resulting from maintaining or destroying natural ecosystems and processes 
because of the complex and abstract nature of these gobds. The problem 
of measuring such benefits and costs appears to be insoluble. The 
optimum trade-off of natural goods for other goods could be determined 
if the value of a marginal unit of resource destruction could be mea-
sured but man does not have sufficient knowledge to do this. Attempts 
to calculate a partial equilibrium solution are impractical since the 
Loss of one area will have some effect on neighbouring areas. Dohan 
has pointed out that the economic criteria of cost-benefit analysis is 
assymetrical - it may be used to reject a project proposal, but can never 
be conclusive about a project's acceptability. <46-166) Acceptance 
depends on the satisfaction of other social criteria. 
The cost-benefit analysis approach thus has serious Limitations. It is 
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important to stress that a single inde~, no matter how methodically and 
carefully calculated, cannot provide an adequate appraisal of alter-
natives. Ultimately one must trust to value judgments not amenable 
to complex mathematical treatment. There is nothing magic about the 
numbers in cost-benefit analysis, and the economist has no greater claim 
to rationality or objectivity than the sociologist who may in fact be 
better able to discern the true nature and extent of the welfare con-
flicts involved. 
In practice, conventional cost-benefit analysis can hardly be divorced 
from its bias favouring commercial undertakings - the entire approach is 
based on assumptions regarding the crucial importance of economic welfare. 
Other judgments are not incorporated into the formula (such as the speci-
fication of environmental quality objectives and equity objectives) 
which may be more meaningful to total social welfare. There is an 
unfortunate propensity among decision-makers to consider efficiency 
objectives as being of paramount importance, and to accept cost-benefit 
analysis as conclusive (at least on the individual project level). It 
can be argued that the efficiency objective is a false goal if its 
attainment results in an inefficient environment. The environment has 
been underpriced because the value of ecological and social factors are 
unknown and therefore ignored. If these cannot be reliably estimated, 
then cost-benefit analysis is not a reliable guide. The true objective 
of cost-benefit analysis should be to improve the decision-maker's per-
ception of the welfare effects of alternatives, and to this end more 
information is necessary on the value of the natural environment. 
Because cost-benefit analysis is concerned with producing quantitative 
results, many of the largely imponderable effects of urban and industrial 
developments are often ignored. Losses of biological entities and dis-
ruptions to ecological processes are seldom included in a project evalua-
tion, even though these directly affect man's health and spirits and 
contribute to the maintenance of socio-cultural assets. Outputs of 
easily measurable goods are therefore given undue emphasis, and results 
in what Mishan calls "horse and rabbit stew". <109-160) Mishan counsels 
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against attempts to quantify the unquantifiable, but would try to correct 
for gross distortions by stating clearly the
1 
area of ignorance, offering 
a range of guesses of the value of damage to be expected, and making 
contingency calculations to show how the net social benefits of a project 
can be offset by the spillovers. Mishan has also suggested constructing 
"social indicators" for socially desirable goods which are difficult to 
quantify - these could then serve as proxies to provide some index by 
which welfare changes could be measured. <109-406) 
Dohan agrees that one should not attempt to assign monetary values to 
benefits that are distantly related to economic aspects of Life. (46-163) 
Where possible he uses shadow prices to provide a minimum estimate of the 
economic value of certain natural functions which contribute to safety 
and environmental quality. However, due to the absence of. data on 
socially relevant output of ecosystems, it is not possible to accept as 
optimum the choice indicated by the cost-benefit analysis and so it is 
necessary to List and consider nonmonetized social benefits and costs. 
(46-165) 
Krutilla advocates a similar approach and suggests using a model which 
assesses a whole time path of irreversible investments. (91-40) If, 
as seems Likely for many public projects, the benefits of development 
decline over time relative to the environmental opportunity costs, the 
model should use a Low discount rate, which would favour preservation of 
environmental amenities. Alternatively, one could estimate what the 
initial year's preservation benefits would need to be in order that the 
present value of preservation is at Least equal to that of development. 
<91-125) 
Krutilla assumes that environmental amenities will remain positively 
income-elastic. Mishan agrees that the terms of trade as between manu-
factured goods and natural goods will tend to move increasingly in favour 
of the Latter. (109-290) He therefore suggests the cost-benefit 
analyst calculate the hypothetical rate of growth over time of the value 
of natural goods relative to manufacturers that would be necessary 
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to equalize the excess benefit of the two alternative projects. This 
calculation might be plausible enough to protect natural areas. 
Seneca and Tausig have said the cost-benefit framework is indispensable 
and enables economists to ask the ~ight questions even if they are 
not yet able to provide the correct answers. <133-20) This tool can 
strengthen environmental protection arguments beyond the weak "save our 
heritage'' appeal. Dohan says by using cost-benefit analysis we now know 
more precisely what the real trade-off is between net economic benefits 
and those many other elements that enter into man's well-being. <46-167) 
Even if the known costs and benefits are only enumerated, and attention 
is also drawn to potential costs and benefits, and the appropriate time 
periods involved for some of these costs and benefits, the analysis will 
be useful in making decisions. For instance, if a development project's 
schedule is recognized to be on a much different time scale than that of 
preservation of natural amenities, perhaps the quantification bias will 
be largely nullified. 
Decision-makers are advised to employ the cost-benefit concept in its 
most general sense. It is vitally important to take a broad view, to 
include intangibles and higher order interactions, and to assume a Long 
time horizon. The cost-benefit framework can be used for policy 
decisions as well as individual project decisions. It is perhaps at 
this most general level, where precise measures become subservient to 
directional questions, that the concept is most valuable and least sub-
ject to the quantification bias. 
A major difficulty, especially for more general studies, is to determine 
and evaluate future costs and benefits and compare them to today's. 
Several crucial assumptions are involved in this process, and the cost-
benefit analysis can be confounded by attempts to forecast the extent 
and value of future costs and benefits, and the preferences of future 
generations. There is a .natural intertemporal bias favouring the 
present and near-term and heavily discounting the long-term. This is 
rationalized by placing faith (unwarranted by recent developments) 
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in technology to provide for future needs. The problems of uncertain-
ty and irreversibility seem to have Little influence on the process of 
discounting. 
The striking thing about evaluating a future stream of costs and benefits 
is the arbitrariness of the assumptions on which one bases the analysis. 
It is possible (indeed Likely) to be out by an order of magnitude on 
forecasts, which completely invalidates the conclusion. The major 
sources of error are unforeseeable technological developments and socio-
psychological developments. Given this great uncertainty, perhaps the 
major consideration should be the value of risk-aversion. It is de-
sirable to cultivate a conservative cast of mind amongst decision-makers 
on matters which involve highly uncertain or potentially irreversible 
effects on the environment and on the supply and demand of amenities. 
The traditional cost-benefit approach is dangerous since irreversible 
actions can be justified. Ehrenfeld has pointed out that extinction of 
a biological resource can be economically superior to Long-term, sustained 
yield gains of the sort generated by intact marsh, provided that the 
prof its and the discount rate are each sufficiently high. (54-653) 
Many development projects impose effectively irreversible effects on the 
natural environment. When dealing with potentially irreversible actions, 
it is vitally important to carefully consider the role of uncertainty, 
the meaning of welfare, and the appropriateness of discounting. 
DISCOUNTING 
The rationale for discounting future costs and benefits is based on two 
phenomena: (1) the net productivity of capital, which is derived from 
r~sources that might otherwise have gone into present consumption but can 
be used to increase the resources that can be consumed in the future, 
and (2) the positive rate of time preference, which is based on the fact 
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that consumers prefer to consume a smaller amount now to a somewhat Larger 
amount Later. <46-157) Discounting seems reasonable when applied to 
the consumption of goods made possible by capital formation, or to the 
consumption pattern of a given individual. When applied to goods pro-
duced by nature, or to consumption by groups placed differently in time, 
the practice of discounting seems inappropriate. Since many natural 
goods are not subject to increases in the amounts available for con-
sumption (but only decreases) and since this means consumers cannot 
choose to consume a smaller amount today in preference to a Larger amount 
tomorrow, discounting should not apply to such natural goods. <The 
only justification for discounting would be if it were known that future 
preferences would shift away from these natural goods - this is not fore-
seeable.) 
Lloyd has said that the ordinary source of motives for economy is a 
foresight of the diminuation in the means of future enjoyment depending 
on each act of present expenditure. (97-9) Perhaps this outlook is an 
appropriate way of Looking at the future for any category of goods the 
present consumption of which is Likely to result in .future deprivation. 
Since the stock of natural goods cannot be augmented by the net product-
ivity of capital, but can certainly be diminished by present consumption, 
there would appear to be no prospect for consuming more Later and, 
instead, a very real prospect of having none to consume Later if the 
future is discounted. From the point of view of society in perpetuity, 
the positive rate of time preference does not apply because time is no 
Longer relevant: it is not Logical to say that consumption by earlier 
generations is to be preferred to that of Later generations. Only 
within an individual's span of time is it reasonable to prefer present 
to future consumption. 
The practice (or habit) of discounting causes man to systematically 
undervalue the products of nature and their future benefits. The net 
productivity of capital gives some incentive to invest in the future but 
this motive is assymetrical - it applies to man-made goods and not to 




tive rate of time preference. The result is t~at when evaluating a 
future stream of costs and benefits in a cost-benefit analysis there is 
an inherent incentive to produce man-made goods for the future but no 
incentive to provide natural goods for the future. While this may be 
rational for present generations, it does not·adequately consider the 
welfare of future generations. For society as a whole (present and 
future) time of consumption is irrelevant and the only consideration is 
whether a goad's value can be diminished by time or use. Natural goods 
~o not Lose their value in this way, while man-made goods ultimately do. 
It is therefore rational to discount the future for man-made commodities, 
since these have utility over short-time horizons <which affect only 
present individuals), but society should not consider present consumption 
of natural goods preferable to future consumption, and therefore should 
not discount this category of benefits. (Costs of lost natural goods 
should be discounted however - the cost of Losing such a resource is the 
value of that resource less administrative costs discounted into the 
indefinite future. (9-143) This could be a substantial amount.) Under 
the present practice of discounting, future generations may bear the costs 
of development but not share the benefits. Benefits from most projects 
tend not to persist or aggregate, but are consumed and discarded (or 
deteriorate), while costs to the environment tend to both persist and 
aggregate. If the socially relevant time horizon is beyond one genera-
tion, discounting would seem unacceptable. 
The fact that natural goods are .Provided free by nature, and are not the 
result of man's Labour, brings up the question of who has just claims on 
these goods. If it is granted that these goods have utility to any 
generation, and no generation has "earned" the right to abuse 6r destroy 
them, then the present generation has no valid claim, simply by virtue of 
its place in time, for discounting their future use. An object which 
cannot be improved by human Labour has a certain utility or use-value 
which is independent of considerations of time. Any generation's 
position in time is fortuitous and irrelevant to its appreciation of any 
good, service, or condition which enhances its well-being. Natural 
goods exist in stocks which cannot be expanded over time, and so their 
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supply can be regarded as having a static relationship wiH1 lirne. If 
time is regarded as a frozen continuum, then all experiences of well-
being conferred by natural goods take place in an "eternal present". 
There is no reason to prefer their being concentrated toward one end of 
the time scale and attenuated toward the other. 
On the other hand, the value of natural goods relative to man-made goods 
can be expected to change over time. Since time is unidirectional and 
the supply of natural goods can be reduced but not augmented, the relative 
value of natural goods might be expected to increase over time. As man-
made goods proliferate the relative value of natural goods could rapidly 
appreciate. This suggests that natural goods should have a zero or 
negative rate of discount and man-made goods a positive rate of discount. 
It is therefore suggested, on intergenerational efficiency grounds, that 
in cost-benefit analysis it is necessary to fully account for the effects 
of a project on all natural goods, and to determine economic values where 
possible, and to apply some rate of discount to irreversible costs and 
a zero rate of discount to benefits for natural goods. 
Garrett Hardin has calculated that at a discount rate of a half per cent 
his investment of one dollar in a redwood seedling will not pay because 
it takes 2000 years for the tree to mature and yield 14000 dollars in 
lumber. <70-75) But perhaps the investment may be considered worth-
while to society since the cost-bearer's time horizon is irrelevant and 
the benefit-receiver will have paid absolutely nothing. If one is sure 
to be excluded from the benefit, the positive rate of time preference 
does not apply and discounting is senseless because time is no Longer 
pertinent to the decision. If one is to receive a free benefit, dis-
counting is senseless since there was no cost incurred. From the point 
of view of society, .if one considers the Long time span involved, the 
connection between the original investment and the final payoff is 
extremely tenuous: it may be that the redwood tree will have a value 
far greater than the Lumber value of 14 000 dollars <particularly if - as 
is Likely to be the case - it has acquired great scarcity value). In 
any case, many of the costs and benefits of investments concerning natural 
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goods are nonmonetizable and therefore not properly Liable to dis-
counting treatment. Major costs of converting natural goods into man-
made goods include the costs of increasing uncertainty and approaching 
irreversibility. Major benefits of preserving natural goods (like 
planting a redwood tree) are altruistic satisfaction and hope in the 
future of man and nature <and not just the value of the lumber). 
Preservation policies seem to exact a high opportunity cost, but these 
are balanced by low i;nvestment and operating costs and high benefits 
over a long life. The benefits of most development projects accrue 
over short periods of time whereas the benefits of natural ecosystems 
accrue over periods of time which are, for all intents and purposes, 
infinitely long. The application of a high social rate of discount has 
the effect of shortening the socially relevant time horizon, and thus 
has a marked impact on the valuation of natur?l ecosystem benefits. 
The fact that this rate is often determined by the rate of return on 
private investment seems to introduce a bias against s.uch benefits 
(which are not related to· the current productivity of capital). The 
practice of applying a discount rate which would seem moderate as a rate 
of interest on capital has profound effects on valuation in a very short 
time: 
... at a 10 per cent interest rate, the future 
value of forests and oil, among other resources, is 
discounted by 75 per cent in only fourteen years. 
With the future so heavily discounted, the market 
cannot be expected to raise prices sufficiently 
and soon enough to prompt adequate conservation a~ 
scarcities develop. <13-147) 
The main problem with discounting is that rates tend to be set far too 
high due to the present generation's understandable bias toward present 
preferences and near-term benefits and the difficulties (uncertainty) 
associated with ascertaining future preferences and Long-term benefits. 
When discounting, one must project demand and scarcity patterns. 
Superior goods with inelastic supply should be discounted at a Low or 
zero rate since (1) one can Logically forecast a demand increasing 
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disproportionately with income <and presumably income levels can be 
expected to rise, however slowly, in developing countries), and since (2) 
natural goods by their nature cannot be augmented by technology and are 
subject only to decreases in supply. A choice must be made as to the 
·~ l 
level at which society will provide for the needs and desires of present 
generations relative to those of future generations. If decision-
makers are committed to a sustainable society, some degree of suffering 
and injustice now (from a slower development ~ate) may be preferable 
) 
to leaving future populations without the means for a secure and satisfy-
ing existence. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Economics has not developed a theory of value which can be applied to 
common pool resources, and attempts to ascribe monetary value to them have 
not been satisfactory. A particular problem is to assess the signifi-
cance of cumulative and irreversible losses. Thus there is a danger 
that natural goods with high use value may be allowed to disappear be-
cause their intrinsic value is not perceived. It is therefore necessary 
to rely on the informed value judgments of specialists for estimates of 
present and future use values for natural goods. 
Valuation based on "willingness to pay" estimates are highly suspect and 
in any case are theoretically inferior to a "willingness to sell" measure 
of utility. The shadow project concept largely avoids the incommensura-
bility problem but is costly. One possible approach to making trade-' 
offs is to allow informed and responsible decision-makers to calculate 
the compensation variation by means of a variety of techniques <including 
ecological, historical, and literature surveys). 
Urban-industrial man is losing contact with nature and may not be compe-
tent to judge the relative value of economic and natural goods. 
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Consumers often fail to discriminate between wants and needs, have 
little appreciation of the nature of ecological risks, and are inherently 
selfish. Consumer preferences do not constitute a reliable guide to 
social welfare improvements. 
Conventional cost-benefit analysis fails to ac~ount for social and eco-
logical costs which cannot be expressed in monetary terms and therefore 
the special values of common pool resources are excluded from consideration. 
No single index can be considered an adequate appraisal of alternatives; 
ultimately one must rely on the informed valu~ judgments of responsible 
investigators. However, the cos.t-beriefit concept is useful, particular-
ly for decisions at the policy level, and techniques can be devised 
to mitigate the quantification bias which favours economic goods. 
Another difficulty is the intertemporal bias favouring present and near-
term needs. The practice of discounting can provide justification for 
irreversible actions and should not be applied to intergenerational con-
sumption of natural goods. Since the stock of common pool resources 
can only be diminished by economic activity, it would be logical to apply 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are many methods of analyzing the policy alternatives. For 
example, utility analysis techniques (137-27ff) could be applied to the 
policy choices to determine their utility in satisfying the basic needs 
of man. Or a cost-benefit framework could be utilized and the specific 
costs and benefits of each alternative could be weighted and scored 
using the Battelle method. <45-523ff) It is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to attempt an exhaustive analysis of the two policy alter-
natives; the only objective here is simply to give some indication 
of how the alternatives might be examined. The following sections are 
( 
266 
intended to explore in more detail some of the implications of the 
policy alternatives and illustrate how thesemight be more systemati-
cally considered. 
THE POLICY ALTERNATIVES RATED 
The two alternative policy options can be rated in terms of their 
potenti~L for satisfying the five goals which contribute to social 
well-being (see pp. 83 and 109). The five goals are to provide for 
(1) health and physical well-being, (2) protection from violence and 
insecurity, (3) social stability and economic justice, (4) aesthetic, 
cognitive, and spiritual satisfactions, and (5) the ability to satisfy 
the needs of future generations. The two policy options under consider-
ation are (1) a policy of rapid and unconstrained development based on 
industrial growth and economic expansion, and (2) a policy of develop-
ment which does not rely on modern industrial technology and is con-
strained by a provision for maintaining some significant proportion of 
the Land as natural and near-natural areas. 
The first policy option would promote rapid material advancement through 
the introduction of modern technologies. Production achievements 
would be Limited by: scientific and technological constraints; the 
availability of raw materials, capital, and skilled manpower; the 
adaptability of present populations and institutions; competition with 
other societies; and the tolerance Levels of ecological systems which 
contribute vital Life-support functions. There are thus technological, 
economic, sociological, political and environmental constraints to 
exercising this option. The second policy option places Less emphasis 
on material production and more restrictions on the pace and extent of 
development. It would bring about advancement which is balanced and 
wide-based, through the use of traditional and intermediate technologies. 
Production achievements would be constrained by self-imposed Limits to: 
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reduce dependency on resources which are not abundant; pre~ent social 
upheaval and the breakdown of traditional institutions; lessen compe-
tition and confrontation with other societies; and ensure that eco-
logical equilibrium and potentially valuable genetic resources are 
maintained. For convenience the first policy will be referred to as 
the "industrial option" and the second policy as the "conservation 
option". The two policies will be briefly compared for each goal in 
turn to provide an illustration of how these policy options might be 
evaluated in general terms. 
Goal 1: Provide for improved health and physical well-being 
The industrial option has had considerable success in developed countries 
in improving the health and physical well-being of most members of 
society, but the distribution of welfare has not been equitable: some 
sectors of the population have benefited far more than others, and 
poverty has not been eliminated. In developing countries, the industrial 
option has had mixed success in satisfying the basic nutritional and 
material needs of the people, and although it has had little success 
in reducing poverty, it has improved survival rates and general 
health conditions throughout much of the world. Perhaps the most 
striking result of this policy has been the production of a great variety 
of material goods in considerable abundance. However comforts, con-
veniences, and amusements appear to improve well-being only up to a point, 
beyond which the law of diminishing marginal utility has great effect. 
The conservation option does not in itself contribute to tha satisfaction 
of this goal, and (due to the reservation on land-use) may result in a 
degree of material deprivation for some peoples. However, the supply 
of essential goods, such as food, clothing, and shelter, would seem 
within the capabilities of traditional and intermediate technologies so 
long as the population does not grow out of balance with the renewable 
resources available, and so long as resources are not wasted in the 
production of superfluous goods. 
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Goal 2: Provide for protection from violence and insecurity 
The industrial option has led to greater individual security in many 
parts of the world,,but while personal security may be generally improved, 
collective security may be at greater risk. Security from the threat 
of physical violence is conferred by the proper functioning of socializing 
elements, as well as by police and military protection. Environmental 
security depends on the degree of ecological equilibrium that a society 
maintains. There are indications that the industrial option leads to 
higher risk of sociological and environmental breakdowns. Rapid growth 
and change threatens the stability of social institutions, advances in 
police and military technology may ultimately result in greater violence, 
and increasing productivity through more relentless exploitation of the 
environment may degrade and diminish the resource base and so lead to 
greater environmental insecurity. 
The conservation option may have some Low, negative impact on the 
provision of security in remote areas to which police and military pro-
tection may not be extended effectively. <These areas could even become 
sanctuaries for criminals and terrorists.) However maintaining tradi-
tional social institutions may reduce the need for police protection, 
and the adoption of certain political strategies can reduce the require-
ment for military protection. The adoption of environmentally appro-
priate technologies would avoid the environmental hazards which are 
associated with modern technology. These hazards constitute a source 
of social insecurity in themselves, and also weaken a country, making it 
more vulnerable or dependent on other countries, which results in 
greater political and economic insecurity. 
Goal 3: Provide for social stability and economic justice 
The industrial option has not been successful in balancing equity con-. 
siderations against those of efficiency. Absolute poverty has not been 
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eliminated through economic growth or redistribution, and relative 
poverty has even increased. While this policy option might in theory 
be capable of providing social stability and economic justice, in 
practice the gap between the rich and poor continues to widen and this 
has increased the potential for social strife. It is unlikely that the 
more affluent sectors of society will ever be so well satisfied or so 
generous that adequate progress will be made in rectifying social and 
economic disparities. If economic policy is geared to a system which 
is designed to produce material benefits, then the social needs of man 
may be widely frustrated. 
The conservation option could make some positive contribution toward 
meeting this goal. This is because excessive exploitation of the 
natural environment primarily benefits the rich while depriving the poor 
of traditional livelihoods and social security. Maintaining natural and 
near-natural areas might slow the widening gap between rich and poor, 
and strengthen rural development by making rural areas more attractive 
places in which to live and work, where social needs might be more 
easily met. 
Goal 4: Provide for aesthetic, cognitive, and spiritual satisfactions 
The industrial option has great potential for enhancing satisfactions 
from creative and cultural activities through technological achievements. 
However the Western experience indicates that the mass of men remain 
untouched by the most notable aesthetic, cognitive, and spiritual 
accomplishments of an industrial civilization because they are sub-
jected to a host of lesser influences, isolated from higher influences 
by social and economic barrie'rs which are part of the system, and 
insulated fro~ the healthy influence of nature by the urban environ-
ment and modern modes of conveyance. The promise of industrial civil-
ization has been largely unfulfilled - individuals appear to have little 
prospect of attaining self-actualization because their lives are con-
sumed by trivial activities. The necessity to provide an abundance ?f 
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goods,and services to enhance well-being has been questioned by a great 
number of philosophers and social scientists, who feel that the physical 
accoutrements of a society and the range of amusements available do not 
necessarily lend vitality to a civilization. The citizens of modern 
cities appear to be materially prosperous but aesthetically and spirit-
ually impoverished. The industrial option is not necessary to the 
pursuit of self-actualization, and may hinder its attainment. 
The conservation option affords greater opportunities for direct contact 
with nature, which constitutes a primary source of aesthetic, cognitive, 
and spiritual satisfaction. Once physiological and safety needs are 
reasonably satisfied, perception of natural goods can be a most signifi-
cant source of pleasure, instruction, and inspiration. Maintaining 
natural and near-natural areas permits all men - regardless of social or 
economic standing - to experience the special satisfactions attainable 
only through direct association with nature. 
Goal 5: Provide for the needs of future generations 
The industrial option is concerned with satisfying present and near-term 
needs; long-term needs are heavily discounted. This policy has a 
built-in bias against future generations because certain inescapable 
costs and great risks to future well-being are deemed acceptable. 
Industrial development entails the irreversible destruction of many 
species, ecosystems, unique objects, and special qualities of nature 
<which might be of great value to future generations) and increases the 
risk of disrupting vital Life-support processes. Future quality of 
Life, and the very existence of future generations is threatened so that 
present generations may prosper. 
The conservation option would Leave a greater Legacy to future genera-
tions, and help maintain ecological equilibrium so that risks to survival 
will be reduced. This policy offers far greater prospects for sustained 
social progress, and promises a world of greater variety, integrity, and 
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beauty to enhance the quality of Life and Lend stability and security 
to the Lives of untold generations. 
Conclusion: 
The two policy options might be rated according to their potential for 
realizing each of the five goals, and a final assessment made of their 
overall acceptability based on this potential and the relative signifi-
cance of the goals. For example, a subjective analysis of the fore-
going might indicate the following, very approximate, ratings. <These 
ratings are obviously disputable but are here intended to illustrate 
the process of policy evaluation.) 
Goal 
Provide for: 
Health and physical well-being 
Protection from violence and 
insecurity 
Social stability and economic 
justice 
Aesthetic, cognitive, and 
spiritual satisfactions 


















It can be seen that the lowest and most prepotent need is best satisfied 
by the industrial option. The two options have similar potential for 
satisfying the next two needs. However the conservation option is much 
to be preferred in meeting the final two needs; there is a significant 
variance in potential for satisfying the supreme goal for the individual 
(self-actualization), and a most striking difference in the prospects 
for ensuring that social progress will be sustainable. As Long as the 
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conservation option can reasonably satisfy the lower needs, which can 
be achieved with intermediate technologies, then this option is to be 
preferred. There is no point in overgratifying the lower needs or 
satisfying them more quickly if it means sacrificing the attainment of 
self-actualization and the prospects of future generations. If 
decision-makers are committed to providing for a high quality of life 
over Long time horizons, a policy which provides for maintaining sub-
stantial portions of the natural environment in the form of natural 
and near-natural areas should be adopted, and appropriate technologies 
and appealing alternatives to urban-industrial life styles should be made 
available. 
Rapid and unconstrained industrial development may reduce poverty and 
provide greater security for today's populations, and may possibly result 
in greater social stability and economic justice, depending on the 
society's political, social and economic institutions. However these 
·goals can also be realized by other methods which involve Less ecological 
risk and allow more options to be maintained. A policy of rapid and 
unconstrained development would appear to adversely affect the prospects 
of achieving two important social goals: providing opportunities for 
individual self-fulfilment, and ensuring that social progress is sustain-
able. This is because the natural environment provides natural 
amenities and essential Life-support services which could be destroyed 
or seriously impaired by the process of industrial development. 
The costs of maintaining natural and near-natural areas may be regarded 
as foregone opportunities to provide the maximum goods and services 
which could be produced <given the present state of technology) to 
satisfy culturally-i0duced needs and the lowest basic needs of present 
generations. The benefits of maintaining natural and near-natural 
areas may be regarded as providing future generations with greater 
prospects for survival and more opportunities to satisfy the higher 
basic needs. The principal conclusion of this analysis is that the ex-
ploitation and conversion of all remaining natural and near-natural 
areas, most of which have Little potential for increased productivity, 
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would not contribute significantly or for long to providing for man's 
culturally-induced and lowest basic needs, but would increase risks 
to survival and reduce the prospects of satisfying higher basic needs. 
If decision-makers are committed to the sur~ival of mankind and to pro-
vlding for the highest quality of life that society might enjoy, then a 
policy of maintaining natural and near-natural areas should be adopted in 
spite of short-term opportunity costs. 
THE POLICY ALTERNATIVES EVALUATED 
,. 
The two policy alternatives differ significantly in their potential for 
satisfying the five social goals. A policy of rapid and unconstrained 
industrial development might be expected to satisfy basic physiological 
needs rather quickly and thoroughly, but a commitment to this policy is 
Likely to result in a system of production and consumption which goes far 
beyond man's requirements to maintain health and physical well-being. 
An important point in Maslow's theory of motivation is that once a true 
need is satisfied, the organism is "released" to the next need in the 
hierarchy - there is thus no object in providing more goods and services 
than are required to satisfy a need. In the case of physiological 
needs, only a few goods and services would suffice to keep these needs 
satisfied. But industrial societies stimulate new, "unnatural" needs 
which may inhibit the emergence of higher instinctoid needs or interfere 
with their satisfaction. There are certain conditions necessary 
for the satisfaction of each basic need, and it is the task of political 
and social Leaders to bring about these conditions and provide individuals 
with abundant opportunities for satisfying all of their true biological 
needs. Failure to do so on any Level· will result in some degree of 
inanition and social disintegration. Natural and near-natural areas 
comprise a wide range of satisfiers, particularly for higher needs - they 
represent sources of aesthetic and spiritual nourishment - and should 
therefore be provided in some abundance. Culturally derived "substitutes" 
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for natural goods are not really substitute~'at all, and therefore 
satisfy neurotic needs rather than basic needs. 
One great danger of industrial development is that it destroys primary 
sources of basic need gratifiers - natural and near-natural areas - and 
fosters a system of production and consumption that is directed at lower 
and culturally-induced needs rather than at the higher biological needs. 
The need for self-actualization may then never clearly emerge, or 
attempts to satisfy it may be frustrated by the confusing plethora of 
goods and services which demand the individual's time, attention, and 
energy. The notion that the health and material benefits to be con-
ferred by the urban-industrial complex outweigh all possible adverse 
impacts is a dangerous delusion since this system could destroy the 
spirit and reason for living of the people to be provided for. (42-134) 
The other major difficulty with a policy of rapid and unconstrained 
industrial development is that it is destructive of resources on which 
man's very existence depends~ It is often argued that environmental 
protection involves a cost to the welfare of poorer peoples, and that 
developing nations must Look after their own interests, just as the 
more developed nations did in the past. This ignores the perils of the 
new reality: failure to protect the environment may ultimately result 
in welfare reductions and a threat to the very survival of these same 
peoples. There is a very real possibility that gaining admission to 
the ranks of the affluent involves a cost that is unacceptable. A 
policy which destroys genetic resources and natural ecosystems as a matter 
of course must be regarded as extremely hazardous. There are no clear 
rules for risk-taking, but considering the present scale of environ-
mental degradation and the importance of maintaining equilibrium in life-
support processes, one might conclude that this policy is already at high 
risk. An examination of recent major development projects and environ-
mental problems indicates that technological innovation is advancing at 
a much faster rate than ecological understanding. It seems likely that 
following a policy of rapid and unconstrained industrial development 
could eventually result in an environmental disaster of major proportions. 
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The second policy, which provides for maintaining substantial portions 
of the natural environment in the form of natural areas and near-
natural areas, would involve acceptance of self-imposed constraints on 
modification of the natural environment and on the production of goods 
I 
and services. This is of course not to suggest that goods and services 
which are absolutely essential to the satisfaction of physiological 
needs should be restricted; rather, production of superfluous goods 
and services, particularly those intended for the satisfaction of 
culturally-induced needs, would be greatly curtailed. Appropriate 
technologies could be designed to satisfy man's physiological and 
security needs within the Limitations of the resource base. 
This policy has one disadvantage and two very great advantages. The 
disadvantage is that resource utilization is necessarily Limited to 
some extent so that total output is somewhat reduced. The advantages 
are that many natural goods which have special utility in meeting the 
need for self-actualization are maintained, and greater resource 
reserves for the needs of future generations are assured. The serious-
ness of the disadvantage depends on how great the population pressure is 
and whether resources are to be used to meet basic needs or culturally-
induced needs. If only basic needs are met, the resource base can -
with appropriate technology and adequate distribution - probably support 
more people. In any case, population growth will ultimately reach 
some quantitative or qualitative Limit, and it seems prudent to confine 
population growth and resource utilization to selected areas rather 
than to commit all global resources to the risks associated with over-
development. The Latter course would only allow more people to Live 
at a Lower level of existence and at greater risk. 
SELF-ACTUALIZATION AND THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 
Maslow says the "Big Problems" are how to make the "Good Person" and how 
to make the "Good Society". ( 102-732) Technological goods lose their 
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value, and all good works come to nothing, if these problems are not 
solved. Maslow suggests that modern man suffers from "deficiency 
diseases" brought about by failures in the environment. He calls 
these "sociosomatic" diseases and "metapathologies" - they are the 
spiritual or philosophical or existentJal ailments. (102-733) Perhaps 
many of these ailments result from the deprivation of certain natural 
goods; many natural goods should be regarded as balm to the spirit 
and mind, or a kind of preventative medicine, ,.or fortifiers which can 
restore psychological health and lead to the development of the Good 
Person and the Good Society. 
Maintaining natural and near-natural areas ministers to cognitive 
needs <the need to know and to understand) and aesthetic needs (the need 
to avoid ugliness and contemplate beauty). Naturalists exclaim on the 
endless variety in nature, the multitudinous assemblage of marvellous 
objects and mysterious phenomena for investigation and speculation; 
and aestheticians find natural beauty a great source of inspiration 
and satisfaction - in fact, all art reflects nature and is an attempt 
to capture and convey the beauty nature inspires, whether through 
humanized landscapes or some wilder, more primal source. If the 
capacity for knowledge and aesthetic appreciation may be acknowledged 
as among man's highest and most distinguishing attributes, then this 
vast repository of information and fountainhead of all beauty should 
be treasured and made safe. 
McFarland, speaking for the preservation of a scenic valley, defended 
the ideal of maintaining natural areas in general: 
The true ideal of their maintenance does not run 
parallel to the making of the most timber, or the 
most pasturage, or the most waterpower, but to 
maintain in healthful efficiency· the lives of the 
people who must use that lumber and other 
resources. (113-166) 
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This statement points to the limitations of utilitarian considerations, 
and the need to consider higher order values w~en evaluating any 
proposal. Man's most obvious needs may be physical, but the cognitive, 
aesthetic, and spiritual needs are no less important if man is to be 
whole and healthy. Nature provides abundant' sources of satisfaction 
for man's higher needs. Acceptable substitutes cannot be found in 
the developed environment, nor could their Loss be compensated by 
indulging culturally-induced needs: 
The requiredness of basic need gratifiers differ-
entiates them from all other need gratifiers. The 
organism itself, out of its own nature, points to 
an intrinsic range of satisfiers for which no sub-
stitute is possible ... (103-92) 
Man's intimate relation to nature is an evolutionary fact, and natural 
objects constitute basic need gratifiers which Lead to self-actualization. 
The Transcendentalists of early 19th century New England in America 
sought self-actualization through direct contact with nature. Natural 
objects and scenes were regarded as symbols of a higher reality, as 
keys to a spiritual and intellectual liberation, and so direct contact 
with nature was regarded as fundamental to the advancement of mankind. 
Henry David Thoreau, a most eloquent Transcendentalist, spent much of 
his life walking alone in the woods consciously seeking the inspirations 
and insights which Lead to self-fulfilment. The following selections 
from his journals give some indication of the special relationship one 
may have with nature, and the value of that relationship. 
This stillness, solitude, wildness of nature is a 
kind of thoroughwort, or boneset, to my intellect. 
This is what I go out to seek. It is as if I always 
met in those places some grand, serene, immortal, 
infinitely encouraging, though invisible, companion, 
and walked with him. ( 134-170) ... Ah, dear nature, 
the mere remembrance, after a short forgetfulness, of 
the pine woods! I come to it as a hungry man to a 
crust of bread. (134-68) ... My desire for knowledge 
is intermittent; but my desire to commune with the 
spirit of the universe, to be intoxicated with the 
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fumes, call it, of that divine nectar, to bear 
my head through atmospheres and over heights unknown 
to my feet, is perennial and constant. (134-41) 
... I Long for wildness, a nature which I cannot put 
my foot through, woods where the wood thrush forever 
sings, where the hours are early morning ones, and 
there is dew on the grass, and the day is forever 
unproved, where I might have a fertile unknown for 
a soil about me. (134-118) 
But Thoreau observed that most men fail to perceive the wonders of 
nature: 
I suspect that the child plucks its first flower 
with an insight into its beauty and significance 
which the subsequent botanist never retains. ( 134-77) 
... Men talk about Bible miracles because there is 
no miracle in their Lives. Cease to gnaw that crust. 
There is ripe fruit over your head. (134-36) 
Man's insensitivity has resulted in great depredations of nature which 
has further diminished man and reduced his potential for self-actuali-
zation: _, 
... when I consider that the nobler animals have been 
exterminated here ... I cannot but feel as if I Lived 
in a tamed, and, as it were, emasculated country .... 
I am reminded that this my Life in nature, this 
particular round of natural phenomena which I call a 
year, is Lamentably incomplete. I Listen to a con-
cert in which so many parts are wanting .... I should 
not Like to think that some demigod had come before 
me and picked out some of the best stars. I wish to 
know an entire heaven and an entire earth. ALL the 
great trees and beasts, fishes and fowl are gone. 
The streams, perchance, are somewhat shrunk. ( 134-157) 
Thoreau believed that to the extent a culture, or an individual, lost 
contact with wildness it became weak and dull. ( 113-88) Thoreau 
regarded wild places as sources of intellectual and spiritual nourishment, 
as important to man as sources of physical nourishment, and believed 
wildness should continue to exist if only to suggest that earth has 
higher uses than we put her to. (113-103) 
/ 
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Most "defenders of wilderness" <Thoreau included) recognize the va Lue 
of pastoral scenes and rustic settlements as well, and could not abide 
an endless wilderness - what is wanted is a balance in the countryside, 
so that one can move from city to hamlet to farm to wild woods and 
life, and no one "good" is so 
Dubos ~refers the rural land-
the laridscapes which provide the 
back again. Variety does add spice to 
good that it can supplant all others. 
scapes of France, and points out that , 
most lasting pleasure for the largest number of persons are still those 
in which man has tamed the wilderness. (50-140) Krutilla stresses the 
need to protect these living landscapes which add so much to the quality 
of the total environment: 
Landscapes should be compared and evaluated as 
representing a resource in their own right .... Visual 
end-products need to be anticipated .... (90-290) 
, Sir Frank Fraser Darling comments on the importance of beautiful land-
scapes, and the fact that beauty is correlated with ecological 
equilibrium: 
Perpetuation of a derelict landscape as a back-
ground to children's lives is like rearing them to 
some extent in lovelessness .... Human tastes vary, 
but all in all the most general consensus of 
beautiful landscape would be found to be that which 
is in ecological repose or near to it. <40-112) 
The seemingly endless exigencies of today, and the fear of some impending 
ecological catastrophe tomorrow, should not eclipse more complex issues 
and subtle dangers. These concern the availability of solitude, of 
peace and beauty, and of rewarding recreational activity. (2-14) 
While these things may now seem relatively inconsequential, and hardly 
relevant to the present needs and aspirations of developing countries~ 
it must be remembered that these consideratio~s will become increasingly 
important as development continues. In a world of frenzied activity 
and change, the parks and reserves of the world assume increasingly 
greater values as places of relative stability and peace. ( 149-15) 
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Such psychological benefits are real and si~nificant to our concept of 
well-being, even though they are Largely incalculable. Certain forms 
of recreation and relaxation require natural environments, and their 
value may easily be underestimated. Cultural and historical values 
associated with natural environments stem from man's inseperable ties 
to nature and his earlier relationships with nature. Future genera-
tions will require some physical reminders of truly natural environments 
to fully appreciate man's present and past traditions and value systems. 
To enhance such understanding, it seems desirable to establish reserves 
not only for natural areas, but for near-natural areas where a whole 
way of Life can be protected - where man, in fact, is accepted as an 
integral part of the ecosystem receiving protection. ( 149-15) 
Near-natural areas can to some degree be reconstituted or created on 
demand, but natural areas are absolutely unique and not replaceable. 
Fisher stresses the importance of authenticity as an attribute in the 
demand for undi~turbed natural areas and compares the value of original 
art against reproductions to certain outdoor activities which have no 
, recreational substitutes. <59-100) Those who appreciate natural 
environments with the greatest intensity are urban dwellers with higher 
Levels of income and education. (59-101) The demand for pristine 
environments may be expected to increase dramatically as the supply is 
diminished and human populations grow in both numbers and sophistication. 
PROVIDING FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS 
A decision-maker's Limited time horizon is of fundamental importance 
because present perceptions of utility may be unrelated to the needs 
of posterity. For example, species of current economic value might 
pale in significance if compared to species which will become valuable· 
in the future, but the Latter are presently unneeded or unknown and may 
therefore be unprotected. In a world of rapidly diminishing resources 
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and increasing demand, modern technology may not be trusted to provide 
for the future - there should be a substantial effort to conserve' 
species and ecosystems of no current economic significance on the 
grounds that some may prove to be of inestimable value to future genera-
tions. 
It is difficult to gauge one's responsibility to future generations: 
for example, ~o they have a right to enjoy wilderness, the products of 
nature, the myriad perceptions and experiences made possible by a bio~ 
logically diverse world? How do their rights to such things stack 
up against our rights to have large fami~ies, and consume and destroy 
what we will? What is truly economic? Even in national parks, there 
is a dangerous tendency towards wrong or overexploitation of the present 
at the expense of the future. <26-44) In deciding how to manage an 
ecosystem, perhaps one should ensure that for those ecosystems having a 
range of potential uses, the final choice is determined by the long 
term needs of the community. <48-53) Evaluations change over time, 
and there is no way for the generations to get together and negotiate 
a binding contract. <59-106) Environmental quality is highly income-
elastic, but more affluent future generations cannot pay present 
generations to forgo irreversible destruction. Our whole society is 
burdened in every corner by investments in which posterity had no say. 
(150-49) Seneca and Tausig say it is necessary to regulate economic 
behaviour in order to provide for posterity: 
It becomes difficult even to specify the meaning 
of social welfare in an uncertain, dynamic world 
<which) must include not just the present consump-
tion of existing householdi but also the consumption 
of future households .... In such a world, govern-
ment intervention ... may be necessary to achieve a 
socially desirable time configuration of production 
and consumption ... (133-46) 
Krutilla points out that for cases in which irreversible Losses are 
sustained, it will generally be optimal to refrain from investment 
warranted by current benefits and costs, i.e., to take short-term Losses, 
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if in the not too distant future a Lesser Level of development would 
be desired. (91-55) Too much development can result in greater future 
Losses, and therefore one must anticipate the effect of irreversible 
Losses. Since technical change can be expected to extend the opportu-
nities of extractive industries (mining, forestry, and agriculture) and 
cannot be expected to improve the amenity services of a natural environ-
ment, present conflicts should be resolved in favour of the latter: 
the relative value of the alternative uses is likely to change, tending 
to favour the retention of the area in its "unimproved" state. (91-13) 
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature has advocated 
the establishment of "Resource Reserves" which would be held in trust 
to prevent overexploitation and preserve options. The principal idea 
is to prevent unplanned, single use and short-term economic exploitation 
in regions which are under considerable pressure for colonization and 
greater utilization, but for which there has been inadeq~ate research 
and planning. (78-19) It is advisable to adopt a generally conserva-
tive policy with regard to developments which are irreversible since 
the optimal plan for a future generation cannot be implemented if it is 
in a direction which has been foreclosed by earlier activity. In 
addition, option values increase with uncertainty about costs and 
benefits since better and safer decisions can be made Later. Some 
natural areas should be maintained so that future discoveries can Lead 
to wiser development patterns. Jackson feels that the tsetse fly may 
be a blessing in disguise because it has kept Large tracts of the 
African continent free from the adverse effects of deforestation and 
overgrazing so that modern resource management practices can now be 
applied in these areas. (81-199) 
Edwards feels that the indigenous vegetation in most of southern Africa 
is needed for maintaining Life and achieving environmental stability 
over the short- and Long-term. (52-156) Environmental stability Lends 
security to man's activities and 
because it permits the evolution 
begets more diversity). (158-53) 
also promotes species diversity 
of community complexity (and diversity 
Leopold points out that plants and 
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animals are connected by chains of dependency for a maze of services. 
<93-162) Activities which destabilize ecosystems retard community 
complexity, create special hazards, and reduce diversity. Goodman says 
that even if species diversity does not in itself contribute to eco-
system stability, the loss of genetic resources can be destabilizing for 
man: the disruption of the patterns of evolved interaction in natural 
communities will have untoward, and occasionally catastrophic conse-
quences. (54-651) Maintaining species diversity and environmental 
stability serves to reduce hazard and keep management options open. 
The cost of maintaining stability and options in managed ecosystems is 
lower economic yield because the highest biological productivity is 
attained in some successional stage, rather than the climax. However 
it may be desirable to stay near the climax to reduce the need for 
inputs and reduce risk, especially since energy is becoming more costly 
and risks are becoming potentially more serious. The energy available 
for productivity in a successional stage would be used for maintenance 
near the climax, thus reducing the need for economic inputs to maintain 
productivity over the long-term. (147-187) 
The value of untapped genetic resources is difficult to estimate because 
man has long relied on a very few species and has not properly evaluated 
many potentially useful plants and animals. 
Of an estimated 80000 edible plants in the world, 
only about 50 have been cultivated on a significant 
scale, and 90 percent of the world's food comes 
from only 12 species .... Nearly one-half of all pre-
scription medicine contains a drug of natural origin 
as an active ingredient .... Yet only 5 percent of all 
plants have been studied for their medicinal value. 
( 124-9) 
In the animal kingdom, new uses are being 'found for species at an 
increasing rate. Polar bear hairs have recently provided researchers 
with a clue that may help them produce materials for better cold-
weather clothing and solar energy collectors, and armadillos are proving 
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to have inestimable value in the search for a cure for leprosy. 
(80-3/9) Decision-makers should be alert to the possibility that a 
seemingly useless organism might one day be thought priceless. Ehren-
feld has noted several examples of erstwhile ~seless species which have 
special value, or have been used as pollution indicators or general 
environmental indicators. <54-650) The United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment has called for governments to agree to an inter-
national programme to preserve the world's genetic resources. <146-13) 
Gene banks, zoos, and small nature parks cannot maintain genetic 
resources in a dynamic and evolutionary state, so it is necessary to 
set aside large, unmodified landscapes for this purpose. <79-12) It is 
important that such reserves be large enough to contain viable popula-
tions with adequate gene pools to continue the evolutionary process of 
adapting to environmental variation. ( 104-8; 135-25) 
Reserves are also needed for other purposes. Aldo Leopold valued 
natural areas for their instructive value as a base-datum of normality, 
a picture of how healthy land maintains itself as an organism. ( 113-198) 
Protected reserves can serve as baseline and monitoring areas to help 
in predicting, preventing, and solving environmental problems. "Con-
trolled Reserves" have been proposed for animal breeding and protecting 
green belts in desert areas; other reserves can serve as seed reser-
voirs and grazing reserves for times of drought. <147-49) Some bio-
sphere reserves are used in the Global Environmental Monitoring Systems 
<GEMS> of the United Nations Environmental Programme CUNEP> to help 
provide an early warning system for significant environmental problems. 
(151-30) Man-modified reserves can provide examples of long-established 
and stable patterns of land use and examples of degraded landscapes 
which can be restored to generate new knowledge for rehabilitating and 
managing areas subject to deleterious land use practices. ( 151-22, 23) 
Dasmann suggests that maintaining a variety of natural environments 
will prevent "ethnocide" - cultural diversity is one way of insuring 
that the human race will continue to survive, as well as a way of 
providing for a more interesting and colourful existence. (42-131) 
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Cultural diversity maintains freedom of choice, but cultural al'terna-
tives must be vigorously protected in the face of spreading conformity, 
or else as people die, their ways will be forgotten. (42-132) Develop-
ing countries should set aside natural and near-natural areas while Land 
is relatively "cheap" to avoid the predicament in which Holland now 
finds itself: land is now so expensive that not enough can be bought 
for research to find out how to manage the rest of the country. (27-98) 
Man seems capable of using modern technology to overcome most forms 
of environmental resistence to his biotic potential. This involves 
taking dangerous gambles. Some constraints should be imposed for 
safety's sake, and maintaining natural and near-natural areas seems a 
sensible insurance measure to protect future generations. Other species 
are subject to physical and behavioural limiting factors which normally 
prevent populations from exceeding absolute environmental limits. 
This is instructive, and serves as a warning. Failure to maintain 
adequate portions of the natural environment may Lead to gradually de-
creasing productivity and reductions in carrying capacity. This is 
suggested by the historical evidence of the decrease in carrying capacity 
of such areas as Iraq and Lebanon and the indications that man's 
engineering is leading to similar deterioration of the environment in 
other areas. (136-38) Man must have the foresight to impose limiting 
factors of his own devising to avoid environmental deterioration on a 
regional and global scale. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The two policy options vary in their potential to satisfy different 
social goals. The industrial option has had spectacular success in 
improving health and material well-being in many parts of the world 
(although large sectors of society have not shared in these benefits) 
but has not proved effective in providing for man's higher needs, and 
I 
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has failed to adequately consider the needs of future generations. 
The conservation option is capable of satisfying man's most essential 
material needs through appropriate technology, and would provide for 
man's hjgher needs and the needs of future generations by adopting self-
imposed limits to maintain valuable common pool resources. 
There is no point in over-indulging material needs since this interferes 
with the satisfaction of other needs. The most desirable policy would 
be one which provides the greatest prospect of satisfying all of man's 
true, biological needs in perpetuity. The industrial option cpters 
to culturally-induced or neurotic needs and destroys sources of basic 
need gratifiers found in nature and traditional forms of social organ-
ization. The conservation option would attempt to restrict superfluous 
production in order to provide for man's higher and future needs. 
Natural goods have great potential for satisfying man's highest need -
the need for self-actualization - and are also needed to ensure the very 
survival of mankind. These goods should not be sacrificed to meet 
lower or culturally-induced needs, particularly since many natural 
goods are irreplaceable and have no substitutes. Future generations 
may be expected to place an even higher value on these goods and so it 
is optimal to limit developments which have irreversible effects on 
the natural environment. Maintaining natural and near-natural areas 
would provide for a host of uses which have profound significance for 
the future of mankind. 
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CHAPTER 14 
A BALANCED APPROACH TO PROGRESS 
"The. p.ll.a.c...tic..e.-6 we. now c..aU c..oMe.Jz.va.tion a.Jz.e., 
to a .f.aJr.ge. e.xte.nt, loc..al aUe.v.ia..tion-6 ofi biotic.. 
pain. The.y a.Jz.e. ne.c..e...6..6a.Jz.y, but the.y mU-6t not 
be. c..onfiU-6e.d with c..UJz.e.-6." < 94-274) 
INTRODUCTION 
A central postulate of welfare economics is that an expansion of choice 
represents a welfare gain; reduction of options, a welfare Loss. 
(91-43) Tastes and preferences may be expected to change, and provi-
sion should be made to satisfy a wide range of choices. Ecosystem and 
genetic diversity contribute to social welfare by virtue of options 
maintained. Since the attitudes and specific requirements of future 
generations cannot be reasonably predicted, we have a clear responsibi-
L ity to "keep options open" and to prevent, to the best of our ability, 
the depletion or destruction of natural area~ and of the genetic 
288 
diversity of life. (149-5) The prevailing concept of "progress" is 
destructive of natural ecosystems and genetic resources, and leads to 
greater social and political tensions, as individuals and nations com-
pete for scarce resources to fuel growth. Odum suggests ecology can 
serve as a model to reduce world tensions by demonstrating that action 
based on holistic values and properties is a viable alternative to 
development on the basis of competitive exclusion alone. <116-1291) 
There may be more appropriate forms of development than the urban-
industri al system. Maintaining natural and near-natural areas buys 
time for the development of new technologies which are more efficient 
and less disruptive. 
THE CONSUMPTION IDEAL 
To an economist, consumption implies satisfaction derived from using 
goods and services and it is assumed that the well-being of an individual 
can be improved by increasing consumption. To an ecologist, consump-
tion implies equilibrating activity and it is accepted that the well-
being of a system cannot be improved if increasing consumption is non-
homeostatic or destabilizing. The idea that welfare is improved with 
increased consumption might be disputed by ecologists - too much of 
even a good thing can be bad for an organism. Most economists feel 
that consumption is a good in itself, and the goal of society is to 
maximize consumption over some relevant time period, but Mishan points 
out that there is something inherently self-defeating in the idea of 
maximizing consumption: eventually we might become increasingly 
frantic trying to "cut corners" and save time in the endeavour to "enjoy" 
all our goods. ( 109-235) The concept of equilibrium would seem more 
germane to welfare than that of consumption. Schumacher suggests that 
economies should be geared to maximize human satisfactions by the optimal 
pattern of consumption rather than to maximize consumption by the optimal 
pattern of productive effort. <129-53) A simple way of living, based 
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on minimizing consumption, is rational in a wo~ld of diminishing 
resources. Boulding advocates the "spaceman economy", which is intended 
to achieve maintenance of a given total stock with a lessened throughput 
(that is, less production and consumption). (23-78) The production of 
goods in excess of real needs can lead to ~elfare losses. Kohr points 
out that once a community exceeds optimum size, social consumer goods 
(such as police, health, military, traffic, and safety services) consume 
a greater proportion of GNP so that little is left to increase personal 
welfare. Even personal consumer goods can be "substitute burdens". 
What is gained in one work field is lost by having increased the number 
of work fields. (85-38) Larger community size also results in cultural 
estrangement and the loss of convivial social patterns. 
The urban-industrial model is based on a conception of man as an acquisi-
tive and competitive creature with unlimited wants and desires. The 
engine driving an urban-industrial society is competition of the 
crassest and most negative kind. (55-194) Competition is necessary 
because resources are scarce relative to desires. The industrial 
ethic sug§ests the solution to scarcity is to increase output: 
We have not yet reached a situation in which scarcity 
has been banished from the face of the earth so that 
there would no Longer be any point in trying to 
increase output. ( 18-246) 
But it is unlikely that scarcity will ever be banished from the earth and 
increasing output also increases scarcity. An alternative is to reduce 
wants, or change the nature of wants so that they can be satisfied in 
ways which are not socially or environmentally destructive and which do 
not result in increased scarcity. This is a "costless" way of dealing 
with scarcity because no resources are destroyed. Institutions can be 
designed to inculcate values to bring about welfare improvements without 
depleting the natural resource base. John Stuart Mill felt mankind 
should settle for one Level of output that could be maintained, then go 
about the process of adjusting humanity to it. (12-162) He also 
suggested that the best state for human nature is that in which, while 
J 
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no one is poor, no one desires to be richer. <2-90) Some subsistence 
societies demonstrate qualities which minimize competitiveness and 
facilitate group survival.· These societies are characterized by strong 
community bonds, a reasonably even distribution of material goods, and 
a high regard for social ethics. Although such societies did not con-
sciously adopt these social forms, and the prospect of social engin-
eering presents daunting challenges, these time-honoured societies might 
serve as more appropriate models of development - they demonstrate that 
social institutions can keep consumption patterns of natural goods at 
Low Levels and so reduce impacts on the natural environment. Greater 
moderation and a more equitable distribution of goods would significant-
ly reduce the pressure on the natural environment and improve the out-
look for mankind. 
THE PROBLEM OF CONGESTION 
Natural and near-natural areas also represent potential recreational 
space for human populations. As crowding increases, there arises in-
creased competition for scarce space to be alone. This in turn Leads 
to an increased desire for apartness. (55-194) \ The Loss of privacy 
and opportunities for experiencing solitude constitute welfare Losses. 
It is not good for man to be kept perforce at all 
times in the presence of his species. A world 
from which solitude is extirpated, is a very poor 
idea L. ( 2-91 ) 
Consideration must be given to the effects of congestion on psycholo-
gical well-being, as well as on the functioning of fragile ecosystems. 
Crowding degrades recreational resources in both a psychological and a 
physical sense, and the ultimate effect is to substitute one group of 
users for another (callous individuals will replace those who are more 
sensitive to their surroundings) so that the "outdoor experience" 
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becomes a mockery of itself. Utilization may ~e high, but quality 
will be low; the old precept that it is desirable to provide the 
greatest good for the greatest number thus becomes a perversion. 
The problem of congestion is somewhat deceptive in that there may be a 
Lengthy period of no discernible cost with increased use, then negligible 
costs, and then catastrophic costs may appear rather suddenly as con-
' 
gestion effects set in. Krutilla says congestion effects are op~imized 
at the point at which the disutility on others by the addition of a 
party will just cancel the utility gained by the additional party. 
(91-13) Congestion effects must be anticipated by assessments of 
carrying capacity, and the adoption of a management policy based on 
limited access. 
THE NEED TO RESTRICT FREEDOMS 
There is a great danger that the growth ethic of the urban-industrial 
system will ultimately result in more poverty rather than more prosperity. 
Economic growth will require dramatically increased resource consump-
tion in developing countries to attain a very high Level of develop-
ment, and resources might be exhausted before that Level is reached. 
Biologist and Nobel Laureate Peter Medawar feels: 
The goal of a happy, high-consumption world cannot 
be fulfilled even for the 3.5 billion people now 
alive, much Less than for the six billion expected 
by the year 2000. At the <U.S.) standard of Living, 
the Earth could support only 500 million. ( 139-19) 
Hegel defined freedom as "the recognition of necessity". (55-192) It 
is not rational to refuse to accept Limitations on population growth 
and economic development. Some freedoms must be sacrificed to keep 
other freedoms. Hardin points out that man has accepted many 
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restrictions on the commons in the interests of group survival, but 
more restrictions are now needed. <65-63) Many natural goods and much 
greater security may be had for the small opportunity cost of fore-
going Large families and superfluous material goods. 
THE NEED FOR GOALS, PLANNING, AND CONSERVATION 
Man cannot expect to have all his desires satisfied. It is necessary 
to surrender some aspirations to ecological reality, and select only 
those goals which are essential and achievable. The absence of defined 
·and understood goals has been one of the principal causes of human 
confusion and environmental degradation. (42-14) Marden suggests five 
steps for formulating goals and objectives and designing a policy for 
I 
development: ( 1) Defining where we are now. (2) Deciding where we 
want to go. (3) Deciding how to get where we want to go. (4) De-
fining how much needs to be done in given time periods. (5) Allocating 
our scarce fiscal and human resources. (100-216) 
Social patterns must be ordered according to ecological principles, 
and conservation must be regarded as being necessary to the attainment 
of certain social goals and as being supportive of development, rather 
than in conflict with development. 
The United Nations' definition of conservation is -
"the rational use of the earth's resources to achieve 
the highest quality of Living for mankind". This 
would be an equally good definition of the ideal goal 
of economic development. <43-17) 
If the quality of life is to be sustainable, then conservation is an 
essential part of development. 
development by two criteria: 
Leopold would judge any policy of 
(1) Does it maintain fertility? (2) Does 
it maintain a diverse fauna and flora? (93-163) These criteria would 
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appear both necessary and sufficient to avoid ecological disasters. 
The advance of civilization should not be seen in terms of conquest, or 
as man constructing an Alhambra atop some pinnacle of his own devising: 
Civilization is not the enslavement 'of a stable 
and constant earth. It is a state of mutual and 
interdependent cooperation between human animals, 
other animals, plants, and soils .... The real end 
is a universal symbiosis with land, economic and 
esthetic, public and private. (95-45, 50) 
Man requires a balanced environment to maximize welfare. Natural and 
near-natural areas serve uses for which the developed environment offers 
no substitutes. Odum says the true value of a man's total environment 
is determined by the diversity interaction between the "developed" and 
the "natural" environment and not only by the worth of each as a 
separate component. ( 117-180) Decision-~akers tend not to evaluate the 
total environment, but only the developed part - yet if some of the 
natural environment is disrupted and unable to function, a ripple-effect 
occurs and eventually the developed environment begins to deteriorate. 
This may not be perceived in time to prevent a collapse of the developed 
environment. Odum cautions that beyond some point, conversion of 
natural to developed environment will result in costs which rise per-
cipitously in non-Linear, multiplying fashion. Accordingly, there has 
to be some optimal proportion between the natural and developed environ-
ments. ( 117-180) 
Planners should favour decentralized communities because they remove 
much of the tendency toward destructive exploitation of resources and yet 
permit a reasonably high standard of living to be maintained. <42-156) 
There is also value in keeping a closer association between individuals 
and the natural environment because natural goods can confer benefits 
directly (without the intervention of a production function) and 
because people should remain sensible of their dependence on nature. 
Kohr says that smaller communities are capable of maintaining an 
internal balance and are self-regulating. Larger communities require 
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greater control and direction because they are not so responsive to 
social homeostatic mechanisms. <85-51) 
THE NEED FOR TIME TO ADJUST 
Rapid development can disrupt communities as well as ecosystems. Time 
is required to adjust to new conditions. Social stability is the 
analogue of ecosystem stability; if change is too rapid, the system can 
collapse. There is psychological value in maintaining time-honoured 
customs and traditions, but it is difficult to do this when technology 
steps up the pace of change - there is not enough time to adapt. Indi-
viduals and families simply cannot sustain rapid and profound change. 
(55-199) Changes should occur slowly, over several generations, thus 
enabling adaptive processes of a biological and social nature to create 
a new, acceptable relationship between man and environment. <50-194) 
This may be particularly true of more primitive societies and poorer 
environments. Traditional societies are often subjected to completely 
novel stresses for which their institutions and philosophies were not 
\ 
designed. This Leads to confusion, dissension, and dissatisfaction 
instead of improvements in welfare. A classic example of the poten-
tially disastrous effect of rapid and profound change is the breakdown 
of the Eskimo society, in which the alcoholism rate has reportedly 
reached 80%. 
Eskimos were once known as the "Laughing people" 
and it was true. We were the happiest people in 
the world. In the earlier days, they didn't have 
such problems as alcoholism and drugs, having to 
worry about a monthly rent, pollution, politics, 
new diseases ... we would Like things to slow down 
a Little bit. Give the Eskimo a chance to prepare 
himself for things to come. (118-312) · 
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A slower rate of development would be socially as well as ecologically 
more desirable. 
Developing countries often have highly localized loyalties. The drive 
to-industrialize and urbanize these countries may lead to fractious 
political entities and general discontent, whereas these same loyalties 
can serve to promote a balanced, broad-based growth with a special 
feeling for the land which supports the community. Traditional 
societies cannot be transformed too suddenly without ill effects -
development should be regarded as an evolutionary process rather than 
an act of creation. The introduction of sophisticated technology can 
destroy the cohesion of a society and cause mass unemployment, migra-
tions into cities, and the breakdown of families and communities. Both 
urban and rural areas can experience great social and environmental 
disruptions when economies suddenly become too specialized, and peoples 
can become subject to a new form of colonialism. The hurried develop-
ment that is being attempted in unindustrialized countries must lead 
to economic colonialism because the education necessary to make the 
growth self-supporting cannot take place as quickly as the increase in 
wealth. (132-46) Perhaps full employment and economic independence are 
more satisfactory economic criteria than total output and total income. 
THE NEED TO WEIGH RISK 
The disappearance of plants and animal species with-
out visible cause, despite efforts to protect them, 
and the irruption of others as pests despite efforts 
to control them, must, in the absence of simpler 
explanations, be regarded as symptoms of sickness in 
the Land organism. Both are occurring too frequent-





Man's environmental impacts are increasing in both number and magnitude; 
this suggests that the conservative outlook is increasing in rationality 
and requiredness. A conservative approach to development is dictated 
by the ecologist's view of the environment as a sensitively balanced 
system. New developments may have dangerous consequences. There 
is not enough information to accurately assess the effects of spillovers 
or determine whether they can be effectively controlled. This logic-
al Ly imposes a requirement to exercise the greatest caution in develop-
ment planning. Any well-meaning action or promising new process could 
reduce rather than increase welfare, and a series of such actions and 
new processes could have cumulative effects which might prove cata-
strophic. Unfortunately, most decision-makers are prepared to accept 
such risks and proceed with new developments unless they are almost 
certain to be disastrous. 
The argument that environmental concerns can be deferred until a 
developing country can "afford" to deal with them is specious. It is 
likely that the rate and scale of environmental degradation will be so 
great that by the time material prosperity is attained, the cost of 
environmental restoration will be prohibitive. An intransigent 
attitude of "development at any cost" may also cause Low-cost opportu-
nities of protecting the environment to be missed. Kneese points out 
that prevention of environmental problems is often much cheaper \han 
cure. (84-103) While reasonable risks are justifiable in meeting 
physiological and safety needs, risk-reduction must always remain,a 
supreme consideration in the development process, and should be of 
paramount concern in developments intended to satisfy culturally-induced 
needs. 
Fisher and Krutilla have shown that it pays to be inefficient if a 
relatively modest investment may forestall much more serious and even 
catastrophic consequences. <59-103) Baumol and Oates, discussing the 
need for pollution abatement, point out that a fundamental principle 
of rational conduct, all too Likely to be overlooked in the formulation 
of policy, asserts that the severity of the policy that should be under-
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taken in defence against some peril depends on both the Likelihood of 
the threat and the character of the damage that it threatens. (16-66) 
This is equally applicable to decisions concerning other environmental 
hazards. When environmental risk is extremely high, the marginal 
reasoning underlying cost-benefit analysis cannot Legitimately be 
applied; and in the case of catastrophic disruption of ecological 
systems, marginal trade-offs between environmental quality and con-
sumption of other goods and services are not meaningful. <133-227) The 
costs of Large-scale ecosystem destruction are potentially very high, 
while many of the benefits are short-term and crass. Too Little is 
known about ecology to conf identally assess degrees of risk associated 
with major developments. Schumacher says small developments are 
preferable because of safety. Activities should be scaled to the 
recuperative forces of nature. ( 129-31) 
Environmental problems are growing increasingly complex, intertwined, 
and Long-term. However, decision-makers sti LL rely on a generally ad 
hoe approach to problem solving, seeking to maximize returns over 
short time horizons. In the past, Long-term planning and careful 
timing and balance were not so critical, but now one must be concerned 
about the cumulative effects of innumerable actions. There is no pro-
cedure for forecasting such effects, and so greater caution should be 
exercised. Commoner's warning that everything is connected to every-
thing else (and we should therefore expect the unexpected) suggests a 
general approach to action: to refrain from risky enterprises, to 
cultivate an ecological awareness, to adopt a new set of values, to 
establish new research and development goals, and to develop new means 
of measuring welfare. (121-2.4) No amount of wealth can confer security 
if the world itself is not secure, as Kierkegaard so eloquently testi-
fies: 
To be rich I must possess something until the 
morrow ... must be secured for the morrow; but 
to be rich I must also be assured of the morrow. 
Take away riches, and then no Longer can I be called 
rich; but take away the morrow, and then too, alas, 
I no Longer can be called rich. (83-103) 
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The potential for qisaster is unprecedented. Too many peoples are 
relying on too few techniques to meet their needs. If any one of these 
techniques goes wrong, there would be global ramifications. For example, 
growing demands for food are being met by a handful of high-yielding 
varieties of plants, and agricultural pests ar~ being controlled all over 
the world by a few chemical agents which may have unforeseeable side-
effects. Production and distribution activities nearly everywhere 
depend on the continued availability of uncertain supplies of· fossil 
fuels and certain minerals. And traditional skills and knowledge 
are disappearing as the urban-agro-industrial pattern is adopted by more 
societies. But there is safety in diversity and isolation. Ev.olution 
proceeds by encouraging new processes in an uncertain and dangerous 
world. Mankind ignores this at its peril. The major reason for main-
taining natural and near-natural areas is safety - man's increasingly 
sophisticated and Large-scale environmental modifications are already 
disrupting regional ecosystems and having globally significant spillover 
effects. Natural environments, which have passed the test of evolution-
ary survival, have a stabilizing effect, and offer refuges which could 
be important centres for renewal. 
Decision-makers face a rapidly changing environment with Limited informa-
tion - new opportunities abound, but outcomes are not certain. There 
are no commensurable units of val~ation by which welfare improvements may 
be measured, and no way to gauge the degree of risk associated with 
alternative actions. The increasing value of uncertainty calls for a 
change in strategy - fear of Loss should now be given more weight than 
hope of gain. The relevant decision rule is to move toward gain up to 
the point at which you can no Longer bear the contemplation of the Loss 
you will sustain if you are wrong. (22-64) For some, this point has 
already been passed; for others it is being neared all the time, and at 
an ever-increasing rate. 
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ACCEPTING. IMPOSED LIMITS TO GROWTH 
Economic growth is the result of (1) population growth, (2) technolo-
gical growth, and (3) growth in desire for more resource-based goods. 
( 141-4) Even if population growth is curtailed, the other sources of 
growth constitute a great threat to the envirGnment. In the United 
States, between 1946 and 1966, population increased 43% but use of 
fertilizers increased by 700%, of electricity by 400%, and of pesticides 
by 500%. ( 136-11) If developing countries with high population densities 
follow this pattern of growth, the probability of ecological calamity is 
high. It would seem prudent to adopt self-imposed limits to .all three 
components of economic growth and rely on more appropriate forms of 
development. 
Environmental problems result when tolerance Limits are exceeded by man's 
growing demands on the natural environment. Modern economies are 
committed to infinite growth on a finite planet. Regional and global 
Limits will most certainly be reached sooner or later. If Limits are 
near, then continued growth may be regarded as suicidal and must be 
halted. If Limits are not yet near, it is still desirable to slow 
growth because serious environmental problems, which are costly and have 
no ready solutions, are already being created and these can be expected 
to soon wipe out the welfare gains of rapid development. The question is 
not whether any fixed growth rate will ultimately be terminated, but how 
the change will be achieved. ( 16-129) If it is terminated abruptly 
(due to political or technological failure, or the exhaustion of some 
critical resource), the effect will be catastrophic. There is consider-
able doubt whether continued economic growth can be expected to improve 
welfare for much longer. Economic activities are already having many 
complex and far-reaching impacts on the biosphere (and on social, 
economic, and political institutions) which could eventual~y prove 
destructive. 
Decision-makers in developing countries should take ccgnizance of the 
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manifold costs of urbanization and industrialization which reduce the 
quality of Life when the standard of living is increased. For example, 
a country which trades natural amenities and a £imple Life style for the 
materialism made possible by polluting industries will bear the in-
creasingly heavy costs of specializing in pollution, and these costs may 
ultimately outweigh the benefits of material prosperity. Pollution 
costs affect health and safety, property, agriculture, and countless 
environmental amenities. There are also significant costs associated 
with becoming reliant on increasingly scarce and expensive raw materials, 
particularly special sources of energy. The urban-industrial system 
was founded on cheap energy, and the increasing costs of energy should 
now dictate a new type of development. There may soo~ be no alternative 
but to develop alternative technologies based on Low energy consumption 
and energy of current issue. Oil is scarce, coal is dirty and not 
evenly distributed, and nuclear energy is very risky. <129-117) Short-
ages and prdlibitive prices could interrupt the supply of essential fuels 
and materials after peoples have become accustomed to higher standards 
of Living, and this could precipitate an economic or political collapse. 
Industrialization reduces options and diminishes the degree of control 
which decision-makers have over social and economic developments. If 
investment in modern technology (and supporting resources and Land-use 
patterns) becomes too great, it may prove unfeasible to risk change 
Later. The development of traditional and intermediate technologies 
based on simple skills and resources which are secure would keep options 
open and reduce Long-term risks. 
It is often argued that economic growth is necessary to provide employ-
ment and goods and services for an expanding population, but it seems 
possible that the use of appropriate technology could provide full 
employment and meet the basic needs of the population with a steady-state 
economy. Seneca and Tausig appear to agree: 
Society must alter its basic philosophical position 
toward the meaning of economic growth. The over-
riding social goal would be maintenance of environmental 
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resources and would entail acceptance of a lower 
rate of growth - even a zero rate - of current 
output toward this end. (133-352) 
The"maintenance of environmental resources" entails the maintenance of 
natural and near-natural areas. The exploitation of natural and near-
natural environments often leads to short-term or minor benefits, and 
long-term and more serious costs: marginal Lands may not be suitable 
for agriculture and soi L fertility or structure may soon be lost; 
mining may benefit richer countries more than the local population; and 
clearing forests may result in fuel shortages, flooding, and erosion. 
(62-124) Some natural and near-natural areas should be maintained for 
their special values while other, more suitable sites are developed. 
The conservation of nature can be interwoven into development as con-
ceived by the principles of ecodevelopment. <78-5) Conservation can 
improve the ret~rn from developments, as when river developments make 
provision for conserving the natural vegetation of upstream catchment 
areas. 
There is no denying that there are few truly "natural" areas Left in the 
world. The few that are Left may therefore be regarded as having 
valued properties which altered environments do not have, and these may 
be vitally important to maintain for posterity. Maintaining natural 
areas is a way to provide for minority preferences, in accordance with 
Mishan's concept of separate facilities. (38-319) Maintaining near-
natural areas is a means of retaining humanized Landscapes and encourag-
ing appropriate development based on ecological principles in accordance 
with Dubos's vision of sustainable Land-use practices. (51-461) Main-
taining significant portions of the natural environment reduces costs to 
the developed environment because ecological processes contribute many 
supportive functions. Development efforts may also be made more effiCi-
ent if restricted to areas more suitable for development rather than 
being dissipated over vast, relatively unproductive regions. 
Sound planning and effective management must be based on surveys under-
I 
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taken to identify areas of possible scientific, educational, recreation-
al, and aesthetic value so that these may be given special protection 
status. Parks and reserves should be established as soon as possible, 
before population pressure grows worse and more claims to the Land are 
made, and provision should be made for ensuring that Local inhabitants 
benefit from the establishment of parks and reserves. 
In order to protect natural and near-natural areas, it will be necessary 
to remove the economic incentives to exploit them. Appeals to reason 
and morality are not so effective as economic arguments. Ultimately, 
it must be persuasively demonstrated that indiscriminate exploitation 
of the natural environment is not rational, and failure to maintain 
natural and near-natural areas is uneconomic. An enlightened central 
government could Legislate a system of economic incentives and disincent-
ives which would have the effect of restricting exploitation to certain 
areas. A system of development permits could be used to control ex-
ploitation; these could be auctioned to the highest bidder and 
revenues could be used to compensate those who would suffer costs but not . 
benefit from development activity. <Such a system woul~ be flexible, 
relatively invulnerable to inflation, reasonably resistant to population 
pressures, and would minimize uncertainty about levels of destruction.) 
Ecologically sound activities could be subsidized and undesirable 
activities could be curtailed by imposing extraction or discharge fees. 
Economic manipulation could divert desires and aspirations away from 
goods which are ecologically costly and toward goods which are inexpen-
sive, safe, and renewable - high prices and high taxes for the former, 
and generous subsidies for the latter. The gap between developed and 
developing countries could also be narrowed by pricing policies and 
transfer payments. Whatever specific methods are used, the guiding 
principle should be to encourage a form of development which is appropri-
ate to man's needs and ecological condition. 
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The Founex Report recognized that it is inadvisable to assume that 
what has worked in developed countries will also work in developing 
countries - there are simply too many profound differences in their 
respective situations. (4-42> Many rich countries, for example, got 
that way by exploitation of Labour and abundant raw materials taken 
from poorer countries. This option is now closed. Dasmann urges that: 
Where preindustrial Land-use systems exist, with 
a Long history of successful adaptations to their 
environments and continuing productivity, they 
should, if possible, be Left alone. This applies 
to hunter-gatherers, nomadic pastoralists, and 
traditional agriculturalists .... (42-125) 
It is not wise to tamper with a balanced system. Developing countries 
generally Lack financial and other resources, and the ecological know-' 
Ledge, to increase productivity with modern, sophisticated technologies. 
Where investment is meagre it is better to work 
with the ecosystem than to fight it. Where invest-
ment is available, higher yields can be achieved by 
making modifications to the ecosystem, but new 
strategies must then be evolved to counter degra-
dation. ( 147-234) 
Farvar and Milton point out that modern technology often has more serious 
environmental impacts in developing than-in developed countries and 
suggest the idea that traditional societies can and should be overhauled 
overnight has not only proved virtually unachievable, but perhaps un-
desirable. (57-xv> There has been more disaster than development, more 
ecological costs than economic benefits. Ward and Dubos have recounted 
how tropical forests in West Africa were cleared for Large-scale culti-
vation of cassavas and peanuts and then, without the protection of the 
natural vegetation, torrential rains carried away tons of valuable top-
soi L and the equatorial sun baked the remaining soil into bricklike 
Laterite. In India and Pakistan, extensive irrigation developments 
Led to waterlogging and salinization of soils. ·Dam-building in the 
Damodar Valley drove subsistence farmers to practice shifting agri-
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culture on steep slopes, degrading the watershed and silting up the 
reservoirs. (154-159ff) For these projects, long-term costs have 
greatly exceeded the short-term benefits. 
Developing countries are in a good position to plan more appropriate 
forms of development: 
Many environmental projects ... can be implemented 
by relatively labor-intensive methods which would 
harmonize environmental concerns with the employ-. 
ment goals that are so important in development 
planning .... It is a paradox of history that most 
developing countries can more easily mobilize re-· 
sources for long-term development than get imme-
diate relief from poverty. ( 128-77) 
Modern technology requires high capitalization, which restricts the 
satisfaction of venture and work for oneself to a handful of wealthy 
capitalists. Intermediate technology spreads satisfaction around by 
providing opportunities at a human scale. In agriculture, intermediate 
technology is more suitable for smaller farms, and a policy of en-
couraging smaller farms serves equity goals. 
not be inefficient. 
Also, small farms need 
In many countries smaller farms consistently out-
produce large farms on a per acre basis, although 
they do produce less output per man-hour. In 
other words, they maximize returns to increasingly 
scarce factors of production, namely land and 
energy; rather than to an increasingly abundant 
one - Labour. These production methods are capable 
therefore of producing both increased total output 
and increased rural employment. ( 13-45> 
The situation in developed countries has differed greatly from that in 
d~veloping countries. In the United States, for example, land and 
capital have been abundant while Labour has been scarce. American 
farmers have simply substituted an energy-intensive and materials-
demanding technology for Labour and careful husbandry. (61-219) In 
most developing nations, capital and good Land are scarce while Labour 
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is abundant. Modern agricultural methods are therefore inappropriate 
in such countries, particularly since fuel and fertilizers are getting 
more expensive. Also, the environmental costs of capital-intensive 
agriculture are becoming more serious. These costs include pesticide 
residues and increasing pesticide resistence, chemical fertilizer run-
off, animal waste pollution, erosion, and sedimentation. 
Developing countries should not rely on mechanized agriculture and the 
Green Revolution, but should adopt intermediate technologies which are 
both more efficient and more reliable in the long-run. Appropriate 
development involves technologies which are suited to existing circum-
' 
stances and available resources. Much more research should be done 
to develop and promote intermediate technologies, small-scale energy 
generation systems, and renewable energy sources. The adoption of 
sophisticated machinery and processes may initially increase production 
and lower costs but it then becomes necessary to continue increasing 
production to recoup investments and maintain machinery and activities. 
The many interactions (e.g., between farmers, tractor manufacturers, 
pesticide producers, and choosey consumers) promote a self-feeding cycle 
which is unecological: it is a successional process consisting of 
positive feedback loops which can only lead to greater growth and 
greater social and ecological costs. Given limitations on energy and 
other resources, and high population levels and rates of growth, the 
developing countries have no hope of achieving the consumption levels 
of developed nations. The pathways for economic development in these 
countries must be those that make use of other sources of energy and 
should not be based on a fossil-fuel technology. <42-55) 
The enormous inputs of fossil-fuel energy in modern agriculture have 
produced a misleading impression: that productivity can be improved all 
over the world. But this vaunted efficiency is, in a very important 
sense, a deception - as fossil-fuels become more costly, what must be 
stressed is input efficiency: the ratio of energy in to energy out. 
Population and economic growth in developed countries have been ''purchased'' 
by accepting unfavourable ratios of energy input to output. Dasmann 
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reports that in China, 50 calories are gained in food for every one 
calorie employed in producing it, whereas in the U.S. it takes over 7 
calories of energy input to produce 1 calorie of energy output. (42-64) 
The previously Low monetary costs of energy inputs from fossil fuels 
is a pre-eminent reason why modern technology was so successful in 
raising production and generally increasing the standard of living in 
developed countries - great gains were made with great inefficiencies. 
But the cost is rapidly increasing and some fossil fuels may soon be ex-
hausted. Adopting modern technology may be disastrous if energy or 
environmental costs suddenly become prohibitive. 
Fossil-fuel based technologies should be rejected as too risky and 
unnecessary. It is not necessary to use dangerous tools just because 
they are available. For 99,9% of human history, man lived without being 
dependent on fossil fuels. Odum says fossil fuels constitute the tool 
with which man accomplished an ingenious uncoupling of man and nature. 
(115-251) Man previously relied on the solar-powered natural eco-
system but with fossil fuels he was able to escape previous constraints. 
Fossil fuels power the urban-industrial system and subsidize the agro-
ecosystem, but fuel-powered and fuel-subsidized systems are now unsatis-
factory because they depend on resources which may soon be unavailable. 
Odum suggests new technologies based upon new goals. To recouple man 
and nature into a more harmonious whole requires that science and 
technology be integrated with reordered social, economic and political 
goals - a most difficult task. ( 115-253) Perhaps the major difficulty 
will be to stem the tide of rising expectations. The urban-industrial 
system promises unlimited goods and services, and this has spawned the 
"technological imperative" (to produce more at a Lower private cost), 
which has become a pervasive and unrestrained force in the world today. 
The challenge is to create new goals and opportunities which are in 
accord with ecological imperatives. 
For those who think technology can always cope with the forces of nature, 
the experience of pesticides should be a warning. Agricultural science 
is Largely a race between the emergence of new pests and the emergence 
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of new techniques for their control. (94-254) The development of inte-
grated pest management, which is largely based on maintaining diversity 
and high Levels of interactions to achieve stability, points to an 
appropriate strategy for dealing with man's problems: working with 
nature. The success of agribusiness (and the· Green Revolution) is based 
on costly insecticides, herbicides, fertilizers, fuel and equipmeni. 
The efficacy of these tools is diminishing while their cost is increas-
ing (in both economic and ecological terms), but the effect is to make 
continued production even more dependent on high technology and big 
operators. Agribusiness is thus driving the small farmer out of 
production and into the city, which increases social problems. Since 
these methods are Less efficient in the long run, and ultimately 
destructive, they should be discouraged. Small fdrmers should be sub-
sidized and provided with more appropriate tools and techniques. Das-
mann suggests that one need examine the practicability of a solar-
powered, wind-powered, labour-intensive, livestock-fert~lized, and 
live-horse powered farm as representing a more viable model. (42-66) 
Maintaining the viability of diversified livelihood systems should take 
precedence over the optimization of any single product system, and Land 
reclamation and rural infrastructure projects which emphasize the use 
of local materials and local labour should be given priority. ( 147-310, 
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It is important to make rural areas appealing and provide employment 
opportunities for rural populations. Corea says the drift from rural 
to urban areas conflicts with development and employment objectives 
in developing countries: 
But if these objectives are to be fulfilled, parti-
cularly in respect of the educated youth, the rural 
habitat itself needs to be transformed. This is 
more than a matter of raising productivity in agri-
culture. It is also a question of improving the 
facilities and amenities in the rural areas. 
( 34-81 ) 
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Greater direction and control of rural development and settlement 
patterns can reduce cityward migrations and distribute population more 
evenly. In drylands particularly, settlements should be surrounded 
by protected areas within which grazing, farming and fuel gathering 
are restricted to prevent degradation and desertification, and urban 
development should not be carried out to the detriment of adjacent 
Livelihood systems. (147-60) If rural areas can be made more attract-
ive, and basic needs can be satisfied through the use of intermediate 
technologies, then a more· harmonious and sustainable pattern of 
development will be achieved. 
THE NEED FOR AN ECOLOGICAL OUTLOOK 
Decision-makers in developing countries naturally wish to emulate the 
urban-industrial system of the developed countries in order to partially 
rectify the gross disparity in standards of Living around the world. 
But concern for distributional justice must be tempered by ecological 
reality. If attempts to "close the gap" are Likely to result in 
ecological catastrophe, then such attempts should be abandoned in favour 
of a more moderate course. It is rational to recognize Limitations 
and proclaim modest but realistic goals; it is irrational to disregard 
Limitations and attempt to achieve overly ambitious and dangerous goals. 
There is agreement between what is rational and what is ecological, truly 
economic, and ethical. The great ethical systems of mankind all sought 
to express an underlying moral reality, that we Live by moderation, by -
compassion, by justice, that we die by aggression, by pride, by rapacity 
and greed. <153-192) Being conservative (and being a conservator) is 
being ethical and rational, and this behaviour has economic as well as 
ecological value. 
Aldo Leopold saw ethics as a process in ecological evolution: 
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An ethic, biologically, is a limitation on 
freedom of action in the struggle for existence.· 
An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation 
of social from antisocial conduct .... An ethic 
may be regarded as a mode of guidance for meeting 
ecological situations so new or intricate, or 
involving such deferred reactions, that the path 
of social expediency is not discernible to the 
average individual. (95-44, 45) 
Decision~makers should be guided by an ecological ethic rather than a 
simple desire for human justice, equity, and general prosperity. What 
is ecologically right or wrong depends on the situation confronting the 
decision-maker. In situation ethics, the morality of an act is 
determined by the state of the system at the time the act is performed. 
(68-114) It was not wrong for 19th century Argentine ranchers to 
slaughter cattle for their hides and leave the carcasses to rot because 
the meat was not needed <or could not be transported to where it might 
be used) and there was no damage to the system; today it is perhaps 
wrong to even produce beef when it is possible to produce and distribute 
more food, which is desperately needed, at lower ecological cost. It is 
perhaps even more wrong to allow production activities to destroy the 
land's ability to provide; the greatest sin is not against life itself 
but against the land, which supports and nourishes life. 
The major challenge facing decision-makers in this period of impending 
global disaster is to effect a transformation in human values to what is 
ecologically expedient. Hardin believes a new system of values must be 
developed to replace the myths and taboos which so effectively protected 
nature in many pre-industrial societies: being treated as sacred can 
protect an object against destruction by impoverished people who might 
otherwise discount the future in a simplistically rational way. <70-77) 
A new Land ethic and intergenerational ethic is required to protect 
resources from overexploitation. Passmore suggests that the moral onus 
should be on anyone who seeks to destroy or modify any part of the 
natural environment to demonstrate that such an action is justifiable 
and poses no great short- or long-term risk. (120-121) Leopold's 
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classic statement of moral criteria by which to judge any action 
should perhaps be the ultimate guiding principle for decision-makers: 




right when it tends to preserve the 
stability, and beauty of the biotic 
It is wrong when it tends otherwise. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The problem of scarcity can best be solved by reducing wants (and there-
by minimizing consumption) or changing the nature of wants (so that 
consumption activities will be Less destructive) in order to maintain 
equilibrium in a complex and finite world. Congestion effects and 
other impacts must be anticipated, and restrictions on man's activities 
should be accepted, if the risk of catastrophe is to be minimized. 
There is some optimal ratio between natural and developed environments 
and maintaining that ratio should be given the highest priority. 
Development planning should be based on reasonable goals, related to 
man's true needs, and development should proceed at a pace which is not 
disruptive to social institutions or vital ecological processes. 
Political and environmental hazards are now so serious that ambitious 
development programmes should be abandoned in favour of a conservative, 
balanced approach to development. Decision-makers are advised to 
develop institutional mechanisms which will impose limits on economic 
growth so that political, social, and ecological Limits will not be 
reached. Adopting a policy of appropriate development, using alterna-
tive technologies which are suited to the special demands of the environ-
ment and the society concerned, would allow real needs to be satisfied 
at Low cost and Low risk. 
· The ecological outlook is gaining in relevance and rationality as 
312 
environmental impacts grow more serious at the regional and global 
level. Decision-makers need to adopt an ecological ethic if man is to 




"The. c.omb.in.e.d e.v.ide.n.c.e. oi) h-Wto11..y a.n.d e.c.oR..ogy 
J.ie.e.m.6 to J.iu.ppo11..t on.e. ge.n.e.11..a.R.. de.du.c.tion.: the. R..e.J.i.6 
v.ioR..e.n.t the. ma.n.-made. c.ha.n.ge.J.i, the. g11..e.a.te.11.. the. 
p1t..oba.b.iR...ity oi) J.iu.c.c.e.J.i~i)u.R.. 11..e.a.dju..6tme.n.t .in. the. 
pylt..a.m.id." ( 94-257) 
The natural environment provides Life-support functions and amenities 
which are important to man's survival and well-being, but their value 
cannot be precisely measured and is usually underestimated. These 
natural goods are threatened by the urban-industrial system, which is 
rapidly converting natural environment into developed environment and 
increasing the Level of impacts on remaining natural and near-natural 
areas. Because the value of goods and services produced by the urban-
industri al system is more readily perceived and appreciated, and the 
adverse effects of Losing natural goods are more subtle and often go 
unnoticed over Long time periods, there is a significant possibility 
that decision-makers will allow an unfavourable ratio of natural en-
vironment to developed environment to occur - a situation which may be 
irreversible and which poses two distinct dangers: < 1) the quality of 
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life may be substantially reduced, and (2) the~osts and risks to 
survival may be substantially increased. 
For developing countries, a central question is whether the urban-
industrial system is a desirable model for economic and social progress 
over longer time horizons. Some maintain that technological and ,econo-
mic growth bring greater choice, more leisure time, and less drudgery; 
others suggest urban-industrial man has less control over his fate, 
is less capable of using leisure time to advantage, and is more driven 
than ever before - as man becomes increasingly disassociated from the 
natural world, he becomes more dependent on others to meet his needs and 
more bound up in a contrived world which may be inherently less satis-
fying. There is also considerable doubt whether the urban-industrial 
system is an attainable model of development for countries which are 
poor in resources, overpopulated, and lacking infrastructure and skills. 
There may be alternative systems of development which promise greater 
long-term efficiency, more equitable distribution, a higher quality of 
life, and enhanced prospects that social progress will be sustainable. 
Recent experiences of world-wide inflation, the growing gap between the 
rich and the poor, forecast shortages of raw materials necessary to main-
tain the urban-industrial system, and increasing imbalances in the 
environment, should be regarded as persuasive evidence that the urban-
industrial system is at high risk. Developing countries need to 
devise new patterns of development which are less wasteful and which can 
be accommodated by the limited resources of the biosphere. Instead of 
relying on modern technology to solve resource shortages and environ-
mental problems, perhaps inadequacies and imbalances in man's approach 
should be righted. This is a particularly daunting challenge because 
it means reversing direction, and the urban-industrial model has already 
instilled certain attitudes and created certain expectations which will 
be difficult to change. A high priority in developed countries 
should be to reduce consumption and seek alternative life styles; a high 
priority in developing nations should be to convert people's expectations 
and set more realistic objectives. Natural and near-natural areas can 
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be maintained as a bulwark against inappropriate forms of development 
and serve as vehicles of such reversals. 
Development should be based on goals which serve the true needs of man 
and are achievable with existing resources used in such a way as to 
minimize risk. Because of the great differences in conditions around 
the world, specific objectives and methods may differ from place to 
place. Traditional systems of land use should be retained wherever 
possible and development should be directed towards carefully adapting 
intermediate technologies to the conditions of Local ecosystems. The 
central objective, then, should be to determine what constitutes 
appropriate development for a given region, i.e., that form of develop-
ment which promotes a rational form of growth: one that is sustainable, 
,promotes equity, and is designed to meet true needs, rather than one 
which is hazardous, creates inequitable distribution, and is designed to 
induce new wants. Development must be given a qualitative determina-
tion; it must meet the real needs of society, and it must not endanger 
survival. A commitment to maintaining a significant number of natural 
and near-natural areas for their special psychological and ecological 
values is essential to any model of development which seeks to maximize 
social welfare and provide for future generations. 
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